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In April 1937 a Preliminary Commission of Inquiry in
Mexico City heard the defense of Leon Trotsky, the chief de-
fendant in absentia in the Moscow purge trials. In December
1937 the full Commission of Inquiry, known as the "Dewey
Commission" after its chairman, Professor John Dewey, an-
nounced its verdict in the Trotsky case— "Not Guilty." The
"counter-trial" is the subject of this dissertation.
Based primarily on research in the Trotsky Archives
(Harvard University), interviews with participants in the
hearings, and readings in periodical literature of the time,
this study focuses on the quality of Trotsky's "defense."
However, the Soviet purge trials are also examined,
along
with the difficulties encountered in forming the
Commission
and the effect of its verdict on public opinion.
This study concludes that the Dewey Commission,
de-
spite certain deficiencies, conducted an "impartial"
investi-
gation. It also concludes that Trotsky
misinterpreted the
effect of the purge trials on Stalin's reign.
But the verdict
of "not guilty" contributed to a historical
judgment: Stalin
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It was a "Time of Troubles" unmatched in the memory
of modern man. The Soviet Purge of 1936-38 devoured liter-
•4
ally millions of victims in an attempt to liquidate an elu-
sive Fifth Column which allegedly threatened the very exis-
tence of the state. "Trotskyites , " "Rightists," Mensheviks
,
Social Revolutionaries, etcetera, etcetera—they were all
purged in this "witches' sabbath of human reason." NKVD
agents, sweeping over the land in their Black Marias, like
a motorized oprichnina
,
brought fear to almost every house-
hold in the land. The great and not-so-great of the nation,
alike in their fright, scurried for safe niches, waiting for
the storm to abate. But the ubiquitous " seksots " ("secret
collaborators") had created such distrust in Soviet Russia
that many fearful citizens kept a small suitcase packed with
two changes of warm underwear; men talked only to their
wives, and then at night with the blanket pulled over their
heads. Estimates vary, but the "Great Terror" resulted in
500,000 executions, 7-9 million arrests, and some 8 million
unfortunate souls being sent to "corrective" labor camps,
from which they rarely emerged alive, passing from the cate-
gory of "living" to that of "dead," which made little dif-
ference to them. As Aleksander Tvardovsky once wrote,
vi
Who and what for and by whose will-
Figure it out, History.
The purge has been described as the "first full-
sized example of the hitherto inconceivable ravages which
modern despotism is capable of inflicting on the bodies and
souls of its subjects." But such massive "ravages" needed
some kind of justification. The three "show" trials of 1936-
38 were designed to dramatize the mortal danger to the nation
and legitimize the saturnalia of blood inflicted on the pop-
ulace. First there was the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial of August
1936. Then came the Py atakov-Radek case of January 1937.
And finally there was the greatest spectacular of all, the
March 1938 trial of Bukharin and Rykov. In almost every
case the defendants astonished the world by "voluntarily"
confessing that they had conspired to overthrow the Soviet
regime, to liquidate the Party's leadership, and to prepare
the way for Russia's defeat in wartime. "Old Bolsheviks,"
some of whom were Lenin's close colleagues and members of
his Politburo, heaped self-abuse on their heads and demanded
death for their heinous crimes— arranging "medical" murders,
contaminating troop trains with "biological" germs, even
throwing "nails" and "glass" into butter. A horrified nation
insisted that "the running dogs" be liquidated. In most
cases the accused received "the supreme penalty," a pistol
shot in the back of the head.
But "enemy number one" ( "vraq nomer pervyj ") was
missing from the dock. Lev Davidovich Trotsky had been
vii
exiled from the Soviet Union in 1929, forced to live in one
unsafe haven after another until his assassination in 1940.
During the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial he was living in Norway,
but after January 1937 he resided in Mexico. In newspapers
and over the airwaves Trotsky learned that he was the
"Judas" of Bolshevism, who had arranged the death of Sergei
Kirov, plotted to fell Stalin, and used terrorism and
wrecking to regain power. He had even become an "appendage
of Fascism" by aligning himself with the Nazi government.
His goal was a "return to capitalism." The multiple calum-
nies were like a "delirious" nightmare to Trotsky, something
out of the pages of Dostoevsky.
The chief defendant iri absentia—Trotsky—was deter-
mined to refute the accusations and turn the accusers into
the accused. In order to explode the "greatest falsification"
in all of history, however, he needed a platform. Despite
valiant efforts to arrange an "impartial commission of in-
quiry," however, there were few takers, until the "American
Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky" arranged to have
an international body hear Trotsky's case. In April 1937 a
Preliminary Commission, chaired by Professor John Dewey,
opened hearings in a "Blue House" in the Mexico City suburb




Trotsky is the primary subject of this dissertation,
which attempts to assay his understanding of the purge phe-
nomenon and his success in turning Stalin into the accused.
But the history of the American Committee for the Defense of
Leon Trotsky— or "Defense Committee"— and the Commission of
Inquiry—known as the "Dewey Commission"—necessarily is in-
cluded in this tale. The record is not complete, however.
A book can, and should be devoted just to the efforts of the
American organizers of the investigation.
Moreover, Trotsky's "defense" necessarily omitted a
response to the Bukharin-Rykov trial. The Mexican hearings
occurred after the first two "show" trials, but before the
final trial in March 1938. The last chapter of this study
briefly describes his reaction to the trial of Bukharin and
Company, but the bulk of the paper is devoted to Trotsky's
refutation of the charges in the first two court proceedings.
In truth, however, his views on the trials changed little
from April 1937 to March 1938.
In order to put the "counter-trial" in perspective,
the first chapter of this study is concerned with the history
of the "Great Purge" until the middle of 1937. The second
chapter details Trotsky's life in exile and his efforts to
arrange a "fair" hearing. The next chapter is devoted to the
Defense Committee and the formation of the Commission of
Inquiry. This is followed by two chapters on the hearings
themselves, and a final chapter on the aftermath of the
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investigation. A concluding section, in addition, attempts
to evaluate the efforts of the Dewey Commission and Trotsky's
success in turning the tables on Stalin.
A note on transliteration and spelling is in order.
As E. H. Carr has noted, "No system of transliteration is
satisfactory except to the philologist who has invented it."
The transliteration system used in the English-language ver-
sions of the Moscow court records and the Dewey Commission
reports differs significantly from the standard Library of
Congress system. In order to avoid confusion, this study
follows the Soviet procedure. Thus, throughout the paper
the name of a chief defendant is rendered "Pyatakov," not
the more acceptable "Piatakov." In addition, instead of
writing "center," the Soviet and British spelling— "centre"
—
has been followed, in order to avoid two spelling variations
of the same word.
*****************
Many people have assisted in this study. The edito-
rial assistance of Professors Robert H. McNeal and Milton
Cantor has been of great value. My wife—Heidi—has provided
great spiritual support, as has my father. During the
course of the preparation of this paper three daughters were
born—Alix, Melissa, Kim--who also helped me in their own
special way. Not least of all, there has been the consci-
entous work of my typists, Mrs. Joan Taylor and Mrs. Roberta
Hunting.
I would like to express gratitude to the various
professors and administrators at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst, who provided financial support,
through the years, the sine qua non for the completion o
this task.
CHAPTER I
SIGNS OF SOCIAL PATHOLOGY: PURGES AND TRIALS
The Great Soviet Purge of 1936-38 is something of an
historical Sphinx, with the answer to the riddle hidden in
the bowels of the Central Committee. Since Soviet archives
are both distant and inaccessible, the student of The Great
Purge runs the risk of being either too assertive or too
irresolute. An example of the categorical imperative is the
rather injudicious remark of Nathan Leites in 1954: "It is
unlikely that we shall ever be able to know much more about
. i .,1
the Moscow trials than we are now in a position to learn.
An example of historical timidity carried to an extreme is
an editorial in The Nation in 1937: "It is possible that it
will be another hundred years before all the actual facts
about the recent Soviet trials are known." It then advised
readers to "suspend judgment "— apparently for another hun-
dred years—on some of the most important aspects, of the
2
Soviet charges.
Actually the historical cupboard is not totally bare
of scraps of information pertaining to the Moscow trials.
As a result of Nikita S. Khrushchev's revelations about
Joseph Stalin's "crimes," the door to the Party archive
was
opened a crack, allowing certain tantalizing clues to
emerge
from the dark past. Now the historian of the Great
Purge is
in roughly the same position as the historian of the Middle
Ages of the Lower Empire who, Robert Conquest suggests,
"after having for many years covered his subject by means of
a handful of inscriptions and two or three chronicles (one
of them falsified for reasons of state), finds half-a-dozen
•a
new codices, including confidential official documents."
Despite the mysterious circumstances of The Great
Purge, it is no more a complete enigma than China is inscru-
table. Even in 1936-38 many clues to this disorder were
available to the diligent researcher. There was, for ex-
ample, the Soviet system itself.
I. The Purge Formula
The essential ingredients for a diabolical formula
of incredible potential were inherent from her earliest
years. The three main prerequisites—party purge, mass
terror, show trial—were no strangers to Soviet life in the
1920s and early 1930s. Once they coalesced, a critical mass
would be created. Once the political decision permitted
such a merger, fusion was inevitable. Stalin made the nec-
essary decision.
The Party Purge
The " chistka "—variously translated as "purge,"
"clean-up," or "combing-out "—was a familiar facet of Party
life, and indeed of Russian history.
4 During the years of
underground struggle, there was an obvious need for the
Bolshevik Party to weed out Tsarist infiltrators and
agents
provocateurs. But given V. I. Lenin's insistence on the
necessity of a disciplined and monolithic cadre of profes-
sional revolutionaries, there was a duty to purge all oppor-
tunists and half-hearted fellow-travellers from the Party's
ranks, not to mention those who dared question Lenin's om-
niscience. With victory in 1917 the need for such "self-
cleansings" increased, if anything. Hordes of self-seeking
careerists suddenly discovered the material and political
benefits that Bolshevik sanctification bestowed. But only
the truly righteous were equal to the awesome tasks facing
the Party: conclude a bitter Civil War; liquidate the
former ruling classes; and create the new society. Few were
equal to the call.
Thus, there was a need for a reliable method to en-
sure the Party's purity, efficiency, and "democratic" nature
The chistka was designed to weed out the impure and ineffi-
cient, and subject the Party's leadership as well as its
rank-and-file to intensive scrutiny. In practice, the de-
sirability of "democratic controls" from the bottom gave
way to the superior wisdom—demand for loyalty tov the summit
As Zbigniew K. Brzezinski has written,
Despite their official celebration of the demo-
cratic aspect, they /the leaders/ conceived of
the role of the masses in the purge as being
like beaters flushing the foxes out in a fox-
hunt, whose goal is to assist in locating the
victims. But it is the hunters on horseback
(or the secret police) who make the kill. 5
If not "democratic" in result, the Party purge was rela-
tively successful in eliminating the passive and the
unreliable, the self-seekers and the heretics. Periodically,
every Party member had to run this "hazardous gauntlet" in
order '"to justify the lofty title of member of the Party.'" 6
In the same way that a democratic politician expects, from
time to time, to face the scrutiny of the voters, the Party
functionary expects to face the stern inquisition of a con-
trol commission.^
Mass Terror
The second essential ingredient in this diabolical
recipe was mass terror. State-inspired violence has been
part-and-parcel of the Russian experience. Certainly Ivan
IV s "hooded order of vigilantes," the Oprichnina , and Peter
the Great's torture chamber, the Preobrazhenskii prikaz ,
were worthy models for the Soviet secret police. Even
though the party purge and mass terror were closely inter-
twined—indeed, had a symbiotic relationship—they were not
identical in the early years of Bolshevik rule. Whereas
the purge was basically a "non-violent," intra-Party affair,
the "Red Terror" was originally directed at external foes.
Much terrorized by the Tsarist Okhrana during their under-
ground years, the leaders of the triumphant Bolshevik Party
had few qualms about squaring matters after coming to power.
Certainly Lenin and Trotsky did not shrink from the use of
"stern revolutionary justice" to ensure the victory of their
sacred cause. Unlike those "sentimental" liberals, the
Bolshevik leaders took perverse pride in their
"tough-minded"
willingness to liquidate the class enemy, be it mighty Tsar
or lowly tramp. But terror was not to be dispensed in an in-
discriminate manner. It was to be applied in rational doses,
commensurate with the problem at hard.
Although the 1917 Bolshevik insurrection was not an
especially bloody affair, the Party was soon awash in rivers
of blood. The "traitorous" behavior of the Left Social-
Revolutionaries and the "inhuman" cruelty of the "White
Terror" during the Civil War left the Bolsheviks no choice:
terror was to be applied mercilessly against the enemy. It
was Trotsky, in particular, who later argued that the "Red
Terror" was only a logical and necessary response to the
"White Terror." And, indeed, the Ukraine endured a gory
occupation at the hands of the White forces. But the pro-
verbial problem of which came first, the chicken or the egg,
complicates the problem. It can be argued that the Whites
were only following the lead of the Reds in terrorizing the
land. Adam B. Ulam, for one, has concluded that, "Far from
being a regrettable necessity, the extent of the Bolshevik
terror was one of the factors that made victory i<n the Civil
g
War more difficult."
Certainly the Bolshevik Party institutionalized
violence at an early date. In December 1917, the
CHEKA, or
The Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-
Revolution and Sabotage, was established. In charge
of "'our
brave Chekists' " Lenin appointed Felix Dzerzhinsky,
often
referred to as "'a knight without fear or
blemish,'" by
9Soviet admirers. Dzerzhinsky may have had honorable in-
tentions, but hardly the same could be said for his subordi-
nates, all too often renowned for their sadism. Even
Dzerzhinsky himself once lamented that, "'Only saints or
scoundrels can serve in the GPU /successor to the CHEKA/,
but now the saints are running away from me and I am left
with the scoundrels.'" 1 By September 1918, this police
organization was authorized to sentence and execute class
foes without referring the cases to revolutionary tribunals.
In the first full year of Bolshevik rule the CHEKA offi-
cially executed 6300 enemies of Bolshevik power, including
1173 in the ominous category of "miscellaneous."
11 Lenin
was a staunch supporter of Dzerzhinsky ' s cadres and even
used the threat of terror "administratively" to cut red tape
and improve bureaucratic efficiency.
Despite many examples of random cruelty, it can
hardly be said that the use of mass terror was countenanced
by the Party during the "tranquil" years of NEP, 1921-28.
But this situation changed radically during the early 1930s.
Forced collectivization of the peasantry resulted" in greatly
increased use of force. Some of the kulaks and serednyaki
(middle peasants) took unkindly to their expropriation.
Fierce battles ensued. In some cases peasant bands,
armed
with pitchforks, fought desperate engagements with
GPU de-
tachments, armed with automatic rifles, and even
planes and
tanks. There was a great loss of life (three to
five million
peasants, from various causes), and an even
greater loss of
I
7livestock (some 42 million cattle, for instance). It is an
open question which loss—human or animal—was the most
bothersome to the Party.
As a result of this violent clash in the countryside,
the Party was placed on a war footing. Military measures
became the norm for achieving social reforms. No longer was
mass terror dosed out in modest amounts. If anything, the
use of violence became almost "banal," and opened the way for
the mass slaughter of other sections of the populace,
finally reaching the Party itself. Once limitations on the
use of violence had been relaxed, not even the Party could
escape its ever-widening spasm. The creators of the terror
became its victims. As Bertram D. Wolfe has written,
... if there is one thing that is certain
about the use of total terror to solve the com-
plex problems of economics, politics and
thought—the incalculable affairs of men in
society— it is that one cannot have recourse
to terror on a scale sufficient to embrace all
the affairs of society without its spilling
over into the very group that uses it.
The universal cruelty of the early thirties
coarsened and brutalized the whole of life. It
inured men to the idea of using torture and
death to settle what was unsettled, to make
certain what was uncertain, to silence, uproot,
crush opposition, compel approval, remake men
and their lives. All-encompassing torment and
death spread like a plague through the country-
side, then into the cities, then into the
party. . . . 1
The nation, then, had been bloodied. By 1935 Lenin's worst
fears were realized. The Party had begun to devour its own
kind.
8The "Show" Trial
The so-called "show" trial completes this unholy
trinity. But once again the Soviet dramatists unconsciously
borrowed from the late fifteenth-century. At that time the
"Judaizer" heretics were forced to appear in public trial
before ecclesiastic judges in order to be read out of the
14true church. During the 1920s and 1930s the Soviet de-
fenders of the one-and-only faith also turned to public
1
5
dramas as a means of exorcising heresy. Rather amateurish
in conception, the early trials abounded in blunders. 16 But
they also served a useful purpose. In Robert Conquest's
phrase, a "pilot model" for the successful trial was
developed. "The Judge" (V. V. Ulrikh) and "The Prosecutor"
(Andrei Vyshinsky) gained valuable experience. Vyshinsky,
in particular, learned the technique of impressing an out-
landish story on browbeaten witnesses, and also became adept
at obscuring embarrassing discrepancies in the court
testimony. In fact, he learned that discrepancies in detail
were of small note. "'In totalitarian propaganda the details
17
do not matter,'" Arthur Koestler once observed. * But it was
important to d?^zzle the public with a complicated plot, the
more complicated the better. Faced with a labyrinth of
underground conspiratorial contacts, the public would lose
sight of the lack of evidence. Material proof, in fact,
only made Vyshinsky' s task more difficult. In this regard
Robert Conquest quoted the Minister of War in Penguin Island,
who, in discussing charges against a Jewish officer, exclaimed
"Proofs! Of course it is good to have proofsbut perhaps it is better to have none at all
'
the Pyrot affair, as I arranged it, left no roomfor criticism; there was no spot at which it




The stage should be as ill-lit as possible to ensure the
success of the production.
The lack of material proof was also obscured, para-
doxically, by publishing "verbatim" transcripts of the
trials. Following the completion of the Pyatakov-Radek
proceedings (1937), and also that of Bukharin-Rykov (1938),
the Soviet authorities issued 600-page tomes, so impressive
in their weight and wealth of detail that they graced many a
New York coffee table in the late 1930s. They also remained
largely unread. Stalin well understood that most critical
faculties become listless when confronted with such massive
documents. Recently Nikita Khrushchev has written that
Stalin, himself, "never liked it when someone seemed to have
less than absolute faith in statements that exposed and de-
19 ...
nounced conspiracies." If so, he shared this failing with
many western intellectuals of the Thirties who confused
words with facts
,
and a profusion of words with the gospel
truth.
The very complexity and incredibility of the well-
publicized trials served a special purpose: to shroud the
purge itself from critical attention. Even Trotsky, as we
shall observe, tended to ignore the vast dimensions of the
nation's purification, choosing, instead, to concentrate his
j
10
powerful mind on the trials' manifold absurdities. More
recently Z. Brzezinski has attempted to redress the balance
of attention. He has dismissed the trials out of hand as
mere "frosting on the cake," just the keynote to the purge
i * 20itself.
Without denying that the trials served to dramatize
the purge, it should also be noted that they tended to
legitimize ( oformlenye ) the "self-cleansing" process.
Spectacular accounts of treason in Moscow justified the ar-
rest of innumerable "enemies of the people" in every nook
and cranny of the far-flung nation. As Robert Tucker has
explained this process, the purge trials served "a political
symbolic function, which was to provide a rationale for the
purge, to make publicly meaningful the campaign of arrests
21
that was going on night after night."
Besides providing ideological vindication for the
all-Union dragnet, the court proceedings made credible the
incredible. Without such abject displays of self-debasement
the renowned revolutionary names of Bukharin, Rykov
,
Rakovsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, et al . , might have become
Bolshevik martyrs at some point in the future. It was cru-
cial to destroy their reputations publicly and portray
them
"in the blackest possible light for the people and for
22posterity .
"
This falsification of the Party's history was part
of a broader effort to turn truth inside out
and impress a
gross untruth on the nation's memory. To
this purpose
Pravda and other organs of the Soviet press devoted immense
amounts of space as they reported the trials. Day after day
their columns featured lengthy excerpts of the testimony,
revelations of new conspiracies unearthed in obscure places,
and indignant demands by such-and-such a factory that the
running dogs be shot. Mass indoctrination had reached new
heights. Stalin's productions made it all but impossible to
separate truth from legend.
Thus, the great show trials of 1936-38 cannot be
ignored. Deciphering these "hieroglyphs" allows the student
of Stalin's Russia to peer dimly into a distant society, one
beset by an acute case of "social pathology," to paraphrase
23Robert Tucker.
II. The Curtain Rises
By the early 1930s conditions were ripe for the out-
break of a political tragedy of unprecedented proportions.
The party purge, mass terror, the show trial— all were in an
advanced stage of readiness. But a political catalyst was
needed to fuse the three elements and trigger the expected
reaction. On December 1, 1934, the missing catalyst was
supplied, when Sergei M. Kirov was assassinated in
Leningrad's historic Smolny palace. With pardonable ex-
aggeration Robert Conquest has called this murder "the crime
of the century." Before the "Kirov affair" was settled,
hun-
dreds were shot for direct complicity in the crime and
n ^
24
literally millions perished for being indirectly
involved.
It was the signal for the opening act of the great tragedy.
The Kirov Affair
Sergei Mironovich Kirov, the Party's Viceroy for the
Northern Palmyra of Leningrad, was a rough-and-ready
Stalinist, of the type which loudly supported the "General
Line." A veteran of Civil War intrigues in the Caucasus,
Kirov had subsequently been responsible for purging the
Zinoviev apparatus in Leningrad and constructing the blood-
stained White Sea-Baltic Canal project, two "credits" that
forever exempted him from the ranks of humanitarians. But
despite his strong-armed tactics, there are several reports
that his solicitude for the Leningrad workers, his personal
courage and accessibility, and his considerable oratorical
ability had made him that rarity among genuine Stalinists,
25
a truly popular Party leader. Certainly he was a man on
the rise.
Although Kirov was ostensibly Stalin's man, there
was some friction, apparently, between the two strong-
willed leaders. Trouble had surfaced in 1932 with the ap-
pearance of the so-called "Riutin Platform." Bearing the
name of Mikhail N. Riutin, a veteran Party worker and
"Rightist," this manifesto assayed the Party's situation in
1932, and concluded that, '"The Right wing has proved cor-
rect in the economic field, and Trotsky in his criticism of
the regime of the Party.'"
26 More to the point, the plat-
form devoted some fifty pages to Stalin, depicting him as
the "evil genius of the Russian Revolution who,
motivated by
vindictiveness and lust for power, had brought the
Revolution to the verge of ruin." 27 Shaken by what he in-
terpreted as a call for his assassination, Stalin demanded
that the GPU summarily execute the impetuous Riutin; but
after the "buck" had been passed up several Party echelons,
the Politburo majority decided otherwise. It is said that
Kirov "spoke with particular force against recourse to the
28death penalty." Stalin had suffered a rare rebuff, one
29that would rankle for years to come.
Stalin's pique was also exacerbated by Kirov's
growing popularity within high Party ranks, especially for
his "reform program." In some academic circles Kirov has
been credited with sponsoring a "'policy of reconciliation,'"
one that would have considerably lessened the nation's in-
ternal divisions. It is said that he advocated offering re-
prieves to ex-oppositionists, ending terror within the
Party, easing the lot of the peasantry, and stressing
"proletarian humanism" in Party propaganda. All of these
measures were predicated on the supposition that the regime's
external foe, Nazi Germany, was a much more dangerous ad-
versary than any internal malcontents. If true, this thesis
directly clashed with Stalin's theory that as socialism ap-
proached complete victory, the enemy became increasingly
. . 30
desperate, resulting in more violent class conflicts.
Whatever Kirov's program, he must have been doing
something right. There are several reports that he was wel-
comed in January 1934 to the Party's XlVth Congress-
"The
Congress of Victors "—with a spontaneous ovation approaching
the dimensions of the applause given to the "Beloved Leader. 1,31
And at this Congress, more aptly named the "Congress of the
Condemned," considering the high mortality rate of its dele-
gates in coming years, Kirov was named one of the Party's
"co-equal" secretaries, along with Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich,
32and Andrei A. Zhdanov. Later in the year (November 25-28),
the Central Committee of the Party held one of its periodic
plenums, at which, according to Nicolaevsky, it " accepted
the whole of Kirov's grand plan ," but only published the
33
economic planks.
After the conclusion of this Plenum, Kirov hurried
back to Leningrad to report to the city's aktiv (most active
Party members) on the Central Committee's decisions, and
possibly to inform it of his imminent transferal to a new
post in Moscow. But he never returned to the capital. Late
in the afternoon of December 1, 1934, as the shadows
lengthened in the long corridors of his Smolny headquarters,
a shot sounded. Stunned Party officials ran out into one of
the hallways to find Kirov lying dead on the floor. No
guard was in sight. But alongside the dead leader lay a
Nagan revolver and one Leonid V. Nikolayev, apparently over-
, , .
.34
come by his act.
Despite close scrutiny, many of the elements of the
"crime of the century" have never been adequately explained.
For instance, the assassin still remains a shadowy figure.
A veteran Party worker, Nikolayev' s career had suffered some
setbacks in the early 1930s. At one point he was offered an
obscure post at a Machine Tractor Station (MTS) in the
countryside, a position he refused on the grounds of "ill-
health," possibly epilepsy. The "club-footed Lenka," as he
was called, was in the doldrums, having lost his wife, job,
and even, temporarily, his Party membership. 35 Certain pages
in his "diary," confiscated after the murder, are said to
regret the loss of friendly relations within the Party, the
former "'blood brotherhood'" which Nikolayev missed dearly.
Perhaps this regrettable situation could be underlined with
a terrorist act. He had read deeply in the memoirs of the
Narodovoltsi and Social-Revolutionaries, and "regarded his
own act as the continuation of the terrorist activity of the
3 6
Russian revolutionaries of the past." Whether he was a
"typical representative of that younger generation" which,
after experiencing much anguish in the early years of the
Party, emerged finally "with nerves shattered, health broken,
3 7
and soul deeply seared," he was certainly a misfit in
Stalin's Russia.
Another explanation of Nikolayev' s motives stressed
his burning hatred for the "'evil genius—Kirov !,' " who not
only personally blocked his Party career, but had even se-
duced his lovely wife. However, a source who claimed to have
personally known the "beauty" suggested that if Nikolayev
had found his wife in bed with Kirov "'he'd have been beside




However, the generally accepted version is that the
local NKVD was searching for just such a malcontent. Ac-
cording to several reports, one of Nikolayev's "friends" (an
agent provocateur ) betrayed his comrade to Ivan Zaporozhets,
deputy head of the Leningrad NKVD, and was directed, in turn,
to turn Nikolayev's generalized anger into a hatred for
39Kirov. Support for this view comes from the fact that
Nikolayev made at least one abortive attempt to reach Kirov.
Arrested near Smolny, he was discovered to be carrying a re-
volver and certain incriminating evidence (either a "note-
book" or "chart"), that clearly indicated his intentions.
Yet Zaporozhets ordered him released! Certainly this
"strange liberalism" on the part of the local NKVD was
w 1,-1 . . 40highly suspicious.
Once the "tragic" news had been relayed to Moscow,
Stalin wasted no time in hurrying to Leningrad, accompanied
by several of his closest henchmen. One report has Genrikh
Yagoda, overall chief of the NKVD, briefing Stalin on the
situation at the Leningrad train station, and being slapped
in turn. "'You nincompoop,'" supposedly shouted Stalin,
"•Don't you know how to protect the leaders of the working
class?'" 41 Stalin took personal charge of the investigation,
and even interrogated the assassin, who was anything but
servile in the presence of the "Plowman," and boasted that
he had really directed the shot at the Party.
42 In addition,
he ordered the guestioning of one Borisov, Kirov's loyal
factotum and erstwhile bodyguard, who had been unaccountably
absent when the fatal shot was fired. Without a doubt
Borisov could have shed much light on the mysterious circum-
stances of the murder but, "unfortunately," he died in a




Stalin's deep grief at the murder of one of his own
was so marked that he publicly kissed the cheek of the
corpse as it lay in state; nonetheless, he was able to con-
trol his sorrow and attend to matters of state. 44 Within
hours after the murder decisive action was authorized, the
.famous "Kirov Decree/ 1 one of those happy "contingency"
pi ans that governments prepare beforehand in case of just
such a "crisis." As revealed by Khrushchev, this decree
ordered:
"1
. Investigative agencies are directed to
speed up the cases of those accused of the prep-
aration or execution of acts of terror.
"2. Judicial organs are directed not to
hold up the execution of death sentences per-
taining to crimes of this category in order to
consider the possibility of pardon, because the
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of
the USSR does not consider as possible the re-
ceiving of petitions of this sort.
"3. The organs of the Commissariat of
Internal Affairs are directed to execute the
death sentences against criminals of the above-
mentioned category immediately after the passage
of sentences . "45
Soviet police authorities were ordered to complete such
cases in no more than ten days, and not to accept the repu-
diation of confessions, no matter how obtained. Relatives
of the accused were also considered responsible for their
alleged actions.
46 In short, Yagoda had been given a free
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hand. Bloodshed was the order of the day.
Kirov's death was to be mercilessly avenged, but the
identity of Nikolayev's accomplices was under advisement.
Three different sects were officially blamed in the coming
weeks. First it was the turn of the "White Guardists."
Soviet investigative agencies discovered that scores of
emigre terrorists had penetrated the border in order to aid
the murder conspiracy. In addition, a Finnish consul, who
later became the "Latvian" consul in Leningrad, one
Bisseneks, had given the assassin some 5,000 rubles to
further the plot. Although the consul was allowed to
quietly leave the country, the "White Guard" terrorists were
swiftly liquidated for their role in the crime, even though
47
they had been residing in Soviet prisons before the act.
Besides ordering the execution of hundreds of such "agents,"
Yagoda also directed that thousands of political suspects be
hastily arrested and sent to Siberia, the so-called "Kirov
flood." 48 As for Nikolayev, and his "group" (now numbering
fourteen), a secret trial was held on December 28-29 before
a specially appointed Military Collegium of the Supreme
Court. The trial was brief. The Soviet press announced
49
the execution of all the accused on December 30th. With
the physical elimination of Nikolayev and his coterie the
Soviet leadership allowed this particular leitmotif to dis-
appear quietly from stage center. The "Latvian consul" and
"White Guard" terrorists were omitted from all subsequent
versions of the crime. Even Nikolayev himself was permitted
19
to vanish into a historical limbo, mentioned only when abso-
lutely necessary.
The second official version of the murder complicated
the plot immeasurably. At his trial in camera Nikolayev had
been identified as a member of the '"Leningrad center'" of
Zinoviev's followers. In fact, G. Zinoviev, L. Kamenev, and
thirteen others had been arrested two weeks earlier, on
December 16. 50 It is quite probable that they were the orig-
inal quarry in this political hunt, triggered by the assassina-
tion, but Nikolayev' s intransigence under questioning forced
51impromptu changes in the script. At some point Stalin ap-
parently decided to implicate his former political allies no
matter how confusing the result; a Soviet source claims that
Stalin personally picked the members of the "Leningrad" and
"Moscow" centers and that this "roll," in his own hand-
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writing, still existed in 1956. On January 15-16, 1935,
this group was tried for stimulating the terrorist pro-
clivities of the Nikolayev band. Although the accused
pleaded not guilty and denied many of the specific points in
the indictment, Zinoviev did accept "moral and political
responsibility" for the act. He was quoted as declaring,
".
. .
The task that I see confronting me at this
stage is to repent fully, frankly and sincerely,
before the court of the working class, of what I
understood to be a mistake and a crime, and to
say it in such a way that it should all end,
once and for all, with this group.'53
For their efforts the accused received sentences ranging
from five to ten years. More important, they had capitulated
20
once again and become logical candidates for a future trial,
much more deadly in nature.
On January 23, 1935, yet another group was tried in
connection with Kirov's murder. The blame was extended to
the NKVD detachment in Leningrad. Zaporozhets and eleven
other police functionaries were charged with nonfeasance:
'".
. .
having received information about the preparations
for the attempt on S. M. Kirov . . . they failed to take the
necessary measures to prevent the assassination . . . al-
54though they had every possible means of arresting it.'"
Such failures to perform official duties in the Soviet Union
normally resulted in the forfeit of life. Yet, incredibly,
the convicted NKVD officials received two-to-three years in
a labor camp. Suspicions were heightened when it was
learned that they were given special treatment in the camps,
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and even allowed to receive expensive gifts. But in 1937
their luck turned. In his "Secret Speech" Khrushchev re-
vealed that,
After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of
the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sen-
tences, but in 1937 they were shot. We Can as-
sume that they were shot in order to cover the
traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing.
(Movement in the hall.) 5 ^
But Khrushchev refrained from naming the "organizers" of the
crime
.
The mysterious involvement of the NKVD in Kirov's
death undermined the official fable that the White Guards-
cum-Zinovievites were responsible for the dastardly act. It
I
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seemed only logical that Zaporozhets would never have taken
such a cavalier attitude towards the life of a ranking Party
official unless he was following orders. 57 This suspicion
was confirmed in the March 1938 trial of Bukharin and Rykov.
It now appeared that G. Yagoda had ordered Zaporozhets to
ease Nikolayev's path. The head of the NKVD, in turn, was
acting on orders given him by A. Yenukidze, who oversaw
Kremlin security. 58 Only in 1956 did the Soviet authorities
cast doubt on this version. Khrushchev declared that he was
not satisfied with the earlier investigation:
It must be asserted that to this day the cir-
cumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide
many things which are inexplicable and myste-
rious and demand a most careful examination.
There are reasons for the suspicion that the
killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by
someone from among the people whose duty it
was to protect the person of Kirov. 59
At. the XXIInd Party Congress in October, 1961, Khrushchev
announced that a thorough investigation into the complicated
case was continuing, but the "'more deeply we study the mate-
rials connected with Kirov's death, the more guestions
arise. . . . '" Apparently more guestions are still
arising, for a res judicata is still lacking in the case.
Did Stalin directly order Kirov's murder? There
were "transparent hints" to that effect, as Svetlana
Alliluyeva wrote in 1963, but she could not believe that her
father would have Kirov eliminated: "He was one of us," she
asserted, "an old colleague and friend. My father liked him
and was attached to him." Stalin may have committed many
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crimes, but "I'll never believe my father was involved in
this particular death," affirmed his dutiful daughter. 61 In
truth, the evidence against Stalin is highly speculative.
Kirov's death may have been "the keystone of the entire edi-
fice of terror and suffering by which Stalin secured his
6 2grip on the Soviet peoples/ 1 but this only convicts him of
being a consummate opportunist. More likely is the supposi-
tion Stalin desired to use an abortive attempt on Kirov's
life to justify new reprisals against the opposition but,
"To Stalin's dismay, Nikolayev's attempt succeeded," suggests
6 3John Armstrong. In fact, this was Trotsky's view in 1934.
If the Kirov murder remains a political enigma of
the first magnitude, then the later show trials are also
shrouded in mystery, for this act, among all the alleged
poisonings, mine explosions, train wrecks, ad infinitum ,
was the "only proven crime" in this phantasmagoria of deadly
sins. 64 The key to the trials continues to be Kirov.
The " Soviet Spring "
With the "final solution" of the Kirov problem in
January 1935, it appeared that the skies had cleared and
that the Soviet Union was about to enjoy some balmy politi-
cal weather. Outwardly the spring of 1935 seemed to con-
tinue beyond its natural limits, and become a "'Soviet
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spring, 1 " one that extended into the next year.
Optimism was inspired by several favorable omens.
Food rationing was discontinued by late 1935. The inhuman
tempos of the collectivization and industrialization cam-
paigns were muted. Peasants were even allowed to cultivate
a hectare of their own land and own a few chickens and pigs.
Traditional Russian heroes like Alexander Nevsky and General
Suvorov were resurrected, while Pushkin once more became a
hallowed name. Some gaiety even appeared. Party functions
were likely to feature exhibitions of the foxtrot and the
tango. Wives of high officials displayed their new jewels
and fashionable gowns; their husbands sported pressed
trousers. The Soviet press even suggested that it was
highly proper to erect Christmas trees on New Year's Day, a
concession to nostalgia. "'Life is getting better, happier,'
6 6Stalin declared in 1935.
The year 1935 was also marked by two much applauded
innovations— "Stalin's Constitution" and the "Popular Front"
policy. During much of 1935 and 1936 the press avidly dis-
cussed the work of a constitutional commission, chaired by
Stalin himself, which was attempting to write the "most
democratic" of all constitutions, one that would authorize
the secret ballot and safeguard individual liberties, among
other desirable reforms. No matter that this document would
legitimize the Party's absolute authority within the Soviet
system, its implied sanction of "democratic liberties" was
warmly welcomed, especially in the West, where Louis Fischer,
among others, wrote rapturous articles about this "model"
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constitution.
Then the VII th (and last) Congress of the Comintern,
held in Moscow in August 1935, put the seal of approval on
the "Popular Front" strategy. Henceforth the Soviet Union
would become a defender of the Versailles settlement and a
member of the League of Nations, and it would join with all
"peace loving" peoples in opposing the overwhelming threat
posed by Hitlerite Germany. In order to save civilization
it was necessary for all "democratic" and "semi-democratic"
forces to forget past differences and unite their energies
in a crusade against the forces of darkness. The "Popular
Front" was the slogan of the day. With this dramatic
vol to- 1 ,icc the Soviet Union ended its role as the inter-
national outcast and earned a certain respectability as the
leader of the anti-fascist forces.
But this "lull" was deceptive. As Arthur Koestler
observed, it was like the period of suspense in Daniel
Defoe's Journal of the Plague Year , "between the first ap-
pearance of the plague, and its full outbreak several months
later." 68
"Note;; I rom tho Uiu U m ~tj ronm I '
'
The "halcyon days" of 1935-36 diverted attention
from other, more ominous departures. "Alas, how naive were
all these hopes of ours!," lamented an "Old Bolshevik." Ho
could not, in retrospect, understand how the "symptoms" of
impending havoc were ignored. In actuality, the trend was
away from reconciliation and toward the intensification of
terror within the Party, until it reached its logical con-
clusion, the "physical extermination of all those whose Party
past might make them opponents of Stalin or aspirants to his
69power .
Some of these "symptoms' 1 involved personnel changes:
a new breed assumed leading positions of authority. On the
one hand, Valerian Kuibyshev, a loyal Stalinist of rather
temperate nature suddenly died of "natural causes" in
70January 1935. On the other hand, Nikolai Yezhov, a "blood-
thirsty dwarf" destined to become a world-wide celebrity,
assumed Kirov's vacated post as secretary of the Central
Committee, and also became chief of the Central Control
Commission
#
the official purge apparatus . His assistant for
Party affairs was Georgi Malenkov, an ambitious young career-
ist, eager to fulfill almost any task, no matter how noxious.
Heading Stalin 1 s personal secretariat was A. N. Poskrebyshev
,
his "faithful dog, 11 whose amorality was noteworthy even for
this company. In addition, Nikita Khrushchev and Andrei
Zhdanov were pi aced in charge of the all-important Party
organizations in Moscow and Leningrad, respectively. The
post of Attorney-General fell to Andrei Vyshinsky, whose re-
lationship to the Party has been described as that of a
"gangland lawyer," but who managed to outlive his legion of
7
1
detractors. A wrecking crew of impressive credentials had
been formed to implement Stalin's bidding.
There were other signs of subterranean activity,
other disquieting signs. In April 1935 the regime issued a
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draconian decree that made children over the age of twelve
liable to all legal penalties, including capital punishment.
This decree had a wonderous effect in encouraging "voluntary
confessions," for many of the accused in later proceedings
could not bear to have their children arrested as accomplice
with all this entailed. Also in May-June 1935 the Society
of Old Bolsheviks was disbanded, along with the Society of
Former Political Prisoners and Exiles. Both societies were
dedicated to the revolutionary ideals of October, which
meant they were millstones around Stalin's neck, for he was
intent upon liquidating the revolutionary generation.
At this point in the scenario reality, in the form o
an actual attempt on Stalin's life, may have insinuated it-
self into the story. Details are few, but three puzzling
incidents of some importance occurred during May-July 1935:
a number of Kremlin guards secretly stood trial; Abel
Yenukidze was suddenly relieved of his post as Secretary of
the Central Executive Committee; and Lev Kamenev received
another five years on his prison sentence. These events may
be interrelated.
Almost nothing is known of the Kremlin Guard affair,
except that in "the spring of 1935" some forty members of
Stalin's bodyguard were tried iri camera . Two of them re-
7 3
ceived the death penalty. At the same time the commandant
of the Kremlin—the Latvian A. A. Petersen—was relieved of
his post and later eliminated. A rather romantic figure,
Petersen had once commanded Trotsky's famous armored train
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during the Civil War.
Apparently linked to this affair were two other
developments: an attack on Stalin by a "princess in the
Kremlin library/' and Yenukidze's fall from favor. Accounts
vary both in details and accuracy, but it has been suggested
that Yenukidze, a staunch supporter of the arts, was struck
by the beauty of a would-be artist and sometime librarian,
one Zoya Nikitina. Eager to brighten his chief's life, he
arranged for this daughter of White Guard emigrees to ar-
range some books in the Kremlin library, while Stalin
scrutinized her from a secret peephole in an adjacent room.
But the hyper-suspicious Stalin was disturbed by the young
lady's peculiar cape, and ordered her searched. To his con-
sternation it was discovered that she had concealed under
the cape "a small pistol loaded with poison bullets." Ap-
parently she met a swift end, along with hundreds of her
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acquaintances in the Komsomol
.
This tale seems highly suspect, but Yenukidze's dis-
7 6
missal occurred at the time. A fellow Georgian and in-
timate friend of the Alliluyev family, Yenukidze had long
been Stalin's crony, and had overseen the management of the
7 7
Kremlin, including its security. Well noted for his warm
nature,
78 it is possible that he attempted to ease the lot
of those sentenced in the January 1935 trial of the "Moscow
center." In this connection he supposedly told his inter-
rogators that he once pleaded with Stalin to stop the repres
sion :
28
"'Soso,'" I told him, "'there is no denying
they have wronged you, but they have already
suffered enough for that: you expelled themfrom the party, you keep them in prison, their
children have nothing to eat.
" 'Soso,'" I said, '"they are old Bolsheviks,
like you and me. You are not going to shed the'blood of old Bolsheviks! Think what the world
will say about us!'
"He gave me a look as if I had murdered his
father and said,
'"Remember Abel, who is not with me is
against me ! '
"
7 §
In June 1935, Yenukidze was dismissed from his post at the
Central Executive Committee and accused of shielding enemies
of the Party, such as "'former princes, ministers, courtiers,
Trotskyites, etc.,'" a real "'counter-revolutionary nest.'" 80
For his efforts he was relegated to running "health resorts"
in the Northern Caucasus. Eventually arrested but never
properly conditioned to appear in a public trial, he was
8
1
secretly executed in December, 1937.
Then Lev Kamenev was tried again in July 1935, by
most accounts a superfluous act of vengefulness . Yet the
"Old Bolshevik" confided to B. Nicolaevsky that this '"second
Kamenev trial'" was held "in connection with a terroristic
conspiracy against the life of Stalin," one which also in-
volved the Kremlin guard. Although innocent of any wrong-
doing, Kamenev was once more attacked in a further effort to
discredit the Opposition. "Apparently there was a grain of
truth in the case," added Nicol aevsky ' s highly placed in-
8 2
formant, involving at least talk about eliminating Stalin.
Also convinced that there was "a grain of truth in
the story," Robert Conquest has written that Kamenev was
implicated through his brother, one Rosenfeld, who was mar-
ried to a doctor assigned to the Kremlin. After Rosenfeld
testified against his brother in the secret trial, Kamenev
received a ten-year sentence, convicted under a statute ap-
plying to terrorist acts against Soviet officials. 83
If the "covert struggle over this case dominated the
84ensuing period," as Conquest has contended, then perhaps
the assassination "attempt" on Stalin's life figured in the
show trials. Certainly the accused were credited with a
myriad of efforts to liquidate Stalin, often of a bizarre
nature, as we shall observe. It is impossible to go beyond
speculation here, but there is a highly tenuous link between
the "attempt" in the Kremlin library and Trotsky, through
Kamenev (Trotsky's brother-in-law) and Petersen, his former
companion-in-arms. Indeed, various "grains of historical
truth" did find their way into the trials' records. It is
not beyond the realm of possibility that an actual attempt
on Stalin's life, involving the opposition in some way, was
a motivating factor in staging the trials and conducting a
massive purge of the Party.
The Pace Quickens
All during the period of 1933-35 a Party purge was
in process, one that cleansed its ranks of at least 315,000
"•rogues, kulaks, white-guards, counter-revolutionary
trotskyites, zinovievites , double-crossers and other hostile
elements.'" 85 But on December 25, 1935, the Central
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Committee of the Party declared the purge a success and
ordered its cessation. This was not the end of the purifi-
cation drive, however, for in January 1936 a new purge began
under the guise of "exchanging" old membership cards for new
ones, which resulted in the expulsion of more undesirables
ft fifrom the Party's ranks.
As the "re-registration" campaign of early 1936 took
its toll, Stalin was personally directing preparations for
the first public trial. A special NKVD team was charged with
obtaining confessions from some 300 oppositionists , whose
complicity in a massive plot against the regime had sud-
denly been uncovered. The experienced interrogators followed
the tactic of obtaining confessions from minor figures-
Valentine Olberg (a secret NKVD agent), Isak Reingold (an
acquaintance of Kamenev), Richard Pickel (a former aide to
Zinoviev)— and then confronting the chief figures in the
alleged plot with this incriminating evidence. Despite ill-
health, threats to their families, and oppressive prison
conditions, Zinoviev and Kamenev remained unyielding until
July 1936, when they agreed to stand public trial if Stalin
would guarantee their lives in the presence of the entire
Politburo. According to defector sources, they did obtain
an interview with Stalin, who was seconded only by K.
Voroshilov and Yezhov. After berating Stalin for dis-
crediting Lenin's Politburo, Zinoviev apparently broke down
and wept, a performance which left Stalin unmoved: "'It's
already late for tears,"' he correctly observed. When Kamenev
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asked where was the guarantee that they would not be shot,
Stalin asked if they wanted an official treaty certified by
the League of Nations. This was all too much for Voroshilov,
who advised them "'to fall on their knees before Comrade
Stalin and thank him for the life preserver that he is
throwing to them. If they don't want to be saved, let them
drown. The devil take them!'" After Stalin assured his
former colleagues that the trial was actually aimed at
Trotsky, not them, Zinoviev and Kamenev agreed to stand
trial if none of the Old Bolsheviks were shot and if their
families were left unmolested. "'That goes without saying,'"
8 7
confided the benevolent dictator of the Party.
By the end of July 1936 the main roles in the
pageant had been cast, although I. Smirnov and V. A. Ter-
Vaganyan still objected to their humiliating lines. But
what would the Party's cadres think of this political bomb-
shell? The "Old Bolshevik" assured Nicolaevsky that the
"trial came as a complete surprise not only for the rank and
file of Party workers, but also to members of the Central
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Committee and some members of the Politburo." vBut this
statement is belied by a Central Committee letter, dated
July 29, 1936, and marked "top secret." Entitled, "On the
terroristic activity of the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-
revolutionary bloc," it informed the Party faithful at some
length about the forthcoming trial, and laid down a "general
line" for combating any doubts about the guilt of the famous
defendants. In particular, this letter featured copious
quotations from the preliminary examination (Protokol
doprosa ) of the accused, many of which were entered in the
o qtrial record itself.
But the most sensational part of the letter was left
to the end. The last few paragraphs began with the ominous
refrain— "Only the absence of Bolshevik vigilance can ex-
plain the fact, that ..." ("Tol'ko otsutstviem bol 1
shevistsko j bditel ' nosti mozhno ob' yasnit ' tot f akt
,
chto" )
followed each time by a "suitable sin," as Robert McNeal has
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noted." For instance, only the lack of "Bolshevik vigilance"
could explain how some of the arrested Party members in re-
cent months "were passed in the check of Party documents and
were left in the ranks of the Party." Even more alarming,
however, were the final lines of this extraordinary letter:
"The inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present
conditions should be the ability to recognize an enemy of
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the Party, no matter how well he may be masked."
Henceforth, the basic criterion for Party membership
was the willingness to "unmask"— i.e., "squeal on"— fellow
Party workers. Only the most obtuse of apparatcliiki could
have expected the purge to end with the liquidation of
Zinoviev and friends. It was only the opening act.
III. The Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial
On August 15, 1936, the great news was finally
broadcast far and wide. Grigori Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Ivan
Smirnov and thirteen others were to be publicly tried for
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arranging Kirov's assassination, for planning numerous ter-
rorist acts against Soviet leaders, including Stalin, and
for conspiring with Fascist agents to undermine the regime.
Writing from Paris, Walter Duranty, the doyen of Kremlin
observers, immediately declared that such a public spectacle
was "inconceivable" without the authorities having "full
proofs" of the defendants' guilt. A "dark story of treason-
able intrigue" will emerge, Duranty confidently predicted,
though he was not sure of its details. These were
furnished on August 18th, when the full indictment appeared
in the Soviet press. The trial opened the following day.
The "dark story" was to be told at last.
Mis-en-Scene
The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court heard
the case in the little "October Hall" of the Trade Union
House, not as glamorous as the great "Hall of Columns,"
scene of earlier public trials, but not entirely without dis-
tinction. A rather ornate chamber (formerly a ballroom in
the then Nobles Club) , it featured white Corinthian columns
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and light-blue walls. "In a frivolous ballroom of a van-
ished nobility, where dancing girls in the plastic frieze
smile down on sixteen doomed revolutionaries," the fantastic
94drama was to unfold.
The accused sat behind a low wooden bar, a "railed-in
pen" sideways to the audience, alertly guarded by three
rather massive NKVD soldiers, standing rigidly at attention
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with their bayoneted rifles. 95 In the "gallery" were seated
some thirty foreign journalists and diplomats, along with
150-odd "workers from numerous shops and factories," as the
special correspondent for the New Masses informed his
96
readers. This particular factory was named the "Lubyanka"—
NKVD headquarters. 97
In the rear of the chamber, opposite the gallery,
sat the judges, led by Vassili V. Ulrikh, a man of many
chins, whose "enormous head" hung almost on a level with
his shoulders, and who looked like "a proper country land-
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owner of Czarist times," observed an NKVD defector. Re-
portedly a one-time officer in the Counter-intelligence De-
9 9partment of the CHEKA, Ulrikh was presiding judge in most
of the political trials of the 1920s and 1930s— from that of
the terrorist, Boris Savinkov, in 1924, to the "Great Trial"
of Bukharin and Rykov in 1938. This record was surely a
great testimonial to his reliability, if not integrity. In
1936 Time magazine noted that he had the reputation of
"having handed out more Death sentences than any other
jurist in the world." 100 By 1938 this journal was referring
. n 101
to him as the "'Shooting Judge'" of the Moscow trials.
The other two judges— I. 0. Matulevich and I. I.
Nikitchenko—were of so little consequence during the pro-
ceedings that they merely took up space. Ten years later,
however, Nikitchenko was to grace the High Tribunal at the
Nuremburg war crimes trial. (Not surprisingly, this Tribunal
refused to question Rudolph Hess on his alleged talks with
35
Leon Trotsky in the 1930s, a central issue in the Pyatakov-
Radek trial of 1937.
)
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As in so many other political trials, the prosecutor
was Andrei Vyshinsky. Anything but disheveled, this veteran
inquisitor was something of a dandy, and looked the part of
a King's counsel. One observer at the trial, Joshua Kunitz,
depicted him in this fashion:
His straight blond hair brushed harshly to the
side, his closely cropped, bristling reddish
mustache; his steel-blue eyes, thin lips, deci-
sive movements, and cold concentrated expression
suggest his fitness for the part he is to play
at this trial. 103
But in this trial Vyshinsky was somewhat "less light of step
and panther-like than usual," reported Time, 104 possibly be-
cause he occupied an exposed position. A Menshevik until
1920 , and once arrested for ant i- Soviet behavior , this
parvenu was charged with lending credibility to an implau-
sible script, one prepared by NKVD veterans. The NKVD de-
fector
,
A. Orlov , described the situation as follows
:
The chiefs of the NKVD didn't dignify
Vyshinsky with their confidence and treated
him with the same humiliating condescension
with which Stalin's influential bureaucrats
treat non-party men. And even then, when
they were instructing Vyshinsky how cautious
he should be with the weak points of their
judicial forgeries, they never openly used
the word "falsification," but instead em-
ployed hypocritical phraseology for their
explanations
.
Vyshinsky had grounds to hate his haughty
bosses. He knew that he would have to cover
up at the trial their clumsily concocted
forgeries and outdo himself in eloquence in
order to lend at least some plausibility to
their idiotic fabrications. He also knew
that if their falsifications came out during
36
the court proceedings, the inquisitors would
make him responsible for the fiasco of the
trial and maybe even accuse him of "sabotage." 105
His vulnerability made him uncommonly obedient, and thus
particularly useful to Stalin. In fact, he lived to see his
tormenters perish in Siberia's frozen dungeons, and gained
new prominence after World War II when he represented the
USSR at the United Nations, where once again he displayed
his gift for abuse.
But, of course, the real stars of the drama were the
distinguished defendants. Grigori Zinoviev was a founder of
the Bolshevik Party, close associate of both Lenin and
Stalin, and first chairman of the Communist International.
Famed for his oratorical gifts, Zinoviev had stood in the
first ranks of the Party, and shared the revolutionary lime-
light with Lenin and Trotsky. But at this trial the former
"'Bomb Boy of Bolshevism'" was "unshaven, round-faced, wild-
haired" in appearance, reported Time . 106 The New York Times
man in Moscow, Harold Denny, also noted that the once-
arrogant Zinoviev seemed "utterly beaten, chagrined and
apathetic," and his great voice had fallen to a "womanish
whisper .
"
Lev Kamenev was almost as distinguished a defendant
as Zinoviev. Once leader of the Bolshevik faction in the
Tsarist Duma, Kamenev had also served as leader of the
Moscow Party organization and Vice-Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars after Lenin's death. Married to
Trotsky's sister, he had joined Stalin and Zinoviev in the
famed "Troika" of the mid-1920s. At the trial Kamenev re-
tained some of his former dignity. Denny found him still
"animated and distinguished-looking with his white imperial
and snowy hair." Even Kunitz noted that with "his gray
hair, aristocratic whiskers, high stiff collar, sparkling
pince-nez, and well-fitting business suit around his gener-
our waistline," Kamenev was the personification of academic
dignity. 109
Ivan N. Smirnov had once led the famous Fifth Army
in Siberia during the Civil War and become known as the
"•Lenin of Siberia.'" Close to Trotsky, he had been an op-
positionist in the 1920s and served time in various cor-
rection camps. In fact, he had been continuously in prison
since January 1, 1933. With his shirt open at the trial, he
struck Kunitz as a typical labor leader, one who might have
come from a typographical union in the Middle West. 1 "'' 0
The other five defendants of major st ature--Grigori
E. Evdokimov, Vagarshak A. Ter-Vagany an
,
Sergei V. Mrachkovsky
Ivan P. Bakayev, Yefim A. Dreitzer— also had outstanding
Party records, if not quite as prominent as those^ of the
three chief defendants. 111
Corpus Delicti
The trial began with a bang. After President Ulrikh
had ascertained that the defendants had no objection to the
court's membership, and that they declined to be represented
by "counsel," the court's secretary stepped forward and
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rapidly read the sensational charges. Supported by a pro-
fuse number of quotations culled from the pre-trial examina-
tions, the indictment charged that Zinoviev and Company not
only were aware of Nikolayev's terrorist inclinations in
1934, as was already known, but were "the direct organizers
of the assassination of Comrade S. M. Kirov." 112 Kirov was
struck down, it was charged, because of his close association
with Stalin for, as Zinoviev once told Reingold, "'It is not
enough to fell the oak; all the young oaks growing around it
must be felled too.'" 11 This act was in line with a ter-
rorist policy adopted in late 1932, when the Zinovievites
and the Trotskyites formed a "united centre." Their only
goal was to "seize power at all costs," as they lacked any
kind of a political program. 114 Concealing their true in-
tentions with "double-dealing" tactics that might have been
admired by an Azef or a Malinovsky, they made plans not only
to destroy Kirov, but also to assassinate Stalin, Voroshilov,
Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze
,
Zhdanov, Kossior, Postyshev, and
others. Stalin was the chief target of their efforts for,
as Trotsky allegedly observed (quoted secondhand Nby Reingold),
"'the whole matter is in the top, therefore the top must be
115
removed. ' " Several attempts were prepared against
Stalin's life, including one to shoot him during the Vllth
Congress of the Comintern (August, 1935), in line with
Trotsky's order that the act should be "'timed with some big
116
political event of international importance.'" From
abroad Trotsky also wrote detailed instructions to his
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confederates, and personally dispatched Olberg, Berman-Yurin
,
and David on terrorist missions. In addition, one of
Trotsky's gangs was "actually organized by the active German
fascist Franz Weitz
,
the representative of /Heinrich 7
Himmler, at that time the leader of the fascist SS detach-
ments and now the director of the German Secret Police
(Gestapo)." 117
At the conclusion of the indictment it was claimed,
not unexpectedly, that the formidable charges had already
been established. More surprising was the assertion that
all of the accused, with the exception of Smirnov, had
"fully admitted their guilt of the charges preferred against
118them." This was staggering news. As Kunitz later wrote,
The picture of plotting, villainy, treachery,
double-dealing, hypocrisy, cynicism, lust for
power, and murder uncovered by Vyshinsky as
the result of months of investigation is so
terrifying, so monstrous, seems so utterly
inapplicable to most of the scholarly-looking
men in the dock that the European bourgeois
correspondent at my side whispers to me:
"Incredible . . . the concoction of a dis-
eased mind!
"
In particular, this correspondent doubted the unanimity of
the alleged guilty pleas and their tenor: "'Fantastic . . .
They couldn't possibly have admitted all the crimes ascribed
119
to them, not in this spirit, not in these words. . . .
But then fourteen of the accused corroborated the claim by
publicly pleading guilty to all the charges! Only Smirnov,
and Holtzman as well, attempted to dispute the indictment.
Although they admitted participation in the Trotskyite-
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Zinovievite organization, and even confessed to transmitting
terrorist instructions, both of them denied personal parti-
cipation in the preparation of terroristic acts. 120
The Ritual of Confession
The deportment of Zinoviev and Company was even more
shocking than their formal confession of guilt. Instead of
attempting to undermine Vyshinsky' s case or introduce seeds
of doubt, most of the accused cheerfully cooperated with the
Prosecutor in digging their own graves. Nothing astonished
Western public opinion more than the tone of the confessions
remorseful, self-accusing, all-inclusive. The enigma of the
confessions quickly became the major cause celebre of this
trial , and of the others that followed. As we shall soon
observe
,
Trotsky devoted much attention to the "mechanics"
of confessions. But at this point it is only necessary to
introduce several illustrations of the phenomenon. For ex-
ample
,
at one point Vyshinsky questioned Zinoviev about the
centre 1 s activities
:
Vyshinsky : . . . Was it your centre that
organized the assassination of Comrade Ki^rov?
Was the assassination of Sergei Mironovich
Kirov organized by your centre, or by some
other organization?
Zinoviev : Yes, by our centre.
Vyshinsky : In that centre there were you,
Kamenev, Smirnov, Mrachkovsky and Ter-Vaganyan?
Zinoviev : Yes.
Vyshinsky : So you all organized the assas-
sination of Kirov?
Zinoviev : Yes.




Vyshinsky : Sit down. 121
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It is notoriously difficult to unearth the human touch in
cold trial records, but no one could miss Zinoviev's moral
prostration or Vyshinsky's complete contempt in the above
exchange. "Sit down," commanded the ex-Menshevik to the
ex-founder of the Bolshevik Party.
In another memorable exchange the two leading de-
fendants so helpfully subscribed to Vyshinsky's slurs on
their actions that a note of self-mockery, not to say bur-
lesque, was reflected in the dialogue. Vyshinsky began the
intercourse by questioning Kamenev about his "double-dealing"
tactics
:
Vysh i nsky : What appraisal should be given
of the articles and statements you wrote in
1933, in which you expressed loyalty to the
Party? Deception?
KMtenev : No, worse than deception.
Vysh i nsky : Pel t idy?
Kamenev : Worse.
Vysh i nsky : Worse than deception f worse
than perfidy— find the word. Treason?
Kamenev : You havo I ouml i t .
Vysh i nsky : Accused Zinovi ev , do you
con 1 i i in I hi:;. 1
Zi novi ov : Yes.
Vyshi nsk"y : Tre ason
,
perfidy , doublc-
deal i ih] ;
| y ?
7, i in >v i i >v : Yes
.
^
Such shameless deference to the Prosecutor's verbal assaults
eoul d on 1 y dumb I ound most West o t n jou rn a 1 i s t s
.
Harold Denny was one of the first spectators to con-
fess his inability to fathom this behavior. There was an
"incomprehensible desire" on the defendants' part to convict
themselves, he wrote in The_ Now York Times . Faced with
death, they cried out: " ' We who are about to die salute you.
i ti
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Springing to their feet like "bright students," they seemed
eager to show how much they knew. There was even "witty
repartee" in the court, with the defendants joining in the
general "merriment." They were marching to their death
"amid gales of laughter." This behavior was all so alien to
Denny that he could only blame it on the "traditional Slavic-
Oriental indifference to death." But he noted that their
stories dovetailed nicely and admitted bewilderment: "If
there is more here than meets the eye, not even the most
12 3
skeptical observer can guess what it is."
But there was much more here than met the eye. As
Robert Conquest has correctly noted, the "impression of unan-
imous surrender was not, indeed, entirely a correct one."^^
If Denny and the other journalists present at the trial had
been more attuned to the swirling undercurrents in the court-
room, they would have detected a subtle and desperate effort
by some of the defendants to undermine Vyshinsky's case.
Since open defiance only invited swift retribution, the ac-
cused used various rhetorical devices and "veiled language"
to cast doubt on the charges. The employment of vsuch
125
"'double-talk'" or "'Aesopian language'" was an almost
hallowed revolutionary tradition. Even Lenin in 1911
observed that Russians had gone through the school of serf-
dom: "'they are able to read between the lines and to add
what the speaker did not say in so many words.'
A great variety of such techniques was utilized to
convey the intended double entendre , or hidden meaning. The
43
defendant might plead forgetfulness to some allegation, deny
's
minor facts, admit to only "general orientation" to a crimi-
nal program, or even refuse to answer one of Vyshinsky'
s
charges. In this connection Stalin commented in 1936: 1,1 It
may be said that silence is not criticism. But that is not
true. The method of keeping silence, as a special method of




addition, the accused might suddenly remark, "of course, 11
when the Prosecutor made a particularly absurd allegation,
one that had been denied until that point. Another device
was to feign amazement and say, "that's news to me," after
some startling revel ation . For instance
,
Vyshinsky quoted
Kamenev as stating in the January 1935 trial : " 1 1 became
blind--I lived to the age of 50 and did not see this centre
in which, it turns out, I myself was active, in which I
participated by action and by inaction, by speech and by
silence.'" When Vyshinsky attempted to force Kamenev in
the August 1936 trial to admit that he was fighting against
socialism, the latter replied, "You are drawing the conclu-
sion of an historian and prosecutor," clearly contradicting
the conclusion. And another favorite device was to sug-
gest a historical analogy that exposed the absurdity of the
charge. Thus, M. Lurye testified to asking Zinoviev how it
was permissible for Marxists to practice individual terror
and maintain contact with fascist groups, a touchy point in
the case. Zinoviev supposedly replied, "'You are an
historian, aren't you, Moissei Ilyich,' and he drew the
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parallel of Bismarck and Lassalle, adding: 'why cannot we
1 30today utilize Himmler?'" Clearly the political coopera-
tion of Bismarck and Lassalle was of a different stripe than
the alleged relationship of the "centre" and Himmler.
In this trial it was Smirnov who most effectively
used "veiled language" in his defense, which Vyshinsky found
necessary to "decipher" for the edification of the gallery.
Although Smirnov steadfastly denied any participation in
terrorist activities, and frequently challenged the veracity
of his fellow defendants' testimony, Vyshinsky finally forced
him to admit membership in the " bloc , " to confirm a 1931
meeting with Lev Sedov (Trotsky's son) in Berlin, and to
acknowledge transmitting certain terrorist instructions from
Trotsky. Yet not all the honors in this duel went to the
Prosecutor. Smirnov managed to insert in the record that
131
"Sedov was not an authority for me," an important point,
since there was great difficulty in directly linking
Trotsky— the real authority— to the alleged conspiracy. In
addition, when Mrachkovsky testified to meeting Smirnov in
his apartment for secret discussions, the 1 atter v suddenly
turned on him and demanded, "Was it at my apartment? Where
is my apartment?," a question that Mrachkovsky was unable to
132 _ .
answer in detail, and which undermined his testimony. At
another point Vyshinsky asked Smirnov about his alleged
resignation from the centre: "I did not intend to resign;
there was nothing to resign from," came back the telling re-
tort.
133 The balky defendant underlined this point by
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further testifying that, "I did not resign from the bloc
officially, but actually I was not a member of the bloc." 134
And on one occasion Smirnov turned to Ter-Vagany an
,
Mrachkovsky, and Dreitzer, and jeered, "'You want a leader?
Well, take me,'" which Vyshinsky considered "jocular," but
was surely meant to be derisive. 135
This line of defense was only a continuation of
Smirnov' s pre-trial tactics, as Vyshinsky revealed in his
closing argument. According to the Prosecutor, at his exam-
ination on May 20, 1936, Smirnov merely said, "'I deny that,
again I deny, I deny.'" On July 21 he admitted something,
but when confronted with Mrachkovsky ' s accusations, replied,
"Invention and slander,. . .'" Smirnov also answered
questions with such phrases as— "'I do not remember,'"
"•evidently such a conversation may have taken place,'"
"•there was not, but there might have been, 1 " "'I have nothinc
to reply to that'"—which Vyshinsky characterized as "animal
cowardice." Finally he admitted "full responsibility," con-
tended the Prosecutor, on August 13, i.e., only six days
before the trial opened! 13 ^ K
Only a Vyshinsky could argue that Smirnov made a
full, open, and voluntary confession. In fact, he was the
demi-hero of the drama.
Circumstantial Evidence
The Prosecutor took great pains to discredit
Smirnov' s "elastic form of lies," as well he might, for this
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was the fatal flaw in the proceedings, 137 missed by Denny
and most other observers. If Vyshinsky could not make the
various confessions appear a model of consistency and
totally convincing, then the case would fall to pieces
around him. The "voluntary" confessions were his ace in the
hole—his only ace. To compound the difficulties, the trial
record was rife with flagrant contradictions of both time
and place. Finally, there was "no evidence against them
/the accused/ except for their confessions and those of
I "DO
others," as Conquest has correctly noted.
The so-called "material evidence" in the case was
nothing but a mirage. True, Vyshinsky did cite four
clandestine letters that Trotsky allegedly sent to his con-
federates in the Soviet Union, but the State's attorney
could only produce one of them as an exhibit— a 1932 "Open
Letter" that Trotsky addressed to the Central Executive
Committee of the USSR, and which had been widely disseminated
in several European languages—hardly a secret communica-
tion. 139 The other "letters" had vanished, in one way or
another. For instance, in 1934 Trotsky supposedly wrote a
letter in invisible ink to Dreitzer and Mrachkovsky, which
he signed, " Starik " ("Old Man"). 140 This extraordinary com-
munication was smuggled into the Soviet Union concealed in
a "German cinema magazine," but, alas, Mrachkovsky burnt it
for "reasons of secrecy."
Faced with an embarrassing lack of material evidence
to link Trotsky directly with the conspiracy, Vyshinsky , then,
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was forced to rely on the testimony of Trotsky's secret
142
agents. it appeared that the "Great Exile" controlled a
whole platoon of emissaries, including "Friedmann," A. Lunt
,
Y. Gaven, N. Lurye
,
M
. Lurye , K. Berman-Yurin
, F. David
(I. Kruglyansky
) , and V. Olberg. All but Friedmann, Gaven,
and Lunt, never produced in court, testified that either
Trotsky or his son had personally directed their undercover
operations. In addition, Berman-Yurin and David contended
that they had met Trotsky in Copenhagen in late 1932, when
the latter was giving a rare lecture to socialist students.
At this time Trotsky directed them to assassinate Stalin.
Holtzman also met Trotsky in the Danish capital. According
to his testimony, Sedov suggested such a meeting, but they
agreed to make the trip from Berlin separately. Then Holtzman
added a few details:
I arranged with Sedov to be in Copenhagen within
two or three days, to put up at the Hotel Bristol
and meet him there. I went to the hotel straight
from the station and in the lounge met Sedov.
With these apparently innocent remarks Holtzman raised havoc
with the State's case, which will later be examined in some
detail
.
In addition, it was never fully determined when the
centre was formed and how long it functioned, important de-
tails that Vyshinsky was careful to leave muddled. Zinoviev
testified that the united centre was organized in "the summer
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of 1932," and functioned "up to 1936." Kamenev also re-
ported that in "the summer of 1932" Zinoviev had told an
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organizing meeting of his group that the union with the
Trotskyites was "an accomplished fact." 145 But another wit-
ness, Professor Yakovlev, selected "the autumn of 1932" for
the formation of the bloc, 146 as did Mrachkovsky and
1 ^\ *7Dreitzer. And Ter-Vaganyan implied that it had been
functioning since the fall of 1931. 148 Vyshinsky choose
not to arbitrate this matter contending, with Zinoviev, that
it had been formed in the summer of 1932, and also declaring
that it had been organized "in the autumn of 1932," leaving
the gallery to select its own date. 149 It did not matter if
"the white threads struck out all over the thing and the
finished product simply didn't hang together; important was
the fact that the defendants executed their commission," as
Max Shachtman once wrote on this discrepancy. 15 ^
The timing of the centre's formation becomes impor-
tant when it is remembered that in the fall of 1932 both
Zinoviev and Kamenev were once again expelled from the Party
and banished to the borderlands, as a result of the Riutin
affair. This development "somewhat held up the execution of
our terroristic plans," Kamenev admitted. 151 Reingold
agreed, testifying that the exile of the leaders caused "an
interruption in our terroristic activities between the
152
autumn of 1932 and the summer of 1933 ..." But Bakayev
contended that the interruption lasted from "the autumn of
1932" to the "autumn of 1934," when the centre became active
again. 153 Yet Vyshinsky, in referring to May, 1933, called
this period a time when "the united Trotskyite-Zinovievite
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centre was intensifying its activites to the utmost, when
these terroristic activities reached their highest point of
development ,
" surely a surprising contention. 154
Thus, the centre was formed in the autumn of 1932
and immediately ceased to function. It reached its high
point in May, 1933 when the two leaders were in exile. It
functioned up to 1936, even though Zinoviev and Kamenev were
once again arrested in December 1934, and jailed until the
August 1936 trial. It was led, on the Trotskyite side, by
Smirnov, who was continuously incarcerated from January 1,
1933, until his execution in August, 1936. But the wily
Smirnov, explained Vyshinsky, had used a "code" to communi-
cate with his companions outside , a "code" that was never
155produced in court.
Despite all of the above discrepancies , the
Prosecutor smugly declared in his closing statement that
the guilt of the accused had been "fully established" and,
therefore, rr I can be relieved of the duty of enumerating the
many facts, and of analysing the material of the Court in-
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vestigation, which exposes them to the fullest degree."
The trial of the missing tarts commenced:
"What do you know about this business?'
the King said to Alice.
"•Nothing, ' said Alice.
"'Nothing whatever ? ' persisted the King.
"'Nothing whatever,' said Alice.
"'That's very important,' the King said,
turning to the jury." 157
50
Doomsday
The crowning point in the trial was Vyshinsky s
closing statement, the " summa summarum " of the State's case.
It was a masterpiece of malice aforethought, and deservedly
earned for the Prosecutor fame as the poet laureate of
political invective
.
Vyshinsky began his lengthy speech by lavishly
passing out compliments. The judges, he declared, had con-
ducted a model trial:
With the greatest possible care you have sub-
jected to investigation and judicial scrutiny
every one of these proofs, every fact, every
event, every step taken by the accused, who
in the course of many years added crime to
crime in their struggle against the Soviet
state
,
against the Soviet power
,
against our
Party and against the whole of our Soviet
people . ± -JO
The chief victim in the case had been "one of the best sons
of the working class, one of the most devoted to the cause
of socialism, one of the most beloved disciples of the great
Stalin , the fiery tribune of the prolet ari an revolution , the
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unforgettable Sergei Mironovich Kirov." He was "most
dear to us," continued Vyshinsky, "that admirabla and wonder
ful man, bright and joyous, as our new life is bright and
joyous." But with his death the entire nation rose up in
support of the Party:
In this boundless love of millions of toilers
for our Party , for its Central Committee , and
for our Stalin and his glorious comrades-in-
arms, in this infinite love of the people lies
the strength of the defence and protection of
our leaders, the guides of our country and l61
Party, against traitors, murderers and bandits.
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With "great and unsurpassed love," workers of the world utter
the name of "the great teacher and leader of the peoples of
the U.S.S.R.—Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin!" Under his
leadership "socialism has finally and irrevocably triumphed
in our country. 11
Once this "Laudeamus Stalin " had been sung, Vyshinsky
turned to the enemy. Were they principled political foes?
No! The accused were but scum, terrorists lacking any





16 3group of traitors and murderers." They were only "liars
and clowns, insignificant pigmies, little dogs snarling at
an elephant, this is what this gang represents!" But they
knew how to kill, and when the order went out,
The underground machinery begins to work, knives
are sharpened, revolvers are loaded, bombs are
charged , false documents are written and fabri-
cated, secret connections are established with
the German political police
,
people are sent to
their posts, they engage in revolver practice,
and finally they shoot and kill.
Their entire domestic program, declared Vyshinsky, could be
165
summed up in a single word— "Murder."
The Prosecutor characterized their method's as double-
dealing, deception, and provocation. These people put masks
on their faces, "adopted the pose of repentant sinners who
had broken with the past, who had abandoned their old erring
166
ways and mistakes which grew into crime." Zinoviev was
particularly adept at masking his true intentions. He had
even had the effrontery to write a eulogy for the dead Kirov,
entitled "The Beacon Man." Vyshinsky exercised his
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indignation that Zinoviev, his hands "stained with Kirov's
blood!/' could write such "insolent sacrilege!," could exceed
all bounds of cynicism:
Such is this man. He loved him, he was proud
of him, and he killed him! The miscreant, the
murderer, mourns over his victim! Has anything
like it ever occurred before?
What can one say, what words can one use fully
to describe the utter baseness and loathesomeness
of this: Sacrilege! Perfidy! Duplicity!
Cunning!
Finally Vyshinsky admitted that he could not "find the word
with which to appraise this despicable trick!" 167
Turning to Kamenev, this hypocrite "'in an ass's
skin, 1 " as Kamenev once described himself, Vyshinsky brought
to the court's attention a preface the defendent had written
in 1934 to Machi avelli ' s The Prince . After quoting the ac-
cused on Machiavelli being a "'master of political aphorism
and a brilliant dialectician,'" one who "'created a shell of
tremendous explosive force which disturbed the minds of
rulers for centuries, 1 " Vyshinsky claimed that the 15th-
century Italian had been Kamenev 's "ideological source," as
well as Zinoviev' s:
Machiavelli was a puppy and a yokel compared
with them, nevertheless, he was their spiritual
preceptor. "Machiavellism, " and Azefism served
you as the source of your activities and your
crimes. Now this has been exposed by Zinoviev
and Kamenev themselves: murder, cunning, per-
fidy and masquerade were the principal, decisive
methods in their criminal activities. 168
But Vyshinsky saved his best for the last. The final
words of the speech sent a chill through the audience:
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The enemy is cunning. A cunning enemv must
not be spared. The whole people rose to itsfeet as soon as these ghastly crimes becameknown. The whole people is quivering with in-dignation and I, as the representative of the
state prosecution, join my anger, the indignant
voice of the state prosecutor, to the rumbling
of the voices of millions!
After reminding—even instructing—the judges to apply the
law to the full limits of its severity, Vyshinsky barked out
the "demand that dogs gone mad should be shot—every one of
169them." Hearing this cry for blood, "the prisoners slumped
back in their chairs and some buried their heads in their
hands and wept for the first time since the trial began,"
knowing in their hearts that all was lost. 170
But one last effort was made to save their lives
during the final pleas, when the accused attempted to pla-
cate the "beloved Leader" by reaching the "uttermost limits
of self-abasement." If Vyshinsky' s closing speech was the
dramatic apex of the trial, then the last words of the de-
fendants were its nadir. As the NKVD defector, A.Orlov,
wrote in wonder, "The old Bolsheviks branded themselves as
unprincipled bandits and fascists and at the same time
praised Stalin, whom they regarded in their hearts as a
171
usurper and traitor to the revolution." Like "camp-
meeting converts," they spared themselves no indignity in
order to reach the proper level of contrition and self-
condemnation. In these final moments some of the accused
were "fainting at times," while others were "choked by sobs"
or stopped to wipe tears from their eyes; "but upheld by the
Russian talent for the theatrical," they delivered their own
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funeral orations before a hushed audience of their enemies. 172
Mrachkovsky began the sorry spectacle. At first he
departed from the prepared script and stressed his revolu-
tionary background, but then he swung his arm and hit the
wooden bar, "with all his might," and returned to form. 173
He ended his last plea with this request: "I depart as a
traitor to my Party, as a traitor who should be shot. All I
ask is that I be believed when I say that during the in-
vestigation I spat out all this vomit." 174
The proper tone had been set. Most of the defendants
followed Mrachkovsky ' s lead in specifically rejecting any
appeal for mercy. Thus, Evdokimov declared that their col-
lective crimes were too great "to make it possible for us to
175
expect clemency." Reingold agreed with this sentiment.
After stating that the organization had been exposed as "the
shock troop, as a white-guard, fascist shock troop, of the
international counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie," he con-
cluded that the trial would bury the "political corpses" of
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, and Smirnov under "a heavy tomb-
stone." Reingold was modest to the end: "I fully admitted
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my guilt. It is not for me to plead for mercy." In the
same vein, Pickel confessed, "the last eight years of my
life have been years of baseness, years of terrible, night-
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marish deeds. I must bear my deserved punishment."
Berman-Yurin and Holtzman also joined the chorus, practically
pleading to be shot. Only M. Lurye , Olberg, and Ter-Vaganyan
asked for mercy, but the last named contritely added: "I bow
55
my head in guilt before the Court and say: whatever your




The two chief defendants were almost as repentant as
the others. Zinoviev began his final "graveside" speech in
a restrained fashion, but finally warmed to his task and
used his great oratorical talents to condemn his many politi-
cal sins. His final plea was notable for the following
formula: "My defective Bolshevism became transformed into
anti-Bolshevism, and through Trotskyism I arrived at fascism.
Trotskyism is a variety of fascism, and Zinovievism is a
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variety of Trotskyism." Only a true Stalinist could have
properly appreciated this inspired invention.
As for Kamenev, he retained a measure of dignity
while explaining how he found himself sitting in the dock
next to foreign agents. It was no accident that their fates
had become linked together: "Such was the path we took, and
such was the pit of contemptible treachery and all that is
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loathsome into which we have fallen." But then he ad-
dressed a personal appeal to his sons, and urged^them not to
look backward, but to go forward, with the Soviet people
—
"to follow Stalin." After this plea he collapsed, and had
to be given assistance. The courtroom was shaken by these
words, and even the "faces of the judges lost the studied
expression of stony indifference."
181 Only Smirnov continued
to be balky and, tossing "his mane of white hair," insisted
I 82
that he was only partially guilty of the charges.
The court took almost seven hours to consider its
verdict, a surprising development, since there was little to
discuss. It is possible that the time was used to consult
Stalin on the sentences, surely approved beforehand. In the
small hours of the morning of August 24 the court re-convened
to hear the verdict. Ulrikh took some thirty minutes to read
the decision, merely a banal rephrasing of the original in-
18 3dictment. Then he named each defendant and announced the
collective sentence— "the supreme penalty— to be shot, and
all property personally belonging to them to be confiscated.
»
1
Some of the NKVD men present then expected to hear the famil-
iar words, that considering past services to the Party, etc.,
etc., the sentences had been commuted. But no such com-
forting words were forthcoming. 185 One of the Luryes, either
Moissei or Nathan, managed, at the end, to interject a fitting
and ironic epitaph to the proceedings : 11 ' Long live the cause
1 Q c.
of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin!*"
According to one Soviet law, the accused had some 72
hours in which to submit a written appeal for clemency.
Barely 24 hours later, however, on the 25th of August, there
appeared a brief press announcement that the sentences had
already been executed. Supposedly the accused met their end
in one of the cellars of the Lubyanka prison, a pistol shot
in the back of the head. Once more Smirnov was in character.
He reportedly exclaimed, as he was being led away to execu-
tion: "'We deserve this for our unworthy attitude at the
trial."' 187
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Was the trial a smash hit, or at least a succes
d'estime? Orlov, for one, later wrote that Stalin had only
succeeded in shooting Zinoviev et al
.
, and that in all other
respects the trial had been "a complete failure," which
foreign opinion regarded an "an act of Stalin's revenge upon
-I Qphis political opponents." But one may question this
judgment, written with the aid of hindsight. The trial of
Zinoviev and Kamenev had been such M a terrible political
event" that many onlookers recoiled in confusion, unable or
unwilling to gaze deeply into the abyss. Despite the lack
of material evidence, despite the many inconsistencies in
the testimony, despite Smirnov's valiant effort to undermine
the state's case, despite the inherent absurdity of the ac-
cusations—despite everything— a large body of opinion
tended to accept the trial's credibility* The confessions,
in particular, carried the day. To a considerable degree,
observed Conquest, "the confession method justified itself
189politically." In addition, there was the rather human
desire to avoid facing a cruel dilemma. "There was little
choice between accepting the trial at its face v^lue and
branding Stalin as a vulgar murderer, and his regime as a
190tyranny founded on falsehood." But this was the period
of the "Popular Front," when Stalin's regime posed as the
lone bulwark against the rampaging forces of Fascism. Best
not to delve too deeply into the quagmire was a popular
response in both America and Europe to the questions raised
.
.
. , 191by the trial.
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True, not everyone was afraid to face the searing
truth. While the trial was still in process Friedrich Adler
and the Socialist International, no strangers to such politi-
cal frame-ups, sent a telegram to Moscow questioning the
lack of judicial safeguards in the proceedings, which the
Soviet press indignantly rejected as a gross intervention in
Soviet internal affairs. 192 From Great Britain came the sane
voice of the Manchester Guardian Weekly
, which suggested that
this was the "familiar cry of the State in danger, the be-
loved leader's life hazarded, a foreign Power fomenting as-
sassination," and posed a question of great relevance:
"With what conviction can the democratic countries develop a
common front with Soviet Russia against reaction if she
descends to the methods of barbarism of the Fascist world?"
And from exile in Switzerland came the anguished cry of
Ignazio Silone, himself a bitter foe of Fascism, who de-
nounced the "macabre caricatures of justice" in the Soviet
Union and declared: "If I remained silent now I should not
have the courage to write another single line against the
Fascist dictatorships." Without respect for human life
Hitler's foes would themselves become Fascists, he added,
194
and "I refuse to be a Fascist—even a Red Fascist."
But more common was the desire to duck the issues
raised by the trial. In this connection the authoritative
words of D. N. Pritt were of great comfort. A prominent
member of the British Parliament, distinguished barrister,
and leading defender of Georgi Dimitrov during the Reichstag
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Fire "counter-trial," Pritt had been specifically invited to
attend the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in Moscow. He repaid this
kindness by writing a series of articles and pamphlets with
but one message: the "case was properly conducted and the
accused fairly and judicially treated." 195
Stalin had been apparently correct when he disdain-
fully replied to the argument that Western public opinion





There was a widespread hope in the West that this
trial saw the end to such macabre proceedings in the Soviet
Union. But the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial contained within it-
self a thread that could be spun out into a new tale, one of
treason to the State.
During the August 1936 proceedings the names of other
prominent "conspirators" figured in the testimony. They in-
cluded, for the "Trotskyites , " G. Pyatakov, K. Radek, L
.
Serebryakov, and G. Sokolnikov, and for the "Rightists ,
"
N. Bukharin, A. Rykov , M. Tomsky , and N. Uglanov. Their
names had been tossed into the conspiratorial pot by Zinoviev,
1 an
Reingold, and Kamenev. The last named not only involved
the "Leftist" group (Lominadze and Shatsky), and the "Workers
Opposition" group (Shlyapnikov and Medvedyev), but was most
explicit in his denunciation of the "Rightist" group:
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In 1932, 1933 and 1934 I personally maintained
relations with Tomsky and Bukharin and soundedtheir political sentiments. They sympathized
with us. When I asked Tomsky about Rykov •
s
frame of mind, he replied: "Rykov thinks the
same as I do." In reply to my question as to
what Bukharin thought, he s-iid: "Bukharin
thinks the same as I do, but is pursuing some-
what different tactics: he does not agree with
the line of the Party, but is pursuing tactics
of persistently enrooting himself in the Party
and winning the personal confidence of the
leadership. "198
As a result of this testimony, Vyshinsky found it necessary
to inform the court at the close of the evening session,
August 21, that,
. .
.yesterday I gave orders to institute an
investigation of these statements of the ac-
cused in regard to Tomsky, Rykov, Bukharin,
Uglanov, Radek and Pyatakov, and that in accord-
ance with the results of this investigation the
office of the State Attorney will institute
legal proceedings in this matter.
There was already enough material, added the Prosecutor, to
1 99begin criminal actions against Sokolnikov and Serebryakov.
The Soviet press fell into line. Pravda
,
on August
22, reprinted Vyshinsky' s statement on the new suspects,
along with a demand of some workers from the "Dynamo" plant
that the links between Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov, Sokolnikov,
Radek, Pyatakov and the "counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-
Zinovievite gang" currently in the dock be investigated with-
out del ay . The next day Pravda carried a similar demand
by the Moscow Party aktiv
,
adopted after an address by N.
Khrushchev, but Tomsky' s name was omitted from the list.
This was no oversight, for the same issue— at the top of the
second page--had a brief communication:
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The Central Committee of the VKP (B) reports
that Central Committee candidate-member Tomsky,
who had become entangled with the counter-
revolutionary Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorists, has
committed suicide. 20 !
On the samo day that Pravda had published Vyshinsky's and
"Dynamo's" statements, Tomsky had taken his life. This
"honorable" but "un-Bolshevik" act was almost the only way
to cheat Stalin of his revenge.
All signs, however, pointed to the imminent trial of
Bukharin and Rykov, as well as Pyatakov and Radek. But it
was not to be. On September 10, 1936, Pravda announced that
the charges against the two "Rightists" had been dropped:
".
. .
The investigation has not established legal grounds
for an arraignment of N. I. Bukharin and A. I. Rykov, in
view of which further development of the case is termi^
202
nated. 1 " Although Rykov soon lost his post as People's
Commissar of Communications, Bukharin continued for some
time to be an editor of Izvestia , and both remained candidate
203
members of the Central Committee.
Obviously there had been a significant development
in late August-early September that served to take the pres-
sure, at least temporarily, off the two "Rightists," but
exactly what kind of development is still unknown. At the
time the "Old Bolshevik" told Nicolaevsky that there was
"some conflict with respect to the advisibility of additional
trials and the persons who were to be incriminated. Under
pressure of some members of the Politburo, announcement was
made rehabilitating Bukharin and Rykov."
204 More recently,
an ex-Party official, Aleksander Uralov (pseud, of Abdurakhman
Avtorkhanov)
,
has flatly stated that in early September a
formal meeting of the Central Committee was held. At this
plenum Yezhov supposedly accused Bukharin and Rykov of being
part of a "'monstrous conspiracy directed against the Party
and the State,'" a charge Bukharin accepted, except that
Stalin and Yezhov headed the conspiracy: "'It is the NKVD
and not the followers of Bukharin, which is preparing a
coup d' etat . • " The vote in the Central Committee went
against the motion to indict the two "Rightists," at which
time Stalin thanked the Committee for its "'healthy criticism
and self-criticism,'" and promised that he would '"take note
.
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of its decision for future guidance. '
"
It is almost certain that Uralov-Avtorkhanov 1 s plenum
never took pi ace . In the first pi ace , there is no formal
record of such a plenum being held, or any mention of an of-
ficial resolution emanating from it, contrary to Party custom.
In addition, such well-informed observers as Nicolaevsky,
Orlov, and Krivitsky never mentioned the calling of such a
meeting. More to the point, Khrushchev also failed to men-
tion this plenum in his 1956 "Secret Speech," even though
the existence of a moderate opposition to Stalin's policies
would have dovetailed nicely with his effort to exonerate
the Party of complicity in Stalin's crimes. Finally, the
details Uralov-Avtorkhanov provides are strikingly similar
to the facts known about an actual plenum, that of February-
March 1937, and it is highly doubtful that Stalin had left
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his vacation retreat in Sochi in early September, 1936. 206
Yet is is quite possible that some Politburo members
were deeply disturbed by the new indictments, George Kennan
207has suggested, and held some kind of informal meeting in
early September to discuss the situation. Stalin may have
taken note of this discontent in high places and decided,
characteristically, not to press the matter until conditions
had ripened. But there seems to have been no decrease in
his personal power. In early September Stalin ordered the
NKVD to prepare a list of some 5,000 of the more active op-
positionists in the camps, and have them summarily shot. 208
Shortly thereafter, with an imperious nod, Stalin dispensed
with Yagoda' s services. In a telegram sent from Sochi,
dated September 25, and co-signed by Zhdanov, the Party's
dictator appeared unmoved by any kind of "moderate" opposi-
tion to his policies . As revealed by Khrushchev , the tele-
gram read:
"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that
Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of
People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda
has definitely proved himself to be incapable of
unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite blocr The
OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This
is noted by all party workers and by the majority
of the representatives of the NKVD."209
There is a report that Yagoda had incurred Stalin's dis-
pleasure by shielding some of the accused and had cast doubt
210
on the accusations made against Bukharin and Rykov. He
would find himself a co-defendant with the two leading
"Rights" in the 1938 trial. Now, in any case, Yezhov was
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clearly in the saddle. Henceforth, the nation's ever-
widening circle of torment was to be known as the Yezhovshchina
.
or Yezhov's thing.
If Bukharin and Rykov were to enjoy a brief reprieve,
not so Grigori (Yuri) L. Pyatakov and Karl Radek, who were
arrested in September 1936. Stalin's price for delaying the
"Rightist" trial may have been an expeditious dispatch of
the other cases. During the fall great pressure was put on
Pyatakov to confess. "Tall, lanky, with a reddish goatee,"
Pyatakov "looked like a Russian editor of Don Quixote." 211
One of the six Party members mentioned in Lenin's "Testament,"
he had deserted the opposition after 1927 and devoted his
"superhuman energies" to the industrialization drive, which
212he oversaw as Vice-Commissar for Heavy Industry. Only
when his nominal chief and protector, "Sergo" Ordzhonikidze
,
promised him that his wife and personal secretary would be
213left unmolested, did Pyatakov agree to stand trial.
Radek also gave much grief to his interrogators.
This "ugly Puck" of Russian Communism had years earlier for-
saken his oppositionist views and devoted his considerable
journalistic talents to enhancing Stalin's public image. As
a result of his many services, Radek was beside himself with
resentment at being arrested: "'After all that I did for
Stalin, I didn't expect such an injustice from him.'"
During the fall he resisted all blandishments and even used
his wicked humor to strike terror in the heart of G. A.
Molchanov, one of his NKVD interrogators. At one point Radek
i
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reportedly agreed to sign anything, even that he wanted to
crown Hitler in the Kremlin, but insisted on adding one small
detail—that Molchanov was one of his accomplices. "'Yes!
Yes! Molchanov!' screamed Radek hysterically, 'If you believe
that it is necessary to sacrifice oneself for the good of the
party, then let us sacrifice ourselves together!'" As the
NKVD chief turned white with fear, Radek pressed his advan-
tage: '"What does the fate of a Molchanov matter to Yezhov
when the interests of the party are at stake! In order to
have at the trial one Radek, Yezhov will gladly throw into
the bargain a dozen like Molchanov. . . .'" 214
According to a NKVD source, Radek refused to confess
until Stalin personally guaranteed his life. In the presence
of Yezhov the Party's chief interviewed his victim in one of
Lubyanka' s chambers. Whatever Stalin said to him was ob-
viously satisfactory, for Radek began to confess on December
4, and became the most willing of prisoners. "From that
moment Radek became personal consultant to Yezhov in the
task of improving the legend of the conspiracy and perfecting
215its dramatic and literary quality." At the trial Radek
even boasted that for two and a half months he had "tormented
the examining officials and compelled them to perform a lot
of useless work," but after he decided to confess he "unfolded
the whole picture" without a single correction from first to
last
.
Before Pyatakov and Radek were deemed ready for pub-
lic exposure, a preliminary trial was held in Novosibirsk,
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November 19-22, which served to put added pressure on them.
Industrial sabotage was the charge. In particular, the West
Siberian Group of Trotskyite saboteurs was charged with ar-
ranging the great explosion in the Tsentralnaya Mine at
Kemerovo (
"
Kuzbas " ) which cost many lives. With the eager
assistance of several NKVD agents turned defendants, it was
not difficult to place the ultimate blame for the "sabotage
act" on Pyatakov's doorstep. Many of the charges and de-
fendants in this Novosibirsk trial were also included in the
?1 7Moscow spectacular of January 1937.
V. The Pyatakov-Radek Trial
The case of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre" be-
gan on January .23, 1937 and, like the last trial, was heard
in the October Hall of the Trade Union House. There was a
deja vu sense to the proceedings. In the chilly courtroom
there were many tall glasses of "smoking hot tea" for the
ubiquitous Ulrikh, who once again played straight man for
Vyshinsky's sallies. Amid "a blue haze of Russian cigaret
smoke" sat a myriad of spectators, including Alexei Tolstoy
("the Lesser") and Lion Feuchtwanger , two prominent novel-
ists. 218 Also present in the courtroom was the newly arrived
American Ambassador, Joseph E. Davies, who avidly followed
the unfolding drama with the aid of translations provided by
Loy Henderson and George F. Kennan. In his celebrated mem-
oir, Mission to Moscow , Davies was to write how impressed he
had been by Vyshinsky: "calm, dispassionate, intellectual,
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and able and wise. He conducted the treason trial in a man-
ner that won my respect and admiration as a lawyer." 219
Another American observer was the veteran reporter, Walter
Duranty, who covered the show for The New York Times
. But
Duranty was in a "delicate position," as he had been in and
out of the houses of many of the accused, especially
220Radek's. And, once again, the NKVD had sent over scores
of selected "workers" to give the Prosecutor moral support.
As usual, mounting guard over the prisoners were
"apple-cheeked" soldiers, with rifles and fixed bayonets. 221
Their charges included Pyatakov, who testified in a voice as
"precise and unemotional" as that of an academician, which
he also resembled, "with his scholar's stoop, high forehead,
black-rimmed glasses and short , reddish beard and waved-black
222hair, both flecked with gray," as Duranty observed.
Radek had an "ugly fleshless face," thought another specta-
tor, and often smiled at the audience or put his arm around
this or that prisoner. When he spoke, "he would pose a
little, laugh a little at the other prisoners, show his
superiority; arrogant, sceptical, adroit, literary." Often
he struck the barrier with his newspaper, or stirred his
glass of tea, and, "whilst he uttered the most atrocious
223
things, drank it in little sips."
Also in the dock was G. Y. Sokolnikov, who had
signed the 1918 Brest-Litovsk treaty for the Soviets, and
had been Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as well as
Ambassador to Great Britain. Like Pyatakov, he delivered
his testimony in a dispassionate voice, but not so L. P.
Serebryakov, who had preceded Stalin as secretary of the
Central Committee. According to Duranty, Serebryakov spoke
as if '-half asleep, and his voice sounded strangely dreamy,"
though his tale was clear enough. 224 The most impressive of
the defendants was N. I. Muralov, a fabled soldier who was
revered for his great courage, and intensely loyal to
Trotsky. He had thwarted his interrogators for some eight
months before agreeing to stand public trial. Davies con-
sidered that Muralov "conducted himself with fine dignity,
and appeared manly and straightforward." 225 The remainder
of the seventeen defendants consisted of various railroad,
chemical, and engineering officials, men of the second-rank,
but still of considerable importance in the Soviet indus-
trial system. 226
"Wreckomani a"
Unlike the earlier Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, sabotage
was at the center of these proceedings. Vyshinsky revealed
that the Trotskyites had engaged in such a widespread
wrecking campaign that it had reached the dimensions of a
national epidemic. According to the indictment, the accused
had carried on "wrecking, diversive, espionage and terrorist
activities for the purpose of disrupting the economic and
military power of our country, thus committing a number of
227the gravest crimes against the state." Outwardly the
sabotage charge appeared inherently absurd. During wartime,
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to be sure, large underground movements, working with mass
support, could inflict serious harm on the enemy. But in
peacetime random acts of sabotage committed by various mal-
contents normally had minor effect, and resulted in swift
exposure. Above all, such acts did not lend themselves to
coherent political objectives. Yet this theme was well
established in "Soviet mythology," i.e., the 1928 Shakhty
2 28Trial. And one close student of the Soviet scene has
suggested that Stalin personally interjected the issue into
the trial, based on his experience with Mwrecking"during the
Civil War,
In this trial Pyatakov was the leading authority on
such acts
,




Rataichak, and others. He calmly lectured the court on the
various methods used: pi acing a coke oven into operation
prematurely; delaying the construction of workers 1 housing;
revising blueprints much too frequently; supplying unsuit-
able coal for power plants; allowing trucks to stand idle
for lengthy periods; and other heinous sins. A dispassionate
observer might be pardoned for thinking that this litany of
treasonable acts appeared to be the normal difficulties en-
countered by any underdeveloped country attempting to in-
dustrialize rapidly. It has even been suggested that the
defendants were being used as "scapegoats" to mask managerial
deficiencies
.
Some of the charges, however, were more serious, or
at least more fanciful in nature. Shestov, for instance,
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testified that labor conditions were made so arduous that
when a "worker reached his place of work, he must be made to
heap two hundred curses on the heads of the pit management/*
a not unlikely possibility at the time. 230 a railroad ex-
pert, Knyazev, also confessed that without mass support he
was able to arrange 3,500 different train wrecks in the
period, 1935-36, or an average of five a day, as one ob-
231
server noted. (For reasons of verisimilitude, Vyshinsky
entered into the record the names of Red Army men killed in
one wreck: 11
. . . Kryuchkov, born 1910, collective farmer;
Sochilin, born 1913, collective farmer, . . . 11 and so on.? 32
Knyazev, in addition, testified that the mysterious
Japanese secret agent, one "Mr. H
—
,
" had instructed him,
in time of war, to contaminate troop trains with "bacte-
233
ria. 11 Even incidents of heroism were portrayed as dia-
bolical acts. When Rataichak reported on a rescue operation
he had organized, after a serious fire broke out in a chemi-
cal works
,
Vyshinsky pointed out that some 17 workers had
been killed as a result of the rescue effort. In his de-
fense Rataichak responded that the operation was ^necessary
in order to save the lives of hundreds of workers:
Vyshinsky : You directed it in such a way
that 17 workers were killed and 15 were wounded.
Is that so? 234
Rataichak : (Remains silent.
)





Terrorism once again played a prominent role in this
trial. In the course of the proceedings some fourteen groups
or individuals were listed as planning terroristic acts
against leading Party figures. Outside of Kirov's murder,
however, only one plot went beyond talk. Molotov, so con-
spicuous by his absence in the August 1936 trial, was now
elevated to the position of chief target extraordinaire
.
According to the indictment, while Molotov was on an in-
spection trip to Prokopyevsk (Siberia), his chauffeur, one
Valentine Arnold, deliberately tried to overturn the car
into a "deep ditch," but at the last moment "flunked" and
did not turn sharply enough, thereby allowing guards in a
second car to catch the automobile before serious harm could
?35be done. D
Vyshinsky's interrogation of Valentine Volfriodovich
Arnold provided a moment of hilarity in an otherwise de-
pressing trial. A consummate actor and professional rogue,
Arnold was able to puncture the Prosecutor's poise, and make
him look foolish, something the more learned defendants were
unable to achieve. A rather "thickset, swarthy, shock-headed
creature, with a sharp-pointed nose that indicates consum-
2 36
mate impudence," Arnold was a " lumpenprolet ari at " adven-
turer, born illegitimate in Tsarist Russia. In his early
years he had traveled from St. Petersburg to Finland, Germany,
Sweden, Norway, England, back to Sweden and then to Russia
again. Along the way he used a variety of names ("Ivanov,"
"Vasilyev," "Efimov," "Rask," "Kulpenen"
) , which Vyshinsky
found impossible to keep straight. When the Prosecutor ac-
cused him of changing the story he had told in the prelimi-
nary examination, Arnold blandly replied, "I signed it
/official statement/ thinking that you had the story straight
And when Vyshinsky became hopelessly confused over the de-
tails of the accused's service in the Tsar's army, Arnold
advised him, "... you had better take up everything in
proper order. You skip things and leave unfilled gaps." 237
But it was Arnold's American experience that had the
audience rocking with laughter at the Prosecutor's ex-
2 38pense. In 1917 he obtained a ship berth to the United
States and found himself in New York. A night spent in the
Army and Navy home resulted in his enlistment in the American
Army. Now an American citizen with another name—Arnold—he
returned to form and found himself in jail (at least once)
for ste aling government property . At one point he reversed
his testimony again, and casually informed the court that he
had been wounded at Verdun by a bomb fragment dropped from
a plane. Vyshinsky exploded: *
Accused Arnold, you would try even the
greatest patience , the patience of an ox. I
am not losing patience yet. You may deny what
you said at the preliminary investigation on
January 9, and what you said at the prelimi-
nary investigation in September , but you will
not get away from what you said only five
minutes ago. 239
But Arnold had the last word. Despite belonging to the
Russian Orthodox Church, this accomplished opportunist became
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a Lutheran in Los Angeles in order "to get into higher
society," i.e., become a Free Mason! In fact, he was a
Master Mason of the Ancient Order of Free Masons, Lodge No.
183. But there was more. Besides becoming a Lutheran and
a Mason, at the same time he also joined the nascent
Communist Party of the United States! This was too much for
the Prosecutor:
Vyshinsky : . . . And what were you really by
conviction, a freemason or a Communist?
Arnold : I was just a man. 240
This was the most dignified response of the entire trial.
After this inspired bit of buffoonery, the rest of
Arnold's testimony was on the prosaic side. Under
Vyshinsky' s prompting, he dutifully described his return to
the Soviet Union, his various work assignments in Siberia,
his involvement with the Trotskyites, and how "cowardice"
kept him from successfully wrecking Molotov's car.^4 "1" Later
in the trial Knyazev accurately declared that such types as
Arnold were "one in a million," and that he was "a rare
242
masterpiece." Still at a loss, Vyshinsky referred to him
as this "hardened scoundrel," a "rascal and an adventurer,"
an "international tramp, who has been, I think, in every
country in the world, and everywhere has left traces of his
243 •fraudulent operations." Despite the serious charges
lodged against him, Arnold only received ten years in prison
for his actions. There is a report that Stalin was so amused
244
by his antics that he decided to show him mercy.
74
"Trotskyite-Fascist Alliance"
Perhaps the most sensational charge in the trial con-
cerned the alleged link between the Trotskyite conspirators
and high-level Nazi officials. According to the indictment,
the Trotskyite "parallel centre" on trial (Pyatakov, Radek,
Sokolnikov, Serebryakov) had a concrete political program
245to "'retreat to capitalism. 1 " Since this policy could
not attract internal support, external assistance was so-
licited. In fact, Trotsky had personally negotiated an ac-
cord with Rudolph Hess, Hitler's deputy, and offered him the
following concessions:
".
. . the permission in the U.S.S.R. of the
development of private capital, the dissolu-
tion of the collective farms, the liquidation
of the state farms, the leasing of a number
of Soviet enterprises as concessions to for-
eign capitalists, and the granting to such
foreign states of other economic and political
advantages including the surrender of a part
of Soviet territory.
"
As Trotsky wrote Radek in December 1935, "'We shall have to
yield the Maritime Province and Amur region to Japan, and
the Ukraine to Germany.'" Furthermore, Trotsky allegedly
wrote that, "'We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin to
Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil in case of war
with America.,'" and '"We shall have to agree to Germany's
demand not to oppose her seizure of the Danube countries and
the Balkans, and not to hinder Japan in her seizure of
China. . . .' 1,246 In return for these concessions, Hitler
and the Mikado promised to aid Trotsky's return to power and
the reintroduction of capitalism. This was a defeatist pro-
gram of formidable dimensions.
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Since Trotsky was unavailable for questioning, and
the incriminating letter not forthcoming, Vyshinsky was
forced to rely on the testimony of Radek--Trotsky 1 s "Minister
247
of Foreign Affairs" —to bolster these sensational charges.
"'That Monkey Radek'" was certainly the most brilliant per-
248former in the dock. In Orlov's opinion, the trial was a
direct challenge to Radek 1 s ego:
To prove the impossible, to clothe an obvious
absurdity in a logical formula and do it better
than anybody else, was a feat that contained a
direct challenge to the demagogical intellect
and vanity of Radek.
A true Thespian, he '"lived 1 " his part, even overfulfilling
his assigned tasks. "Radek whined before the court and
249lashed himself unmercifully," wrote the NKVD defector.
With a certain el an , he painted a vivid picture of
Trotsky's depraved activities, and even quoted verbatim from
letters he allegedly received from his "Chief, " as we shall
see in a later chapter. Perhaps his most valuable contri-
bution to the case, however, was the valuable detail he
added to the "German connection." Radek testified to having
three different meetings with diplomatic and military repre-
sentatives of a "Central European country," where German was
the native tongue. When a diplomatic representative of this
nation asked him in the fall, 1934, about Trotsky's program
of "rapprochement" with Germary , Radek understood immediately
that he was not referring to any published articles, since
he knew that "Trotsky had never advocated the idea of a
rapprochement with Germany in the press," a completely
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accurate statement. Radek advised him that an altercation
between two countries, "even if they represent diametrically
opposite social systems, is a fruitless matter, but that sole
attention must not be paid to these newspaper altercations."
Continuing this theme, he added:
I told him that realist politicians in the
U.S.S.R. understand the significance of a
German-Soviet rapprochement and are prepared
to make the necessary concessions to achieve
this rapprochement. This representative
understood that since I was speaking about
realist politicians it meant that there were
realist politicians and unrealist politicians
in the U.S.S.R.: the unrealist politicians
were the Soviet government, while the realist
politicians were the Trotsky-Zinovievite
bloc . . . .250
Later in the trial Vyshinsky deliberately led him back to
the same subject. Radek testified about a meeting in the
summer of 1935 that he and Bukharin had with a diplomat and
a professor from Konigsberg, as well as a November 1935 con-
versation with a military attache who was also from Germany.
In the second conversation, lamenting the change in Russo-
German relations, the military official recalled the rapport
between the armies during Trotsky's time, and pressed Radek,
"as one who had formerly pursued the Rapallo line." In
response, Radek supposedly repeated that "realist politicians"
were ready "to make the necessary concessions in order to
ensure this friendship." In full agreement, the attache
suggested that "we ought at last to get together somehow and
jointly discuss the details, definitely, about ways of






This second conversation revealed to methat there was an attempt on the part of
military circles to take over the connections
which Trotsky had established with certain
circles in Germany, or that it was an attempt
to verify the real content of the negotiations
that were being conducted. Perhaps, also, it
was an attempt to ascertain whether we knewdefinitely what Trotsky had proposed. 251
At this point Vyshinsky changed the subject.
There will be no attempt at this point to analyze in
any great detail these delphic statements. But if "Stalin,"
and not Trotsky is the "realist politician" in question, as
Nathan Leites has suggested, then the above exchange was a
fairly accurate account of Soviet intentions at the time. 252
In fact, "negotiations" were being conducted in January 1937,
between Stalin and Hitler, not between Trotsky and Hess.
Radek testified about the "negotiations" on the evening of
January 27th; two days later, on the 29th, Stalin's personal
emissary, David Kandelaki, verbally suggested to Dr. Hjalmar
Schacht that direct negotiations be initiated between Germany
and the Soviet Union. However, Hitler reportedly thought the
253time premature to improve relations.
On the other hand, at this precise moment, Stalin was
beginning his subterranean campaign to undermine, and
eventually destroy the High Command of the Red Army. As we
shall see, a major component of this extraordinarily compli-
cated plot was the allegation that Marshall Tukhachevsky had
surreptitiously been holding talks with the German General
Staff, not known for its pro-Hitler sentiments. When Radek
alluded to "military circles" attempting to take over the
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connections which
-Trotsky had established with certain
circles in Germany/' he may have been conveying a signal from
Stalin to Hitler.
At one time "intensely indignant at Stalin's gross
ingratitude" for his services, Radek had used his talents to
expand the charges. According to a defector source, "There
is no doubt that Stalin had promised him special considera-
tion in return for his help in touching-up the picture which
Stalin wished him to present." 254 Perhaps Radek 1 s true mis-
sion was to send messages in Hitler's direction.
"Tilt of Wits"
Any speculation about Radek' s services to the prose-
cution must take into consideration his sharp, and often
malicious clashes with Vyshinsky, from which he emerged
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"with banners flying," as Duranty wrote of his old friend.
Although he must have realized that too much verbal by-play
would seal his doom, observed his biographer, Radek could not
resist making a strong impression: "If he was finally to be
256
martyred, let it be in style!" Whereas Arnold used low
v
humor to discomfort Vyshinsky, Radek employed his ironic in-
telligence in such a fashion that the Prosecutor sometimes
lost his poise completely.
Various sections of the record revealed intense
animus between Radek and Vyshinsky. It is not unlikely that
this opportunity to badger the sharp-witted prisoner was a
precious moment in the Prosecutor's career. But Radek was a
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dangerous adversary. At one point, for instance, Vyshinsky
attempted to put into Radek's mouth the notion that treason
was permissible when socialism was crippled. With ill-
disguised contempt the famous wag replied, "You are a pro- I
found reader of human hearts, but I must nevertheless comment
on my thoughts in my own words." In response the Prosecutor
admitted that he was out of his depths: "I know that you
have a fairly good stock of words behind which to conceal
your thoughts, and it is very difficult for a man, even a
good reader of human hearts, to understand you and induce
you to say what you are really thinking.
"
257 Then ensued an
acrimonious exchange over Radek's "treasonous" position in
1935-36, really an exercise in browbeating, until the de-
fendant taunted his tormenter, and dared him to ask why he
had remained silent for so many months. Vyshinsky angrily
replied:
I do not propose to engage in a shouting
match with accused Radek. I am interrogating
you, putting questions to you. Answer the
questions, if you please, and do not make
speeches. I would ask you not to try to shout
me down and not to speak on questions that
9 ^ fthave nothing to do with the case . ^ D<D s
But then the Prosecutor turned to Radek's long period of re-
sistance, September 22 to December 4, and asked if this be-
havior did not cast doubt on the defendant's claim that he
had many doubts about Trotsky's line:
Radek : Yes, if you ignore the fact that
you learned about the program and about
Trotsky's instructions only from me, of
course, it does cast doubt on what I have
said. 2^
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Vyshinsky had gone too far, and the cornered knave repaid
him in kind, exposing the fatal weakness in the case. The
intrepid Radek, in fact, returned to this dangerous theme in
his final plea. After asking, rhetorically, what proofs
could be produced to show that the Trotskyite organization
was helping to foment a new world war, he answered:
In support of this fact there is the evidence
of two people—the testimony of myself, who
received the directives and the letters from
Trotsky (which, unfortunately, I burned)
, and
the testimony of Pyatakov, who spoke to
Trotsky. All the testimony of the other ac-
cused rests on our testimony. If you are
dealing with mere criminals and spies, on
what can you base your conviction that what
we have said is the truth, the firm truth? 260
The clear implication in Radek' s statement was that the
"truth" rested on quicksand.
The very ambiguity of Radek 's "veiled" utterances
makes it difficult to fathom his true intent. On the one
hand, John Armstrong has written that in an effort to save
his life, Radek, "a cunning orator, seemed to be exercising
his talents almost enthusi astic ally to destroy his reputa-
tion." Orlov agreed that, on the whole, Radek "had car-
ried out Stalin' s instructions in full . " Yet he Nalso noted,
But if we examine carefully what Radek was
saying at the trial, we shall see that he
managed to construct his self-incriminating
testimony in such a way as to stress the
absurdity of the accusations and convey to
the world that the judicial authorities did




As we shall see in a later chapter, Trotsky was almost totally
oblivious to the "dangerous contraband" that Radek had managed
to introduce in the trial.
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Lacunae and Denouement
Although many accounts of the trial ignored the
glaring lack of corroborating evidence, Vyshinsky was well
aware of the serious deficiencies in his case. Where were
the documents, written program, rules, minutes, seal, etc.,
he rhetorically asked, to support the existence of such a
conspiracy? With great aplomb he answered that in such a
case one could not demand such evidence:
You cannot demand that cases of conspiracy, of
couP d'etat be approached from the standpoint:
give us minutes, decisions, membership cards,
the numbers of your membership cards; you can-
not demand that conspirators have their con-
spiratorial activities certified by a notary. 263
The Tsarist Okhrana
,
however, had no such problem in ob-
taining these kinds of records from Lenin and other expe-
rienced conspirators. Although the Prosecutor asserted that
certain documents of great value had been presented to the
court, he candidly admitted that the problem in this case
was to distinguish in the confessions truth from falsehood.
Incredibly, he claimed, "every judge, every procurator, and
every counsel for defence who has taken part in scores of
trials knows when an accused is speaking the truth and when
he departs from the truth for some purpose or other." 264
But in each of the trials the "experienced" Vyshinsky osten-
sibly accepted certain "lies" as facts, which were only dis-
covered in the subsequent trial.
In fact, the material evidence was embarrassingly
meager. A few of Stroilov's notebooks were introduced in
court as exhibits, several German "agents" were identified
82
from photographs presented to the accused, and the Telephone
Address Directory of the German Reich, 7th Edition, Volume
II, was exhibited, "proving" that an address in one of
Stroilov-S notebooks matched that of a German agent in
Berlin. 265
Even a display of extra-sensory perception found its
way into the record. Before 1932 Radek was ostensibly di-
vorced from any Trotskyite activity. But at one point Radek
was walking home from his offices at Izvestia and saw I. N.
Smirnov and his secretary on the street. They immediately
turned away, he recalled and, conseguently , "I immediately
realized that something was in preparation, that something
was brewing. But they did not come to me, and did not speak
to me openly." Yet these two conspirators, "knowing of my
frame of mind" from this chance encounter, supposedly re-
quested Trotsky to get in contact with Radek for the purpose
of recruiting him into the conspiracy. In February 1932,
9 ft f->Trotsky dutifully wrote Radek. Thus, an exceedingly im-
portant contact was generated by "vibrations" passing between
three men as they silently turned away from each other.
During the trial, it was alleged, many letters passed
between Trotsky and his confederates in the Soviet Union but,
once again, none were available for examination in the court-
room. Trotsky and Radek, in particular, maintained a steady
correspondence, their letters being passed back and forth by
Vladimir Romm , a liaison man and journalist. In late July
1933, Romm personally had an interview with Trotsky in Paris
—
83
in the Bois de Boulogne. 267 Trotsky
-s direct involvement in
the plot was further demonstrated when Pyatakov testified
that in December 1935 he flew from Berlin to Oslo, for the
purpose of discussing Trotsky's current line. At that time
an exile in Norway, Trotsky allegedly received Pyatakov and
held a long conversation with him on wrecking activities,
268
etc. The circumstances around these two personal
"meetings" with Trotsky will be examined in some detail in
another chapter for, like the "Hotel Bristol" affair, they
provided Trotsky with an important opening—one that tended
to explode the entire case against him.
Vyshinsky's summation was another exercise in abuse,
even more repetitious than his earlier effort. In recapit-
ulating the proceedings, the Prosecutor claimed that the
trial had been a "searchlight," illuminating "the most re-
mote recesses, the secret by-ways, the disgusting hidden
269
corners of the Trotskyite underground." Like a "reversed
cinema reel," the historical evolution of Trotskyism had been
clarified until its final conversion into a "storm detachment
of fascism, into one of the departments of the fascist
270police." The whole history of this movement, from 1904
to the present, had been "an uninterrupted chain of betrayals
of the cause of the working class, of the cause of social
-
271ism. H In support of this unrelieved picture of treachery
toward the revolutionary movement, Vyshinsky introduced many
distortions of historical fact which will be examined in con-
nection with Trotsky ' s defense.
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In the vignettes of the major defendants, Vyshinsky
highlighted their criminal activities. Once again he
stressed that this was a gang of criminals, hardly to be
distinguished from "gangsters who use blackjacks and daggers
on the high-road on a dark night." 272 Murderers, incendiaries,
bandits—they resembled the medieval " camorra ," which had
united Italian nobility, vagabonds, and brigands. 273 But I
they were hardly intelligent conspirators, for their unequal
alliance with foreign states was like a wretched little gnat
crawling into a wolf's mouth while "consoling oneself with
the idea that the wolf is not wicked and will not gobble one
274
up." In addition, declared the Prosecutor, these
Trotskyites were true "Judases," who had sold their native
land for "30 pieces of silver," thus repeating a familiar
refrain often used by the seminary-trained Stalin. 275
But the climax of the speech came in the final para-
graphs, where Vyshinsky called on the murdered and maimed to
support his plea:
I am not the only accuser ! Comrade Judges
,
I feel that by my side here stand the victims of
the crimes and of these criminals : on crlitches
,
maimed , half alive , and perhaps legless , like
Comrade Nagovitsina , the switch-girl at
Chusovskaya Station , who appealed to me
,
through
Pravda, today, and who, at 20 years of age, lost
both her legs in averting a train disaster
organized by these people I I do not stand alone!
I feel that by my side here stand the murdered
and maimed victims of these frightful crimes, de-
manding of me, as the State Prosecutor, that I
press the charge on all points!
I do not stand here alone! the victims may
be in their graves, but I feel that they are
standing here beside me, pointing at the dock,
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at you, accused, with their mutilated arms
which have mouldered in the graves to which
you sent them!
I am not the only accuser! I am joined in
my accusation by the whole of our people! I
accuse these heinous criminals who deserve
only one punishment—death by shooting! 276
After the dead had pointed their maimed and moldering
arms at the accused, Vyshinsky gave way to three defense at-
torneys. Counsel I. D. Braude, speaking for Knyazev, was
hardly distinguishable from the Prosecutor in his approach:
"Comrade Judges, I will not conceal from you the exceptionally
difficult, the unprecedentedly difficult position which the
defense finds itself in this case," since the great indigna-
tion felt by the entire country toward the accused "cannot
277but be shared by Counsel." Once these "defense" speeches
had been given, the accused presented their final pleas,
generally self-abusive, but not quite as shameless as those
at the August 1936 trial. Perhaps the most pathetic words
were spoken by Pyatakov:
In a few hours you will pass your sentence.
And here I stand before you in filth, crushed
by my own crimes, bereft of everything through
my own fault, a man who has lost his Party, who
has no friends, who has lost his very selvf.278
Certainly this was a sad end to a distinguished career,
symbolizing the tragedy of an entire revolutionary generation.
At 7:15 on the evening of January 29 the court ad-
journed to consider its verdict, and reconvened at 3:00 the
next morning. After Ulrikh had read the verdict, he an-
nounced the sentences. Thirteen of the accused received the
death penalty. Arnold, as mentioned before, was given ten
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years, and Stroilov received eight for his efforts. More
surprisingly, Sokolnikov and Radek escaped with just ten
years apiece. 279 According to Orlov, when Radek heard the
sentence, his "face lit up with joy," he shrugged his
shoulders, and "smiled a guilty smile." 280
That very day, a bitterly cold January 30, 1937, a
mass demonstration of some 200,000 people was held in Red
Square. While the demonstrators waved horrid caricatures of
the accused, and shouted for blood, Nikita Khrushchev ad-
dressed them. The future critic of the personality cult
concluded his speech by declaring:
These assassins aimed at the heart and brain
of our party. They raised their evil hand
against Comrade Stalin. Raising their hand
against Stalin, they raised it against all of
us, against the laboring class, against the
workers! Raising their hand against Comrade
Stalin, they raised it against the teaching of
Marx-Engel s-Lenin
!
Raising their hand against Comrade Stalin,
they raised it against all that is best, all
that is human, because Stalin is hope, aspira-
tion, the beacon of all advanced and progressive
humanity. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our
will! Stalin is our victory I 281
To the surprise of hardly anyone, the workers gained
their wish. It was announced the very next day (February 1)
that all pleas had been rejected and the accused had already
. , 282been executed.
VI. A Second Entr'acte
The liquidation of the "Anti-Soviet Trotskyite
Centre" removed from the political scene a number of
Stalin's erstwhile opponents, but the "prophylactic" action
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was far from complete. A number of potential foes in the
Party, army, and government still served to restrict Stalin's
absolute freedom of maneuverability. Once again the broom




One of the few Party leaders with a measure of in-
dependent authority was G. K. ("Sergo") Ordzhonikidze
, an-
other of Stalin's Georgian cronies. A veteran Party worker,
Ordzhonikidze was known for his tempestuous nature as well as
his elementary sense of decency. As Commissar of Heavy
Industry, he had been heavily dependent on the expertise of
his brilliant deputy— Pyatakov— and had apparently waged a
strenuous fight to save his life. In this effort he sup-
posedly called Yezhov a "'filthy lickspittle, 1 " and even
threatened Stalin over the phone:
"I demand that this authoritarianism cease!
I am still a member of the Politburo I I am
going to raise hell, Koba if it's the last
thing I do before I die! "283
Ordzhonikidze never got the opportunity "to raisevhell." On
February 18th he suddenly died of a "heart attack," as certi-
fied by a panel of eminent physicians, who themselves were to
284perish in short order. Almost immediately rumors circu-
lated that he had been murdered or forced to commit suicide,
but it was left to Khrushchev in 1956 to reveal officially
that instead of a heart attack, he died frrom a self-
inflicted gunshot wound. At the XXIInd Party Congress in
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1961 he added that "Serge" could no longer work with Stalin,
and "'in order to avoid clashing with Stalin and sharing
responsibility for his abuse of power, he decided to take
his life. 1 " Since a decisive meeting of the Central
Committee was about to convene, logic indicates that politi-
cal murder, not suicide, was the order of the day, as Robert
Conquest has suggested. 285
The February-March Plenum
A plenum of the Central Committee met between
February 23 and March 5, 1937, the longest such assembly on
record. At this time the Stalinist "moderates" made a last
feeble effort to deflect their chief from his murderous
course. As revealed by Khrushchev in his 1956 "Secret
Speech," Pavel Postyshev, the Party's loyal satrap in the
Ukraine, led the counter-attack. He was particularly in-
censed that a member of the Ukrainian Central Committee— one
Karpov—had been accused of joining the Trotskyite camp in
1934, after so many years of loyal and arduous service:
".
. .1 personally do not believe that in 1934
an honest party member who had trod the long
road of unrelenting fight against enemies for
the party and for socialism would now be in the
camp of the enemies. I do not believe it. . . .
I cannot imagine how it would be possible to
travel with the party during the difficult
years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites.
It is an odd thing. . . ."286
Supposedly such Party stalwarts as Y. Rudzutak, V. Chubar,
R. Eikhe , G. Kaminsky, and also some Army commanders, at-
tempted to support Postyshev, but Stalin and his gang were
able to shout down any such pleas.
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Also at this plenum Bukharin and Rykov were brought
before the membership, in order to be expelled from the Party
Bukharin took the opportunity to assert that there was, in-
deed, a conspiracy in the land— led by Stalin and Yezhovl
Supposedly Stalin intervened and brutally stated, '"if you
are innocent, you can prove it in a prison cell!'" 287 The
two "Rightists" were arrested on the spot, and led away to
prison. In addition, Stalin berated Yagoda's stewardship of
the NKVD. At this point Yagoda turned on the jeering mem-
bers of the Central Committee and snarled, '"What a pity I
didn't arrest all of you before, when I had the power I'" 288
His arrest was delayed until April of that year.
Toward the end of the plenum, on March 3, Stalin de-
livered a long speech, in which he defended his pet theory
that the class struggle intensified as socialism reached its
triumphant completion and took some ill-disguised swipes at
Postyshev and the Ukrainian organization, portending a new
purge. He charged that some leading comrades had been un-
able to see the real face of the "'wreckers, diversionists
,
spies, and murderers, 1 " and even had " * cooperated* in pro-
moting the agents of foreign states into this or that re-
289
sponsible position.'" Even more ominously, he suggested
that Party leaders at all ranks select "'two Party workers
capable of being their real substitutes,'" hardly a fraternal
_ , . 290piece of advice.
Henceforth, Stalin would have his bloody way, without
significant opposition: The Great Purge was about to reach
its monstrous climax.
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The Red Army Purge
Not even the honored military establishment would be
spared the humiliation of public disgrace, even though it
was revered for its Civil War exploits. "The Red Army was
as well loved among the masses of the people as the G.P.U.




The news of a vast "plot" within the Army High
Command to overthrow the regime became public knowledge in
June 1937, but Stalin had been preparing this stroke since
mid-1936. At that time Divisional Commander Dmitri Shmidt
was arrested , and 1 ater named as a conspirator in the
292Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. (He had once had the audacity to
threaten to lop off Stalin's ears, apparently a never-for-
\2 9 3gotten insult. r Also in this trial record appeared the
name of Corps Commander Vitovt Putna, once military attache
294in London, and close to the Army's leadership.
But Radek was the real harbinger of bad news for the
Army . Apparently following instructions , Radek casually
mentioned at one point in the January 1937 trial \hat Putna
295
had come "to see me with some request from Tukhachevsky .
"
At a later point Vyshinsky led him back to this point, and
Radek protested that he had not meant to implicate the
Army's leader: "Of course, Tukhachevsky had no idea either
of Putna* s role or of my criminal role. ..." There was no
question of having counterrevolutionary dealings with
Tukhachevsky, since Radek knew his attitude to the Party and
I
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Government "to be that of an absolutely devoted man. 1 ' 296 But
there is one report that, as Radek "absolved" the Marshall of
all criminal activities, he "grinned maliciously," 297 perhaps
because Tukhachevsky was not known as being overly fond of
Jews. But this was the denial that affirmed. While stationed
in Holland, Krivitsky read of this exchange, and immediately
informed his wife, "'Tukhachevsky is doomed!'" When she pro-
tested that Radek had again and again absolved the Marshall
of any connection with the conspiracy, he said that was




If the tale that a small band of demoralized and dis-
credited capitulators could seize the country was highly un-
likely, it was at least plausible that the highly disciplined
Red Army could successfully undertake just such a coup
d' etat . Newly modernized, the Army in the 1930s boasted an
officer corps that was well-trained, tightly knit, and
faintly contemptuous of the political commissars, who inter-
fered with their legitimate military duties. However, the
Army explicitly acknowledged that Stalin was the>Party's
rightful leader, being Lenin's "heir." Klementi Y.
Voroshilov was the nominal chief of the military cadres, but
Marshall M. N. Tukhachevsky was the actual director of the
Army. Born into an aristocratic family, Tukhachevsky had
fought as a youth in the Tsar's army, but later joined the
fledgling Red Army during the Civil War and became one of its
leading commanders while still in his twenties. He had come
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close to capturing Warsaw in 1920, only to see this oppor-
tunity dashed by the disobedient tactics of the "Tsaritsyn"
unit on his left flank, led by Stalin. Vain, brilliant, and
ambitious, his prestige had steadily increased to the point
that, if a "Bonaparte" were to appear on the Soviet scene,
this ex-noble was the logical choice. Whether or not
Tukhachevsky and his coterie of followers ever entertained
the thought of overthrowing the regime mattered little.
Stalin had decided that a "preventive" purge was desirable
in order to remove this possibility. 299
By the end of April 1937, it was "an open secret"
that Tukhachevsky and other ranking generals were marked men,
according to a defector source. During the traditional re-
view of the Red Army on May Day, the Marshall and his fellow
commanders stood silent, not even talking to each other,
possessed of a sense of doom. On May 4th Tukhachevsky • s com-
mission to represent the Soviet government in London at the
coronation of George VI was canceled. And six days later he
was demoted and transferred to the command of the Volga
Military District, hardly an auspicious assignment. At the
same time the positions of a number of other leading com-
manders were also shifted. It appeared that the Army purge
was to be a protracted and convoluted operation
.
But in mid-May Stalin received "documentary evidence"
that Tukhachevsky and his group had entered into treasonous
relations with the German High Command. This Byzantine in-
trigue involved the Soviet NKVD, the Nazi SD, the White
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Russian officer corps, and President Eduard Benes of
Czechoslovakia. In a plot as complex as any mystery aficio-
nado could desire, the first move had apparently been by the
NKVD. Through General Nikolai V. Skoblin, a leading figure
in the Paris-based "Union of Tsarist Veterans," who also
worked for both the German and Soviet intelligence agencies,
the story was planted in Berlin that Tukhachevsky was en-
gaged in a conspiracy with his German counterparts. Obvi-
ously a spurious tale, it was promptly fed back to its Moscow
creators in a new guise, designed to compromise the Red Army.
Towards the end of 1936 the Nazis leaked the story of German-
Red Army contacts to Moscow through the good offices of
President Benes. "A dossier was forged in the
first months of 1937. Of great artistic merit, it featured
an exchange of letters between Tukhachevsky and the German
General Staff, some thirty-two pages long, and also in-
cluding a photo of Trotsky with German officials. By May
3011937, this "dossier" was in Stalin's hands.
Whatever reluctance Stalin felt about proceeding with
this particular purge apparently evaporated. Arrests of
leading commanders were commonplace in late May. Then on
June 11, 1937, came the stunning news. Almost the entire
leadership of the Red Army had been arrested. The next day
came the announcement of their execution, after a "secret
30 9
trial." Unlike the earlier "plots," some top Soviet of-
ficials believed in the reality of this intrigue. A leading
NKVD official, Colonel Mikihail Shpigelglas, told A. Orlov
I
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that there had been '"a real conspiracy,"' as indicated by
the panic at the top, the changing of all passes to the
Kremlin, and the alerting of the troops. He quoted M.
Frinovsky, another NKVD chief, as saying, The whole
Soviet Government hung by a thread.""' 303 Yet the voluminous
Nazi records captured after World War II lent no support to
the existence of such a plot. And during the post-war "de-
Stalinization" campaign the executed generals were among the




Even if there had been a plot in the Army High
Command to overthrow Stalin, this hardly justified the vast
dimensions of the military purge. Guilt by association
reached such a stage that lowly captains were being arrested
for active participation in the plot. "Nests" involving
hundreds of officers at a time were discovered, and promptly
eliminated. Although accurate figures on the military purge
are not available, it has been estimated that from 20,000 to
35,000 officers perished, or 35 to 50 per cent of the entire
officer corps. With regard to specific posts, Stalin's mili-
tary victims included 3 out of 5 marshals, 13 out of 15 army
commanders, 57 out of 85 corps commanders, 110 out of 195
division commanders, 220 out of 406 brigade commanders— and
so it went. Such a widespread decimation of the Army's
most experienced cadres could not but affect its efficiency.
Certainly, the Red Army's sorry performance in the 1939-40
Finnish campaign, and also in the first phases of the war
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with Germany, can partially be blamed on its lack of knowl-
edgeable officers in leading combat positions. Even
Khrushchev admitted that, "Very grievous consequences,
especially in reference to the beginning of the war /i.e.,
19417, followed Stalin's annihilation of many military com-
manders and political workers during 1937-41 because of his
suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations." 306
A Nation Prostrated
The NKVD tornado swept across the USSR with demo-
cratic choice and thoroughness, battering the Party, the
government, the nation, as well as the NKVD itself. As early
as March 1937, Yezhov had embarked on a widespread purge of
Yagoda's followers, substituting his own men from the Central
Committee secretariat. A favorite technique was to send
senior police officials on inspection tours to the provinces,
only to have them removed from the train at the first sta-
tion, and returned to NKVD headquarters, this time as pris-
oners. Eventually the purge of experienced police cadres
extended down to the obi ast ' level, resulting in a radically
different institution. Those purged had hardly been paragons
of virtue, but many were dedicated Communists in their own
way, and avoided the use of brutality per se. The new police
cadres had fewer such scruples, following the lead of Stalin,




The purge also transformed the Party into a new
creature. Many familiar faces were missing from the summit
by the end of 1937. Arrested as spies or worse were




Kossior, Eikhe, Chubar, Krylenko, Bubnov, etc. In some
cases these high officials continued to carry out their
Party or government functions, even though their death sen-
O A Q
tences had already been signed. ° A number of them were
never properly conditioned to stand public trial indicating,
as Robert Conquest has noted, that they had a clearer sense
309of values than many who confessed.
During 1937-38 Yezhov handed Stalin literally hun-
dreds of lists of potential Party victims. Part of his
daily routine must have been authorizing the execution of
310thirty-to-forty Party workers. Nor was the center alone
singled out for special attention. Stalin loyalists were
sent to the provinces intent upon wrecking old-time Party
organizations. Zhdanov (to Leningrad)
,
Mikoyan (to Armenia),
Khrushchev (to the Ukraine), and Kaganovich (everywhere) they
were among the most prominent . Local Party secretaries were
replaced by their younger colleagues, who were promptly
purged in turn, a process that seemed endless. But those
who managed to survive had great careers opened to them.
For example, Leonid Brezhnev was a Khrushchev protege in the
Ukraine and member of the "Class of 1 38," those who climbed
311
to prominence over the fallen bodies of their comrades.
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To loyal Communists this decimation of Party cadres
was -the most frightful act in the tragedy of the thirties." 312
Khrushchev, though only in retrospect, was incensed by the
liquidation of those "honest, loyal Leninists, devoted to the
cause of Revolution—
.. ./who? were the first to go when
Stalin imposed his arbitrary rule on the Party." 313 But a
far greater tragedy was visited on the average Soviet citizen.
For every Party member who fell, another eight to ten ordi-
nary Russians were persecuted, perhaps a total of seven mil-
3 1
4
lion. The Party's "tragedy" pales beside that of their
suffering.
As explained in the Preface, the nightmarish atmos-
phere of Soviet life in the late 1930s was a peculiar com-
pound of physical fear and psychological mistrust. Secret
informers, or seksots
,
were so plentiful that expression of
honest feelings all but disappeared; and sons were even en-
couraged to betray their fathers. This "atomization of
society" resulted in the erosion of trust and loyalty, ex-
cept to the Leader. An incautious word might result, at any
time, in a knock on the door in the small hours of the
morning— that is, a visit by the NKVD. "Fear by night, and
a feverish effort by day to pretend enthusiasm for a system
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of lies, was the permanent condition of the Soviet citizen."
"Guilt" or "innocence" had almost nothing to do with
the decision to arrest. It was all a matter of belonging to
certain "objective" categories, which automatically made one
an "enemy of the people." Local NKVD chiefs had to fill
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quotas sent from Moscow. Thus, a defector reported seeing a
cable that Yezhov sent to his man in Frunze, in the Kirghiz
SSR: '"You are charged with the task of exterminating 10,000
enemies of the people. Report results by signal.'" 316
Fortunately for the local secret police satrap, he already
had voluminous lists of "subversives" under such headings as
"AS" (anti-Soviet element), "Ts" (active member of the
Church), "SI" (anyone with contacts abroad), etc. He could
quickly meet his quota, and cable Moscow satisfactory news. 317
But as new and more expansive quotas were assigned, not only
former kulaks were arrested, for instance, but anyone who
knew said "criminals"—until the ever-widening circles en-
compassed a significant percentage of the nation. 318 This
was a "chain letter" operation with murderous consequences.
Besides the obvious danger of actually being a former
"Trotskyite
,
" it was not healthy to have belonged to the Red
Cross, to be a member of a national minority group, to have
run a hotel, or learned Esperanto, or collected foreign
stamps. The list of perilous occupations and associations
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was almost endless. For instance, an opera singer who had
danced too long with a Japanese diplomat at a ball found her-
self in a camp. Even a veterinarian who had treated dogs
from a foreign consulate was swept up, since contact of any
kind with foreigners was especially hazardous. As a class,
intellectuals were particularly prone to arrest. For in-
stance, it was risky to be a biologist and question Lysenko's
agricultural policies, or a linguist and disagree with N.
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Marr-s thesis that all language derives from the four
sounds-rosh, sal
,
ber, and ^on. Nor were poets neglected in
the general roundup. Among the many examples, there was the
celebrated Osip Mandelshtam. Arrested in 1934, he received
three years in a camp, where he attempted to commit suicide.
Allowed to return to Moscow, he was arrested again in 1938
and was sentenced to five years' forced labor in the Far
East, where he was viciously beaten by a criminal gang, and
forced to beg scraps of food. Apparently he finally died in
a psychiatric ward. But earlier he had written these verses:
But your spine has been smashed,
My beautiful, pitiful era,
And with an inane smile
You look back, cruel and weak,
Like a beast that has once been supple,
At the tracks of your own paws. 32 "
Since the charges were patently false, the NKVD in-
terrogators invited the prisoners to invent their own
legend,'" which would later be confirmed by other inter-
rogations. In this way did "imagination materialize and put
321on flesh and blood." As a result, some of the charges
and confessions were worthy of high burlesque, if the con-
sequences had not been so deadly. For instance, the
Assistant Director of the Moscow Zoo was thought to be a
spy, but he told his cell-mates that he was only a "'wreck-
er' "— some 16 per cent of his monkeys had died of TB, a
322smaller percentage than that of the London Zoo. In an-
other case, an elderly lady from a kolkhoz was arrested for
being a "Trotskistka" ( "Trotskyite " )
,
which she confused with
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"Traktoristka " ("tractor driver"); obviously a false charge,
she declared, since old people in her village were not al-
lowed to drive tractors. 323 Another worker from Kiev told
his interrogators how he planned to blow up a kilometer-long
bridge with several kilograms of arsenic, but was thwarted
w 324by rainy weather. And one prisoner admitted developing
special bacteria cultures, which only struck at NKVD cadres. 321
Such myths did not matter in the least, since the
main objective of the interrogation was to obtain the names
of other accomplices. The prisoners were forced to accuse
those who had recruited them, and whom they had in turn re-
cruited, thereby ensuring an ever-widening purge. However,
there were various tactics for avoiding the filthy business
of denouncing one's friends and family members. For in-
stance, one Armenian priest denounced every single Armenian
he had buried in the last three years. In addition, a
leading doctor in Kharkov incriminated every single doctor
in the city, several hundreds, which enraged his interroga-
tor: '"You're not going to tell me that all the doctors in
Kharkov are enemies of the people.'" But the physician stuck
326to his impl ausible t ale • Another tactic was to implicate
all the NKVD personnel involved in one's case, but this was
a chancy ploy at best. No matter, the ever-widening search
continued for "the imaginary founders of our various organi-
zations,' 1 wrote one ex-prisoner. The accused usually re-
ferred to these legendary forefathers as " 1 the arch-
recruiters. 1
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Some ten per cent of those arrested were executed in
speedy fashion. But the vast majority were sentenced by
"Special Boards- to five, eight, or ten years in one of the
various "corrective" camps. It has been estimated that by
the end of 1938 the camp population was about eight million
persons. These camps specialized in felling timber, mining
gold, preparing various construction projects, etc., each
its own special hell. if an inmate survived the frigid
weather, debilitating diseases, and close confinement with
vicious criminals ( urkas ) , he often succumbed to the lassi-
tude brought on by short rations. As soon as a prisoner was
obviously weakening under the terrible regimen, his food
quota was reduced, which meant a quick end. Most of the in-
mates, even the hardy ones, could only survive two years of
this living hell. Of all the millions incarcerated in the




The Soviet Union's collective derangement was reaching
a crisis point in mid-1937. But yet to come were vsome of the
Purge's bloodiest excesses, including the "Great Trial" of
Bukharin and Rykov (March, 1938), to be discussed in a later
chapter
.
Leon Trotsky did not wait, however, for the end of
the savage affair before mounting a strenuous defense against
the calumnies besmearing his political reputation. The
"counter-trial" in Mexico City was staged in April 1937, and
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based primarily on the charges in the first two Moscow
trials. it is appropriate at this point, therefore, to turn
to Trotsky's initial reactions to the Purge and his feverish




"THE PLANET WITHOUT A VISA"
All places that the eye of heaven visits
Are to a wise man ports and happy havens.
Teach thy necessity to reason thus;
There is no virtue like necessity.
Think not the King did banish thee,
But thou the King.
. . .
King Richard II, 1:3
"The Century of the Homeless Man"— a fitting epithet
for an era that has witnessed the forcible dislocation of
human lives on an unprecedented scale. Except for perhaps
God's own—the blessed Anglo-Saxons—most of the world's
tribes in recent decades have experienced the doubtful pleas
ure of forsaking home and starting life anew in an alien en-
vironment. In fact, nothing is so banal as the picture of a
homeless refugee , hands outstretched
,
begging alms from a
bored world. Banishment has been the rule, not the excep-
tion, for the world's pilgrims during much of the twentieth-
century.
In exile, there is both "splendor and squalor," as
Joseph Wittlin has observed,"'' but for most of the world's
outcasts the sorrows have certainly outweighed the blessings
Lack of a valid passport has meant not only spiritual exile,
2
but often the inability to secure work or sink new roots.
Being "paperless," and therefore prey to the whims of gen-
darmes and concierges, these transients were condemned to a
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travel-stained life of cold-water, walk-up flats, temporary
jobs demeaning to the spirit, and incessant fears of yet an-
other trip across the frontier, these "border-bugs." 3
Dreams of the past and hopes for the future became
their consolation. Fearing the irreversible step of accept-
ing a new culture, emigrees tended to recreate a glorious
past. They held on to "stage properties of the past," while
at the same time endlessly debated the shape of the future.
The cafe became the surrogate for the homeland, a place
where the ferocious reality of the present receded in a blue
haze of cigarette smoke and hot cups of tea, where talk was
a virtue in itself: "Five men listened and did not under-
stand, and five others did not understand and talked."
(Herzen) On "the road with one another" to an imaginary
destination, time disappeared and boredom intruded, spiced
from time to time with intrigues, scandals, and gossip
t
all
endemic to emigre life. The result, all too often, was a
psyche deformed by "fear, debasements, destitution, and re-
jection.
"
Not all the "flotsam," of course, was prey to these
tribul ations . The creative ones , in particul ar , even
profited from the experience. Despite the deprivation of
emotional reaction, of the native soil, of language, there
was the liberation from the tyranny of current concerns.
Voltaire, Hugo, Schiller, Herzen— all have benefited from
the opportunity to ignore the transitory in life in favor of
deathless issues, to make "shoes" for feet which will tread
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the earth a hundred years hence. But at some point even
making shoes for imaginary feet loses its charm. 5 Only the
hardy can sustain the necessary faith.
At best, exile has been a mixed blessing for even
the strongest of the exiles. Jean-Paul Sartre once expressed
the problem succinctly. Ke has Matthieu Delarue say in Le
Sursis :
La liberte c 1 est 1 1 exile et je suis condamne a.
etre libre
For the final decade of his life Leon Trotsky was also "con-
demned to be free.' 1
*******************
No stranger to exile and emigration was Lev Davidovich
Bronstein, known to the world as Leon Trotsky. Arrested in
1898 by the Tsarist police for youthful political indiscre-
tions
,
Bronstein spent more than eighteen months in jail
,
before being exiled to the Lake Baikal region of Eastern
Siberia. In 1902 he escaped his captors and finally made
his way to London and a first meeting with Lenin. After
several years spent as a political emigre in France,
Switzerland, and Belgium, he returned to Russia in 1905 to
help lead the 1905 revolution. Arrested again, the young
revolutionary, having assumed the name Trotsky, was ordered
deported in 1907 to lifetime exile in Northern Siberia, to a
penal colony on the Polar Circle. But the intrepid Trotsky
never reached his God-forsaken destination. On the way he
i
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eluded his guards and made good his escape, traveling a week
across the frozen tundra on a sleigh drawn by reindeer and
driven by a drunken native. After coming upon a railroad
line, he made his way to St. Petersburg, and from there to
Western Europe. The years 1907-14 were spent mostly in Vienna,
with sidetrips to the Balkans. The outbreak of World War I
forced him to take up residence in France, which allowed ex-
cusions to neutral Switzerland. But in 1916 he was deported
to Spain. From there he succeeded in finding passage to New
York, arriving in early 1917. Finally, in May 1917, he re-
appeared once again in the Russian capital, this time to
spend ten fateful years in the thick of revolutionary activ-
ity.
On February 12, 1929, the Soviet vessel "Ilyich"
entered the Bosphorus , and disembarked its meager cargo--
Trotsky, his wife and eldest son, and GPU escorts. A year
had already been spent in exile in distant Alma-Ata. But
Stalin desired that his arch-nemesis be banished to an even
more remote realm, to the Turkish "backwater" of Kemal
Ataturk. And so began Trotsky's "third" and last emigration.
This period of banishment was to be far different
than the first two, which Trotsky remembered as "blissful
times," when he could freely cross frontiers on a doubtful
7
passport and appear in open political meetings. Now he
traveled on a passport in the name of "Leon Sedov," no more
8
acceptable to European authorities than the former one.
This time exile was involuntary, and instead of finding a
107
circle of kindred spirits, Trotsky found himself set adrift
in hostile Constantinople, where, to be sure, a Russian
colony flourished, but one consisting of White emigr4es,
from whom he was separated by "the blood of the civil war." 9
He was now an outcast par excellence
,
unwelcome in the West
as well as the East.
But he shared with the other "Lost Tribes of Russia"
the usual vexations of emigre life— impoverishment, imper-
manence, uncertainty. Few, however, could share with him
the extreme vicissitudes of fortune. The former "Ogre of
Europe," who had shaken thrones and defied presidents, was
just another "Wandering Jew." No matter how he conducted
himself, the last years of his life could only be an anti-
climax to the great years of triumph. And the revolutionary
flow did not pledge another triumph in the coming years. Yet
he remained the eternal optimist, with great faith in the
future, no matter what "filthy outrages" history allowed her-
self in the present. At the dawn of the century he had
pledged his faith:
. . . As long as I breathe, I shall fight
for the future, that radiant future in which
man, strong, and beautiful, will become master
of the drifting stream of his history and will
direct it towards the boundless horizon of
beauty, joy and happiness ll°
In the last year of his life he reaffirmed this optimism:
. • . But whatever may be the circumstances
of my death I shall die with unshaken faith in
the communist future. This faith in man and in
his future gives me even now such power of re-




Yet these brave words could not disguise the melancholy
truth of his situation. He was turning fifty as he began
his final period of exile, and the "communist future" was
becoming increasingly remote under Stalin's stewardship.
Trotsky had reached this age just at the point when the
Revolution no longer required his services.
But the "Old Man" contemptuously rejected the notion
of personal tragedy or the thought that he, like the
Mensheviks, had been tossed into the "ashcan of history."
Only a philistine, he wrote in his autobiography, My Life
,
could accept a relationship between the "power of reasoning
and a government post, between mental balance and the present
situation." Proudly he declared, "I know no personal
12tragedy." Like the poet who had carried eight volumes of
Pushkin with him into exile, thus packing "Russia in my
13bag," Trotsky had also packed his "Russia"—the ideals of
October. It was his solitary duty, as he conceived it, to
preserve the legacy of Lenin from Stalin's disfigurement and,
at the same time, to fashion "shoes" for the future. It was
a demanding assignment, excluding personal concerns. And it
was a task that he alone could discharge. "Now nobody re-
mains," he lamented in 1935. As a result, he was reduced to
carrying on a dialogue with the newspapers, hardly an ade-
quate substitute for his earlier exchange of ideas with Lenin,
Rakovsky, Bukharin, et al . Still, Trotsky considered that
his work in those years was "the most important work" of his
life, even more important than his heroic activities in the
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period 1917-21. Then his work could not be considered
"indispensable," not with Ilyich there to guide the ship of
state. The decade of the 1930s was another affair altogether
In an oft-quoted passage, he wrote in 1935 that "now my work
is 'indispensable' in the full sense of the word." it was a
simple fact of political life:
There is no arrogance in this claim at all. The
collapse of the two Internationals has posed a
problem which none of the leaders of these
Internationals is at all equipped to solve. The
vicissitudes of my personal fate have confronted
me with this problem and armed me with important
experience in dealing with it. There is now no
one except me to carry out the mission of armina
a new generation with the revolutionary method




Hardly any other Russian emigre at the time was faced with
such a mission, self-imposed or otherwise.
Trotsky's state of splendid isolation was exacerbated
by Stalin's machinations. As one after another of the voices
of October lost his willingness, or ability to make plain
the reality of Stalin's Russia, Trotsky stood alone in the
historical limelight, the only authentic alternative to "The
Leader of All Progressive Humanity." No matter that Trotsky
was middle-aged
,
frequently beset by enervating illnesses
,
and forced to depend on a handful of loyal secretaries to
transcribe his philippics, his mythical figure grew in direct
proportion to the virulence of the attacks emanating from the
Kremlin. Ironically, as Isaac Deutscher has observed, the
more loudly Stalin "denounced his adversary as the chief or
sole prompter of every heresy and opposition, the more
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strongly did he turn all the mute anti-Stalinist feelings,
with which Bolshevik Russia was overflowing, towards the
outcast's remote yet towering figure." 15 The two Titans
stood alone on facing peaks, issuing their epistles and
clashing over the rightful possession of Lenin's legacy,
while their disciples, far below, debated the proper slope
to scale.
Much of Trotsky's energy was devoted to creating a
Fourth International. Whether this was an heroic or quixotic
undertaking, it was a central concern of his in the 1930s.
Yet this International basically was stillborn: it was never
more than a tiny boat overweighted by a huge sail, to quote
1 c
one observer of the Trotskyite band. Much of the trouble
lay in Trotsky's inability to direct personally the activities
of his followers. Often forced to live incognito, his free-
dom to travel severely limited, police scrutiny a constant
vexation, Trotsky was "cut off from political action,' 1 as he
himself wrote. He even had to turn to "such ersatz journal-
ism" as a private diary:
• . . But one has to take the situation as it
is. For the very reason that it fell to my lot
to take part in great events, my past now cuts
me off from chances for action. I am reduced
to interpreting events, and trying to foresee
their future course. At least this occupation
is more satisfying than mere passive reading. 17
Yet this was no mean task, as Isaac Deutscher has noted: "To
restore Marxism and to reimbue the mass of communists with
its critical spirit was the essential preliminary to effec-
1
8
tive revolutionary action, and the task that he set himself."
Ill
The prosaic present, however, kept bidding for his
attention. Money, passports, police spies—these mundane
matters drew him away from "what ought to be" to "what was."
And then came the nightmare of the purge. Trotsky suddenly
found himself publicly branded as the arch-fiend of the revo-
lutionary movement. What could he do? In 1937 he wrote
Angelica Balabanoff that, "'History has to be taken as she
is; and when she allows herself such extraordinary and filthy
outrages, one must fight her back with one's fists.'" 19 And
so he accepted the challenge issued by Clio or, more ac-
curately, by Stalin.
I. Castaway, A La Turque
When Trotsky's party disembarked in Constantinople
(February, 1929), it was initially housed in the Soviet
Consulate, an awkward arrangement for all concerned. With
the solicitous aid of his GPU escorts, Trotsky finally found
a villa on one of the Prinkipo Islands, or Princes 1 Isles,
in the Sea of Marmara. Once a place of exile for royal pre-
tenders to the Byzantine throne, the "bright red-cliffed
island" lay down beside the sea "like a prehistoric animal
on
drinking." The summer brought hordes of vacationers from
the city, but for the balance of the year Trotsky shared the
island with a few fishermen and shepherds, with "only the
21
braying of an ass" to break the serenity of the isle.
Near the main village of Buyuk Ada was the villa,
rented from an impoverished Turkish effendi. The '"dingy
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marbles, sad bronze peacock, and humiliated gilt betraying
the social pretensions as well as the failure of the Turkish
owner,'" wrote an English visitor, was to be the scene of
ceaseless bustle. 22 His wife—Nat alya Sedova— immediately
set about removing the many signs of senescence in the large
abode, but comfort was not her main concern. Many of the
vast rooms lacked a single stick of furniture, wrote Max
Eastman
:
The lack of comfort or beauty in Trotsky's
house, the absence of any least attempt to
cultivate the art of life in its perceptual
aspect, seems sadly regrettable to me. A man
and woman must be almost dead aesthetically to
live in that bare barrack, which a very few
dollars would convert into a charming home.
The garden surrounding the villa was allowed to run to seed.
"To save money, Natalia Ivanovna explains. Through sheer
2 3indifference to beauty, I should say." Isaac Deutscher
agreed with the "hedonistically minded American visitor"
that the place lacked the coziness of an American middle-
class home, but this was but a "waiting-room" for them:
"Effort and money had to be saved for a desperate struggle
in which the Biiyuk Ada house was a temporary headquarters.
24
Its clean and bare austerity suited its purpose."
Eager to remove himself from this Turkish cul-de-sac,
Trotsky and his friends waged a strenuous campaign to secure
a visa to a more civilized land. But the governments of
Europe were loathe to offer hospitality to such a notorious
guest. The German Social Democratic leadership and the Labor
government of Great Britain turned their hypocritical backs
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on the plight of their "socialist brother," despite the re-
peated efforts— in the case of the British—of Lloyd George,
H. G. Wells, and George Bernard Shaw, among others. 25 The
French, Dutch and Czechs followed suit. Even the Duchy of
Luxemburg turned a deaf ear to his pleas. As for the United
States, Trotsky believed it would be futile to attempt to
obtain a visa from not only "the strongest, but also the most
terrified country." Since Europe and America controlled the
other continents, "This means
—
The pi anet without a. visa. 1,26
When the Soviet regime deprived him of citizenship in 1932,




In actual fact, many relished the spectacle of
Trotsky's fall from grace, none more so than Winston
Churchill. Ironically, considering his war-time relations
with Stalin, Churchill wrote in Great Contemporaries that
"the dull, squalid figures of the Russian Bolsheviks" were
not redeemed in interest even by the magnitude of their
crimes. "All form and emphasis is lost in a vast process of
Asiatic liquefaction," he declared, and not even the slaughter
of millions will "attract future generations to their uncouth
lineaments and outlandish names." Churchill was especially
pleased that Trotsky had been "marooned by the very mutineers
he had led so hardily to seize the ship." Lacking any trace
of compassion or sense of human kinship, Trotsky was like the
cancer bacillus: " . . .he grew, he fed, he tortured, he
slew in fulfillment of his nature." But the "once triumphant
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Trotsky," chortled Churchill, "whose frown meted death to
thousands, sits disconsolate— a skin of malice stranded for
a time on the shores of the Black Sea . . . 1,28
For more than four years Trotsky was to be "stranded"
29on Pnnkipo.
- Amidst secretaries, bodyguards, and family,
he once more established his familiar regimen—work, work,
and more work. The results were impressive. Besides editing
the Bulletin of the Opposition
,
he issued numerous statements
and articles on the Soviet scene, especially on Stalin's col-
lectivization drive and on the Comintern's suicidal policy
towards the rise of German fascism. Even more important,
Trotsky found time during these "tranquil" years to write
his autobiography, My_ Life
,
and the epic History of the
30Russi an Revolution .
This prodigious labor was accomplished despite the
coming and going of numerous visitors. Besides the Eastmans,
other fair-weather friends consulted him on the lonely isle,
such as Beatrice and Sidney Webb, the British Fabians. Fol-
lowers also made the long journey, including one Senin-
Sobolevitzius ( ali as Jack Soble), who later testified that
the GPU dispatched him to keep a wary eye on Stalin's neme-
sis. Another prominent Chekist—Jacob Blumkin— secretly
visited the "Old Man." For this indiscretion he was to lose
31his life.
For relaxation, Trotsky went on long fishing trips
with two Turkish friends, relishing the exertion of dragging
heavy nets and loads of fish. On one occasion, they ran
115
afoul of a great storm at night, and were forced to seek
refuge on a deserted island. 32 Such adventures were balms
to his spirit. "When the- fishing had been good, that is,
very fatiguing," wrote one of his secretaries, "he began
work on his return with redoubled enthusiasm." 33
While preparing to leave Turkey, once and for all,
in July, 1933, Trotsky wrote that "'on this island of quiet
and oblivion echoes from the great world reached us delayed
and muffled.'" In a melancholy vein, he added, "'I feel as
if my feet had got somewhat rooted in the soil of Prinkipo.'"
In truth, as Isaac Deutscher has noted, this was "the calmest,
the most creative, and the least unhappy time of his exile." 34
II. French Hospitality
Somewhat to Trotsky's surprise, and much to his re-
lief
,
the Radical government of £douard Daladier offered him
asylum in July, 1933. Not since 1916 had Trotsky lived in
France; then he had been expelled at the behest of the
Tsarist government. This time the offer of a visa included
stringent conditions . Corsica, home of another notorious
outcast , was to be his residence , until the state of
Trotsky's health caused Paris to relent. The authorities
agreed that he could live in one of the southern departements ,
as long as he maintained a strict incognito and stayed away
from Paris.
The voyage on the Italian vessel, Bulgaria , was slow
and painful, Trotsky being stricken with a severe attack of
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"lumbago." Near the port of Marseilles, various subterfuges
were taken to land him undetected on mainland France. After
a lengthy automobile trip, he arrived in the small village
of St. Palais, near Roy an and the Atlantic coast. From July
25 to October 1, 1933, he lived in a rented villa, receiving
scores of visitors and re-acquainting himself with European
political conditions. But his health was so poor, and his
physical stamina so low, that Trotsky was unable to establish
a work schedule. At the beginning of October, Trotsky and
his wife journeyed to Bagneres de Bigorre, in the Pyrenees,
for a complete rest. Finally on November 1 he moved to
Barbizon, a small town near Paris, his residence for the next
36
six months.
The peaceful conditions of Barbizon allowed him to
return to his political and historical labors. At this time
he researched his proposed biography of Lenin, a congenial
task. Loyal followers protected his identity and carried
messages back and forth to Paris. But in April, 1934, the
local gendarmes stopped one of his messengers for a minor
traffic offense, and, subsequently, discovered the true iden-
tity of the mysterious recluse living on the outskirts of
town. Since the national Surete had not found it prudent to
inform the local police of Trotsky's whereabouts, the news of
the great discovery was given to the press. Newspapers, from
the far left to the far right, attacked the government for
giving asylum to such a dangerous fugitive. As a result of




Accompanied by two secretaries, and followed by a
detective, the beardless Trotsky drove southwards, having
become a true nomad. At Chamonix his identity was discovered
almost immediately. He and his wife moved into a pension,
registering as French citizens of foreign extraction, while
his followers searched for a more permanent abode. Pre-
tending to be in deep mourning, in order to avoid dining with
the other residents, they lived in fear of new difficulties;
they had inadvertently settled in "a royalist pension," the
landlady being the leader of the local monarchists. There
followed another move to a summer house, and still another
"leak" to the local press. After three months of such vaga-
bond living, Trotsky and his wife finally found refuge in a
small Alpine village— Domene—near Grenoble. There they
lived for eleven months in the house of the schoolmaster,
38
without secretaries, bodyguards, or visitors.
Life in Domene was bleak. The depressing conditions
of this period are reflected in a personal diary that Trotsky
kept at this time. In May, 1935, he confided,
Life goes on, as before, in a modified
prison style: between four walls, without
people. Once a day a walk along a path, with
back yards and gardens on one side, and the
ascent into the mountains on the other. The
path leads to villages at either end, so that
the walk is a short one, about 30 minutes long;
to stretch it out to an hour you have to walk
there and back twice. That too resembles
prison walks ... 39
For companionship husband and wife listened to concerts over
,,40
the radio, "an instrument perfectly suited to a prison.
I
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For relaxation Trotsky sampled a wide variety of Russian,
French, English, and American literature, most of which
failed to stir his admiration. For example, he picked up an
unnamed book of Edgar Wallace, and could not fathom why his
stories were read so voraciously: "It is hard to imagine
anything more mediocre, contemptible, and crude." 41 But the
autobiography of "Mother Jones" was another matter. "It has
been a long time since I have read anything with such in-
terest and excitment. An epic book!" He wondered if this
memoir by the veteran American radical had been translated
42into foreign languages. Most of his reading, however, was
as exciting as prison fare
.
To compound his woes, the weather in the Alps was
often raw and chilly, reflected in the state of his health
and his spirits. Intermingled with reflections on the sorry
climate, Trotsky wrote in his Diary a running commentary on
his various ailments for this period. Thus, for May 23,
1935, he penned: "It has been quite a few days already that
N. /Nataly^a/ and I have been ill. Prolonged grippe . We stay
in bed either by turns or together. May has been cold and
dreary. ..." Often he complained of ill health, which
interfered with his work: "Yesterday another period of ill
health began for me. Weakness, slightly feverish condition,
an extraordinary humming in my ears."
44 For June 26, 1935,
he wrote an extended comment on the perplexing problem:
I go on being sick. It is amazing how much
difference there is in me between health and
sickness. I am like two different people, even
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in external appearance, and sometimes this hap-
pens within twenty-four hours. Hence there is
a natural supposition that the cause is my
nerves. But the physicians diagnosed an in-
fection a long time ago, in 1923. It is possible
that it is my "nerves" that give such a wide
range to the external manifestations of the ill-
ness . 4 5
This mysterious "fievre cryptogene , " with him since the early
1920s, struck at odd times, often coinciding with political
crises or personal setbacks; hence the hypothesis that it was
46psychosomatic in origin. Certainly Trotsky's "nerves" were
exacerbated by political matters, at least in part. Imme-
diately after the above passage Trotsky confided to his
Diary that he had dreamt about a shipboard conversation with
Lenin. Worried over Trotsky's illness, Lenin stated: "'You
seem to have accumulated nervous fatigue, you must rest . . .'"
Yes, agreed the sick one, this time "the trouble seemed to
lie in some deeper processes," which caused his mentor to
declare: "'Then you should seriously (he emphasized the
word) consult the doctors (several names) . . .'" At this
point in the dream Trotsky realized that Lenin was already
dead, and so hurried to close the conversation, recounting
47
his trip to Berlin in 1926 for medical consultation.
Without attempting any kind of "analysis" of this dream, one
may still state that Trotsky's "nervous fatigue," or fever,
was associated with the sorely missed Ilyich. Now Trotsky
was the "Old Man," with all that entailed for the movement.
In fact, his age had begun to depress him. Trotsky
remembered that Lenin had once quoted I. Turgenev, and asked
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a colleague, "'Do you know what is the greatest vice?
To be more than 55 years old.- 48 Lenin did not live long
enough to develop this "vice/ 1 but Trotsky was just 55-years-
of-age in 1935. In his Diary he attempted to defend the
necessity of old age saying, with Engels
# that without it
there would be no youth, but it was still a shock: "Old age
is the most unexpected of all the things that happen to a
,,49man. M
Old age, of course, implied death. And Trotsky
worried that the "organism-destroying microbes" would consume
him before the world revolution went forward again. He ex-
pected an early end in 1935:
My condition is not encouraging. The at-
tacks of illness have become more frequent , the
symptoms are more acute, my resistance is
obviously getting weaker. Of course, the curve
may yet take a temporary turn upward. But in
general I have a feeling that liquidation is
approaching. 50
His "liquidation , " of course , was not to come for another
five years.
But it was not only his own life that was at stake
.
Many members of Trotsky's family still lived in the Soviet
Union. All during 1935 Trotsky and his wife worried that
Stalin would strike "police blows against people close to
me."
51 And he remembered a remark by Pyatakov, after
Trotsky had charged Stalin with being the "gravedigger " of
the Revolution: "'He /stalinZ will never forgive you for
this: neither you, nor your children, nor your grandchil-
dren." 52 During this terrible year, starved for information
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about their kin still in Stalin's power, Trotsky and Natalya
feared the worse. Finally a postcard brought the news that
Trotsky's first wife—Alexandra Sokolovskaya—had been ar-
rested and exiled. Later they learned that their youngest
son, the apolitical Seryozha, had also been arrested. At
this point Trotsky wrote in his Pi ary
,
"Poor boy
. . . And
my poor, poor Natasha . . ," 53
Under the weight of so many blows, Trotsky recalled
the sad plight of the 17th-century Old Believer, Avvakum,
forced to wander through the Siberian wasteland for his
heresies. He reminded Natalya of the archpriest and his
wife, the latter sunk in snowdrifts:
"•And I /Avvakum/ came up, and she, poor soul,
began to reproach me, saying: 'How long, arch-
priest, is this suffering to be?' And I said,
' Markovna, unto our very death.' And she, with
a sigh, answered: 'So be it, Petrovich, let us
be getting on our way. • "54
And so the modern-day "archpriest" of Bolshevism and his wife
went on their way.
It was during this year in Domene
,
certainly the
nadir of Trotsky's period of exile, that Stalin's incipient
Purge became to embroil him.
III. Kirov and Trotsky
For several years Trotsky had been warning his fol-
lowers to expect more outrages of the lethal variety from
the Kremlin. As early as March 4, 1929, he wrote:
"There remains only one thing for Stalin: to
try to draw a line of blood between the offi-
cial party and the Opposition. He absolutely
122
must connect the Opposition with terrorist
crimes
,
preparation of armed insurrection
etc . ..." ~ '
If Stalin could not provoke some such "adventure," and thus
discredit his foes, then his clique would be forced to
"fabricate or plant on the Opposition 'a terrorist act' or 'a
military plot.'" 55 Trotsky had no doubt that the "terrorist
act" of December 1, 1934, was just such a provocation. The
"line of blood" had been drawn at last.
Isolated in his Alpine retreat, Trotsky was forced
to rely on his "prison radio" for much of the details about
the Kirov affair. Energized by this political challenge to
his analytical talents, Trotsky responded with a series of
penetrating articles and pamphlets. In each case he at-
tempted to place Kirov's death within the context of growing
internal contradictions, a basic tenet of his approach to
Stalin's regime. His understanding of the purge phenomenon
in the ensuing years was to grow in depth, but would not
radically alter from the initial response to this "colossal
sensation.
"
Trotsky wasted no tears on Kirov's fate. In his
view, the Party's leader in Leningrad was just another ad-
ministrative cipher, of no more political importance than a
Postyshev or a Kossior. Deserving little attention, Kirov
hardly figured in Trotsky's first comments on the affair.
Never did he suggest that Kirov was the leader of a "moderate"
opposition to Stalin's policies. Scorned as a "rude satrap,"
a "third-rate bureaucratic figure," an "administrative man
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of only average talent," Kirov, prior to his death, received
from Trotsky no more attention than he gave "to some general
somewhere in China." Only death gave him stature. "Who in
the world had heard of Kirov before he was assassinated?,"
asked Trotsky before the Dewey Commission. 57
In the same vein, Trotsky disparaged the importance
of Leonid Nikolayev, Kirov's killer. The assassin's name
"reveals nothing to anyone," wrote Trotsky in his first re-
58
sponse to the murder. Too much time had passed since Kirov
purged the Leningrad apparatus in 1926. There must have been
"much more recent circumstances" that drove Nikolayev on the
59
road of terrorism than these old grievances. Whatever the
"subjective motivations" of Nikolayev' s band, they remained
60
"a matter of indifference" to Trotsky. But the Soviet al-
legation that a terrorist organization existed within the
Party was of "great symptomatic significance," indicating a
political atmosphere favorable to such acts.^ As far as
Trotsky knew, however, this was just a band of "unknown
YCLers." 62
Neither Trotsky nor Stalin considered the murderous
act "an isolated and accidental phenomenon," or a tragic
episode. In fact, the bureaucratic leaders invested it with
"a political importance so exceptional," wrote Trotsky, op-
position and terrorism were eguated: "To the terrorist act
of Nikolaev , Stalin replied by doubling the terror against
the party . 1,63 Such "disproportionately great consequences"
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suggested that they were already lodged in the system,
awaiting a signal "to break out into the open." 64
The bureaucratic degeneration of the workers' state
gave rise to such mischief. But not all was amiss. In
Trotsky's opinion, it would be "criminal" to deny the pro-
gressive work of the bureaucracy, such as the program of in-
dustrialization and collectivization, adopted by the " logic
65
of its own interests ." Certainly it had a "historical
justification," in a transitional stage, to protect the
nationalized economy against individual appropriation. In
the village, especially, there was "the need of guarding by
the severest methods of repression the property of the col-
lectives against the peasants themselves." According to
Trotsky, the regime was the instrument for "preventing a new
class struggle that is looming from out of the fierce com-
petition between the interests involved in the sphere of
consumption, on the basis of a still lagging and unharmonious
economy .
"
But the "dual" role of the bureaucracy also contained
a negative side. Externally, in the international working-
class movement, " The Stalinist bureaucracy pi ays _a dis -
organizing
,
demoralizing and fatal role from beginning to
end." In the past eleven years the Comintern, despite nu-
merous revolutionary opportunities, had known nothing save
"shameful defeats, political disgrace and the atomization of
its organization." Internally, the bureaucracy had ex-
cluded the active participation of the entire toiling
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population in planning the economy, resulting in contradic-
tions and crises, with the overwhelming majority of the popu-
lation leading a poverty-stricken existence. There was,
argued Trotsky, "an increasingly more profound and irrecon-
cilable contradiction with the fundamental needs of Soviet
economy and culture. " As a result, there had developed a
"permanent political crisis," with the ground slipping from
under the feet of the Stalinists. 68
Communist youth were caught in the middle. Listening
to the grumbling of their bureaucratic fathers, the "sons"
had no outlet for expression and, if "spurned, oppressed and
deprived of the chance for independent development," then
69terrorism appealed to their senses. Trotsky was unsparing
in his condemnation of Kirov's murder, showing how counter-
productive were its consequences. But he also charged that
such acts were the logical result of bureaucratic decay:
" Individu al terrorism is in its very essence bureaucratism
turned inside out. " Both the terrorists and bureaucrats
have no confidence in the masses. "The Stalinist bureaucracy
has created a vile leader-cult, attributing to leaders divine
qualities. 'Hero' worship is also the religion of terrorism,
70
only with a minus sign." But this was an attempt to short-
change history. The glorification of the "'Great Leader,'
the 'Beloved Chief,'" has led to a tissue of contradictions
71
and the emerging "communist" terror.
Stalin incarnated "in the most complete fashion the
positive and negative traits of the bureaucratic stratum,"
126
believed Trotsky, 72 and he was using the Kirov incident to
"discipline the bureaucratic ranks, which are disintegrating
and which have lost their internal cohesion. 1,73 in particu-
lar, Stalin castigated the "compromised groups," i.e.,
Zinoviev and Company, who had become infected by the pre-
vailing spirit of the bureaucracy, even telling stories about
Stalin's ignorance. "Could Stalin have chosen a better vic-
tim than this group when the shots at Smolny impelled him to
teach the vacillating and decomposing bureaucracy a lesson?,"
Trotsky charitably asked. 74
Yet Trotsky also claimed that linking Zinoviev and
Kamenev to the bloody deed at Smolny reached the depths of
75
"infamous stupidity," hardly a sympathetic comment. Once
it was announced that Nikolayev actually represented an
intra-Party opposition, then the White-Guard version of the
7 6
affair collapsed, revealing "a colossal lie." It was in-
conceivable, charged Trotsky, that Zinoviev and Kamenev
would actually have encouraged such a terrorist attempt.
Disclaiming any need to defend the reputations of his erst-
while enemies, Trotsky recalled their unprincipled struggle
against Marxism-Leninism and their many capitulations, for
*
which they were cruelly punished: "It is not our task to
77defend them I"
But the Stalinist bureaucracy was not judging them
for their "real crimes" against the Revolution; not at all.
Instead, the bureaucracy was making Zinoviev and Kamenev into
"scapegoats for its own transgressions." Certainly they
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lacked character, wrote Trotsky, but no one considered them
"fools or ignorant buffoons." Bolsheviks for many years,
they could not suddenly believe that individual terror would
overthrow the regime, let alone aspire to "'reestablish the
capitalist regime,'" as charged. 78 Only a "savage counter-
revolutionary coup d'etat" could reinstitute capitalism in
the Soviet Union, resulting in countless victims. A destruc-
tive Russian fascism would ensue, so ferocious that the
savagery of Mussolini and Hitler would appear "like philan-
thropic institutions." The liquidation of Zinoviev and
Kamenev would be an inevitable result. Thus, the accusation
lodged against the Zinoviev group was "fraudulent from top
to bottom, both as regards the go al specified, restoration
79
of capitalism, and as regards the means
,
terrorist acts."
At the same time this clique was accused of advocating a more
revolutionary policy against the bourgeoisie and the
restoration of a bourgeois regime. "Where has common sense
gone?,' 1 asked Trotsky: "It is completely buried under a
80
monstrous defecation of infamy. 11
But with the trial of the Leningrad NKVD cadres,
Trotsky perceived another reason for involving the deposed
Bolsheviks: "The Zinoviev affair is a gigantic smoke screen
8
1
over the St alin-Yagoda affair." When the original "amalgam"
t
went awry, Zinoviev and Kamenev were used as protective
coloration to obscure the true situation. As early as
December 30, 1934, weeks before the NKVD trial, Trotsky wrote
of a police link to the assassination. Although he did not
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charge that the Leningrad Chekists premeditated the murder
of Kirov— "we have no facts for such a supposition"—he did
accuse them of knowing the terrorist act was in preparation
and making contact with Nikolayev, all with the purpose of
"attempting to compromise the political opponents of Stalin
by means of a complex amalgam." When he learned, some
weeks later, that Philip Medved and Ivan Zaporozhets, the
Leningrad police chieftains, had been charged with
"negligence" in the affair, Trotsky thought otherwise:
"Excessive zeal
,
taking a. chance with Kirov 1 s life
,
that is
the explanation that fits better the basis of the affair."
But the assassin would not wait until all the pieces were in
place, until all the implicating "notes" had been prepared.
"The difference in rhythms between Medved 1 s work and
Nikolaev's finished up in a bloody outcome, precisely!"
There was no doubt in Trotsky's mind that Medved would never
have taken this gamble at his own risk. "For an affair of
such extraordinary importance, Medved could not but refer
daily by telephone to Yagoda, and Yagoda to Stalin." Thus,
charged Trotsky, the responsibility for the "amalgam" should
be laid at Stalin's doorstep: " Without the direct agreement
of Stalin—more precisely, without his initiative
—
neither




The missing "link" in the entire amalgam was the
mysterious Latvian consul, M. Bisseneks. His role was to
connect the terrorist act and the opposition, all opposition
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The indictment in the secret Nikolayev trial convinced
Trotsky that "the GPU itself
,
through the medium of an actual
or fake consul
,
was financing Nikolaev and was attempting to
link him u_p_ with Trotsky
.
1,84 Sequestered in his Alpine
prison, Trotsky quickly discerned a tentative effort to make
himself responsible for the murder, an effort repeated ad
infinitum in the coming years. From the indictment "there
emerges suddenly— suddenly for naive people—the name of
Trotsky." According to the official charges, Nikolayev had
confessed to having various contacts with a "consul," who
gave him 5,000 rubles for expenses. The assassin further
added: "'He /the consul_7 told me that he can establish con-
tact with Trotsky, if I give him a letter to Trotsky from
the group.'" After reading this singular statement, Trotsky
quickly pointed to its bizarre implication. Neither Trotsky
nor Nikolayev was attempting to make contact; the consul
himself assumed the initiative. "The 'consul' is wide-awake!
The 'consul' is at his post: The 'consul' requires a tiny
document, a letter from the terrorists financed by him to
—
Trotsky." But the letter was never mentioned again, as a
8 5
"curtain of silence" was drawn to avoid any indiscretion.
And the "re-called" consul himself kept quiet, in line with
8 6
the proverb, "'Revelations are silver, silence is golden.'"
Trotsky surmised that he could return home "as a distin-
guished hero who suffered in the service of his passionately
loved fatherland," along with a "certain supplementary sum
8 7
to his modest salary" tucked away in his pocket.
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amalgam," warned the exile, promised new lunacies in the
future. "Using the Zinovievist group as a footstool
, Stalin




namesake, "Trotskyism," or better yet
,
"international
Leninism," was acutely feared by the Kremlin rulers, and
"daily prods on their malevolent will," leading to more blows
New amalgams were in preparation, the leader assured his fol-
lowers, which could only be forestalled in one way: " expose
the scheme in advance
.
" The "Leninists" must prepare the
international proletariat for new expulsions, extraditions,
90
and arrests. And they must break "irreconcilably with
capitulators , " thus making it more difficult for the GPU "to
cook up" new cases. But it would be "criminal light-
mindedness" to believe that Stalin would stop at this stage.
All too accurately, Trotsky concluded that the Zinoviev case
91had the importance of being a "warning." From his mountain
retreat he judged that "the corpse of Kirov has not brought
Stalin any great laurels." For this very reason he cannot
retreat: " Stalin is forced to cover up the unsuccessful
amalgams with new
,
broader . . . and more successful ones .
"
In this armed struggle honest proletarian revolutionaries
could not remain silent. "Of all political figures, the
most despicable is Pontius Pilate," declared Trotsky and,
92
above all, he was no Pilate.
This initial analysis of the Kirov affair is worth
examining, because it foreshadows Trotsky's personal and
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political response to the subsequent "show" trials. As we
have seen, Trotsky was hardly taken unaware by the "bloody
blow." He had expected some such act for many years. He
also anticipated more such deeds in the future. Stalin had
set a course that was unalterable. Although Trotsky re-
frained from accusing Stalin of direct complicity in the
assassination, he was convinced that his old nemesis had been
aware of the developing provocation. The only way to thwart
new "amalgams" was to expose them in advance. No "Pontius
Pilate" himself, Trotsky almost relished the opportunity to
bring his great powers of mental discipline to bear on the
"colossal lie." In response to the plot woven around Kirov's
corpse, he published detailed analyses of the entire affair,
featuring trenchant reasoning, mixed with liberal doses of
irony and sarcasm. At one point he even suggested that "an
international commission of authoritative and conscientious
people" be formed to investigate the repressions associated
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with Kirov's murder; and in this proposal was the genesis
of the later Dewey Commission. Implicit in this approach
was the belief that Stalin's provocations were unable to
withstand searching inquiry, would thereby be checkmated.
But Trotsky's analysis of Kirov's death suffered from
an inability to isolate the ruling motive behind the act.
Was the plot primarily directed at the "vacillating and de-
composing bureaucracy," at the "compromised groups," i.e.,
Zinoviev's faction, or at "international Leninists?" In the
first case, Trotsky appeared to favor the "lesson" Stalin was
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dishing out to some sections of the bureaucracy. In a simi-
lar vein, he was hardly dejected at the picture of the capit-
ulators being punished for their "real crimes" against the
revolutionary movement. But a "monstrous defecation of in-
famy" was the smearing of Zinoviev and Company, one which ex-
tended to the Trotskyites. This extension of the frame-up
to his own followers convinced Trotsky that the bureaucracy
was in its death throes, and thus needed to invent such
"amalgams" to deceive the masses, and at the same time needed
to compromise "international Leninism," the only alternative
to the ruling clique.
Thus, there existed in the Soviet Union a "permanent
political crisis," between the bureaucracy and the masses,
and between different factions of the bureaucracy itself.
But what of Stalin's role? Implicit in the theory that
Stalin was administering a blow to the weakened bureaucracy
was Stalin's ascendency over his bureaucratic colleagues.
In fact, the aftermath of the Kirov affair found Stalin to
be a much more powerful figure than previously. The assassi-
nation served as a pretext for liquidating hostile elements,
potential or otherwise, within the Party and bureaucracy and,
incidentally, greatly strengthened Stalin's personal power.
Almost mesmerized by the plight of the bureaucracy, Trotsky
failed to foresee the coup that Stalin was preparing. Kirov's
corpse may not have brought Stalin any "great laurels," but
it paved the way for a totalitarian state, in which the
bureaucracy served the leader. The administrative apparatus,
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as an independent creature, was doomed, but not so the
"ruling clique," i.e., Stalin. Whatever the motivation,
Kirovs death signaled Stalin's strength and Trotsky's power
lessness. Henceforth, Stalin would act—with bloody deeds;
and Trotsky would react—with indignant words.
IV. In the Land of Ibsen
In his monk's cell high in the mountains, Trotsky
had an excessive amount of time on his hands. Doubts about
the Kirov affair began to appear in his private diary in the
first months of 1935. When Pravda published an article on
the '"stinking dregs of Trotskyists, Zinovievists
, former
princes, counts, gendarmes, all this trash, acting as one,'"
Trotsky commented that there was something fatal in such
stupidity: "Only a historically doomed clique could become
so degenerate and moronic!" But, he also concluded, this
was evidence of some "'disorder'" deep within the bureauc-
racy itself; the amalgam of dregs and trash was probably
directed at a third party, "most likely against liberal
tendencies within the ranks of the ruling bureaucracy." In
addition, he wrote that new steps against the "Trotskyists"
were in preparation, in order to lay the groundwork for a
blow at more intimate enemies of "Stalin's Bonapartism.
"
Even a "new coup d' etat " might be arranged to provide jurid-
ical sanction for Stalin's personal power. But Trotsky
doubted that Stalin would take a crown or the title of
"'leader'" for life, since it smacked too much of the
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"Fuhrer!" In any event, he worried that some "new stage is
being prepared, by comparison with which Kirov's murder was
only an ominous portent." 94
The "lone eagle" also mused over his personal fate.
Convinced that the struggle for the Fourth International was
"ricocheting" back against the Soviet bureaucracy, he be-
lieved that Stalin "would now give a great deal to be able
to retract the decision to deport me: how tempting it would
be to stage a 'show' trial!" However, the Soviet dictator
must look to other methods. "Stalin will unguestionably re-
sort to a terroristic act in two cases," wrote Trotsky, "if
there is a threat of war, or if his own position deteriorates
gravely." Then, of course, there could be a third case and
a fourth. "We shall see. And if we don't, then others
will." 95
There was a more immediate threat to his security.
French "hospitality" had long since lost its charm. Local
Stalinists and home-bred Fascists were united in making overt
threats against his personal safety. With the "Popular
Front" initiative in March, 1935, and French ministers being
wooed in the Kremlin, Trotsky could no longer depend on of-
ficial protection.
In March 1935, the possibility of a new haven arose.
A Labor government had been formed in Norway. Trotsky's in-
termediaries guickly petitioned the new government on his
behalf. As negotiations proceded, the famous outcast had
misgivings about Norway, knowing little of it except from
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the pages of Ibsen; but he had even more misgivings about re-
maining in France, with the threat of being deported to some
remote colony: "Norway is not France, of course: an un-
familiar language, a small country, off the main track, de-
layed mail, etc. But still it is much better than
96Madagascar.
"
Then, in early June, 1935, assured that a visa was
forthcoming, Trotsky and his wife left for Paris, but at the
last moment the Norwegian authorities reneged on the agree-
ment, having second thoughts about granting asylum to such
a desperado. Stranded in Paris, beset by the suspicious
Surete
,
which feared some kind of a ruse, Trotsky sent a
telegram (June 12, 1935) to the Norwegian Prime Minister:
The French government believes that I have de-
ceived it, and demands that I leave France
within twenty-four hours. I am sick and my
wife is sick. Situation is desperate. IQ7
solicit immediate favourable decision.^'
Finally news was telephoned from Oslo. The visa had been
granted, but only for six months, as a "precautionary meas-
98
ure." That was enough. Trotsky and his wife packed their
bags once again.
With two secretaries, Trotsky and Natalya journeyed
to Antwerp, where they boarded a small Norwegian vessel. The
officer in charge of tickets listed the party as a "Frenchman,
a Czechoslovak, and two Turks," since the two Russians
traveled on emigre passports issued by the Turkish govern-
ment." Finally on June 18, 1935, Trotsky was thankful to
disembark on Norwegian soil. Not all were overjoyed by his
136
presence in Norway, however. The Opposition raised questions
in Parliament (Storting), and hostile noises emanated from
the camps of the local Fascists and Communists. But the
Labor party stood firm, and its official organ even declared
that, "'The Norwegian people feel . . . honoured by Trotsky's
presence in their country. 1 ,,10 ° in short order Martin
Tranmael, founder of the party, and Trygve Lie, Minister of
Justice, paid their respects to their famous guest. After
securing Trotsky's promise to refrain from political activity
(which the exile understood allowed political writings), the
Labor officials happily interviewed him for their paper,
Arbeiderbl adet . Among other political comments, Trotsky
complimented his hosts on Norway's beauty:
"In the short time I have been in Norway, I
have been completely captivated by the 1 and-
scape , nature 1 s beauty and the people . I don 1 1
know if the so-called 1 Aryan 1 race is directly
descended from Norway, but I must say that the
tall, strong figures and faces in which one
reads such dignity make the best impression
upon a person. Nature--at least in the small
part of the country I have so far gotten to
know— appears fascinating and soothing. To
anyone who is looking for rest and recreation
,
who wants to engage in either intensive mental
work or sports, I would warmly recommend
Norway. 11 101
Trotsky's opinion of the land never changed. A year-and-a-
half later, as he sailed away under less auspicious circum-
stances, he warmly remembered "the marvelous land of forests
and fiords, of the snow beneath the January sun, skis and
sleighs, children with china-blue eyes, corn-colored hair,
and of the slightly morose, and slow-moving but serious and
^ v. ,,,102honest people. Norway, good-bye!
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There was the usual difficulty in securing a safe
abode for the Trotsky entourage. Finally Konrad Knudsen, a
Social Democratic editor and later deputy in the Storting,
offered living accommodations in his home in the village of
Wexhall, some thirty miles north of Oslo. Trotsky and his
wife became close to the family of his warm-hearted and
courageous host. There was an amicable agreement between
the two men not to press their political differences, which
surely contributed to the serenity of the household.
Natalya later noted that in 1935-36 they found "'the illusion
of true security, in the home of these upright people,'" who
104quickly became their friends. Sometimes the two families
went to a cabin in the mountains, where they resided, wrote
105
Mme. Sedova, "in the harsh enchantment of the cold."
Life with the Knudsens was "completely peaceful and well-
ordered— one might even say petty-bourgeois," judged Trotsky
106
as he was being expelled from the country.
Trotsky worked assiduously, sometimes arising at
5:30 in the morning, while the rest of the household slept.
From time to time the inevitable visitors called him from
his labors. Among the Americans were Max Shachtman, A. J.
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Muste, and Harold Isaacs. But his literary work was most
impeded by the recurrence of illness. Shortly after arriving
in Norway he wrote in his diary that the trip had not been
too strenuous:
But now everything has come back at once; weak-




If s an affliction there's
no other word for it.l°8
In September, 1935, he entered an Oslo hospital for some in-
conclusive medical tests. Due to his '"financial catastro-
phe,"' he had difficulty in paying these bills. And he was
forced to spend most of December in bed, which he described
as '"the worst month of my life.'" 109
V. "Enemy of the People"
This "Norwegian idyll" came to an end in early
August, 1936. Despite his enervating illness, Trotsky had
just completed the manuscript for The Revolution Betrayed
,
perhaps his last great theoretical opus. In the form of a
respite, Trotsky and Knudsen went camping on an isolated
island in one of Norway's many fjords. There they learned
of a bizarre happening. On the evening of August 5-6, 1936,
some fascist followers of Major Quisling, later to gain a
certain international notoriety, attempted to make a "'house
search'" of Knudsen 's home. Despite their police badges,
Knudsen' s daughter found the whole affair suspicious, and
"stood with arms outspread in front of the door to my room,
declaring that she would let no one enter," wrote Trotsky
with admiration for her courage. Meanwhile, her younger
brother gave the alarm, neighbors appeared in their night-
clothes, the frightened invaders fled, taking a few papers
with them. The ostensible objective of the raid was to ob-
tain documents proving that Trotsky had violated the terms
of his asylum; they were to be used by the Fascists and
Opposition to embarrass the government in upcoming parliamen-
tary elections. Trotsky was confident that no such compro-
mising material had been obtained, but on August 13, the
chief of the Oslo criminal police arrived by light plane to
interrogate Trotsky on the incident. On this occasion
Trotsky managed to convince the police official that he had
done nothing to harm the best interests of Norway. The
"incident was closed, 1 " or so believed Trotsky at the time. 1
Trotsky's peaceful sojourn in the solitary fisherman'
cottage on the rocks of the tiny island was completely
shattered on the night of August 14-15, 1936. Knudsen was
listening to a weak radio signal on his portable wireless set
when he heard some excerpts from a Tass communique; there was
something about " 1 Trotskyist groups • 11 and " ' counterrevolution
ary activity. 1 "
"What does it mean?' he asked me.
" 1 Some very nasty piece of work , ' I replied
,
'but exactly what, I don't know.'"
In the early morning a journalist friend from the nearby vil-
lage of Christiansand arrived at their cottage, with fuller
particulars on the charges. Although prepared for most any-
thing, Trotsky could not believe his eyes, "so outrageously
unbelievable did the mixture of villainy, impudence and
stupidity in this document" seem to him:
" 1 Terrorism, well and good, 1 I repeated,
stupefied, 'that is still within the realm of
comprehension. But the Gestapo! Are you quite
sure that it said "Gestapo"?'
"
' Yes. 1
'"So, right after the fascist attack, the
Stalinists accuse me of being an ally of the
fascists? 1
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"•There is no doubt about it.'
•"All the same,
/
there are limits to every-
thing] A communique like this can only be the
work of a drunken agent provocateur
— and an
illiterate one, to boot ! ' "ill "
Then and there Trotsky dictated to the journalist his first
statement on the announced trial. Though lacking the text
of the report, he branded it as " one of the greatest falsi -
fications in the history of politics . " The charge that he
directed a terrorist plot from Norway against the Soviet
rulers " does not contain an iota of truth
,
,r and " stands in
sharpest contradiction to my ideas and to the whole of my
activities
,
which at the present time are devoted exclu-
sively to writing . " Denying that he had had any communica-
tions recently with the Soviet Union, Trotsky referred to
himself as "a man without a country" and suggested that a
competent Norwegian commission investigate the charges. An-
other possibility was the formation of "an impartial inter-
national commission by the labor organizations of the entire
world, or better still of its international leaders, to in-
vestigate the charges made in the Soviet Union." In this
matter, he concluded, "I have nothing to fear and nothing
to hide. As for myself, I am only concerned with estab-
lishing the truth." 112 Speaking extempore, Trotsky had
established on this small island the main lines of his de-
fense effort.
Shortly thereafter, the small party broke camp and
returned to Wexhall. "Dictionary in hand," Trotsky followed
the course of the trial in the Oslo newspapers. One
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incredible charge followed another. "I felt as if I were
in a madhouse," he later wrote. 113
Trotsky: The Arch-Murderer
During the Zinoviev-Kamenev "show" trial there was
a concerted effort to present a stark contrast: a united,
triumphant Soviet nation, led by Stalin, and an unprincipled
gang of political adventurers, led by a power-crazed mur-
derer. On the positive side, Vyshinsky described a nation
united in "infinite love" around the Party's leadership,
which had produced a veritable paradise. Fields in the
kolkhozes were rich with a "golden harvest," Stakhanovite
factories were "pulsating with life," Krivonoss trains were
speeding over "glittering ribbons of steel." In fact,
claimed the Prosecutor, "socialism has finally and irrevo-
cably triumphed in our country," resulting in a "new, really
human, socialist culture." These victories had brought "our
whole country, every factory worker and collective farmer,
every office worker and intellectual, a happy and a well-to-
do life." All of this occurred under the leadership of
Comrade Stalin, who had "developed and undeviatingly carried
out Lenin's teachings on the building of socialism in our
country, having armed the vast millions of workers and col-
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lective farmers with these teachings."
If this picture of unrelieved prosperity was un-
believable, no less so was the portrait of its archenemy.
With no expectation of mass support, the "united bloc," led
142
by Trotsky, directed their "hatred and rage against social-
ism" on the Party leadership. There was only one aim, to
gain power. Trotsky planned to take a personal hand in
this endeavor. As Kamenev testified, '"Trotsky's appear-
ance and his active participation in the struggle for power
were taken as a matter of course.'" 115
Trotsky, it was further charged, was motivated by
his extreme loathing for Stalin. In fact, he only agreed
to the formation of the bloc if Stalin were to be removed
by violence. According to Berman-Yurin
,
Trotsky paced up
and down the room during their interview, and "talked of
Stalin with exceptional hatred." He told Fritz David that,
"'Now there is no other way out except the removal by vio-
lence of Stalin and his adherents. Terror against Stalin--
that is the revolutionary task. Whoever is a revolutionary-
his hand will not tremble.'" In furtherance of his mur-
derous program, Trotsky personally directed a number of his
agents to strike a blow at Stalin, preferably in some large
assembly, in order to have a "tremendous repercussion," one
far beyond Soviet borders. Berman-Yurin testified that
Trotsky believed this public act would be "an historical
political event of world significance." If arrested, how-
ever, it was the duty of the agents "'to conceal by every
possible means Trotsky '
s
role in the organization of a ter-
roristic act against Stalin,'" or so said Leon Sedov to V.
Olberg. This policy of deception was analogous to the posi-
tion taken by the Central Committee of the Social-
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Revolutionaries, which denied responsibility for Dora
Kaplan's attack on Lenin. 116
If the whole domestic "program" of the Trotskyites
was murder (including blows against Kirov, Voroshilov,
Kaganovich, etc.), their foreign policy was defeatist.
"Here," charged Vyshinsky, "the shades of the dead arise,
here the old ' Clemenceau theses' are revived, here the
cloven hoof of Trotsky again becomes visible." Not even
disdaining aid from the Gestapo, Trotsky, according to
Fritz David, confided in event of war with Japan, "'our
task will be to unite and take the lead of these discon-
tented masses, to arm them and lead them against the ruling
bureaucrats.'" Every wartime setback would be used to seize
power. As Trotsky told Berman-Yurin , "'We will defend the
Soviet Union provided the Stalin leadership is over-
1 1 7thrown. 1 " ±JL
In their final pleas before the court
,
many of the
accused blamed their fall from grace on Trotsky's evil in-
fluence . Fritz David, for instance , assured the court "that
I curse Trotsky. I curse that man who ruined my life and
pushed me into heinous crime." And Evdokimov had some ad-
vice for the absent satyr
:
"Trotsky is not with us here in the dock because
he is abroad. He has two perspectives before
him: either to disappear immediately and with-
out a trace , as Azef did, not only from the
political arena, but from the arena of life in
general and go into oblivion, hide behind some
false name as Azef did—or else, at some time,
face a proletarian court." 118
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In its final verdict the court adopted Evdokimov's sugges-
tion. Trotsky and his son were declared "convicted" of
having directed various terrorist acts against the Soviet
leadership. As a result, they were "subject, in the event
of their being discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R.,
to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R." 119 Another trial would
seem to be superfluous. But this formula was just "an
esoterically phrased death sentence," as Robert Tucker has
120
suggested. There was now a "contract" on Trotsky's head.
To be sure, this portrait was a travesty of the
authentic Trotsky, but presumably it accurately reflected
the Kremlin's understanding of "Trotskyism," or at least
the caricature it wanted broadcast far and wide. According
to this two-dimensional image, the Trotsky of the October
Revolution and the Civil War had passed into a "memory
hole," his part in these epic events wiped clean. In the
same vein, the Trotsky of formidable intellectual preten-
sions, the author of "permanent revolution," and other
formulations, ceased to exist. Instead, there was the pic-
ture of the exile, wallowing in self-pity, consumed by his
own bile, plotting to regain power— for the sheer sake of
power— at any cost. Frustrated by the success of "socialism
in one country," Trotsky turned to terrorism as the only
means to overthrow the regime. Above all, he lusted for the
death of Stalin, his hated rival. He was even willing to
accept the aid of the Gestapo, and utilize wartime setbacks,
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to achieve his nefarious ends. "Trotskyism" then, was com-
posed in this first trial of two main ingredients: terror-
ism and defeatism. Based on the assumption that these
charges reflected Stalin's real concerns, the Party's chief
must have feared, above all, assassination and the loss of
power, as a result of war.
Throughout the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, Trotsky's name
ran like a "red thread." He emerged as the "real defendant,"
with Stalin assuming the role of prosecutor. 121 To a great
extent, the great clash of ideologies had been reduced to a




As the "muddy tide of lies" flooded over the air-
waves, Trotsky struggled to understand the gross misrepre-
sentations attributed to him and his "co-conspirators." He
was "stunned by the cold-blooded premeditation of the frame-
up, by the moral gangsterism of the clique in power, by this
attempt to deceive world opinion on such a massive scale
—
over the entire earth, in our generation and for genera-
tions to come." The sheer magnitude of the campaign be-
wildered him. No longer did the political lie retain an
element of dilettantism and timidity. "We are far from that
stage today in our era of the absolute lie," he observed in
wonderment, "the complete and totalitarian lie spread by the
monopolies of press and radio to imprison social conscious-
ness."
122 As the "assemblyline liar" on the radio paraded
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forth his various falsehoods, Trotsky frequently asked him-
self: "Can the human race possibly be so stupid?" Trotsky
and his wife fought to have faith in the good instincts of
mankind, but had to admit that Stalin had "assimilated in
full the psychological techniques of fascism, which consist
in smothering criticism under a massive blanket of repeated
lies." 123
While making notes with which to refute the lies,
Trotsky wondered, "'But isn't it shameful to answer such in-
famous charges? 1 " He understood that to answer the accusa-
tions, was to become tainted; to stare long and hard at the
author of the crimes was to reflect some of his depravity.
Murder, double-dealing, treachery, conspiracy, falsifica-
tion
— it was all a "delirious dream." As he wrote during
the third trial,
It is with almost _a physical effort that I
tear my own thoughts away from the nightmarish
combinations of the OGPU and direct them upon
the question
,
" How and why could all this be
made possible ?"124
But to submit passively to such abominable accusations would
be to aid the conspiracy, Trotsky thought, tarnish his revo-
lutionary honor and that of October, and acquiesce in the
liquidation of hallowed revolutionaries
.
Consequently, Trotsky marshaled his arguments,
checked his facts, prepared his documents. The physical
power of thought, merciless consistency, a lucidity and
solidity of line— all that he considered the fundamental
traits of the October Revolution—were applied to Stalin's
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calumnies. Once again " Pero " thrust his chief weapon, his
pen, into the fray. As he later wrote, "I make an appeal
to reason, to logic, to criticism. I present facts and
documents. I demand a verification!" 125 But this task was
far different from exposing contradictions in theoretical
formulas. In writing on the trials he observed over and
over again "how limited is our vocabulary and the range of
our feelings in the face of the enormity of the crimes
being committed today in Moscow!"
After reading the verbatim record of the second
trial, he told the Dewey Commission for the "hundredth and
first time, I have the impression of reading Dostoyevsky .
"
And it would take the vocabulary of a Dostoevsky to depict
adequately the masochistic self-degradation that was the
trials' chief claim to fame. But there was nothing of
Dostoevsky in Trotsky. The underground world of tormented
psyches, of self-inflicted suffering, of 1 ' ame Russe—none
of this was congenial to Trotsky's mind. The irrational
held no fascination for him. He preferred the scholastic
theorems of Marx to the mystical mutterings of Prince
Myshkin. Although Trotsky shared with Ivan Karamazov the
intellectual sin of excessive faith in unadorned reason, he
was alien to the entire Karamazov mise-en-scene . Yet Ulrikh,
Vyshinsky, Yagoda—even Stalin—had much more in common with
Smerdyakov than Plekhanov.
In short, Trotsky was out of his depths, using reason
to subdue the frenzied witches in a Walpurgis Night of
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iniquity. During the second trial he compared the phenome-
non to medieval times, when witches were thought to spread
epidemics and Jews drink- the blood of Christians: "is it
really so long ago that Jews were accused of using Christian
128blood?" Trotsky, in a sense, was just another "wandering
Jew," another Mendel Beilis, only this time accused of
drinking "Bolshevik blood." Against this charge, "clarity
of thought," etc., etc., was not enough.
To remain silent, however, would be even more shame-
ful, and also obstruct the "march of truth." In addition,
it was of paramount importance to answer the charges as they
appeared. "He had to refute Stalin's accusations before the
world's amazed and shocked sensitivity was blunted. All
that he needed was the freedom to defend himself," observed
129Isaac Deutsche r
.
At Wexhall journalists of all kinds "besieged" him.
With the aid of two secretaries—Erwin Wolf and Jean van
Hei jenoort—Trotsky prepared almost daily press releases
during the trial's run, which were eagerly picked up by
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American, British, and French news agencies. In an open
letter to Mr. Swen, the police chief, he defended his right
to engage in "literary" activities in other countries, and
also offered to appear before "any impartial commission of
inquiry" to answer the new charges: ". . .1 undertake to
131
prove that my accusers are the real criminals." On the
20th of August he gave a press interview which received wide
coverage in the Oslo papers. After an extended criticism of
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the trial's early sensations, which began on August 19,
Trotsky concluded:
The whole thing is a crude frame-up. it's
a lie, an infamous lie that is directed at me.
But there is no possibility of raising the
voice of criticism in the Soviet Union.
Criticism is strangled there and these sense-
less accusations will remain unassailed there
for the time being. But here we do have the
possibility of criticizing. And as for me,
gentlemen, I criticize . 132
There was no letup in "criticism" in the following
days. To a British journalist, Trotsky expressed his irri-
tation at being associated with Berman-Yurin , a name unknown
to him previously, and "banges /sic/ fist in the desk and
almost shouted." Intervention was necessary to expose "the
greatest falsification in political history," which only an
133impartial investigation could achieve. In a statement
written in German on the 23rd of August, he again called for
an impartial inquiry: "A free and open trial would be of
historical importance, not only for myself but for the whole
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affair." On learning of Tomsky's suicide, he praised his
former adversary for being the "greatest figure the Russian
proletariat had produced out of its own ranks in the course
of 30 years," and contended that his suicide was "an irref-
135
utable denial of the accusations and the whole trial."
And so it went, statement after statement, a strenu-
ous effort to refute the charges before they gained credi-
bility. In one case he was vexed by a counter-suggestion.
A certain "Herr Johann Scharffenberg, " a Norwegian Labor
party official, had proposed that Trotsky voluntarily appear
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in Moscow: '"You belong to the barricade, and the barri-
cade today is the Court in Moscow.'" 136 Trotsky found this
proposal "more pathetic than realistic," but also a trifle
embarrassing. Bound hand and foot, he would have little
chance back in Moscow to expose the truth. Did Herr
Scharffenberg really believe that in Russia he could
"subpoena these witnesses and make my documents public?"
Under the conditions existing in the Moscow court how could
he "contribute one iota to the clarification of the case?"
To expect "the truth to be victorious in Moscow is . . .
absolutely impossible." Instead, he invited Herr
Scharffenberg and others to help him unmask the amalgam in
13 7
a friendlier environment, i.e., Norway. But the suggested
analogy to Georgi Dmitrov and the Reichstag Fire case, how-
ever unfair, cast some doubt on Trotsky's revolutionary
courage
.
When the death sentences were announced, Trotsky de-
clared they were inevitable, as only in this way could "the
seriousness of the indictment against me be shown to the
1 38
world," but when he learned of the actual executions, he
could scarcely believe his ears: "'Cain Dzhugashvili
/Stalin/ has reached the very peak of his destiny,'" he said
to his wife when "the first minutes of stupefaction had
139passed." More than ever he demanded his day in court,
since he was the only one not silenced: "'In submitting
myself to the impartial courts of these countries, I fulfill
my duty to unmask and avenge one of the most horrible crimes
in world history.'" 140 But he also warned that more "mock
trials" were just down the road: "There is no calling a
halt once started on this road." 141
Quid Pro Quo: Herring for Detention
Instead of granting him his day in open court, the
Norwegian government provided Trotsky with a free vacation-
four months in strict confinement. After August 27, 1936,
the socialist regime, "dripping with democratic hypocrisy,"
silenced its disconcerting visitor. 142
As early as July, before the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial,
Trotsky had fretted over the too-cozy relationship between
Oslo and Moscow. When Halvdan Koht , Minister of Foreign
Affairs , was received in the Kremlin
,
Trotsky asked Konrad
Knudsen if he knew why the Norwegian official was being
feted:
" 1 Why?'
"'They are bargaining over my head. 1
11
'How do you know that? 1
"'Moscow is hinting to Mr. Koht—or saying
outright— "We will charter your ships , we will
buy your herrings, but on one condition, that
you sell us Trotsky." 1
"Devoted to his party, Knudsen was annoyed
to hear me talk this way. 'So you think that
our principles are for sale? 1
"'My deal Knudsen,' I replied, 'I am not
saying that the Norwegian government is getting
ready to sell me. I am only saying that the
Kremlin would like to make such a deal.' "143
Then came the charges of "murder," "conspiracy," "treachery
etc., which placed the government's guest in a new light.
Certainly the Socialist ministers sensed a "'practical aim'
of the trial, as Friedrich Adler phrased it: "'. . . a
question of depriving Trotsky of asylum in Norway, of
152
organizing a veritable manhunt against him, of making it im-
possible for him to exist any place on earth."' 144
For the better part of a fortnight the "sulphureous
fumes" from Moscow got into "Norway's eyes and nostrils and
set them tingling," commented a New York Times reporter. 145
For instance, Izvestia charged that Norwegian labor offi-
cials were dispersing "'lethal gases of hypocritical lies'"
to cover for Trotsky's activities. 146 Then on August 29
Soviet Ambassador Yakubovich delivered to the Oslo govern-
ment a formal diplomatic note demanding Trotsky's expulsion
,
but not his extradition
. After recounting the "proven"
charges in the just-concluded trial, and asserting that
Trotsky was using Norway as a base for conspiratorial
activities, the note warned,
"In informing the Norwegian Government of the
above the Soviet Government believes the con-
tinued granting of refuge to Trotsky, the
organizer of terroristic activities, may harm
existing friendly relations between the U.S.S.R.
and Norway and would be contrary to modern ideas
of procedure in international relations."
Soviet authorities were confident, the note added, that Oslo
would take the "'necessary measures to prevent further
147granting of refuge to Trotsky on Norwegian soil.'"
Although fearful of an open break with Moscow, the
Labor government could not openly accede to such a flagrant
threat. Minister Koht made all the right noises: "'The
principle of asylum will be maintained by the present govern
ment of Norway. We will not let ourselves be subdued in
such matters by anyone."'
148 At another time, Koht bravely
153
declared that, '"Norway does not intend to dance to an-
other government's pipes.'" 149
Despite these words, the government was buffeted by
strong pressures, especially from Norwegian financial
circles, to sacrifice Trotsky in return for Soviet trade.
The Socialist ministers were afraid of economic reprisals,
whether the Kremlin actually threatened them or not. 150
For his part, convinced that the shipowners made policy, no
matter who occupied the seat of government, Trotsky believed
that Norwegian commercial interests and Soviet diplomats
were combining to silence him. As for the government it-
self, worried by its balance of payments and a coming elec-
tion, it justified its capitulation, sneered Trotsky, with
the rationale, "'All the same, we can't sacrifice the coun-
151try's vital interests to Trotsky!'"
With Trotsky's head being weighed against herring
and freight bottoms, the government looked for some "transi-
tory compromise" in order to extricate itself from the in-
creasingly awkward situation. The answer was internment.
Minister Lie handed to Ambassador Yakubovich a reply, noting
that Trotsky had arrived in Norway some six months after
Kirov's assassination, thus it had nothing to do with Oslo.
But it was also stressed that Trotsky had been interned
152
"'before'" reception of the Soviet note. Technically
this claim was correct, but it was also highly probable that
Yakubovich made an oral demarche during the trial, thus
... . . 153
prompting subsequent actions by Norwegian officials.
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The first steps inhibiting Trotsky's freedom of
action were taken on August 26, 1936. Several ranking
functionaries, accompanied by eight plainclothes policemen,
visited Wexhall and demanded that Trotsky sign a document
agreeing to new conditions in exile. He was not to write
on political conditions in other countries or grant press
interviews. In addition, he was asked to allow censorship
of his mail. This demand, felt Trotsky, was a self-willed
invitation "to ask for chains and handcuffs. I categori-
cally refused." Then and there his freedom was severely re-
1 S4
stricted.
The "following morning" he was called once again as
a "witness" in the affair of the fascist intruders into his
lodgings. After the judge suggested that Trotsky had vio-
lated the terms of his asylum, he was taken under police es-
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cort to confront the Minister of Justice. Again he was
asked to sign the document restricting his freedom of action
"I, Leon Trotsky, declared that I, my wife,
and my secretaries shall not engage , while in
Norway, in any political activity directed
against any state friendly to Norway. I de-
clare that I will reside at such place as the
government may select or approve . . . that I
,
my wife, and my secretaries, will in no way . . .
involve ourselves in political questions current
either in Norway or abroad . . . that my activ-
ities as author shall be limited to historically
works, biographies, and memoirs . . . that Any/
. . . writings of a theoretical nature . . .
shall not be directed against any government of
any foreign state. I further agree that all
mail, telegrams, telephone calls, sent or re-
ceived by myself, my wife, and my secretaries
be censored. . . . "156
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In response Trotsky heaped scorn on the head of Trygve Lie
for these outrageous demands. He also declared that this
was the first act of surrender to Nazism, and prophesied
that the government would pay dearly: "'But the day is
near—remember this!—the day is near when the Nazis will
drive you from your country, all of you together with your
Pantoffel-Minister- President. • 1,157 Trotsky also challenged
Lie to act on his own:
"•If you want to arrest me,' I demanded,
•why do you want me to authorize you to do it?'
"'But,' the minister replied, with an air
of profundity, 'between arrest and complete
liberty there is an intermediate situation. •
"'That can only be an equivocation—or a
trap; I prefer to be arrested! '
"
The Minister obliged him on the spot. Erwin Wolf was shoved
aside, and Trotsky forcibly returned to Wexhall. 158
According to the Norwegian Constitution, it was il-
legal to incarcerate someone not convicted of a crime. But
Minister Lie was not deterred by such legal niceties. Three
days later (August 31, 1936) he obtained King Haakon's signa-
ture on a special "royal decree" that gave him the authority
159to intern "'undesirable'" aliens. On September 2 the
police moved Trotsky and his wife to Sundby, a small village
overlooking a fjord some twenty-two miles south of Oslo.
This "bourgeois prison" was home for more than three-and-a-
illhalf months. The couple occupied the second floor, while
downstairs lived more than a dozen "slow-moving, heavy police
men who smoked pipes, played cards, and at noon brought us
newspapers" when they were in the mood.





more inconvenience, his secretaries-Wolf and van Heijenoort
were deported, and he was forbidden visitors, except for
occasional call by his Norwegian attorney. Even physical
ercise in the courtyard was forbidden. "it was worse th
the Tsarist prison," commented Trotsky, "because in the
Tsarist prisons we had visits from friends and from my rela-
1 6 Xtives." At first even a radio was forbidden to them,
since it was considered incompatible with the proper regimen
for internees. In charge of this northern "St. Helena" were
three senior officials, with fascist proclivities. One,
Jonas Lie, later served the Quisling government as chief of
police. The irony of this impossible situation did not
escape Trotsky. As he observed in wonderment, first the
fascists raid his home, then Stalin accused him of an alli-
ance with the fascists and obtainedhis imprisonment, and
finally he was locked up under the supervision of three
fascist functionaries: "No chess player, in his wildest
fantasy, could dream up a better deployment of the pieces." 162
At the beginning, internment was a balm to Trotsky's
spirit. It was like "a rest cure," after the "nervous ten-
sion of the Moscow trial week." Without news, without tele-
grams, without mail, without telephone calls— it allowed the
Trotskys to recover their strength. "But from the day we re-
ceived the first newspapers, internment became torture," he
163later wrote. Unable to answer the lies coming from
Moscow, he "raged like a caged tiger," sadly observed his
wife: "To defend himself against slander, to fight it— after
157
all, this was his native element, the organic passion of his
being; he found refuge in furious labor and in the struggle
against all his contemptible enemies.- But doomed to silence
he fell ill. The Norwegian government had subjected him
to a kind of "political paralysis," where one could see,
hear, and understand everything, but was "unable to move a
finger to ward off mortal danger." in these conditions, the
appearance of his son's book, Livre Rouge sur le proces de
Moscou, was an "inestimable gift"; he now had a defender. 165
Unbowed, Trotsky continued his "literary" labors,
writing several pamphlets and articles on the trials, in ad-
dition to letters to his son and to various attorneys. After
submitting them to censorship, he impatiently awaited re-
plies, unaware that most of these letters were simply con-
fiscated. If he had known their fate, he would have "laid
down my arms ^and read Hegel—there he sat, right on the
shelf." But the government prohibited nothing in clear and
1 fir:distinct terms.
With the noose tightening every day, Trotsky tried
other means to escape this infuriating cul-de-sac. In an at-
tempt to have the Moscow charges aired in court, he sued two
Norwegian papers—one Stalinist, one Fascist—which had en-
dorsed the calumnies. But on October 29, 1936, there appeared
another "Provisional Royal Decree" which authorized Lie to
deny legal recourse to any alien interned under the August 31
act which, coincident ally
,
only applied to Trotsky. Then he
instructed his French attorney to sue Stalinist papers in
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Prance, Czechoslovakia, and other countries, again with the
intention of stating his case in court, even through inter-
mediaries. But the Minister of Justice („ho years later
headed the United Nations) was equal to the challenge. On
November 11 he informed Trotsky in a "rude letter" that legal
action in foreign courts, and even communication with lawyers
abroad was prohibited.
In retrospect, Trotsky rued that he had never been
persecuted with "as much miserable cynicism" as during these
four months. 168 From the beginning of his stay, after meeting
the Labor Party leaders, he "got a strong whiff of the stale
odor of the musty conservatism denounced with such vigor in
Ibsen's plays." 169 m fact, he reread Ibsen, his "literary
love" of some thirty-five years earlier, while vegetating in
a Norwegian lockup. "Ibsen's hatred of Protestant bigotry,
provincial sottishness, and stiff-laced hypocrisy," he wrote,
"became more comprehensive and closer to me after my acquain-
tance with the first socialist government in the poet's native
land." At one point he even engaged Minister Lie in a dis-
cussion of Ibsen's play, "Enemy of the People." The socialist
official was bothered by Trotsky's comparison of his activ-
ities and those of Burgomaster Stockmann in the drama. 170
Trotsky would not let him off easily: "'To make out the best
case for you, Mr. Minister: Your government has all the
vices but none of the virtues of a bourgeois government.'"
This exchange prompted Lie to declare that the government
had committed "'a stupidity'" in granting Trotsky a visa.
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'"And, are you preparing to rectify this stupidity by means
of a crime?, - Trotsky quickly retorted, mindful of the fate
of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in "socialist"
1 71Germany. x
During the months of internment Trotsky remained
calm and self-controlled, always insisting upon his "rights"
but not offending his captors in the process. 172 However,
he continually fretted over the unanswered lies that poisoned
the airways and the press. Trotsky's imprisonment and
forced silence implicitly tended to support the charges. 173
But on December 11, 1936, he had one last chance to set the
record straight on Norwegian soil. Called once again as a
"witness" in the prolonged trial of Quisling's men, Trotsky
testified for some four hours in German, denying that he had
violated the conditions of asylum, and also analyzing the
Zinoviev-Kamenev trial at some length, a first "sketch" of
his statements before the Dewey Commiss on. 174 This time he
had complete freedom of expression—before an empty court-
room. (Minister Lie had the court cleared of spectators and
the press.) No matter; he intended "to open doors and win-
dows." At several points in his testimony Trotsky explicitly
censured Lie for the "trap" he had made of political asylum.
He also pointed out that in this case the Communists and
Nazis had cooperated in muting his critical comments: "The
fascists steal my papers in Norway, the GPU steals them in
Paris, and this unity of action engenders a solidarity of in-
terest." In fact, "Stalin and Mr. Quisling have collaborated
160
to have me interned," not without some official aid. 175
Trotsky informed the court of his concern for his
papers, which could be used to arrange a new trial or prove
his innocence. In a telling metaphor, he asked the court to
imagine a pious man who had always lived by the Bible, but
was then accused of spreading anti-religious propaganda, on
the basis of false documents and false testimony. What would
this maligned man say?
"Here is my family, here are my friends, here is
my library, my correspondence over many years,
here is my entire life. Read all my letters,
written to the most diverse people on the most
varied subjects; question the hundreds of people
with whom I have had connection for many years,
and you will be convinced that I could not have
engaged in an activity contrary to my entire
personality, contrary to my entire moral code."
To signs of assent from the President of the Court, Trotsky
concluded that this argument would convince any honest and
reasonable man: "My situation is analogous to the one I have
176just described."
VI. "Deliverance"
Such compelling testimony had no effect on the
Norwegian government, which was now anxious to be rid of its
unwelcome guest. While Trotsky wondered if his "socialist
comrades" would actually hand him over to the tender mercies
of the NKVD, the ministers were considering a transfer
to
I 77
some inaccessible place in the far north.
Meanwhile, Trotsky's Norwegian visa was due to ex-
pire on December 18, 1936, and his friends
abroad once again
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searched for a nation willing to grant him sanctuary. At
one point Trotsky apparently requested the Catalan government
to allow him to settle in Barcelona, which would surely have
complicated the Spanish Civil War, already beset by Byzantine
178
complexities. In Mexico, American followers of Trotsky
approached Diego Rivera for assistance. The flamboyant
muralist went to President Lazaro Cardenas, who unexpectedly
I TO
agreed to provide a haven for Trotsky. The happy news was
•I OQ
quickly relayed to Oslo.
Trotsky had been kept informed of Mexican efforts on
his behalf, but his enthusiasm for such a move was tempered
by the violent nature of Mexican politics. He feared that
his enemies might be behind the invitation. The whole affair
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was something of a "mystery" to him. With the possibility
of a Mexican visa looming, Trotsky requested permission to
consult friends, arrange for a safe voyage, and secure the
safety of his archives. But when Minister Lie visited him
at Sundby in the second week of December, he was "obviously
staggered by the extremism of my requests." Trotsky reminded
him that even in Tsarist jails exiles were allowed to see
friends and arrange their personal affairs. "'Yes, yes,'
replied the Minister of Justice philosophically, 'but times
,„182have changed . . .
On the 18th of December Lie returned to inform
Trotsky that the visa had been granted, and that he had al-
ready chartered the "Ruth," a Norwegian oil tanker, which
would leave for Mexico the following day. Once again
Lie
refused Trotsky leave to arrange his personal affairs. This
unseemly haste disturbed Trotsky: "'And what , 1 he asked,
•if Stalin knows about your tanker? We may be torpedoed on
I Q O
the high seas and never reach the English Channel.'" But
the Minister was not swayed by such considerations: Trotsky
and his wife were given a few hours to pack. "Not one of
our numerous migrations ever took place in such an atmosphere
of feverish haste, such feeling of utter isolation, uncer-
tainty, and suppressed indignation." Amid the helter-skelter,
Natalya asked, "'Mightn't it be a trap on the part of the
government?'" Trotsky replied, "'I hardly think so,'" but
184
with no great assurance.
As he prepared to leave the known dangers of the Old
World for the unknown ones of the New, Trotsky finished an
article on the sycophantic defenders of the frame-up, en-
titled "Shame I" Intended for his son in France, he fear-
fully concluded: "I do not know if my letter will reach you.
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In any case, I am consigning this bottle to the sea." He
also took the precaution to name his sons, Lvov and Sergei,
as his literary heirs. The struggle would be continued in




The "Ruth" sailed on December 19th. On the initia-
tive of the shipowner, they were assigned his comfortable
cabin, not the "semi-dark infirmary" which had
been Lie's
suggestion.
187 Trotsky and his wife were the only passengers,
with the exception of the ever-suspicious
police agent, Jonas
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Lie. As the tanker steamed through the Atlantic, Trotsky
"avidly" read books on Mexico and worked on his diary, parts
of which were later incorporated in his book on the trials,
Les Crimes de Staline . Despite the security precautions,
journalists quickly learned of the voyage. Several American
newspapers wanted to interview Trotsky, via the ship's trans-
mitter, but this was forbidden: "'The Norwegians believed it
was necessary to protect the United States against my ideas,
188
and deprived me of the right to use the ship's radio.'"
On the morning of January 1, the ship's sirens greeted the
new year, but there was no echo, except for the salutations
Jonas Lie brought from his Minister. "The world seemed en-
189
gulfed in absurdity," commented Isaac Deutscher. As the
sea became extraordinarily calm, the lonely passenger mused,
"Behind are four months of captivity. Ahead—the ocean and
..190the unknown .
"
After a long journey, which included much tacking
from one course to another, the "Ruth" finally sailed into
Tampico Bay on January 9, 1937, a hot, tropical morning.
Trotsky had no intention of disembarking unless met by
friends: "We had not the slightest grounds for trusting the
Norwegian vassals of the GPU, alike in the tropics as in the
Oslo parallel." But a government cutter approached the
tanker, bringing a Mexican general, various journalists, and
"friends"—Frida Kahlo (substituting for her ailing husband,
Diego Rivera), Max Shachtman (his "close co-thinker"), and
George Novack (Secretary of the American Committee
for the
164
Defense of Leon Trotsky). x Later Natalya Sedova recalled
how their anxiety dissipated as they saw all the friendly
and affectionate faces: '"We breathed our deliverance.'" 192
Trotsky and his wife stepped, "not without excite-
ment," onto the New World. There was an immediate physical
and spiritual contrast with their former hermitage. "Torn
free from the atmosphere of revolting selfwill and ener-
vating uncertainty, we encountered hospitality and atten-
193tiveness at every step." According to Frank Kluckhohn,
the New York Times reporter at Tampico, Trotsky appeared
"tanned and healthier than for some time," as a result of
the sea voyage, and sported a tan golf suit with knickers,
along with a red tie. Peering tranquilly from behind horn-
rimmed glasses, which he tapped in a rather pedagogical
manner, Trotsky immediately made a short statement in
Russian, which he orally translated into French for the
benefit of the assembled journalists. He commended Mexico
for its kindness in granting the visa, promised not to in-
terfere in local politics, pledged "complete abstention"
from any actions that might hamper Mexico's relations with
other nations, and supported with all his "strength" the
proposed international commission to investigate the
Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. Then Trotsky expressed the desire
to learn more about Mexico and to finish his much-deferred
book on Lenin.
194 As he later wrote, "A new chapter for our




That evening the party left for Mexico City in a
special presidential car. As the train climbed higher and
higher into the mountains, the air became cooler and, he
recalled, "we soon rid ourselves of the northerner's fear
of the tropics which had seized us in the steamy atmosphere
196
of the Gulf of Mexico." During the trip Shachtman and
Novack briefed Trotsky on plans for a commission of inquiry.
The conversation also turned to the theoretical backward-
ness of American radicalism, especially Max Eastman's ti-
197
rades against dialectical materialism.
On the morning of January 11th, they alighted at
Lecheria, a tiny station on the outskirts of the capital.
The "agile" Trotsky descended from the "magnificent rail-
road car," to be met by Antonio Hildago, a Mexican radical,
Fritz Bach, the former Swiss Communist, and Rivera, who had
just been released from the hospital. Even though Rivera
and his friends "loaded their revolvers," Trotsky was "not
198 _
even noticed, much less molested" at the station. For a
moment security precautions broke down, as a throng of un-
known well-wishers surrounded them. Asked to get in a car
with some policemen and other strange faces, Natalya Sedova
suddenly felt anxious: "'A fear crossed our minds:
weren't
199
we being taken, as before, to a new place of
captivity?'"
But the destination was the suburb of Coyoacan,
once
the residence of Cortes, and the "Blue House"
on Avenida
Londres. The exotic ambience of the house
immediately im-
pressed the two northern refugees. In
the words of Natalya,
166
it was,
"A low blue house, a patio filled with plants,
airy rooms, collections of pre-Columbian art,'
a profusion of pictures ... We were on a new
planet, the home of Frida Kahlo and Diego
Rivera. "200
More Frida' s home than Diego's, it had been designed by Juan
O'Gorman, with flat planes and metal finishings. The nat-
ural concrete had been poured in cobalt-blue and rose, with
lemon-colored floors and natural plaster walls. Furniture
in deep-blue and red spotted the spacious rooms. 'I', ill
eucalyptus trees soared above walls draped with purple
bougainvillea. There was an orange tree, along with rose
bushes and geraniums in the patio. Completing the decor
201
were a spider monkey and green parrot. In this improb-
able setting Trotsky and his wife lived and worked for two
years. The "Blue House" was also the setting for the ses-
sions of the Dewey Commission.
"The Lion" and "The Frog"
At the beginning of his stay in Mexico, Trotsky wrote
of Rivera: "It was to him above all that we were indebted
202
for our emancipation from captivity in Norway. Thus be-
gan a tempetuous friendship between the two giants. They
were men vastly dissimilar in nature and appearance. Rivera
was of immense size, with an attractively ugly face,
featuring good-natured, frog-face features and dark pro-
truding eyes. To his wife he was "Carasapo " ("Frog-Face")
or "Panzas" ( "Fatbelly " )
.
203 He had joined the Mexican
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Communist Party in 1922, and directed its stormy affairs
for some years, along with his fellow artists, David Alfaro
Siqueiros and Jose Clemente Orozco. In 1927 he attended
the Xth- anniversary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution
and was invited to sketch Stalin, not one of his best ef-
forts. He left Moscow in a huff, upset that some artists
had been silenced, and that popular and religious traditions
204
were not incorporated in Soviet art. Later he wrote that
the '"undertaker 1 " /Stalin/ had a '"peanut-shaped head'" and
liked to pose a la Napoleon, with one hand behind his back,
205before his worshipers. In 1929 the Mexican Communist
Party expelled Rivera on the false charge of "Trotskyism."
Nonetheless, as Bertram Wolfe has suggested, his poetic
world of pre-Columbian heroes had little in common with the
206prosaic celebration of Soviet tractors.
In 1937 the Riveras were probably the Trotskys'
20 7
"closest" friends. The artist sympathized with Trotsky's
lonely struggle. In 1933 he included the "Lion's" portrait
in several of his celebrated murals, notably a "Communist
OAO
Unity" panel. The artist in Trotsky also appealed to
him, observed Rivera's biographer:
His mind /Trotsky's/ operated like that of an
artist, in terms of sudden insights, theoretical
formulations possessed of a certain literary
elegance, constructs based on a mixture of
reality and imagination. Analogy—the building
block of the logic of the artist mind—plays a
major role in his thinking: the prominence of
the "Thermidor Theory" in his programmatic
system gives evidence of that. 209
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For his part, Trotsky was strongly attracted to Rivera, "to
the imagination, charm, transparency, and geniality of the
210great artist." In particular, Trotsky admired the com-
bination of artistic and political themes in Rivera's
murals, believing that the craftsman should be just another
worker, one not alienated from his surroundings, and that
211great art combined politics and poetry. And then there
was Rivera 1 s "elemental temperament , somnabulism , and
'Gargantuan size and appetites'," so foreign to the Russian,
"which made of him a riotous and roaring prodigy like any
212
of the chimerical figures appearing in his paintings."
Frida Kahlo, Rivera's wife, also caught Trotsky's eye.
A "concealed devil" (
"
un demonio oculto "), she was a painter
of melancholy and fantastic compositions. Fantastic in her
own right, she concealed her "maimed body" (the result of
a car accident) in long-flowing Mexican garments of ex-
quisite grace and riotous color. Indeed, as Bertram Wolfe
213
wrote, she looked like some pre-Conquest Indian princess.
Until the end of 1938 the two couples were convivials,
though there is some doubt how much they actually saw of
each other. 214 Shortly after Trotsky called Rivera "'the
greatest artist of our epoch and an indomitable revolution-
ary, '" implying that he was the Gorky of the Fourth
international, 215 severe strains developed in their re-
lationship. One cause, apparently, was a quarrel
between
the two women. Increasingly irritable and
aggressive,
Natalya provoked flare-ups in the household,
and sometimes
169
insulted the dignity of the women comrades. After harsh
words were exchanged, Natalya would feel deeply remorseful,
but the harm had been done. When Frida became the target of
this attack, she felt hurt and outraged. 216 Possibly, we
may speculate, Natalya was expressing her displeasure at
Trotsky's rather old-fashioned "flirtation" with this ex-
217
otic Mexican woman.
But a more important reason for the strained re-
lations was political in nature. Rivera, the proverbial
" pintor a pistola ," almost a Mexican landmark, had attacked
Cardenas toward the end of 1938 as "'an accomplice of the
Stalinists,'" and publicly backed his conservative foe in
the presidential election. Since the Stalinists could
easily make it appear that Trotsky, Rivera's "mentor," was
behind the move, the Russian refugee was forced to make a
public disavowal in order to protect his delicate position
in Mexico. Above all, Trotsky had to avoid even the sem-
blance of interference in local politics. As a result,
Trotsky stated in early January, 1939, that he no longer
enjoyed "'moral solidarity'" with Rivera, and soon left his
house, despite the great financial inconvenience this en-
tailed.
Unlike many other such ruptures in Trotsky's long
career, he retained great personal affection for Rivera,
while regretting the artist's political naivete. Shortly
after this political quarrel, Trotsky defended Rivera against
certain political attacks, and expressed undiminished
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admiration for the "'genius whose political blunderings
could cast no shadow either on his art or on his personal
integrity.'" 219
"Noxious Influence"
The volatile political situation in Cardenas' Mexico
forced Trotsky to be highly circumspect in his conduct. As
was the case in Norway, both extremes of Mexican politics
awaited only the slightest miscue on Trotsky's part before
attacking him. The offer of asylum was not universally
popular, even within Cardenas' government. True, such
organizations as the General Labor Confederation of Mexico
welcomed him as an "'upright and sincere revolutionary,'"
whose presence in Mexico "'surely will provide orientation
to the proletariat in view of the enormous social experience
he had.'" And the managing editor of the government's
mouthpiece, Nacional , declared that "'ethical reasons con-
sonant with the clean conditions of our country'" had led to
221
the issuance of a visa.
But the left-wing of Mexican politics saw the offer
somewhat differently. Hernan Laborde, Secretary-General of
the Mexican Communist Party, branded Trotsky as a "'noxious
influence,'" one who would surely encourage reaction both
home and abroad.
222 Prior to Trotsky's arrival in Mexico,
the local Party's chief also proclaimed that "'the entry of
Trotsky into Mexico must be prevented. We will make every
effort to keep Trotsky out of Mexico. Trotskyism is the
171
22 3same as Divisionism. ' " The Mexican Confederation of
School Teachers, echoing such sentiments, lamented that
Trotsky's presence would '"encourage the assassins of labor
224and work woe to Mexico l'" More important, Vicente
Lombardo Toledano and the powerful Confederation of Mexican
Workers (CTM)
,
one of the bulwarks of the government,
launched a violent campaign in the press to force Cardenas
to reconsider his decision. Lombardo Toledano' s behavior
was so unprincipled, wrote Trotsky, that the "Russian
Mensheviks were genuine knight-errants of the revolution,"
225
compared to him.
On the right, conservative opponents of Cardenas'
agrarian revolution charged that he never made a move with-
226
out first consulting the "'Red Demon of Coyoacan. ' " When
American oil properties were nationalized, it was freely at-
tributed to Trotsky's influence, the eminence grise behind
the President. The New York Daily News repeated this
227
slander, much to Trotsky's irritation. And The New York
Times weighed in with a solemn editorial, assuring its
readers that Cardenas was no "Trotskist," and that it was
not expected that Trotsky would advise on foreign or domestic
policies. Regarding relations with the United States,
Mexico's "celebrated guest will almost certainly be in-
228
structed to keep hands off."
From the moment the visa was granted, the Mexican
political atmosphere turned ugly, with a hint of violence in
the air. Reportedly Diego Rivera's caretaker was
kidnapped
and beaten by four armed men, who eventually pitched him
out of an automobile, '"for refusing to talk.'" 229 Another
story had two armed assailants attacking Rivera himself in
a Mexico City restaurant; when Frida attempted to intervene,
she was felled by a blow in the stomach. 230 In the opinion
of Max Shachtman, the Mexican Communist Party would stop at
nothing to eliminate its hated nemesis, and Rivera had
doubts that Trotsky would be allowed to leave the tanker in
2 31good health. Mexican political circles were alive with
the rumor that the Stalinists had orders '"to shoot Mr.
Trotsky on sight.'" 232
President Cardenas successfully faced down this tide
of opposition, and even expressed confidence in Trotsky's
233discretion. He had little to fear. Trotsky was well-
aware of his delicate position. Fresh from his bitter ex-
perience in Norway, he had no intention of violating the
terms of asylum. On his first day in the New World, Trotsky
sent a telegram to Cardenas pledging non-interference in
2 34
Mexican politics. And to some Mexican journalists he ex-
pressed a desire to drop out of sight and become "u_n homme
prive . 1,235 It was with "great gratitude" that he had ac-
cepted the visa, and he lost no opportunity to applaud the
"magnanimous hospitality" of this "magnificent country,"




Yet Trotsky reserved the "right" to answer publicly
any slander, a "right" which the Norwegians abhorred,
but
173
the Mexicans allowed. Trotsky had little doubt that GPU
agents would penetrate Mexico and assist the "friends" of
the Soviet Union in making his continued stay a difficult
237
one. Fully expecting Moscow to invent new falsehoods
about his career, Trotsky expressed the hope that Mexican
public opinion would accord him a "certain moral hospital-
ity," i.e., permit him the opportunity to refute the forth-
2 38coming accusations before passing judgment. However, as
Frank Kluckhohn wrote at the time, Mexico, for Trotsky, was
"a place to live in but the wide world remains his chosen
239field." Scarcely two weeks after his arrival in Mexico,
the "wide world" once more beckoned to Trotsky, this time
in the form of the Pyat akov-Radek trial.
VII. "Enemy of the People"—Anew
News of the impending trial first reached Trotsky on
January 19, 1937. With its actual opening four days later,
Trotsky and his wife once more lived through "a week of
nightmare." Even though the procedures were clear and the
decision foreordained, wrote Trotsky, "the impression of
moral horror increased rather than decreased. The dispatches
from Moscow seemed like insane ravings. It was necessary to
re-read each line several times to force oneself to believe
240
that behind these ravings were living men." Natalya
later recalled that period of anguish:
"We listened to the radio, we opened the mail and
the Moscow newspapers, and the insanity, absurdity,
outrage, fraud, blood were flooding around us as
174
in Norway, as over the whole world . . ."241
Again. Trotsky asked himself if mankind was really so stupid
as to believe such charges. "Of course not," he assured
himself, but "the frame-ups of Stalin are so monstrous that
they likewise seem impossible crimes."
"For The Sake of Trotsky's Beautiful Eyes "
These "insane ravings" directly involved Trotsky's
honor as a revolutionary and human being. Even more than in
the first "show" trial, he was the center of attention, re-
ceiving due credit as the mastermind of the many "impossible
crimes." The portrait of the "Prince of Darkness" was more
diabolical than ever. The surreptitious aims of "rotten
putrid Trotskyism" were revealed for all to understand. His
betrayal of Lenin and Lenin's Party was fully exposed, ex-
tending back to the year 190 3: "The whole history of the
political activities of the Trotskyites represents an un-
interrupted chain of betrayals of the cause of the working
243
class, of the cause of socialism."
During the trial the various defendants vied with
each other in tossing dung at their absent colleague, the
"Judas" of the revolutionary movement, Knyazev, for instance,
called him a "scoundrel," and Rataichak implicated every
member of the "centre," in order that none would be left
"even in the slightest degree contaminated with the rotten-
944 . , . , ,
ness of this Trotskyite morass." Repeating this theme,
Drobnis regretted the many years he had lived in the "stuffy,
I
stinking, foul, evil-smelling Trotskyite underworld," but
was quick to assure the court that he had "washed rotten
putrid Trotskyism from every recess of my mind, I have
dealt with it ruthlessly." 245 Boguslavsky also spoke of
the "absolutely intolerable and incredible rottenness within
the Trotskyite organization," and warned that Trotsky's
"venomous fangs have not yet been extracted," a necessary
task, for his system of deceit might have some success
abroad: "... the inspirer and organizer of all this
criminal activity of ours was Trotsky, and the task of his
exposure, complete and final, is the basic task besides the
task of finding the specific criminals, his accomplices
246here in our country." And Norkin, in case his final
plea was the last act of his life, wanted "to take advantage
of it to convey my seething contempt and hatred for
247Trotsky.
"
On a somewhat more elevated level, Pyatakov stressed
Trotsky's impatience to get on with the dirty deeds. Time
was short, and talk was cheap. In 1932 Leon Sedov conveyed
Trotsky's acute dissatisfaction to him: "'You know the sort
of man Lev Davidovich is, he is roaring and raving, burning
with impatience to have his instructions carried out as
quickly as possible, and nothing concrete is visible from
your report.'"
248 When Pyatakov allegedly made his furtive
journey to Norway in December 1935 to protest certain in-
structions, Trotsky stressed that they had little time
left.
-It was a matter of a relatively short period,"
Trotsky
supposedly stated, and used "expressions of utter dis-
satisfaction and nasty and sarcastic remarks" to express
his displeasure at the failures to date.
Ostensibly, Pyatakov and Radek were dragging their
feet because of a lack of enthusiasm for Trotsky's new pro-
gram. As Radek phrased it, "For nothing at all, just for
the sake of Trotsky's beautiful eyes--the country was to
return to capitalism. When I read this I felt as if it were
250
a madhouse." This was the new element in Trotskyism
—
"a retreat to capitalism"—which had many profound impli-
cations. According to the internal logic of Trotskyism, as
seen from the Kremlin, there must necessarily be a politi-
cal program: "There can be no struggle for power without
some kind of program, a program that formulates the aims,
tasks, strivings and methods of struggle." Six months
earlier the only program Vyshinsky was willing to ascribe
to the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre" was a simple lust
for power, but in January, 1937, he revealed that both cen-
tres had the same basic aim— "an open assertion of the need
251
for capitalist restoration in the U.S.S.R."
By December, 1935, Trotsky had supposedly concluded
that the collapse of the Soviet state was inevitable, as
socialism could not be built in one nation alone. In the
famous Norwegian "interview" with Pyatakov, the "Old Man-
delivered a "veritable phillipic," it was claimed. "'Y
can't break away from Stalin's navel cord," he
allegedly




construction." 1 Not only the Trotskyites, their mentor
allegedly charged, but also the masses were "under the
hypnotic influence of the huge constructive work that was
going on in the country, constructive work which they took
to be socialist construction." 252 As a result, the only
feasible method for seizing power was through a coup d'etat
,
with the aid of imperialist states.
Fortunately, from the Trotskyite point of view, war
with the imperialist states was imminent, perhaps in 1937.
As Pyatakov reported, Trotsky believed that capitalism was
beginning to grow stronger, and clearly could not tolerate
the defensive power of the Soviet state much longer: "A
military clash was inevitable, and if we remained passive,
all the Trotskyite cadres as well would perish in the ruins
253
of the Stalin state." Sokolnikov further explained that
the most organized form of capitalism was fascism, which
was seizing Europe: "'Therefore, it would be better for us
to come to an agreement with it, better to arrive at some
compromise in the sense of retreating from socialism to
254 . . i
capitalism.'" Furthermore, in the forthcoming war with
the fascist powers it was necessary to "deliver a stab in
the back" to the Soviet regime. According to Pyatakov,
'"He, Trotsky , considers it absolutely necessary to adopt a
distinctly defeatist attitude in this war. He considers
that the bloc '
s
coming into power can certainly be hastened
by the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in war."
255 This was, charged
Vyshinsky, just the old Clemenceau thesis: "'Hasten the
178
collision 1 —provoke war, prepare for the defeat of the
U.S.S.R.—this was the program of the Trotskyite 'centre' in
the sphere of, so to speak, 'foreign policy.'" 256
But could an agreement be made with the fascist
powers? Repeating his favorite figure of speech, Radek
pointed out that if such an agreement was arranged, it "would
not be made purely for the sake of Trotsky's beautiful
257
eyes." Sharing this view, Trotsky allegedly entered into
negotiations with Rudolph Hess, Vice-Chairman of the National
Socialist Party, and made important territorial and economic
concessions. These concessions were specified in a letter
Trotsky sent allegedly to Radek in December of 1935:
"'.
. .We shall inevitably have to make ter-
ritorial concessions. ... We shall have to
yield the Maritime Province and Amur region to
Japan, and the Ukraine to Germany.
"'Germany needs raw materials, foodstuffs
and markets. We shall have to permit her to
take part in the exploitation of ore, manganese,
gold, oil, apatites, and to undertake to supply
her for a definite period with foodstuffs and
fats at less than world prices.
"'We shall have to yield the oil of Sakhalin
to Japan and to guarantee to supply her with oil
in case of war with America. We shall also have
to permit her to exploit goldfields. We shall
have to agree to Germany's demand not to oppose
her seizure of the Danube countries and the
Balkans, and not to hinder Japan in her seizure
of China. . . . ' 1,258
Pyatakov concluded, "What was new, if you like, was formu-
lated distinctly enough: in essence, the Trotskyite organi-
,,259
zation was being transformed into an appendage of fascism."
Certain practical steps were inevitably linked to this
program. In the event of coming to power, charged the
final
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verdict, Trotsky undertook to "liquidate the state farms,
to dissolve the collective farms, to renounce the policy of
industrialization of the country and to restore on the ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union social relations of capitalist
society." In the meanwhile, "at the behest of the enemy of
the people Trotsky," and with the direct participation of
German and Japanese agents, diversive and wrecking work in
defense industry and on railways was performed, consisting
of "disrupting plans of production, lowering the quality of
the product, organizing fires and explosions at factories
or factory departments and mines, organizing train wrecks
and damaging rolling stock and railway track." In organizing
these activities, the accused were guided by Trotsky's dic-
tum, "'to strike palpable blows at the most sensitive
places,'" supplemented by instructions from Pyatakov and
others not to shrink before loss of human life, because
'"the more victims, the better, since this will rouse the
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anger of the workers.'"
Terrorism was also of "prime importance" to the
Trotskyite centre. 261 "At the direct behest of the enemy
of the people L. Trotsky," the centre formed terrorist groups
in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Rostov, Novosibirsk, Sochi, and
other cities. They prepared terrorist acts against Stalin,
Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze , Yezhov,
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Zhdanov, Kossior, Eiche , Postyshev and Beria. According
to the Prosecutor, Trotsky at least twice published docu-
ments giving terrorist lines, "documents which
their author
180
has proclaimed urbi et orbi. 1,263 Ties to fascist states,
wrecking, terrorism—they were all necessary tools of the
struggle. In a conversation with Pyatakov, Sedov quoted his
father to the effect, that whoever attempted to brush aside





Retreat to capitalism! Appendage of fascisml Stab
in the back! Surely these charges taxed credulity. Who
could believe such flummery about Trotsky, a veteran of more
than thirty- five years service in the revolutionary trenches
?
Vyshinsky, himself, recognized the problem and asked rheto-
rically,
How can these people who fought for socialism
for so many years, people who blasphemously
called themselves Bolshevik Leninists, be ac-
cused of these monstrous crimes? Does it not
prove that the accusation is unfounded, that
these people are being accused of crimes they
cannot possibly be accused of because of the
very nature of their past socialist, revolution-
ary, Bolshevik activities?
But he had a ready answer. For decades Trotsky and his Com-
pany had sung the praises of capitalism and damned socialism.
Trotskyism had always been a foe, ,f this old enemy of the
workers and peasants, this old enemy of socialism, loyal
servant of capitalism." In fact, for more than thirty years
Trotskyism had been preparing for its "final conversion into
a storm detachment of fascism, into one of the departments
of the fascist police." In fact, claimed the Prosecutor,
the entire history of the Trotskyites represented an
265
"uninterrupted chain of betrayals" of socialism.
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In support of this "historical" perfidy Vyshinsky
dragged up some old chestnuts. His first exhibit was
Trotsky's "despicable" pamphlet, Our Political Tasks (1904),
packed full of "filthy insinuations" against Lenin: "In
this pamphlet Trotsky squirts venomous saliva at the great
ideas of Marxism-Leninism." He even slandered Lenin,
Vyshinsky asserted, by calling him "'Maximilian,'" after
Robespierre. Then in 1911-12 this "Judas-Trotsky" knocked
together the so-called "August bloc " which, in Lenin's
opinion, was built on hypocrisy and empty phrases. In re-
ply, Trotsky and his co-adjutors "retaliated with a stream
of filthy slander; they hurled abuse at Lenin and the
Bolsheviks, and called them 'barbarous,' 'fiercely sectarian'
Asiatics." But in this struggle against Lenin and his Party
worse was to come: "In 1915 Trotsky came out in opposition
to Lenin's doctrine of the possibility of the victory of
socialism in one country. Thus, he completely capitulated
to capitalism over twenty years ago!" Trotsky, in fact,
served "Economism, Menshevism, Liquidationalism, Kautskyism,
Social-Democracy and national-chauvinism, just as he is now
serving imperialism and fascism in the fight against the
U.S.S.R. 1,266
And after the October Revolution and Civil War (con-
veniently ignored in this recital of historical sins),
Trotsky continued his treacherous ways. In 1922 he advocated
allowing Soviet industrial enterprises to mortgage property
to private capitalists in order to obtain credits. This
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"capitalist control" meant political control, as Stalin ex-
posed at the time. "Is it an accident that," asked Vyshinsky,
"having started with capitalist control
, these people sank to
a frank platform of capitalist restoration
, to open struggle
for the purpose of carrying out this platform in alliance
with the capitalists against the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat?" Then, in 1926-27, the "New Opposition" took their
struggle into the streets, took the path of "open anti-Soviet
crime," and used "their pseudo- ' Lef
t
1 " proposals on "super-
industrialization" to break the bond between town and country.
"Strictly speaking, these proposals and demands were on a
line with the present acts of diversion and wrecking.
Strictly speaking, there is only a difference in form between




Vyshinsky triumphantly concluded his historical in-
dictment with the boast, "Organic connection is proved.
Historic connection is proved." The charge was fully docu-
mented. "This accusation," he continued, "condemns the
criminals in this dock to eternal disgrace and to the external
execration of all honest toilers, of all the honest people in
our country, and throughout the world." From anti-Soviet
street demonstrations in 1927 to terrorism and treason in
268
1932-36 was "only one step. And this step they took!"
Unfortunately, for Moscow, "the brain of the crime"
was not in the dock with the other degenerates. In his final
plea Pyatakov had but one lament: "I only deeply
regret that
1 M \
he, the main criminal, the unregenerate and hardened offender,
Trotsky, is not sitting beside us in the dock." 269 But the
final verdict once more held out hope for such an occasion:
Enemies of the people, Lev Davidovich Trotsky,
and his son Lev Lvovich Sedov,
. . . having been
convicted by the testimony of the accused . . .
as well as by the materials in the present case
of personally directing the treacherous activi-'
ties of the Trotskyite anti-Soviet centre, in
the event of their being discovered on the ter-
ritory of the U.S.S.R., are liable to immediate
arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of
the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. 270
Apparently the court had some reason for believing that
Trotsky and his son might suddenly reappear on Soviet soil,
either voluntarily or involuntarily.
Trotskyism Revisited
The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial had shed little light on
Trotsky's background or underlying motives. Trotsky's non-
existence, before the Party expelled him, was implicit in this
earlier trial. Almost no judicial attention was given to his
earlier career. Before 1927, he was an "un-person" as far as
this court was concerned. But in the 1930s, devoid of politi-
cal principles , his only aim was to seize power. In pursuit
of this obsession Trotsky, according to the Prosecutor, was
willing to accept fascist assistance and take advantage of
wartime setbacks, a form of defeatism. But he relied chiefly
on terrorism, pure and simple, to achieve his objective.
Trotsky, consequently, was portrayed in the earlier trials as
a power-mad has-been, consumed with hatred for Stalin, willing
to countenance criminal methods in order to regain power.
I
184
But in the Pyatakov-Radek trial Trotsky and
"Trotskyism" received much more serious attention. Trotsky
was still the criminal captain of a murderous and traitorous
band. But it was "proven" that his betrayal of Lenin and
Lenin's movement was of long duration, extending "uninter-
ruptedly" back to the year 1903 and the beginning of
Bolshevism. According to Vyshinsky, Trotsky's capitulation
to capitalism had surfaced in 1915, when he came out in op-
position to "Lenin's doctrine of the possibility of the vic-
tory of socialism in one country." At this point the seeds
of treason were sown.
Implied throughout the trial was the impossibility
of "permanent revolution" versus the possibility of "socialism"
in one country." Although Vyshinsky was careful not to dis-
cuss Trotsky's formulation of "permanent revolution," he
equated this "black program" with a retreat to capitalism,
and then contrasted it to Stalin's program of liquidating all
remnants of capitalism and building the "socialist motherland."
This was "a life and death struggle between two programs," ex-
claimed the Prosecutor, "two opposite sets of principles, two
mutually hostile trends and views which reflect the respective
sets of principles."
271 In Vyshinsky 's Manichean view of the
struggle, two diametrically opposing political programs
clashed—Trotsky and capitalism, Stalin and socialism.
During the trial Vyshinsky took great pains to demon-
strate that "Trotskyism" inevitably led to treason. "Is
it
an accident," he continually asked, that Trotskyism
had become
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an appendage of fascism? Certainly not! The "logic of the
struggle" determined Trotsky's historical path, and
"strictly speaking," it was only "one step" from questioning
the Party's line to conspiring with fascists for its downfall.
In other words, when Trotsky asserted "A" (the impossibility
of socialism in one country), he also implied "Z" (retreat to
capitalism)
, the path he subsequently followed. There was no
intermediate position in this conception. Either a Party
member wholeheartedly supported the Party line, or inevitably
272sunk into the "Trotskyite morass" and the fascist camp.
Even the faintest taint of the dread disease could
have serious consequences. At the trial Pyatakov testified
he had attempted to rid himself of his old ideas, after his
capitulation in 1927, but there remained "a poisoned splinter
of the remnants of Trotskyite ideas," around which grew "that
festering sore which brought me to the path of crime, treach-
2 7 3
ery and treason." Serebryakov also confessed that his
original political error— i.e., adherence to Trotsky's views
—
"by the inevitable logic of fate, developed into most grievous
crimes." 274 And Radek made the warning explicit: "whoever
has the slightest rift with the Party, let him realize that
tomorrow he may be a diversionist , tomorrow he may be a
traitor if he does not thoroughly heal that rift by complete
275
and utter frankness to the Party."
Thus, the internal logic of "Trotskyism" led its
author to a progression of criminal acts. Not only did the
"roaring and raving" Trotsky accept fascist assistance,
but
186
he became an appendage of fascism. Not only was he willing
to take advantage of wartime setbacks, but he urged a "stab
in the back" during the military struggle. Not only was he
eager to undermine the regime, but he advocated striking
"palpable blows at the most sensitive places" of the Soviet
system. In the space of six months, from one trial to the
next, "Trotskyism" had become a malignant disorder of extreme
depravity, highly infectious and immune to treatment. Pre-
ventive innoculation was the only answer. But its creator
was beyond assistance, except for the mercy of the "ice-
pick. "
VIII. "Bitter Work"
At the end of the trial Pyatakov predicted that the
chief culprit would not— "for I know him full well"--find any
other course than to dissociate himself from "what we have
done together with him and under his leadership, to slander
us, to lie, to accuse us of cowardice, and anything else he
may please."
276 Far from frigid Moscow in sunny Mexico City,
Trotsky did as predicted by Pyatakov and the other accused.
He went about dissociating himself from them. It was "bitter
work," Natalya Sedova later wrote. The "Blue House" in
Coyoacan was "haunted" by the faces of Trotsky's former
col-
leagues who had already disappeared and those who would
un-
doubtedly follow them.
277 After the frustrating Norwegian
experience, however, "enemy number one" felt grateful
for the
opportunity to refute the charges in the most
recent Moscow
187
tragicomedy. "'What good luck it is," Trotsky wrote his son,
Lyova, in Paris, "'that we have managed to come to Mexico




spite the incredible charges designed "to paralyse every
critical thought and to render every argument grotesquely
279inadequate," observed Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky valiantly
struggled to pierce the veil of mystery and puncture the
trial 1 s credibility.
Pencil in hand, "over-tense and overworked, often in
fever, yet tireless
,
11 Trotsky listed the forgeries , searched
280documents, checked dates, but the work was despairing and
the contest unequal, as he well knew:
The struggle is being waged with unequal weapons.
On the one side—the GPU, the court, the press,
the diplomats, the hired agentry, journalists of
the Duranty type, attorneys of the Pritt type.
On the other--an isolated "accused" who has
hardly torn himself free from a socialist jail,
in an alien, distant land, without a press or
resources of his own. 281
No matter! This "David" entered the fray, hoping to wound
Stalin's "Goliath" with the sting of his irrepressible pen.
Le Vieux Journaliste
On the eve of the trial Trotsky declared that the
back-stage managers of the new production wanted "to catch
282
public opinion unawares and commit rape upon it." The
"precipitate procedure" in announcing the trial only four
days before it opened was aimed, above all, "to prevent me
—
the main defendant— from exposing the new frame-up in time."
in Trotsky's opinion, "the G.P.U. is calculating
upon
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gullibility, ignorance, short memories." But these calcu-
lations would prove faulty, since there was no question of
internment this time:
I challenge the organizers of the frameup! I
do not doubt that the Mexican government, which
has been so hospitable to me, will not prevent
me from presenting to world public opinion the
whole truth about the monstrous frameups of the
G.P.U. and its inspirers.
This "vieux journaliste , " as he once called himself, remained
during the trial "at the disposition of the honest and im-
,,283partial press."
If anything, he was too lavish in gratifying the
press's insatiable need for fresh copy. For eleven days
after January 20, 1937, Trotsky prepared and issued over
forty articles and statements relating to the Py atakov-Radek
trial. In many cases there were two or more original
Russian versions of each statement, plus authorized trans-
lations into Spanish, French, and English. His feverish cam-
paign to refute the accusations before they gained a patina
of respectability bore some fruit. In The New York Times ,
for instance, daily dispatches from Moscow on the trial's
progress were juxtaposed with daily disclaimers issued from
m 284
Mexico City. This time his voice was heard.
The trial's chief aim, declared Trotsky, was "to
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cover me with shame in the eyes of world public opinion."
in response, his tactic was similar; namely, to cover
each
charge with shame and ridicule, in order to assist
his
readers in analyzing "the greatest political crime
of our
189
epoch and, perhaps, of all epochs," aimed at maintaining the
286Bonapartist clique in power. Like a drama critic, he re-
viewed the various performances, doing so with a certain per-
sonal relish. Vyshinsky, for Trotsky, was nothing but a
former Menshevik who was now attempting to save the October
2 fl 7Revolution from all those who had been its creators.
Pyatakov's role in the trial was no surprise, especially
after his unseemly capitulation in 1927; and just before it,
Trotsky recalled, he had predicted, "'if a Bonaparte appears,
Pyatakov will accept a portfolio, and quietly set out for
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the office.'" And no one could have any illusions about
Radek, whom Trotsky considered a "'traitor,'" pure and
289
simple. As for the "loyal" Muralov, Trotsky quietly ob-
served that "it was already many years since he had been com-
290
pletely separated from politics." Only Rakovsky's name
elicited any sentiment on Trotsky's part. when Drobnis im-
plicated the veteran revolutionary, thus hinting at a new
trial and new accusations, Trotsky wrote that his old
friend's destiny was "deeply tragic," and sorrowfully pre-
dicted that "this old fighter, crushed by life, will not out-
291
run his fate . 11
In other comments, Trotsky castigated the "infernal
conveyor" system, which forced new confessions, leading to
new trials. Not even Stalin could stop this self-perpetuating
process. Indeed, Stalin "resembles a man who drinks a salt
solution to quench his thirst."
292 Trotsky had nothing but
scorn for the theory that the so-called Russian
"soul"
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explained the debasing self-accusations. The defendants were
not personalities, but "empty vessels," the stooges of the
GPU, which staged an enlightened spectacle on the theme,
" 'Trotskyism is the source of all evil.'" Before the eyes of
the whole world, the accused threw themselves "under the
chariot of the terrible divinity Mahabharata. " But, unlike
the pious Hindus, they did so not out of blind fanaticism,
"not in religious ecstasy, but cold-bloodedly, hopelessly,
29 3under the club which drove them into the impasse." These
confessions, produced under instructions, only reflected the
Stalinist principle: "'The State— it is I! Socialism— it
is I.'" From his lofty position Stalin feared assassination,
which he imputed to the opposition: "Stalin imposed his own
interests and psychology on the accused with the aid of
294political terror."
On other matters, Trotsky was eager to disprove that
he had ever met Vladimir Romm— an izvestia correspondent and
"courier"— in the alleys of the Bois de Boulogne. It was
easy since he was at the time in a sickbed hundreds of miles
from Paris. 295 Moreover, he quickly perceived the many in-
consistencies in Pyatakov's story that he had flown to Oslo
in December 1935, in order to interview Trotsky; and Trotsky
telegraphed a number of specific questions to be asked
Pyatakov in Moscow, all designed to explode the story once
and for all. Trotsky was convinced that the grandiose frame-






Once more Trotsky contended that the trial was a
fiasco, that it only exposed the weakness of Stalin's regime.
The "moral fiasco" of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial led to the
Pyatakov-Radek trial: "In order to cover up the fatal story
of Pyatakov's plane, Stalin now has to have a new trial."
But who would be the new victims? Perhaps they would come
from the ranks of the bureaucracy:
A new period has opened! Using the bureaucracy,
Stalin crushed the people; now he is terrorizing
the bureaucracy itself. The bureaucracy fears
its own isolation from the people and therefore
supports Stalin. Stalin is afraid of his isola-
tion from the bureaucracy and is trying to play
the people along; hence the "democratic" con-
stitution and the demagogic trials.
As was his habit after each trial, Trotsky solemnly stated:
"The political system of the USSR has entered an epoch of




Before the verdicts were proclaimed, Trotsky wrote
that perhaps two or three of the accused might be spared, but
to pardon the others would only signify that the trial was
298
nothing but "a miserable comedy." He was genuinely sur-
prised, however, that Radek and Sokolnikov were among those
saved: "One cannot avoid seeing here a partial retreat on
..299
the part of Stalin before international public opinion."
Trotsky, to be sure, was not sure who was worse off— the
executed or those who were spared. The "saved ones" could
be a "sort of explosive bomb" in prison, revealing the truth
about the trial. All the world, charged Trotsky, knew
that
192
Radek could not keep a secret; "and each imprudent word from
Radek represents an enormous danger for Stalin." 300 But
Stalin was unwilling to take that chance with Pyatakov, who
could testify about the "mythical" plane flight before some
future commission. Furthermore, he had to execute the others
OA "I
in order to strengthen his right to execute Pyatakov.
Despite all the vicious charges made by the accused
against their former "mentor," Trotsky still defended their
innocence: "... before all humanity I exclaim from the
depths of my soul : These men are innocent of all the crimes
which the G. P.U. forced them to take upon themselves . " They
were but the victims of the horrible political system
—




In his many statements on the Pyat akov-Radek trial,
Trotsky repeatedly stressed the need for a "counter-trial."
Returning to a theme first developed during the Zinoviev-
Kamenev proceedings, he demanded that world opinion accord
him his day in court. At various times he entertained the
idea of an "international commission of inquiry," an appear-
ance before a Mexican extradition court, and even an appeal
to the League of Nations. Despite the unsettled nature of
such an inquiry, Trotsky was steadfast in his determination
to clear himself and indict Stalin before the bar of public
opinion and, eventually, before the bar of history.
i
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He reiterated the need for an "impartial inquiry" at
every chance. Even before the Py at akov-Radek trial commenced,
Trotsky proudly declared:-
. . . I am ready before any free and impartial
court , before any independent commission of in-
quiry to prove, with the aid of irrefutable
facts , letters , documents , evidence , that the
Moscow trials of "Trotskyites 11 represent the
most horrifying falsification, and that the
real criminals are not the accused , but the
accusers . 303
Such an inquiry was simply a matter of "elementary political
hygiene," he argued in another statement. Even if the GPU
was unwilling to present charges before an international com-
mission of outstanding personalities, "I, for my part, prom-
ise to demonstrate before such a commission that Stalin is
the organizer of the greatest political crimes in world his-
tory." 304 This commission should result "in a great counter-
trial ," he told a Mexican audience, one that would rid the
atmosphere of "the germs of deceit, calumny, falsification
and frame-ups," and confirm that there was "not a stain on
30 5
my honor, both personal and political." The question of
an international commission was not a personal caprice, a
family affair, or even just a concern for imprisoned opposi-
tionists :
No this is an international question. It deeply
involves the political consciousness and moral
standards of all countries. In the most diffi-
cult conditions there is no more vivifying means
than the truth ! That is why all workers' organi-
zations, all progressive social groups, all
honest citizens must support the initiative for




If the terms of such an inquiry were vague, not so Trotsky's
impassioned plea that somewhere, somehow, men of good will
would come together to hear the truth.
A variation of this stratagem was to present his
case before an authoritative Mexican court. If only Moscow
would formally demand his extradition, then Trotsky could
use a legitimate judicial setting to answer the charges. All
the world would listen. At one point during the Moscow trial
he commented on a rumor that extradition might be demanded:
"I welcome this idea warmly. What is more, for my part, I
demand that the Russian Government present such a request."
Recalling his frustrating appearance in a "closed" Norwegian
court, he boasted:
I am now ready to repeat the action with very
much more detail, with the doors wide open, be-
fore a Mexican court of law. I cannot imagine
a better solution of the whole matter. 307
Not only was Moscow unwilling to provide Trotsky with a legal
platform, but the entire idea was something of a sham. There
were no formal diplomatic relations between Mexico and the
Soviet Union; as a result, no extradition treaty governed
Trotsky's situation.
308 In effect, Trotsky's challenge was
a public relations device.
Even more fanciful was an appeal to the League of
Nations. After Balkan terrorists had assassinated King
Alexander of Yugoslavia and French Minister Barthou in
Marseilles (in October 1934), there was an international
out-
cry and a demand for the League to establish a
tribunal on
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terrorism (not unlike the international reaction to the mas-
sacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics). Heading
the effort to have lawyers establish judicial foundations for
such a tribunal was Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Foreign
Minister, and the "new boy" in the League. As part of the
proposed agreement, nation-states would transfer terrorists
to the interested party, not unlike the exchange of Michael
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Bakunin between allied monarchs in the nineteenth century.
Could Litvinov' s enthusiasm for this plan have any-
thing to do with Russia's most famous outcast? Not only did
Trotsky believe he was the "target" of this Soviet initiative,
but that it was part and parcel of the "first amalgam," or
counterfeit conspiracy, around the Kirov affair. Unfortu-
nately, Nikolyaev fired the fatal shot before a link was
established between Trotsky and the terrorists, and before
the international tribunal had been established. Little came
of the effort. "The scandalous speech of a Soviet diplomat
trying hard to unite the world's police forces against
•Trotskyism' is presently the only thing left from the grand
,,310
design of reaching me through the League of Nations.
However, Trotsky perceived an opportunity to turn the
tables on Stalin and embarrass him at his own game.
On
October 22, 1936, while still interned in Sundby,
Trotsky
directed his Norwegian lawyer to address a letter
to the ap-
propriate League officials. Trotsky doubted that
Stalin
would ever press a case before the proposed
tribunal, but as
. "claimanet" /Tic7 he could bring the case
to its attention;
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and, if the Soviet government did not respond, then "the
accusation with all its international consequences must be
recognized as anihilated /sic/. " The only reply Trotsky re-
ceived was acknowledgment of its receipt, No. 3 A/15105/
15058. Trotsky, persevering, made the same threat in
January 1937. If the tribunal were ever established, "I
will undertake all the necessary legal steps in order that
all the accusations against me can be judged in their en-
311tirety." Twice disdained, Trotsky returned to this
frivolous enterprise fourteen months later, in a letter ad-
dressed "To the Juridical Section Secretariat of the League
of National /sic/. " He still claimed the right to refute
charges of terrorism by ill-intentioned governments. He was
ready at any time, he stated, to appear before a League tri-
bunal and "convert my accusers into accused." Citing a long
list of murdered associates, Trotsky contended that there
was ample basis for the interference of an international tri-
bunal against "a centralized Mafia of terrorists" led by
Joseph Stalin. Since Litvinov had declared that governments
must extradite terrorists, the Foreign Minister, "we can
hope, will not refuse to employ his influence to place the
above-mentioned Joseph Stalin, as head of the international




IX. "Be It Even Over Our Bleaching Bones,
The Truth Will Triumph!"
If an appearance before a Mexican court was impracti-
cable, an appeal to the League of Nations implausible, and
even a law suit of dubious worth, then Trotsky's options
were severely circumscribed. In effect, he had only three
choices: to be silent, to wage a polemical campaign, to
stage a "show" trial. But each possibility was not without
its inherent defects.
Trotsky, as already observed, rejected out of hand
the path of silence. Not only would inaction tend to rein-
force the appearance of personal guilt, it would betray the
ideals of the October Revolution. The "unsoiled banner of
socialism," he argued, must be handed to future generations,
313
cleansed of monstrous falsifications. As he repeatedly
urged affirmed to his listeners, "'Fealty to the October
revolution demands merciless exposure, and, if need be,
cauterize its sores.'" 314 He had nothing but scorn for those
"'radical bigots,*" who avoided any criticism of the Soviet
Union, and who tended to believe the danger lay "'in the
medical diagnosis,"' and not "'in the disease which gnaws
cunningly at the organism!'"
315 Only those revolutionary
hypocrites masquerading under the cheap title, "'friends of
the USSR,'" could keep silent in order not to aid fascism:
"This is like superstitious people who are afraid to name
their illness aloud because they believe in word
magic.
These so-called radicals sought to protect
the revolution
198
like "a fragile hot-house plant," but only revealed their
lack of historical understanding and their undersupply of
political courage. For, Trotsky declared, the "road to
human emancipation is the road of truth and forthrightness
,
not puerility and falsehood." 317
One such hypocritical "friend," in Trotsky's opinion,
was Andre Malraux. The famed French writer had been one of
his many visitors at St. Palais in the summer of 1933. If he
so desired, Malraux could have corroborated Trotsky's state-
ment that it would have been next to impossible for him to
have met Romm in Paris at the time. Despite Trotsky's ap-
318peal, however, Malraux chose to remain silent. Then in
February 1937, this experienced observer of revolutions made
a trip to New York to rally support for the Loyalist cause
in the Spanish Civil War. At a banquet in his honor,
tendered by the editorial staff of The Nation , Malraux was
quoted as saying, "'Trotsky is a great moral force in the
world, but Stalin has lent dignity to mankind; and just as
the Inquisition did not detract from the fundamental dignity
of Christianity, so the Moscow trials do not detract from the
— — 319
fundamental dignity /of communism/.'"
This sophistry was too much for Trotsky. Although he
had once written a generally favorable review of Malraux'
s
The Conquerors , a novel dealing with the Chinese revolution,
and had urged Simon and Shuster to issue an American edition
of Man's Fate , calling it a '"true work of art,'" Trotsky
turned on his former friend, and publicly declared that,
199
"In 1926 Malraux was in China in the service of the Comintern-
Kuomintang
,
and is one of those who carry the responsibility
for the strangulation of the Chinese revolution." Unlike
Andre Gide, Malraux "is organically incapable of moral in-
dependence," and "is officious by birth." This New York trip,
Trotsky asserted, was all part of the Stalinist campaign to
prevent a review of the Moscow trials. Malraux left Spain,
charged Trotsky, for the purpose of conducting in the United
States "a campaign in defense of the judicial work of Stalin-
321Vyshmsky . "
In response to this intemperate attack, Malraux re-
minded Trotsky that he had protested both the Russian's ex-
pulsion from France and Georgi Dimitrov's trial for the
Reichstag Fire incident: "Apparently to Mr. Trotsky moral
independence consists not only in defending Mr. Trotsky but
also in not defending Dimitrov." More tellingly, the
Frenchman observed, Trotsky was "so obsessed with whatever
concerns his personal fate" that he could not accept first
priority for the Spanish cause. He deplored "the incredible
levity with which Mr. Trotsky is ready to hurl any accusation
322
in order to dramatize his personal conflicts."
This minor contretemps reflected little glory on
either man. To some degree Malraux was correct in implying
that Trotsky's obsession with the charges in the Moscow trials
was clouding his perspective, and upsetting his mental equi-
librium. But this was hardly just a "personal" conflict.





with the aid of pathct i c invoc ations
,
from the enormous frame-ups and ass ass in at i ons to other
tasks . " Either Moscow's accusations were true, which would
mean that almost the entire old generation of Bolsheviks had
taken the road to Fascism, or they were false, indicating
that the bureaucratic apparatus was completely rotten. "Tn
both cases, thus, the Soviet state finds itself gravely sick."
But before prescribing a cure for this political, not personal,
illness, a diagnosis must be made: "The truth must be ex-
323plained.
"
If a policy of silence was unimaginable, then Trotsky
had the option of continuing his vigorous campaign to impeach
Stalin in the world press. In refusing to join any kind o!
a counter-trial, George Bernard Shaw advocated just such a
I ine:
"I hope Trotsky will not allow himself to be
brought before any narrower tribunal than his
reading public, whore his accusers are at his
mercy. His present position gives him every
advantage; and If he is personally com i <>i i .ii< i < •
in Mexico (quite a pleasant place) I shall cer-
tainly do nothing to change it. His pen is a
terrific weapon." 324
But Trotsky was surely at a disadvantage in relying only on
his pen in tho confrontation with the Kremlin. Not all of his
statements were well received by the world press. Moreover,
the "friends" and "attorneys" of the Soviet Union had many
more platforms for their polemics than did Trotsky. Tn
addi-
tion, he was hard-put to match the theatrical drama and
in-
herent fascination of the Moscow trials. And the
charges and
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counter-charges were so complex, not even a massive volume
could do justice to their tangled skein. Above all, written
statements gave little sense of the man
—
proud, indignant,
horrified by the monstrosity of the calumnies, but serenely
confident in the Tightness of his cause.
In a very real sense, Trotsky had no alternative.
Only a "counter-trial" could hope to counter the original
dramas in fascination and effectiveness. Besides, the public
Trotsky relished highly theatrical stagings. In 1906, when
the Tsarist government put him on trial, the youthful
Trotsky utilized incisive logic and scathing wit to place
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the regime on the defensive. After the October
Revolution he entertained the idea of doing Tsar Nicholas II
a similar favor, proposing before the Politburo (a few weeks
before the Romanov execution) that they hold "an open court
trial" for the Tsar, in order to expose the government's
policies and reign: "The proceedings of the trial would be
broadcast throughout the country by radio . . . , accounts
of the proceedings would be read and commented upon every
day." 326 Nothing came of this proposal, but a "show trial"
was staged in 1922, featuring the Central Committee of the
Social-Revolutionary Party, with Trotsky's vocal approval.
If Trotsky could confront Vyshinsky in open court, he would
savagely dismember the government's case point by point, dis-
crediting its authors before the bar of public opinion. Such
a fantasy may have appealed to this veteran of a thousand
verbal clashes, but he could have had no illusions
that Stalin
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would permit it. No 1 He had to stage his own "show trial,"
this time with Stalin the chief defendant in absentia
.
As Isaac Deutscher has written, Trotsky wanted a
counter-trial set on "a scale appropriate to the provocation,"
and conducted in such a way as "to shake the conscience of
*3 9 7the international labour movement." But only a tribunal
that was authoritative, impartial, and somehow "legitimate"
could achieve this lofty aim. A court composed of leading
figures in the international workers' movement might meet
these requirements. But his socialist "colleagues" would not
cooperate. Under pressure from Leon Blum, the "conscience-
stricken" leaders of the Second International, as well as the
so-called Amsterdam International of the Trade Unions, de-
clined to participate in any endeavor that might embarrass
328Moscow. Next came appeals to leading intellectuals of the
left, for whom Trotsky had always expressed a certain con-
tempt, since they tended to issue grandiloquent statements
of moral indignation instead of uniting in effective mass
organizations. But such international figures as Berthold
Brecht, Andre Gide , H. G. Wells, Romain Rolland, Lion
Feuchtwanger , Henri Barbusse, and Louis Aragon either en-
dorsed the Moscow charges, or refused to participate in a
counter-trial. 329 Trotsky's followers, however, did manage
to form British, French, and Czech defense committees, among
others, but they lacked the necessary authority to "shake"
the world's conscience. Only the American Committee for the
Defense of Leon Trotsky showed the requisite energy,
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initiative, and gravity to form an effective commission of
330inquiry
.
Despite the uncertainty about the formation of a com-
mission, Trotsky proceeded to build his alibi, a "foolproof
and indestructible alibi," one that would endure for all ages,
331 s
as Isaac Deutscher has noted. His villa in Coyoacan began
to resemble a "sweat shop" in early 1937, as Trotsky, his
wife, and loyal secretaries translated documents, copied af-
fidavits, typed endless statements. In the manner of a
pedantic scholar, Trotsky left nothing to chance, and re-
traced his activities through the years of exile. Affidavits
and depositions were solicited from a myriad of friends and
foes, including inn-keepers and police agents. There was al-
most a surfeit of documentation. No matter! Trotsky drove
himself unmercifully, as he did Lyova, his son, expressing
anger when dates were not checked, signatures not validated,
place names not indicated. At one point he wrote that his
son's slovenliness' " bordered on "'treachery.'" Even more
cruelly, he reproached over-worked Lyova for sending apologies,
not affidavits, in one letter: "'It is difficult to say which
are the worst blows, those that come from Moscow or those from
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Paris. ' "
The "Moscow Themis" had not only blindfolded her
eyes, but also "put cotton in her ears." Nonetheless,
Trotsky remained confident that he had set the right
course:
The immediate task consisted in providing a
factual point of support for the thought of the
most penetrating minds, and to provoke criticism,
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or at least doubts, among the next layer.
Having conquered the minds of the select,
truth would unfold further and further. In
the long run, the spiral of truth would prove
stronger than the spiral of frame-up.
. . .
333
Firmly on the side of "truth
,
" Trotsky expressed no doubts
about his cause. Even when L. Kaganovich called for his head
before a crowd in Moscow, he denied that a successful assas-
sination attempt would alter the situation . "Be it even over
334
our bleaching bones, the truth will triumph!" It was to




"THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE
DEFENSE OF LEON TROTSKY"
The year was 1936. The place was New York City. Yet
another group of civil libertarians had created yet another
"defense" committee. But the endeavor was unprecedented in
its aims—to assure the physical safety and political honor
of a Bolshevik revolutionary. "The American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky" had more than its share of de-
tractors, for it was bucking a historical tide of great
force. The conjunction of the depression with the rise of
Hitler's Germany prompted many Americans—especially intel-
lectuals—to look abroad for an ally strong in both arms and
faith. The Soviet Union appeared to be just such a power.
Thus, the "defense" of Stalin's arch nemesis—Trotsky—was
hardly the most popular of causes in the mid-1930s. The
stage was set for a battle, an exceptionally bitter battle.
'***************
The Great Depression— an unmitigated disaster for
vast numbers of Americans. The "smashup" of 1929 was almost
"like a rending of the earth in preparation for the Day of
Judgment," wrote Edmund Wilson. There was no lack of evi-
dence that the furies had descended on the United States.
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In the cities long lines of once-proud men stood many hours
to obtain a bowl of mush from one of the innumerable soup
kitchens. On the streets were apple peddlers and young boys
gone wild. Empty lots were dotted with "Hoover-villes ,
"
drafty shacks made from tarpaper, old packing cases, and
wrecked car bodies. In the country irate farmers wielded
pitchforks in a futile effort to stop foreclosures. And on
the Anacosta Flats in Washington, D.C. , an army of unemployed
veterans set up their tents, waiting for much-needed bonuses,
until the night of July 28, 1932, when Douglas MacArthur,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, and George S. Patton, Jr. led a de-
tachment of cavalry, infantry, and tanks against the dis-
organized "red rabble," gassing their children, burning
their shacks.''" Much of America shuddered, fearing a
Revolution, or perhaps the Apocalypse.
But the gathering darkness also had some compen-
sating virtues. A segment of the American "intelligentsia"
took some comfort from the disaster. As Edmund Wilson ob-
served, times were terrible,
Yet, to the writers and artists cf my genera-
tion who had grown up in the Big Business era
and had always resented its barbarism, its
crowding-out of everything they cared about,
these years were not depressing but stimulating.
One couldn't help being exhilarated at the sud-
den unexpected collapse of that stupid gigantic 2
fraud. It gave us a new sense of freedom. . . .
To Wilson and his brethren the multiple shocks of the early
1930s also brought a measure of hope, the promise that a new
and better world would be created on the ashes of the
burned-out business civilization.
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The self-appointed legislators and creators of this
Elysium were the former outcasts of Babylon—the intellec-
tuals. No longer paralyzed by a sense of alienation, eager
to grasp the reins of power, they prepared to refashion
America along new lines. But first an internal revolution
was needed. The traditional dichotomies of "art and life,"
"intellectual and Philistine," "contemplation and action,"
"literature and propaganda"—these must be smashed. Only by
a deep commitment to the untutored and dispossessed, wrote
Malcolm Cowley, could an end be put to '"the desperate
feeling of solitude and uniqueness that has been oppressing
3
artists for the last two centuries.'" But there was also
a need for an external revolution, one which called for a
new social vision. Almost by default the quest for a new
faith turned eastward, toward the "Red Phoenix."
A belief in Moscow as the New Jerusalem was hardly
new. Ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 the future
appeared to lie with the "'greasy muzhiks'" and their
4leaders in the Soviet Union. There was a veritable deifi-
cation of the Bolsheviki in the early years of the Soviet
experiment. For instance, a poet on the Liberator wrote an
ode to Lenin on his birthday in 1920:
"Your teachers enlighten the people without any
rest or stint,
And they give them one good rifle with every
good book they print;
And the workers now own everything, even their
right to be born,
And the peasants have taken in the full flax
and the wheat and the corn,
208
And in Moscow it is high noon, and in Europe
it is the morn,
And the Soviets are everywhere!" 5
In the same vein Rose Pastor Stokes, who had worked in a
cigar factory before making an opportune match with a
wealthy industrialist, saluted her fellow comrades:
"0, Russian Proletariat, my Comrades!
I long to share your meager bowl of Kasha,
For the sweet touch to my lips of a wooden
spoon
Whittled with Liberty's new pocket knife.
"O, Mass ! 0, laughing, starving, challenging
Mass
!
What would I not give to laugh and starve
with you,
And with you to fling my challenge in the
face of the fore-doomed enemy;
To hear your Red Standard laughing in the
wind! . . .
Flaming kisses would I kiss you, 0 wind that
bore its laughter
,
Though your breath should be as icy as the
frozen Steppe. "°
During the 1920s any number of the curious—writers,
artists , educators—made the pilgrimage to the Promised Land
7
to share the "meager bowl of Kasha." But many returned with
disquieting news. Certain carbuncles had appeared on the
Soviet corpus: Kronstadt, Chekist outrages, political
factionalism, intellectual repression, economic disparities.
But these blemishes were largely forgotten in the early
1930s. Even the politically non-committed were impressed
by the drift and despair at home, in comparison with the
high hope and bustling activity exhibited by the Soviets
abroad. In the opinion of Arthur Koestler,
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"The contrast between the downward trend of
capitalism and the simultaneous steep rise of
the planned Soviet economy was so striking
and obvious that it led to the equally obvious
conclusion: They are the future—we, the past." 8
In order to participate in "the future," a broad spectrum of
American liberals turned towards economic planning as the
9panacea for domestic infirmities. Admiration for the
Soviet Five-Year plan was almost epidemic. As Frank A.
Warren, III, has written, "It was the confrontation of the
Five-Year Plan with the depression that served as the cata-
lyst," and greatly increased Russian prestige among liberal
circles. Stuart Chase, for one, was eager to fashion an
American plan: "'Why should Russians have all the fun in
remaking a world?'" And Edmund Wilson urged his readers
12
to '"take Communism away from the Communists.'"
The rise of Hitlerite Germany also deepened the
emotional investment in the Soviet Union. As a new dark age
appeared to descend on Europe, with reports of atrocities,
pogroms, and concentration camps, the search began for a
strong force to counter the fascist threat. This quest be-
came frenetic with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in
July 1936. The lines appeared drawn between two systems of
life—democracy and fascism. Spain became the decisive
trial for men of good will. "'To aid Loyalist Spain is not
an act of generosity; it is a debt of honor,'" intoned
Norman Thomas.
13 Diverse factions sprang to Spain's assis-
tance. Aid came from Harvard undergraduates, who left
col-
lege to become cannon fodder in the Abraham Lincoln
Brigade.
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Aid came from Gypsy Rose Lee, who told a Hollywood rally,
"•I have not come to lift my skirts, but to lift the embargo
on Spain!"- 14 But most of all aid, in the form of arms and
men, came from the Soviet Union. Profoundly grateful for
this assistance, many Americans shut their ears to reports
of minor Soviet peccadilloes in Spain, such as the liquida-
tion of anarchists and labor leaders. This was a time of
uncritical loyalty to the sacred cause, in accordance with
Mike Gold's dictum, "'Every anti-fascist is needed in this
united front. There must be no base factional quarrels.'" 15
This united front of anti-fascists in America was
immeasurably aided by a significant shift in Soviet foreign
policy. At the Vllth Congress of the Comintern (July-August,
1935) Chairman Dimitrov officially announced that the "third
period" of revolutionary militancy had been abandoned in
favor of a broad alliance of progressives who abhorred




communists, but not Trotskyites, of course. Earl Browder
hurried home from Moscow to oversee the shift in tactics.
Under the slogan, "Communism is the Americanism of the
Twentieth Century," the Party took a leading role in pro-
moting a whole host of "Fronts," or "Innocents' Clubs."
Among the myriad organizations either controlled or in-
fluenced by the Party were International Labor Defense,
Jewish People's Committee, Jimmy Collins Flying Club, League
against War and Fascism, League of Women Shoppers, Daughters
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of the American Depression, Foster Parents Plan for Spanish
Children, ad infinitum
.
16 Honest anti-fascist sentiment was
monopolized. In the words of Eugene Lyons, "Niagaras of in-
dignation against the bestialities of the Nazi regime, all
the geysers of fear and hatred and panic started by the ag-
gressions and duplicities of the Hitler Axis, were channeled
1 7off into communist-controlled reservoirs." The Popular
Front, or "Trojan Horse" strategy was well-launched.
In historical shorthand, this period in America be-
came known as the "Red Decade," after Eugene Lyons' polemi-
cal outburst of the same name. Himself a lapsed believer
and self-proclaimed "red-baiter," Lyons surveyed the
"intellectual slumming" of the "totalitarian liberals," and
asserted that the united front mentality "tinctured every
department of American life while it lasted and has left its
color indelibly on the mind and moral attitudes of the
country." Without a doubt Lyons was also guilty of coloring
the truth, for on every major issue of the day—economic
planning, collective security, Spanish Civil War, Popular




But the siren song of the Party's troubadours was
highly seductive, especially since the "rudimentary ideology"
of the Popular Front demanded a minimum of critical thought
or courageous action. After the new line of 1935 it was
"•the sweetest bandwagon in all history,'" wrote Joseph
Freeman, a cultural commissar for the Party:
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"For now you could be for every kind of social
reform here, for the Soviet Union, for the
Communist Party, for Proletarian literature--
for everything and anything that was at one
time radical, rebellious, subversive, revolu-
tionary and downright quixotic— and in doing
so you were on the side of all the political
angels of the day; you were on the side of the
Roosevelt administration, on the side of Labor,
the Negroes, the middle class; on the side of
Hitler's victims, on the side of all the op-
pressed colonial peoples in the world. In
short, this is the only period in all the
world's history when you could be at one and
the same time an ardent revolutionary and an
arch-conservative backed by the governments of
the United States and the Soviet Union. "19
This slumming was particularly sweet during Hollywood's
"Celluloid Uprising." With characteristic hyperbole Lyons
wrote that, "Marx and martinis, bridge and dialectics, social
consciousness and social climbing were all mixed up on the
20banks of luxurious private swimming pools."
It was a little too easy, however, to be engage at
the time. The simple catchwords of the movement— "democracy,"
"unity," "anti-Fascism"—tended to obscure a moral dilemma
of considerable perplexity. One could agree with Max Lerner
that the problem of sheer survival demanded a "'peace pact'"
among radicals, liberals, and labor stalwarts. And one
could echo the bleat of The Nation that "'the revolutionary
lions and liberal lambs'" should cautiously join against the
common enemy of Fascism, based on the logic of self-
preservation. 21 But this argument implied that the Soviet
Union was a staunch member of the "democratic" camp of peace-
loving nations. Certain awkward facts of Soviet life, how-
ever, were difficult to ignore. The artificial famine of
I
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1932-33, the herding of millions into "corrective" labor
camps, the murderous aftermath of the Kirov affair all of
this stuck in the gorge of liberals with an uneasy con-
science .
Yet others managed to swallow their doubts. Certain
allowances were made for Soviet defects. By accepting a
Manichean division of the world into the "democracies"
(including the USSR) , and the fascist powers, it was neces-
sary to use a "double standard" when justifying Soviet
aberrations. What was "understandable" in Russia, e.g., the
suppression of civil liberties due to historical causes, was
22
completely anathema in the United States. In the laudable
effort to thwart the fascist threat it was considered the
height of bad manners— and bad politics—to criticize the
leader of the anti-fascist camp. This was moral relativism
with a vengeance.
"The strategy of the lesser evil is the mind's
23
education in opportunism," once observed Philip Rahv.
This opportunism was severely tested when John Dewey demanded
an impartial inquiry into Soviet accusations against Leon
Trotsky. Here the "strategy of the lesser evil" ran head-
long into the traditional credo of American liberals.
I. Echoes of the Purge Reach American Shores
In 1937 James T. Farrell , the novelist, attempted to
convince a mid-western journalist that the Moscow trials had
immense historical significance for America. In response,
his fellow writer asked, "'What do the Moscow Trials mean in
Kokomo, Indiana?'" 24
Perhaps Kokomo, Indiana, was not convulsed by the
specter of Old Bolsheviks humiliating themselves in public
court, but this was not true in New York and other market-
places of intellectual America. The trials rent in twain
the entire American left and split it into "fiercely opposed
camps," wrote one close observer of the convulsion. 25 At a
time when "unity" was the hallowed goal of the anti-fascist
forces, the Moscow spectaculars undermined the basis of the
Popular Front. In addition, American "progressives" were
forced to honor or ignore such traditional liberal prin-
ciples as political asylum and the right of any accused to
his day in court. Above all, an agonizing dilemma had to be
faced, one that bedeviled many intellectuals. As Waldo
Frank, the writer and sometime fellow-traveler, told Trotsky,
"'It is difficult for me to believe that you entered into an
alliance with fascism; but it is egually difficult for me to
. ..26
believe that Stalin carried out such horrible frame-ups I II
In the apt phrase of Philip Rahv , these were "trials of the
27
mind and of the human spirit."
The Zinoviev-Kamenev trial occurred during the
initial uproar over the insurrection in Spain. The American
Communists had labored mightily to exploit this indignation
and draw a distinct line between the peaceful aims of the
Soviet Union and the militaristic goals of Hitlerite Germany
But the first "show trial," and subsequent blood bath,
tended to obscure this moral demarcation line. American
liberals had expressed great anger at the summary executions
atrocities, concentration camps, and public trials that had
become a way of life in The Third Reich. But now these
sorry episodes were also occurring in The Promised Land.
The growing similarity of the communist and fascist regimes
was expressed in a familiar epithet, "Red Fascism," deeply
resented by the Party faithful. But if a moral distinction
was impossible to maintain, then the Soviet Union was an un-




The solidarity of the American left was shaken by
the trials, in fact, but hardly shattered. Legions of
sympathizers flocked to the Soviet-led Popular Front even
during the years of turmoil, 1936-38, but at a cost. As
Edmund Wilson commented, "One of the worst drawbacks of
being a Stalinist at the present time is that you have to
29defend so many falsehoods."
Trotsky and Amorir.i
Trotsky's reputation in America exacerbated the
moral and political dilemma posed by the trials. During his
brief sojourn in New York City (January-March, 1917) he had
become acquainted with many radicals, but his enthusiasm for
the American movement was restrained. "'A Babbitt of
Babbitts is /Morris/ Hillquit, the ideal Socialist leader fo
successful dentists,'" was his sally at the expense of one
i
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prominent figure of the American left. 30 This disdain was
reciprocated over the years when the practical and "business-
like" Stalin triumphed with ease over his "fanatical foe."
As the modern Ishmaelite was forced to scurry from one tem-
porary haven to another during the 1930s, there was a certain
smug satisfaction, not only among the Party faithful. And
there was concern that he would torpedo the fragile anti-
fascist alliance with his revolutionary calls to action.
The New Republic
,
for instance, solemnly warned that Trotsky,
"as is well known, has always demanded communist revolutions
in all parts of the world at the earliest possible moment." 31
Frederick L. Schuman forcefully presented the anti-
Trotsky view in an influential article entitled, "Leon
Trotsky: Martyr or Renegade?" In this "objective" analysis
Trotsky was portrayed as a failed fanatic. According to
Schuman, the trials brought the Russian exile new fame, "for
he again plays the role he loves best—that of a lean and
grizzled revolutionary figure around whom, even in exile,
32
the tempests of controversay rage with cyclonic fury."
The conflict between Trotsky and Stalin offered a political
choice, if not a moral one:
Whatever it was yesterday or may be tomorrow,
Trotskyism today is a program of uncompromising
class war, of repudiation of liberal 'bourgeois'
democracy, of universal revolution, of the con-
version of the Soviet state into a center of
world-wide revolt and conflict. Stalinism to-
day stands for appeasement, for collaboration
with liberalism, for order and peace in a
world society threatened with destruction by
war between classes and war between nations.
However, to side with Trotsky was to side with "the most im-
pressive political failure of the age," the "renegade who
failed." Assuring his readers that political blunders were
worse than crimes, Schuman contended that Trotsky had been
mistaken in almost every political position he had main-
tained, a case of "too early or too late. Always he is a
political blunderer." The death of his followers in the
Soviet Union "will haunt" him, for he risks nothing save
their fate: "Neither the cheers of sympathetic multitudes
nor his own words of spiteful protest will silence the
inner voice which tells him that he had erred and failed
and betrayed himself. In a red haze of anger he passes into
history, always self-defeated by his own follies." Schuman
concluded that in times of peace Stalin's Russia was the
ally of democracies and bulwark of world order: "Because
of this the democratic West must, for its own security, dry
33its tears for fallen heroes and accept Moscow's hand."
But not all American progressives viewed Trotsky as
the "renegade who failed," a mortal threat to world peace.
At one time he had excited the admiration of John Reed,
Raymond Robins, and Max Eastman. In Leon Trotsky : The
Portrait of a Youth (1925) , Eastman had extolled the
Bolshevik leader: "'Trotsky's voice is so powerful that
you rest when he talks. And his thought is so powerful that
you rest when he is thinking. He is a born and inevitable
leader of men. There is mature restraint and wisdom in his
speech, and yet there is young and overflowing boldness.'"
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And Mike Gold, a master of invective in the service of the
Party, had written in 1926 that Trotsky was the symbol of
the artist-leader, one who could speak six languages and
discourse on Freud and Einstein, "•almost as universal as
Leonardo da Vinci.'" Even in 1930 Gold conceded that
Trotsky was "'an immortal part'" of the Revolution, and
surely was "'one of the permanent legends of humanity, like
Savonarola or Danton. ' 11
In the mid-1930s such leading American intellectuals
as Louis Hacker, John Dos Passos, Lionel Trilling, Sidney
Hook, and John Chamberlain, among others, were attracted to
his brilliance, cosmopolitan attitude toward culture, and
obliteration of the romantic dichotomy between thinker and
3 6
activist. Here was the scintillating intellect who could
also lead victorious armies . He was the symbol of their
hopes , a living reproach to those paralyzed by the nagging
problem of alienation and the divorce of mental and physical
labors
.
There was a sharp disagreement, therefore, in ap-
praising Trotsky's talents. In a review of the transcript
of the second trial, Malcolm Cowley confessed that he had no
love for Trotsky:
My opposition is partly a question of tempera-
ment: I have never liked the big-city intel-
lectuals of his type, with their reduction of
every human question to a bald syllogism in
which they are always right at every point,
miraculously right, and their opponents always
stupid and beneath contempt. . . . 37
For the opposition camp, Dwight MacDonald noted Cowley's
personal prejudice against Trotsky, and admitted his own
deep-seated prejudice in Trotsky's favor: "It's hardly
necessary to give my reasons. They are about the same as
Mr. Cowley's." 38
Thus, Trotsky himself was an issue in the intellec-
tual vineyards of America, one intertwined with the greater
problem of how to approach the Moscow trials. As Carleton
Beals, no admirer, shrewdly observed, it was possible that
"Trotsky shakes the New York intelligentsia far more than he
30
does the Soviet Union."
American Reaction to the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial
This discomfort over the fate of the Popular Front
and Trotsky's "fanaticism" influenced the first reactions to
the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. For the "true believers," how-
ever, there was no problem in issuing definitive judgments;
it was merely a matter of correctly echoing the approved
line. The fellow-travelling New Masses , for instance, ap-
proved the verdict in an editorial entitled, "The Trotsky
Cesspool." Only "a complete idiot or an out-and-out counter
revolutionary" could believe that the accused chanced a
firing squad merely to malign Trotsky unfairly. Besides,
the crimes were a logical result of Trotsky's counter-
revolutionary activities; his "bitter and malicious struggle




On the other side of the political divide, the
Trotskyite organ, Socialist Appeal
, approvingly quoted its
leader on the trial being the "'most colossal fabrication in
the history of world politics,'" and echoed his contention
that the Soviet Union was beset by an internal political
crisis. To these Trotskyite editors there was no veil of
mystery obscuring the proceedings: "All correspondents
agree that the trial had only one purpose: to discredit
Trotsky and the revolutionary ideas for which he stands.
Not only to discredit Trotsky but actually to incite fanati-
cal Stalinists to make an attempt on his life." 41
But it was not on the extremes of the political
spectrum that the real controversy raged. The partisans on
both sides fought for the allegiance of the progressive
middle— "the swamp"—which often took its lead from the
liberal journals, The Nation and The New Republic . But
editorials in these magazines revealed considerable anguish
and immense confusion over the issues. While the trial was
still in progress, The Nation took a stab at deciphering the
enigma. On the one hand, it was "unthinkable" that the
Soviet government would stage an open trial unless it had
proof of guilt; on the other hand, it was "equally unthink-
able" that Trotsky would have conspired with fascist agents
to overthrow the regime. The editors of The Nation were
willing to hazard a guess that some foreign plots had
occurred, and that some "Trotskyites " had indulged in terror:
"Beyond that one transcends the limits of even reasonable
conjecture." As a partial explanation for the trial, the
editorial went on to state that the atmosphere in the Soviet
Union was filled with both counter-revolutionary fears and
democratic hopes. Their "conspiratorial blues" would prob-
ably continue, since the Soviet leaders lived in a "wilder-
ness psychology," beset by fears of foreign and domestic
wolves. No matter, The Nation wanted to believe, with
Louis Fischer, that the new constitution inaugurated a reign
of law: "The best test of this claim will lie in the fair-
ness with which the present trial is conducted." 42
With the precipitate executions of the accused, this
hope appeared to have been dashed. A week later The Nation
protested that death by shooting "does not smell any the
sweeter" for being described by Ulrikh as "'the highest form
of social defense--shooting. 1 " But the editors qualified
this censure by reminding its readers that the trial was
part of the "world's iron age, and must be approached in an
iron mood." And it was peculiarly Russian, the confessions
in their "hysteria and their masochism" reminiscent of the
Brothers Karamazov , the yielding to discipline a product of
the revolutionary era. In any event, Russia must gird her-
self for "the most crucial struggle" in her life, in which
she "must be unified, with every opposition stamped out and
43
every national energy whipped up.
"
If The Nation was rather aimless in its analysis,
The New Republic had many fewer doubts about the trial's
essential integrity. After briefly reviewing several
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negative views of the trial, it stated: "We see no reason
to accept any of these labored hypotheses, or to take the
trial at other than its face value." After all, the various
confessions dovetailed nicely and the defendants, "who spoke
volubly and extemporaneously for several days, gave no evi-
dence of having been coached, parroting confessions pain-
fully memoraized in advance, or of being under any sort of
duress." Surely the followers of Trotsky remembered their
days in power: "The hatred American tories feel for
Roosevelt is probably no more violent than the similar
feeling the Russian Trotskyites had for Stalin." Although
the evidence pointed to the "genuineness" of the plot, The
New Republic admitted that it did not seem "conclusive" in
regard to Trotsky's personal participation. Taking issue
with the theory that the Soviet Union had serious internal
problems, the editors assured its readers that the opposi-
tion movement lacked vitality. But the dissidents seemed
unable to change their views or nature: "Over and over
again history teaches us that most men are incapable of
abandoning the fixed set of ideas with which they equip
themselves during their early, more impressionable period.
They will die before they will alter, as these sixteen men
—
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and how many others!—have died."
If it is indeed true that "most men" are incapable
of abandoning a "fixed set of ideas," then the editors of
the liberal journals, especially those of The New Republic ,
must be included in this general category. The shock of the
Zinoviev-Kamenev trial produced much hand-wringing, but
little desire to examine closely the charges or search for
an underlying explanation. Above all, they avoided a fresh
look at the validity of including the Soviet Union in the
anti-Fascist front. As we shall see, the reaction of The
Nation and Ihe New Republic to the purge trials evolved over
the coming years, but these "oracles of 'democratic 1 half-
truth/' to quote Trotsky, never went beyond the "golden
mean," dividing the guilt equally. 45 And they undermined
the efforts of John Dewey and others, searchers for "the
whole truth," a difficult quest at best.
II. Trotsky Finds Defenders
An improbable source took the lead in providing
Trotsky with a forum—The Socialist Party of The United
States. On August 28, 1936, the Socialist Party's Executive
Secretary, Clarence Senior, sent a cable to the fraternal
Norwegian Labor Party:
"Today, with world reaction organizing armed
attacks upon workers and engaged in such attacks
upon Spanish labor, we deplore disunifying action
of Soviet Government in conduct of recent tri al
and in rejecting request of Labor and Socialist
International and International Federation of
Trade Unions for representation at trial
.
"Because of Leon Trotsky's long and worthy
services to labor, impossible to believe that he
is implicated with Fascist terrorists. We sup-
port demand for hearing by an international
labor commission and call upon labor to defend
his right of asylum. "46
This cable echoed the initial reaction of Norman Thomas to
the Moscow proceedings. Writing in the Socialist Call ,
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Thomas clung to the hope that the cause of "liberty and
humanity, the whole hope of a working class solidarity,
shall not be set back by fanatical persecution of the
Trotskyites." In any event, "Trotsky is right in asking a
special commission to take his own testimony." 47 With the
conclusion of the "amazing, fantastic, incredible affair,"
he charged that the defendants had proven themselves "com-
plete cowards and weaklings," even if they were innocent,
still an open question in Thomas' mind. Like The Nation
, he
wanted to "suspend judgment" on the matter of Trotsky's
guilt, but once again called for an inquiry: "The best
thing that could happen would be if an international working
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class inquiry into Trotsky's acts could be arranged."
This was a ticklish time to call for an inquiry.
Like most socialists the world over, the American variety
owed a certain loyalty to the Soviet Union, especially in
its struggles with fascist machinations, even though their
loyalty was more "critical" than most. In addition, Thomas
was the Party's standard-bearer in the upcoming presidential
election and depended on the support of all progressives,
even "Friends of the Soviet Union," if he were to make a
respectable showing.
But at just this point in time the American
Socialists had made a marriage of convenience with the
native Trotskyites. Even though Trotsky had once remarked
that Thomas called himself a socialist as a result of a mis-
understanding, 49 he advised his followers to join the
l
Socialist Party in the spring of 1936. Convinced that
Thomas' Party was on its deathbed, James Cannon and other
Trotskyites negotiated an agreement with the left-wing
"rabble" of the Socialist Party, despite many difficulties:
"A Trotskyist will do anything for the party, even if he
has to crawl on his belly in the mud." 50 As a sign of good
faith, the newly formed Workers Party of The United States
(an alliance of Trotskyites and Musteites) was disbanded,
along with several journals. But the Trotskyites joined as
a "manipulative faction," and continued the tactics of
"boring from within," seizing one Socialist Party stronghold
after another. Within a year open warfare broke out, and
Thomas moved to expel his boorish guests, the Trotskyites
leaving to form the Socialist Workers Party. This folly
was almost the coup de grace to a faltering denomination.
As David A. Shannon has written, "Their /Trotskyites inva-
sion was like a slight cerebral stroke for one already dying
of malnutrition." ^ But this tactical ruse gained for the
Trotskyites many new followers, and severely weakened a
rival party, a result that pleased the exile in Mexico.
Cannon later told a reporter his leader relished the
Socialist collapse, "'Comrade Trotsky said that that alone
would have justified our entry into the organization even if
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we hadn't gained a single member.'"
This morganatic marriage with the Socialists during
the time of the purge trials provided the Trotskyites with a
priceless asset. It served as "protective coloration" for
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their efforts to clear Trotsky and discredit the trials.
With a certain smugness, James Cannon later wrote about this
favorable conjunction of circumstances:
It was required for us historically, at
that crucial moment, to be members of the
Socialist Party and by that to have closer
access to elements— liberals, intellectuals
and half-radical political people—who were
necessary for the great political task of the
Trotsky Defense Committee. I don't think
Stalin could have arranged those trials as
well at any other time to insure their com-
plete discreditment as in the summer of 1936.
We were then in the most favorable situation
as members of the Socialist Party— and,
therefore, surrounded to a certain extent
with the protective coloration of a half-way
respectable party— and we couldn't be isolated
as a small group of Trotskyists, mobbed and
lynched, as they planned to do. We conducted





To an unkind critic, this boasting might suggest that Cannon
and his group used the Socialist Party as a "front" organi-
zation to lure unwary "innocents" into a Trotskyite snare.
However, he was undoubtedly correct in stating that a few
months or years later a majority of these "petty-bourgeois
elements" would have been "physically and morally incapable"
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of participating in such an endeavor.
Despite certain misgivings, Thomas felt honor-bound
to support the creation of a commission of inquiry. His
original desire that a "working class commission" undertake
the inquiry died stillborn, partly because international
socialists were wary of offending Moscow, and partly because
local labor leaders were consumed with the effort to organize
the CIO, an endeavor that enjoyed considerable communist
support. But in October 1936, Thomas and Devere Allen, of
the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Party,
joined John Dewey, Horace Kallen, Freda Kirchwey, and Joseph
Wood Krutch to form the "Provisional American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky." In an appeal dated October 22,
1936, they cited two main goals—to obtain for Trotsky "the
normal rights of asylum and to aid in the formation of an
International Commission of Inquiry, which shall examine all
the available evidence and make public its findings." To
support this appeal was not identical with endorsing
Trotsky's political views. But no great figure, continued
this entreaty, "should be subjected to accusations coupled
with a virtual incarceration //internment in Norway_/ which
denies him the right to answer before a neutral body the
charges made against him." The Provisional Committee in-
vited avowed friends of democratic rights to join the under-
taking: "Will you let us know your answer as soon as pos-
sible?" 56 Within a month the "original six" were joined by
a mixed-bag of academic types (E. A. Ross, Louis Hacker,
Paul F. Brissenden, William H. Kilpatrick) , journalists
(Suzanne La Follette, John Chamberlain, Ben Stolberg, James
Rorty) , writers (Edmund Wilson, James T. Farrell), and a
trade union leader (Vincent R. Dunne). Hereafter the
Committee dropped "Provisional" from its trademark.
57
Along with the appeal was circulated a copy of an
editorial appearing in Freda Kirchwey's journal, The Nation.
The high-water mark in this magazine's misgivings about
i
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Soviet justice, the editorial noted that the transcript was
incomplete, documentary evidence was sparse, the confessions
were "voluble and often melodramatic," and that Smirnov was
"recalcitrant" throughout the trial, a point usually ignored
by press reports on the trial. Contending that the pro-
ceedings were conducted "in a manner foreign to democratic
ideals of justice," with an overwhelming presumption of
guilt, The Nation questioned whether this could be con-
sidered "in any true sense a trial." The most serious and
"least credible" charge involved Trotsky's alleged links to
the Gestapo, but here the proof was "most thin," amounting
to Olberg's word against Trotsky's. Noting that Olberg had
had his day in court, The Nation editorialized: "Trotsky
is entitled to no less, and he has asked that his case be
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submitted to an international proletarian commission."
If this appeal-cum-editorial was allowed to go un-
challenged, the many misgivings about the Zinoviev-Kamenev
trial promised to be reinforced, resulting in a mortal
threat to the Popular Front mentality. But the Communist
Party, U.S.A., was sharpening its long knives. An editorial
in the fellow-traveling New Masses analyzed this "curious
document" (appeal), and suggested that if the Defense
Committee truly desired an impartial inquiry, then it should
have called itself the "Provisional American Committee for
the Neutral Investigation of Trotsky." But with "unconscious
frankness," the American Trotskyites had described it as a
"defense" committee. The sponsors, in addition, were hardly
neutral. Norman Thomas was the "liberal front for a
Socialist Party now rotting with the Trotskyite cancer," and
had "white-washed Trotsky and his accomplices." As for
Joseph Wood Krutch, he was "notoriously anti-Communist" and
had exhibited "persistent prejudice" in allowing Trotskyites
to review books by Communists in The Nation'
s
literary sec-
tion. But John Dewey was a special case. The New Masses
piously regretted finding Dewey's name attached to this ap-
peal. His "sincerity" could not be doubted. "It is a pity
he has been misled by some of his disciples who peddle
diluted versions of pragmatism under a Marxist label," an
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allusion to Sidney Hook's supposed influence.
But the immediate threat to the Party's position
came from The Nation
,
which enjoyed considerable prestige
in liberal circles. After answering point by point
Kirchwey's doubts about the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, the New
Masses demanded to know if the Trotskyites were circulating
the editorial (October 10) with the permission of the lib-
eral journal. The Nation should either protest or explain
its position:
If the Nation wants to support Trotsky's
criminal activities, let it no longer pose as
an organ of liberal opinion. Let it openly
and frankly declare itself a Trotskyite mouth-
piece. Let the public know that it is the
organ of a band of counter-revolutionary con-
spirators and assassins.
Arguing that the editorial had been a "foolish expression of
prejudice," and its circulation a "serious political act,"
the Party's literary magazine posed the question: "Ladies
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and Gentlemen of the Nation
, where do you stand?" 60
In truth, the ladies and gentlemen of The Nation
stood as firm as jello. Replying to this attack, The Nation
compared its position to that of the Light Brigade: "Cannon
to left of us, of short range but great explosive capacity,
have trained a barrage on our recent editorial on the
methods used in the Moscow trial." To the right came bar-
rages from the New Leader
, critical of a report on the AFL-
CIO struggle. Their critics could not have it both ways:
... we can't possibly be Trotskyite assassins,
enemies of the Soviet Union, and Communists all'
at once. The cross-fire from left and right,
however, fails to daunt or confuse us. We
shall proceed as usual through the Valley of
Death, firm in the knowledge that although our
adversaries cannot both be right, both can
be— and are—wrong. 61
But a nervous tremor was revealed in these dauntless words.
Early in 1937 Freda Kirchwey resigned from the Defense
Committee. She adopted a policy of benign neutrality in the
columns of her magazine, but not without a certain bias
6 2
against the Trotsky cause. Score one for the opposition
l
What's in a Name ?
The editorial in the New Masses had also exposed
something of a malapropism on the part of the Committee's
founders. "American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky"— its very title had a curious ring. Was not "to
defend" Trotsky also to side with his political position
against that of Stalin?
I
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The writer, Louis Adamic, for one, felt that the
Committee's name was an ill-advised choice. "I seriously
objected to the defense part of the name of the Trotsky
Committee. Why did he need anybody's defense? Mine, for
instance? Possessor of great literary ability he was fully
capable of writing a defense of himself ," argued Adamic.
His friend, Ben Stolberg, suggested that Alfred Dreyfus had
benefited from a similar defense committee, but Adamic re-
jected the analogy. The Frenchman had been a helpless,
little man, while the Russian was "an historical figure, a
great revolutionary, a formidable political oppositionist,
who, as such, had to expect all manner of dirty work. Why
6 3
'defend' him when one was not his partisan?"
To a large extent the choice of this name was merely
a reminder of earlier defense committees, e.g., the Sacco-
Vanzetti Defense Committee, the Tom Mooney Defense Committee,
etc. Many of those associated with Dewey on his commission
had also participated in these earlier defense efforts, and
considered their "defense" of Trotsky a continuation of a
hallowed liberal tradition. At the beginning of the Mexican
hearings, Dewey took note of the problem and declared:
In the United States, it has long been customary
for public-spirited citizens to organize com-
mittees for the purpose of securing fair trials
in cases where there was suspicion concerning
the impartiality of the courts.
Such committees, continued Dewey, were "traditionally known
as 'defense committees,' and include in their title the name
of the defendant." But membership on such committees
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implied nothing more "than the belief that the accused is
entitled to a fair trial." 64
Perhaps Shakespeare was correct in asking, "What's
in a name? That which we call a rose / By any other name
would smell as sweet." But another name might have smelled
sweeter, and avoided a partisan ring. Surely the choice of
this particular name was a public relations faux pas . Some-
what later Dewey's group called itself the "Commission of
Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the
Moscow Trials," a much more judicious choice.
First Conclave
The most pressing worry for the Defense Committee
was Trotsky's physical safety. Reports from Norway detailed
the sorry conditions of his internment . And there were
strong indications that his visa would not be renewed. In
that case Norwegian authorities might hand him over to the
tender mercies of the GPU minions. From offices at 22 East
17th Street, adjacent to Union Square in New York City, the
Committee issued a statement in late November protesting
"•this outrageous violation of democratic rights by the
Norwegian Government and demands that the full rights of




In addition, the statement
charged that the 1,1 most elementary notions of justice 1 "
dictated that this world-famous revolutionist should be
given " 1 the fullest and freest opportunity to state his
66
case . 1 "
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Although "rotting with the Trotskyite cancer," the
Socialist Party continued the struggle to secure him a safe
haven in an increasingly hostile world. Its National
Executive Committee passed a resolution endorsing the work
of the Defense Committee and also established a sub-committee
to co-operate in making representations to the Norwegian
authorities. The aim was to secure for Trotsky "'the full
rights of asylum, ' " as well as assist any responsible com-
6 7
mission of inquiry. And in early December the Socialist
Call wrote that soon Trotsky would be "a man without a coun-
try, welcome only in the Soviet Union where the hangman
holds a rope in readiness for him." Accordingly, "The
working class demands asylum for Trotsky. And an inter-
national working class commission to investigate the circum-
stances surrounding the Moscow trials!" It also suggested
that if Stalin wanted friendly allies, he should stop per-
secuting Trotsky, or "let him /Stalin/ meet Trotsky face to
face in open court before an international workers' jury
—
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so that we may hear and judge the truth!" Sometimes the
Call had uncommon ideas.
Above all, there was a need to drum up popular sup-
port for asylum and an impartial hearing. Plans were made,
therefore, to hold a mass meeting on December 18, 1936, the
day Trotsky's Norwegian visa expired. By almost any stan-
dards the gathering in the Center Hotel (the former Hotel
Delano on West 43rd Street in New York City) was a great
success. According to various estimates, the "giant" meeting
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attracted two to three thousand people, with another thousand
or so turned away from the doors. 69 The organizers col-
lected the grand total of $1,284.20 from the audience,
70against expenses of $569.32. Radio station WQXR carried
part of the proceedings
, and The New York Times reported on
the affair.
Suzanne La Follette chaired the meeting, with many
listeners standing three hours to hear the lengthy speeches.
In a principal address, Norman Thomas questioned that
Trotsky was actually an assassin, especially when the docu-
mentary evidence was so sparse. Still, the Moscow charges
had immense importance for Liberals and Socialists: "'In a
world like ours justice to the individual always matters.'"
Against a former Bolshevik leader the Kremlin was using
tactics "'as ruthless and unscrupulous as any which this
world of hate and intolerance now reveal,'" he charged:
"'Not on such basis can we ever build that fellowship of
71free men which is our ultimate hope.'"
Other speakers included James T. Farrell who, "being
an Irishman, likes a good fight," reported the Socialist
Call . In his remarks Farrell branded the behavior of the
Communist press as "'Red Journalism Gone Yellow!,'" a
catchy phrase he was to use on other occasions. For his
part, Max Shachtman chided the Soviet regime for not de-
manding extradition hearings in Norway: "'They want him
/Trotsky/ in the Soviet Union where the executioner's bullet
is held in readiness for him. But they do not dare to say
235
so."' An "extraordinary impression" was made when Herbert
Solow read about Stalin's earlier frame-ups from the writings
of Carl von Ossietzky, a Nobel Laureate at the time a guest
in one of Hitler's concentration camps. Only Max Eastman
upset the cheerful unanimity of the meeting when he identi-
fied bureaucratic excesses with the Soviet state, and then
lumped it together with Hitler and Mussolini in the same
72dastardly category. This was too much for the Socialist
Call
,
still professing a certain loyalty to the Soviet Union.
It was sad, wrote the Socialist organ, to see the results of
Soviet splitting tactics, but it was "sadder to see a Max
Eastman lose his balance, as he has done!" The Call sug-





At the Hotel Center meeting the Defense Committee
was able to announce the glad tidings: Trotsky would soon
sail to Mexico and safety. This had been the most pressing
task facing the Committee in the fall of 1936, considering
the Oslo diktat that Trotsky's visa would become invalid
after December 18. "The Committee was instrumental in ob-
taining his /Trotsky's/ visa for Mexico," claimed its final
report, a just claim even though details are sketchy.
Without a doubt, it was the intercession of Diego
Rivera that persuaded Lazaro Cardenas to grant the visa. It
remains unclear, however, who first approached the great
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Mexican muralist. Rivera, himself, contended that he inter-
ceded with Cardenas at the request of the "New York Committee
75for the Rights of Men." The secretary of the Committee,
George Novack, gave credit to Anita Brenner, a journalist
and friend of Rivera, for making the contact. 76 But Miss
Brenner wrote that Cardenas acted on an appeal from John
Dewey, Suzanne La Follette, John Dos Passos, and Rivera.
No matter, when the happy news reached New York, Novack and
Max Shachtman relayed the information to Oslo. Both of
them later journeyed to Mexico to ensure Trotsky's safe ar-
rival. The whole affair cost the Committee the grand sum of
$752.07, certainly a bargain price for obtaining a safe
78
refuge for "the man without a country."
The Committee, and its variegated supporters, had
just reason for congratulating itself on this stroke, which
not only materially aided Trotsky's health, but vindicated
the ancient right of political asylum. At the Hotel Center
meeting on December 18, amidst a few nays, the assembled
crowd adopted a resolution praising Cardenas' action, and
solemnly declared, "'In defending Trotsky's right of asylum
we are not merely aiding one individual , but we are defending
democratic rights for every one everywhere,'" for "'world
reaction everywhere threatens these precious democratic
rights.'" 79 The Committee later claimed, quoting Professor
Horace M. Kallen, that Trotsky had become "'the symbol of all
contemporary political refugees.'" To deprive Trotsky of
asylum would be to attack a noble tradition and, in the
I
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words of Norman Thomas, would '"turn the world into a prison
house in which the best militants of the labor movement could
be confined.'" With a certain ill-disguised pride, the
Defense Committee reported that its achievement in obtaining
a safe haven for Trotsky was "applauded by many political
exiles of many nationalities and political beliefs who saw
their own fates bound up in greater or lesser degree with
the results of our struggle."
But this quick success weakened the Defense
Committee's basic allure. In the general applause over this
triumph lay seeds of dissension. It was one thing for di-
verse liberals, at little personal sacrifice, to support
pious statements about the hallowed right of asylum, and
harken back to the situations of such refugees as Louis
Kossuth and Carl Schurz. But it was an entirely different
matter to proceed to the second task, to inquire into the
Moscow charges against Trotsky. The second aim of the
Defense Committee was a much riskier proposition. Implicit
in an investigation of the charges against Trotsky was a
questioning of Soviet justice, and thus the entire Soviet
system. Many liberals, friends or not of the Soviet Union,
had no desire to become involved in the labyrinth of Kremlin
politics, especially at a time when faith in the Soviet
Union was practically a prescribed article of belief. As
Louis Adamic told Ben Stolberg, "I had been in favor of
Trotsky's finding asylum in Mexico, or in any other country
willing to receive him. That was a simple issue. I could
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easily decide upon it. These Moscow Trials and Trotsky, how-
ever, were another matter." 81 To support such an inquiry,
most assuredly, would result in being branded a "Trotskyite ,
"
a feared stigma in the mid-1930s. Somewhat the better part
of valor was to sing the praises of asylum, and leave the
other, more noisome business to the partisans.
At first the American Communist Party launched a
H veritable lynch campaign'" against granting asylum to
8 2Trotsky. "'We are against asylum anywhere in the world
for those who make assassination their weapon of political
struggle, no matter who they may be,'" proclaimed Earl
8 3Browder. But in questioning the right of asylum, the
Party was casting doubt on a sacred American cow. With the
granting of a visa to Trotsky, however, its line of action
was vastly simplified. "All honest liberals are wondering
why the Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky should con-
tinue to exist, now that there is no longer any issue of
84
right of asylum," asked Soviet Russia Today . And in a
letter of resignation to the Committee, Mauritz A. Hallgren
explained, "I believed when I joined your committee, and I
still believe, in the right of asylum for persons exiled be-
cause of their political or other beliefs. Trotsky has been
granted asylum in Mexico and this part of the committee's
task would seem, therefore, to have been brought to a
close." 85 For liberals to continue with the second task
—
formation of a commission of inquiry—was "consciously or
unconsciously, serving the cause of fascism, reaction and
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war," argued Soviet Russia Today : "For to attack the Soviet
Union at this time is to strike a blow at the strongest
force for peace in the world today." 86
Thus, the very success of obtaining a visa had cer-
tain untoward effects, stripping the Committee of the pro-
tective coloration that such an unassailable cause afforded.
Henceforth, anyone supporting the call for an impartial com-
mission of inquiry was engaged in anti-Soviet activities at
the behest of the Trotskyite assassins.
j
III. The Committee's Core
Early in January 1937 the Trotskyite organ,
Socialist Appe al
,
proudly claimed that the Defense Committee
had "secured the adherence of perhaps the 1 argest and most
distinguished group of intellectuals and publicists ever
8 7joined together for a defense issue.* 1 But the depth of
commitment varied greatly among the "distinguished" figures
who supported the Committee's aims. A small donation or
casual approval of a petition could result in one's name ap-
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pearing on the Committee's scroll of signers. In at least
one case, the name of a well-known writer appeared on the
list through the good offices of a friend, even though this
author had not been consulted, and vigorously opposed any
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"defense" of Trotsky's good name. Thus, "membership" on
the Committee meant different things to different people.
But by April 1937 the Committee's letterhead boasted
the names of 82 adherents ("and others"). Among the recent
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additions were such academic luminaries as Lionel Trilling,
Franz Boas, and Alexander Golderweiser
,
joined by two as-
sociate editors of The Nation
,
Dorothy Van Doren and
Margaret Marshall. The young Dwight MacDonald had enlisted
his waspish pen in the cause, along with the prestigious
Gaetano Salvemini, a noted anti-Fascist refugee from Italy.
Also gracing the Committee's letterhead was a playwright
(Sidney Howard), a theologian (Reinhold Niebuhr) , and an of-
ficial of the Jewish Daily Forward (B. Charney Vladeck)
.
But it was the nature of this kind of enterprise that under
cover of the illustrious names existed a small circle of
dedicated workers—the committee within the committee-which
,
along with the original founders, set the strategy.
"The Founding Fathers"
The American Communist Party, not adverse to accusing
others of its own devices, repeatedly charged that a
Trotskyite cabal was the real master of the Defense Committee.
With regard to "the founding six" (two dons, two leaders of
the Socialist Party, two editors of The Nation ) , they were
hardly "Trotskyites " but, with one exception, were highly
critical of the Soviet system. At least five of the six
founders had little in common with professed "Friends of the
USSR," even if they could not be classed in 1936 as outright
enemies of the noble "experiment."
The acknowledged leader of the academic cluster was
John Dewey (1859-1952). Since this doyen of American
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intellectuals was to become the guiding spirit of the entire
enterprise, this is not the place to examine in any great
detail his thoughts on the Soviet Union. 91 But the elderly
professor at Columbia (and contributing editor to The New
Republic)
,
had forsaken his earlier sympathy for the Soviet
venture, and had taken a clearly hostile line by the time of
the Committee's formation. The suppression of civil liber-
ties, the stress on class warfare, the use of character as-
sassination against opponents—these were some of the Soviet
traits that profoundly bothered this champion of "fair play.
He was convinced that even the threat of class war would
only result in Fascists coming to power: "As an unalterable
opponent of Fascism in every form, I cannot be a Communist."
This tendency to identify Fascism and Communism was shared
by his close friend, Horace M. Kallen (1882-1974), the
eminent, German-born philosopher. Active in Zionist affairs
Kallen was associated with the National Committee for the
Defense of Political Prisoners until his resignation in 1935
from this communist-led group. He was in the forefront of
efforts to bring refugees from Nazi Germany to this country,
and he deplored the tendency to subordinate the individual t
the state in both Germany and the Soviet Union, castigating
93
their "tyrannical apotheosis of Unity." A friend of
political exiles, he was no friend of the Kremlin.
Devere Allen (1891-1955) and Norman Thomas (1884-
1968) had been close associates since they worked together
on The World Tomorrow, an organ of The Fellowship of
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Reconciliation. Long active in pacifist and defense groups,
Allen had written the militant Declaration of Principles
(1934) for the Socialist Party, and in 1936 was a member of
its National Executive Committee. With his pacific leanings,
Allen had little inclination to join any "Popular Front" al-
liance that advocated collective security for a threatened
94Soviet Union. Thomas, more a Christian than an orthodox
Marxist, also shared these pacifist principles. A veteran
of many bitter struggles with the local Communists, Thomas
was on the road to becoming an outright enemy of the Soviet
system. But in 1936 he advocated limited cooperation with
the Communist Party, if not "organic unity":
"The differences between us preclude organic
unity. We do not accept control from Moscow,
the old Communist accent on inevitable vio-
lence and party dictatorship, or the new ac-
cent on the possible war against Fascism, and
the new Communist political opportunism. We
assert genuine civil liberty in opposition to
communist theory and practice in Russia." 95
Thus, Thomas was willing to cooperate with the comrades on
Spain, but not on the campaign for collective security. He
offered "critical loyalty," with the accent on "critical."
The brace of editors from The Nation on the
Provisional Committee were Joseph Wood Krutch (1893-1970)
and Freda Kirchwey (1893- ). In 1936 Krutch was one of
the chief editors of the liberal journal; he was associated
with it continuously from 1924 to 1952, principally as drama
critic and literary editor. A many-sided humanist, author
of works on Samuel Johnson, Edgar Allen Poe , and Henry
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Thoreau, as well as on herbs, birds and deserts, Krutch was
a wistful man, with a pessimistic streak that was balanced
by a deep devotion to the values of urbanity and detachment.
A visitor to Russia in 1928, he feared that Communism was
the retrogressive future, for its "'drama and its poetry
celebrate the machine exactly as the literature of a primi-
tive people celebrates the processes of hunting or of
agriculture,'" but this return to primitive materialism was
at the cost of civilized man: "'We should rather die as
97
men than live as animals.'" In May 1933 Krutch wrote an
editorial for The Nation on the Metro-Vickers trial in
Russian. Entitled "Class Justice," it questioned how
American liberals who had protested against the effect of
class prejudice in other cases could "'logically acquiesce
in the methods of Russia just because they happen to sympa-
thize somewhat with the basic aspirations of the Russian
people." As was the case with Sacco-Vanzetti and Tom Mooney
,
the Russian engineers were apparently convicted because they
were enemies of the social system, whether or not the
specific charges could be proven. Krutch reminded his fel-
low liberals that they had insisted on the individual's
right to abstract justice, and could not logically change
their attitude for Russia without changing it for America
also:
The historical position of The Nation is
the liberal one. It has not changed. We
still advocate a classless impartiality. We
refuse to be satisfied merely to have preju-
dice change sides, and to forget all the
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dangers of a medieval method of trial just
because that method happens for the moment
to be working in the interests of a revolu-
tionary government whose basic aim is to
secure greater economic liberty. "98
This belief in classless justice led Krutch to give his sup-
port to the Trotsky Defense Committee.
But the historical position of The Nation was
changing, notwithstanding Krutch' s lecture. In 1933 Oswald
Garrison Villard forsook active direction of the journal,
with Freda Kirchwey taking charge. Finally, in 1937 she be-
came editor and publisher of The Nation
,
while Krutch de-
voted most of his energies to more congenial tasks at
99Columbia University. Miss Kirchwey had an even longer as-
sociation with the magazine, joining it in 1918, retiring
in 1955. Although she was critical of Marxist revolutionary
strictures and Soviet repressive practices, Freda Kirchwey
was basically sympathetic to Soviet aims, especially economic
planning, collective security, and the "Popular Front"
policy. Above all, she decried sectarianism on the left,
and called for an era of "'good will and decency'" in the
face of fascist aggression, '"a little factional disarma-
ment.'" 100 When the Trotsky issue threatened to split
solidarity on the left, she quickly withdrew from the
Defense Committee, and advocated in the pages of The Nation
a position of "suspended judgment" on the issues.
With the exception of Miss Kirchwey, five of the
"founders" of the Committee were hardly sympathetic to Soviet
aims and practices by the year 1936. In defending the right
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of asylum and an impartial investigation, they were upholding
hallowed liberal principles, but an ingrained bias against
the Soviet Union may have also motivated their activities.
Dewey, Kallen, Allen, Thomas, Krutch—none were
"Trotskyites," but the Trotsky issue gave them an opportunity
to reaffirm liberal values while bringing into question the
basic premises of the "Popular Front."
Committee Cadre
Not only the "kumrads" questioned the Committee's
basic probity. Even Waldo Frank and Louis Adamic detected a
strong whiff of "Trotskyism" in its leading circles. Chair-
man of the first Writers Congress (1935), Frank incurred
Party displeasure by raising some doubts about the integrity
of Soviet justice. But he also doubted the worth of the
proposed Mexican hearings, because the Defense Committee,
"although it contains the names of men of integrity, is in-
dubitably controlled by Trotskyists: that is, by men whose
entire political life has become involved in the premise
that Trotsky and all the defendants are innocent and that
the Soviet Union is guilty."
1 1 The popular Adamic shared
the same concern:
The Committee was run by a few deeply in-
terested and intensely motivated persons who
were obviously Trotskyites, that is, who be-
lieved in Trotsky's conspirational-revolutionary
ideas. The idea to clear Trotsky as a matter of
principle of justice was probably clear and para-
mount only in John Dewey's mind; I admired him
for it. A few people of the Committee's inner
group, as well as most of the Dewey Commission,
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were more or less pro-Trotsky personally.
They admired some part of his mind or past,
without agreeing entirely with his basic
philosophy and future aims. Politically
they were "anti-Stalinist" without being
Trotskyite. They were outraged by the
Trials and executions. I think that Ben
Stolberg, Suzanne La Follette, and John
Chamberlain were of this group. Otherwise
the idea among the Committee leaders was,
for the most part, politically pro-Trotsky
(i.e., pro-conspiracy, pro-Revolution) in
purpose. . . .10 2
George Novack, a prime figure in the Committee's for-
tunes, partially confirmed this analysis. He wrote that a
"hard core of the anti-Stalinist intellectuals" constituted
the "backbone" of its membership. Originally drawn toward
the Communist Party, they labored for various defense efforts
in the early 1930s, especially the National Committee for the
Defense of Political Prisoners. But the refusal of this com-
munist-led group to defend '"agents of the class enemy,'"
e.g., IWW organizers, forced the resignation of Novack and
his ilk. Many became Trotskyites or Musteites, before the
fusion of the two factions. In 1936-37 they joined forces
103
to "defend" the beleagured exile.
The "inner group" of the Trotsky Defense Committee
was composed of a mixed bag of journalists, academics,
writers, and political activists, but was noticeably short
of working-class representatives. On the Executive Committee
(or "Ex Com") were Suzanne La Follette, Ben Stolberg, and
James Rorty (journalists), James Burnham and Sidney Hook
(academics), assisted by the peripatetic James T. Farrell
(writer). 104 The national secretary of the Committee was
George Novack; his chief assistant was Felix Morrow. Much
of the office work was performed by Pearl Kluger and Viola
Robinson Isaacs. Also active in the day-to-day operations
of the Committee were Herbert Solow, Harold R. Isaacs, and
Elliot Cohen. 105
Was a Trotskyite "cell" in actual control of the
Committee's operations? The answer must be a gualified "no,"
but there was strong Trotskyite representation within the
Committee, especially in the Secretariat. George Novack,
for instance, was an open partisan of the Russian exile.
Even now he is a leading figure in the Socialist Workers
Party. A product of Harvard, Novack originally came to New
York for a career in publishing, but the 1929 crash con-
verted him "from a Nation-New Republic devotee, who cast
his first- -and last—vote for a Democratic president in 1928,
into a Marxian revolutionary." In the early 1930s he moved
from the Communist orbit to the Trotskyite fringe, and has
106
made a career of "revolutionary politics" to this day.
His assistant-Felix Morrow—was also "a hardened party
functionary," to use his own words. At one time the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Non-Partisan Labor Defense (NPLD) , an
alliance of Trotskyites and liberals, he had overseen the
liquidation of this organization in 1935-36, as a peace of-
fering to the Socialists, who had their own defense commit-
tee.
107 This act, however, caused some resentment in liberal
ranks, and Morrow was subsequently blocked from becoming the
overall director of the Trotsky Defense Committee. "But
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while the Trotskyists were eager to mollify the liberals in
every reasonable way," Morrow has written, "the reality of
the situation was that the party had placed me in charge of
this work, and I remained in charge until the end of the
1 OR
work of the Commission."
Although close to the Trotskyists, Herbert Solow
was a counter-weight to the Novack-Morrow duumvirate on the
Committee staff. A veteran journalist and one-time assis-
tant editor of the Menorah Journal
,
Solow (1903-1964) joined
the Communist League in 1933, but James Cannon considered
1 09him only "a sort of sympathizer" of the Trotskyite movement.
At various times Solow actively worked for the National
Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners and the
Non-Partisan Labor Defense ; 11<"> he was "resentful" of
Morrow's role in liquidating the latter group. 111 It was
Solow who handled many of the logistical details arising
from the Mexican hearings. In the final years of his career
(1945-64), he was an editor of Fortune magazine, far removed
112
from factional intrigues.
The Executive Committee was much more "liberal" than
the Secretariat, .but one member, James Burnham (1905- ),
was an unabashed Trotskyite. A professor at New York
University, Burnham helped unite the Trotskyites and Musteites
in 1934-35, and later became co-editor of New International ,
113
the Trotskyite theoretical journal. But in 1939-40 he
provoked a bitter split in the Socialist Workers Party over
the nature of the first "workers" state. His theoretical
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views were reflected in the 1941 study, The Managerial
Revolution. In the post-war years Burnham joined the anti-
communist crusade and became a "man in a permanent apocalypsis ,
»
freely predicting a third world war. 115 Considered one of
the "ancestral voices" of political conservatism in the
United States, he is currently a leading editor of The
National Review.
Burnham' s colleague in the Philosophy Department of
New York University, Sidney Hook (1902- ), was another
stalwart on the Executive Committee. A favorite student of
John Dewey, this "'ebullient, scrappy'" philosopher was be-
coming well-known for his Marxist treatises, which featured
incisive, almost brutal logic. But in 1934 Hook ad-
vocated a "communism without dogmas," led by a new party and
117
new international. For this doctrinal mischief the old
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Party cast him into "'outer darkness.'" Hook was one of
the two "doughty professors" (the other being Burnham) who
then negotiated the Trotskyite-Musteite alliance, and later
he was instrumental in arranging the Trotskyite-Soci alist
119
misalliance, the "last progressive act" of his life. In
1936 he admired the "clarity" of Trotsky's vision, and the
"brilliance of his political forecasting," although they had
sharp doctrinal differences. But always "out of step,"
• *
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first a premature Marxist, then a premature anti-Communist
,
he was a prime mover in forming the 1939 Committee for
Cultural Freedom,
122
and the 1950 Congress for Cultural
Freedom, an organization enjoying fraternal ties with the
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12 3Central Intelligence Agency. In subsequent years his
numerous articles on the abuse of the Fifth Amendment, the
danger of communist teachers in colleges, and the threat of
campus violence have made him anathema to much of the left,
124both new and old.
Two other journalists, much less radical than the
Washington Square duo, had a material effect on the
Committee's fortunes. Friend and foe alike found them kin-
dred spirits. Not only Louis Adamic believed they were "pro-
Trotsky personally," but Selden Rodman, James T. Farrell, and
The Nation agreed that they were "admirers" of the Russian
125
exile. La Follette and Stolberg, confided the New Masses ,
were "well-known New York Trotskyites , " with the lady
journalist "strongly under Stolberg 1 s influence," having
written a number of articles critical of the Soviet Union.
To be under Stolberg 1 s influence was particularly disgrace-
ful, for Stolberg was well-known in labor circles, claimed
the New Masses , as a "'stool-pigeon 1 " who had spread "anti-
126
Communist, anti-Soviet propaganda of the lowest order."
In defense against one of the bias charges, Stolberg
wrote that Miss La Follette, as far as he knew, was "just
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another progressive LaFollette, only more so." Daughter
of former Washington Congressman, William L. La Follette, and
cousin to Wisconsin's Senator Robert M. La Follette, this
free lance journalist had been closely associated with The
Freeman and The New Freeman . Although not a Marxist,
she
had supported the work of the NDCPP until her
resignation in
1 281935. Author of the book, Art in America
, she became in-
creasingly critical of all matters Soviet, and supplied in-
formation (along with Stolberg) to Eugene Lyons' The Red
Decade. In recent years she has been listed as a "contrib-
utor" to The National Review . 129
A much more interesting character was Ben Stolberg
(1893-1951). German-born, educated at Harvard, Stolberg had
a career as a sociologist and social worker, before becoming
a fulltime journalist. At one time he considered himself a
Marxist, and believed Trotsky was "a great man," wrote his
close friend and sometime disputant, Louis Adamic. Ac-
cording to the author of My_ America
,
Stolberg was a curious
mixture of Voltaire, Mencken and Marx, "both Karl and
Groucho, the two about evenly divided," an impulsive, ill-
disciplined, friendly child who would never grow older. At
one point Stolberg gleefully told Adamic that the Moscow
trials had put the local Reds on the defensive, and that by
giving Trotsky a hearing the memory of the executions could
be kept alive as long as possible. In February 1937 Adamic
wrote in his diary about the initial reason for Stolberg
being "neck-deep" in this Committee.
. . .
there is in him a compelling personal need
to get into action every once in a while, into
something big and important, and feel himself
function. He is the scholar, the student, the
intellectual , who every now and then must do
something, preferably something "important";
for way down in him he knows that as a mere
writing and talking intellectual he is not very
effectual, but does not know yet that that is
so in great part because he still is not a well-
rounded-out Benjamin Stolberg, but a messed-up
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"Marxian," cluttered up with big, fascinating
ideas not intimately his own. . . .131
Soon he found his own voice, and published The Story of the
CI .0. (1938)
,
in which he chronicled communist penetration
of the labor organization. As a result of this study,
Stolberg became a prime subject for Party invective. For
instance, the Daily Worker called him an ordinary low-
priced street-walker ready to peddle himself in parks,
alleys or hallways to any chance customer. 1 in sub-
sequent years Stolberg returned the compliments in a number
of barbed articles.
Another old soldier in various radical campaigns,
James Rorty, was also drawn into the activities of the
Executive Committee. A former copywriter for B.B.D.& 0.,
Rorty had helped prepare in 1926 the first issue of the New
133Masses . Along with Hook and F. Morrow, he had supported
the slate of William Z. Foster and James W. Ford for the
presidency in 1932. And he had been proposed as an ac-
ceptable contributor in 1932-33 to Granville Hick's abortive
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"Marxist Study of American Culture." But his non-
communist interests queered his relations with the Party,
and he threw his lot with the Musteites. Along the way
this early forerunner of Ralph Nader wrote a number of
articles on consumer issues. A 1936 series in The Nation
eventually resulted in his book, Medical Politicians vs the
People . Rorty was also one of the "renegades" who actively
protested communist-direction of the Second Writers Congress
i
137(June, 1937). For this example of lese-majeste the New
Masses branded him a "Trotskyite .
"
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By early 1938 he was
writing about the "Stalinist Judas goats," who had formed a
"solar system" of "'innocent clubs,'" a la Eugene Lyons. 139
And in 1939 he was one of the signers of a statement for the
"Committee for Cultural Freedom," which denounced all ver-
sions of the totalitarian fraud, including the Soviet
variety. 140 Although in later years Rorty clearly was a
staunch anti-Communist, he forsook the path of a James
Burnham, and wrote against some of the worst excesses of the
141
"cold-war warriors."
And then there was James T. Farrell (1904- ), by
all odds the most original character on the Executive
Committee. This feisty Irishman from the slums of Chicago
had published his Studs Lonigan trilogy by 1935, to con-
siderable critical acclaim. Critics on the left especially
enjoyed his naturalistic descriptions of the Irish sub-
culture, where social conditions turned futile dreamers into
depressing slobs. 142 Certainly young Jim was a comer. But,
like a Norman Mailer, Farrell had a zest for public combat;
his polemical outbursts often infuriated sedate types. Un-
like most writers, Farrell had actually read Marx, with
particular attention to the problem of committed literature.
His 1936 study, A Note on Literary Criticism , castigated the
"'revolutionary sentiment alism' " and " ' Marxmanship 1 " of
Michael Gold, while also taking swipes at the "'mechanically'
determined criticism of Granville Hicks. In reply, Gold
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scolded those pious sectarians (read Farrell), who '"carry
their Marxian scholarship as though it were a heavy cross.'" 143
Undaunted, Farrell kept an unfriendly eye on the efforts of
"proletarian" writers for the reborn Partisan Review
, and
concluded that the left wing cultural movement was "bankrupt,"
its aggressive boasts forgotten "'like a bad dream.'" 144
Once expelled from the ranks of approved writers,
Farrell was a natural for the Trotsky Defense Committee.
Somewhat on the raffish side, Farrell lacked the necessary
gravity to be a spokesman for the Committee, but he busied
himself collecting signatures for various petitions, and ac-
companied John Dewey to the Mexican hearings. In his account
of the voyage, "Dewey in Mexico," Farrell lavished many ad-
miring words on the Columbia University philosopher, and
also asserted that Trotsky was "a man of genius, of will and
of ideas," perhaps the "archtype of the civilized, highly
cultivated and thoroughly Europeanized Western European,"
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certainly a "great man."
Partly as a result of his political stance, Farrell'
s
critical reputation took a precipitate decline. A
"whispering campaign" in the literary underground took on
the character of a "lynching." The New Republic saw fit to
print a letter from twenty-five good citizens of East St.
Louis, Illinois, who took to task this "pretentious wind-
bag," this "palpable fraud whose literary talents are so




"heinous faults of grammar, construction and logic. in
the words of H. L. Mencken, they '"ganged him,'" the outcast
147from Chicago.
Never one to capitulate in the face of hostility,
Farrell became the self-appointed chairman of the "gloaters
committee" after the 1939 German-Soviet pact. Many fellow-
travelers left the red express at the time, but he turned
I AO
back their apologies with easy contempt. After the war
he joined Sidney Hook in organizing the American Committee
149for Cultural Freedom. Currently Farrell is enjoying a
revival of critical attention, though on the restrained side
But he has not forgotten or forgiven the many intellectual
wars of the 1930s, and proudly bears their scars, even
though they personally cost him not a little in book sales,
friendships, and reputation.
IV. Thunder on the Left: Defamation
and Defections
From active support of communist candidates and de-
fense efforts in 1932 to condemnation of "Red Fascism" in
1939—this protracted journey in the political wilderness
resulted in many radicals becoming '"pre-mature anti-
Communists,'" in the words of John Chamberlain.
150 Victims
of the intellectual and moral "Red Terror," disillusioned
supporters of the left found temporary havens in the rest-
homes offered by the Musteites, Trotskyites, and Socialists.
With the onset of World War II or soon thereafter, George
Novack has observed, they "transmuted their anti-Stalinism
into anti-Communism and anti-Marxism, readjusted their ideas
and lives to the established order, and contributed their
quotas to the ideological virulence of the cold war." But
before this final transformation, the likes of Hook,
Burnham, Rorty, and so on formed "the backbone of the
American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky," and re-
ceived a final schooling in factional politics. 151
L ' Affair Trotsky—this was an often traumatic ex-
perience for supporters of the Defense Committee. The
American Communist Party applied immense pressure to split
the Committee and force defections. This campaign resulted
in the resignations of a few Committee adherents, the
silencing of others. In some cases, however, the intimida-
tion was counter-productive. Take the cases of Mary
McCarthy and Louis Adamic, for instance.
Accidental Anti-Communists
Fresh from Vassar in 1933, Mary McCarthy joined The
New Republic as a book reviewer. At the same time she
flirted with the Communists, to whom she felt vastly supe-
rior: "The superiority I felt to the Communists I knew had,
for me at any rate, good grounding; it was based on their
lack of humor, their fanaticism, and the slow drip of cant
that thickened their utterance like a nasal catarrh."
Willing to support a waiters' strike at the Waldorf in
evening clothes, she also realized that her class snobbery
barred her from joining the Party. Still, this would-be
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novelist admired the political activists, especially the
underground types, for they had "a daily ugliness in their
life that made my pretty life tawdry." They dwelled on the
summit. "For me, the Communist Party was the party," she
later admitted, and even though "I did not join it, I
prided myself on knowing that it was the pinnacle." 152
In the fall of 1936 Mary McCarthy was reading about
the brave Spanish Loyalists "with tears of exaltation" in
her eyes, and her heart was "tense and swollen with popular-
front solidarity." But she knew little about the Zinoviev-
Kamenev trial. In November of that year she attended a
publisher's party for Art Young, the cartoonist for the old
Masses . The occasion was solemn, the atmosphere tense. At
one point during the party an acguaintance asked her about
the Trotsky case. "It was a novelist friend of mine,
dimple-faced, shaggy-headed, earnest, with a whole train of
153people, like a deputation, behind him." Confessing her
ignorance of the issues, she was quickly given a short
course in the history of the controversy, while others
waited for her reaction. Dazed by the enormity of the
charges, she was reluctant to express an opinion until asked
if Trotsky had a right to political asylum. "Why, of course,"
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she answered, and quickly forgot the whole affair.
Several days later she received a communication
from the "Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky." Her
name was listed among those demanding asylum and a hearing
for the Russian exile. "How dared they help themselves to
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my signature?," indignantly asked the youthful book reviewer.
But then Mary McCarthy realized that many of the signers had
attended the party for Art Young, where her novelist friend
had been methodically polling the guests. Almost immediately
she decided to withdraw her name and write a note of protest.
But before she wrote the letter the telephone calls began.
Slight acquaintances gave her impersonal warnings: get off
the Committee. It was all very peculiar:
Behind these phone calls there was a sense
of the Party wheeling its forces into would-be
disciplined formations, like a fleet or an army
maneuvering. This, I later found, was true:
a systematic telephone campaign was going on to
dislodge members from the Committee. The phone
calls generally came after dark and sometimes
(especially when the recipient was elderly) in
the small hours of the morning. The more
prominent signers got anonymous messages and
threats
.
And in the morning papers and the columns
of the liberal magazines I saw the results.
During the first week , name after name fell off
the Committee 1 s letterhead. Prominent liberals
and literary figures issued statements deploring
their mistake. And a number of people pro-
tested that their names had been used without
permission. . . .1^5
It was for her a "providential escape." The Party's pressure
tactics had taken the decision out of her hands. Like a
simple reflex which makes one side with the weak, she
"rebounded to the defense of the Committee without a single
hesitation," examined the trial's record, and became "a
little bit hipped on the subject of Trotsky," which gained
156
her a certain notoriety.
Like a number of others, Miss McCarthy became an
"anti-Communist" at the times of the trials "by accident and
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almost unwillingly." And she was branded a Trotskyite. But
this was a different kind of conversion than that experienced
by the experts or the bruised souls who felt deceived by the
Nazi-Soviet pact:
We were luckier. Our anti-Communism came to
us neither as the fruit of a special wisdom nor
as a humiliating awakening from a prolonged de-
ception, but as a natural event, the product of
chance and propinguity. . . .
It was too late for her to become a Marxist. For Marxism
was "something you had to take up young, like ballet
,,157dancing.
"
Louis Adamic underwent a not dissimilar experience.
An immigrant from Yugoslavia, this free-lance writer on
ethnic groups in America was something of a "drifter." In
mid-December, 1936, he left for Guatemala. But when he at-
tempted to renew his visa in mid-February of the next year,
his reguest was denied. As a result, he returned to the
United States, "puzzled, upset, chagrined," only to discover
that his name appeared at the top of the alphabetical list
on the Defense Committee's letterhead. Inundated with tele-
phone calls about his "membership," he was informed that a
few weeks earlier Pravda had printed a dispatch stating he
was not a Committee member: "I wondered: why was it so im-
portant whether I was or not? . . ."
158 Adamic discovered
that Ben Stolberg had added his name to the Committee's
roster on his own initiative; Stolberg had also sent
Committee mail to Guatemala. Apparently this "Trotskyite"
material had resulted in his expulsion from nervous
Guatemala
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The two writers had heated words over the affair, and their
1 59
relationship became strained: "I was—naturally— angry."
Without delay Adamic wrote a letter to the Defense
Committee requesting that his name be removed from its
roster. But before he could mail it, diverse Stalinists,
anti-Trotskyites , and "professional, neurotically loyal, and
well-meaning friends of the Soviet Union pounced on me.
Resign I Resign!" If he did not quit, he would never get a
visa to the USSR, and his books would not be translated into
Russian. Finally one "Kenneth Durante," member of a wealthy
Philadelphia family who had gone "'proletarian'" and worked
for Tass, called and demanded to know if Adamic was or was
not a member of the Defense Committee:
This was a little too much. Was this U.S.A. or
wasn't it? One thing I have never been able to
stand is pressure_t actics . The conversation
with Durante /sic/ ended abruptly. Next day I
received a letter from him, which in tone and
obvious purpose was offensive to me.
As a result of this "near-intimidation," Adamic refused to
withdraw and became briefly interested in the Defense
Committee, even though he continued to have deep reserva-
160
tions about its purposes.
People like Mary McCarthy and Louis Adamic were
"challenging the best-organized, most articulate, least
squeamish pressure group in American life," wrote Eugene
Lyons, "a pressure group backed by the total prestige
and
resources of a great foreign nation," i.e., the
Soviet Union
Besides the organized telephone campaign, there
were
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barrages of telegrams and letters, and threats that their
livelihood and friendships would be adversely affected by
this folly. In his exaggerated manner, Lyons wrote that
this campaign was part of the "Red Terror," an organized ef-
fort by the "mud gunners, character assassins and poison-gas
brigades" to discredit renegades and deserters, and trans-
form them as rapidly as possible "into hideous moral lepers,
intellectual perverts and germ carriers of fascism,
161Trotskyism, etc."
Despite Lyons' hyperbole, there is no doubt that the
Party used bribes (trips to the Soviet Union) and threats
162(damaged book sales) to destroy the Defense Committee.
It was open season on the "Trotskyite traitors."
Resignations
The "lynching" campaign was a partial success. A
few members were terrorized into withdrawing. Others may
have resigned from honest doubts about the effect of an im-
partial inquiry on Soviet prestige. And some may have
originally joined the ranks in order to "resign publicly and
smear the committee in the role of ex-members." Whatever
the reason, at least nine members withdrew from the
163
Committee's roster.
Perhaps the most strident letter of resignation came
from the pen of Mauritz A. Hallgren, an editor on the
Baltimore Sun, and no foe of the Party. In a fourteen-page
epistle, dated January 27, 1937, and which received a
wide
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dissemination, Hallgren used convoluted logic to justify his
resignation. Originally he had joined the Committee in
order to obtain political asylum for Trotsky and provide
him a fair hearing. There was no desire to be "'just' or
'liberal' in the meaningless sense that those terms are
usually employed by American liberals." But it was possible
Stalin had perverted Soviet justice; Zinoviev and Kamenev
might have confessed in return for a mitigation of their
sentences. The possibility of a double-cross, however, had
been erased by the subsequent confessions of Pyatakov and
Radek, who surely knew their fate. There was no reason to
seek in mysticism or in dark magic the reasons for their
confessions, argued Hallgren: "Why not accept the plain
fact that the men are guilty? And this fact, if accepted
with regard to the men now on trial, must also be accepted
with regard to the men who were executed after the first
trial." 164
Hallgren went on to contend that the Soviet evidence
against the accused was both "substantial and convincing,"
while the counter-charge that they were framed was
"backed
up by no evidence of any kind, convincing or
otherwise." If
Trotsky was withholding evidence that might clear
the men on
trial, planning to present it before a commission
of inquiry,
this was simply an attitude of "astounding cynicism,"
charged
Hallgren. Although the case against Trotsky was
not perfect,
the "circumstantial evidence against him is
very strong in-
deed." Until Trotsky came into court with
"his hands clean"
(i.e., ceased his efforts to destroy the Soviet government),
Hallgren would remain convinced that "the present liberal
movement to win justice for him is nothing more than a
Trotskyite maneuver against the Soviet Union and against
socialism." The Defense Committee had become a Trotskyite
"instrument " for political intervention in Soviet affairs
;
nothing less was implied by an "• impartial investigation of
the Moscow trials.'" In conclusion Hallgren proudly declared
that, "I do not intend under any circumstances to allow my-
self to become a party to any arrangement that has for its
objective purpose (whatever might be its subjective justifi-
cation) the impairment or destruction of the socialist system
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now being built in Soviet Russia." And so, with these
words, Mister Hallgren withdrew from the fray.
The Party rejoiced. With Hallgren' s ponderous state-
ment it had its point d' appui . After publishing the letter,
the New Masses solicited reactions from Committee members.
In its issue for February 16, 1937, it announced the happy
news that Jacob Billikopf, of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, and Paul Ward, Washington editor of The
Nation , had resigned. The literary journal of the Party also
published communications from Lewis Gannett, Sam Jaffe, and
Le Roy Bowman. Gannett, literary critic of the New
York
Herald Tribune , claimed that he had never been a member
of
the Trotsky Defense Committee, but even after a protest
his
name continued to be used in its publicity. In Gannett'
s
opinion the Committee had become an organ for
"the propagation
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of Trotskyism, an organ of apparently indiscriminate attack
upon the Soviet Union." He was unsure of the facts about
the Moscow trials but, on the other hand, "I have no faith
in Mr. Trotsky 1 s virginal innocence of the art of conspiracy
,
and no sympathy with the dogmatic fulminations of this mis-
166
named committee." ' The well-known actor, Sam Jaffe, wrote
that his initial concern had been for political asylum.
With this task accomplished, his connection with the Defense
Committee had automatically been brought to a close. He
assured the New Masses that his name was no longer listed on
the Committee roster and added: "I feel myself a genuine
167
friend of Soviet Russia." As for Le Roy Bowman, of
Columbia University and the League for Industrial Democracy,
he felt that the members of the Defense Committee were too
sympathetic to Trotsky's political philosophy, and informed
them in a letter of resignation that his sympathies were
much more "with the present Communist government in Russia
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than with the opposition."
"Stinkers' Committee"
The climax of this early effort to browbeat faint-
hearted liberals on the Defense Committee came in February
1937 with the issuance of an "Open Letter," one which
de-
serves "a place of honor among the curios a of the
Red
Decade." 169 Authored by Corliss Lament, the
"generalissimo"
of the campaign to split the Committee, it boasted
the
signature of a remarkable collection of writers,
teachers,
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social workers, artists, and clergymen. This group was
known as the "'stinkers' committee'" to those who resisted
170its blandishments.
Corliss Lamont was the second son of Thomas Lamont,
board chairman of J. P. Morgan & Co. Wealthy in his own
right, he used a considerable fortune to underwrite a host
of causes dear to the left, and abhorrent to his family.
The Party was delighted to use its in-house millionaire (and
Professor of Philosophy at Columbia) as a front, "rather
like bigoted atheists exhibiting a renegade bishop," claimed
Eugene Lyons: "In time a patina of eccentricity came to
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cover poor Lamont 's identity from head to toe." Chairman
of the "Friends of the Soviet Union," Lamont suffered for
his enthusiasm in the 1950s, when he was forced to fight a
contempt citation from Congress, as well as an effort by the
State Department to deny him a passport. At the beginning
of the 1960s he joined in issuing another statement, this
one deploring the Vietnam War. Currently he is a leading
ideologue of the American Humanist movement, a way of life
"that rejects belief in any form of supernatural and sets up
the happiness and welfare of all mankind as man's chief
ethnical /sic7 aims, using methods of reason and science and
democracy as solutions for all human problems." This faith
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led him recently to author A Humanist Wedding Ceremony.
In this 1937 appeal to liberals Lamont charged that
Defense Committee publications had featured "bitter
denuncia
tions" of the Soviet government, and its
speakers had even
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advocated "armed uprising." There was simply no need for an
"impartial investigation'" of the trials, contended Lamont:
they had been fairly conducted and the Committee had "offered
no shred of evidence to the contrary." The proposed inquiry,
therefore, could only be considered "political intervention
in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union with hostile in-
tent. "
Not content with this appeal, Lamont addressed four
specific questions to his liberal targets. If "you" were
intent on defending the rights of asylum and free speech,
did not the alignment with Trotskyite enemies of the USSR
"only result in confusion and the distortion of true
liberalism?" Again, were "you" willing to become allied
with a movement that had opposed the "progressive movement
undertaken by the Soviet Union under the five-year plan and
the Soviet foreign policy of peace and international under-
standing?" He also inquired whether "you" had considered the
effect of the Committee's activities "in lending support to
the fascist forces which are attacking democracy in Spain
and throughout the world?" The last question, however, was
the piece de resistance of the inspired appeal:
Should not a country recognized as engaged
in improving conditions for all its people,
whether or not one agrees with all the means
whereby this is brought about, be permitted to
decide for itself what measures of protection
are necessary against treasonable plots to as-
sassinate and overthrow its leadership and in-
volve it in war with foreign powers? 1 '-3
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This deftly worded petition played on the liberal
fear of being considered a "reactionary," let alone a
"Trotskyite . " It reminded its readers of Soviet "achieve-
ments/ 1 at the same time it raised the specter of fascist
aggression. The communique, in addition, discouraged any
questioning of Soviet motives, means, or ends. In other
words, it solicited a faith of the heart, not the head, in
all matters Russian. The "Open Letter," moreover, completely
ignored debatable questions of fact in the Moscow trials,
and failed to explain how an "impartial investigation" could
damage Soviet prestige assuming that justice had truly been
served.
This plea was addressed to the emotions, not critical
faculties, and yet a distinguished number of "intellectuals"
found its message so convincing that they joined in endorsing
the basic statement. Among the signers were the hardy per-
ennials whose names appeared under almost every such petition
in the 1930s. It was no surprise to see the likes of Heywood
Broun, Malcolm Cowley, Louis Fischer, Granville Hicks,
Rockwell Kent, Robert Morss Lovett, Donald Ogden Steward,
and Anna Louise Strong ratifying the document. Also listed
were some politically inclined writers—Theodore Dreiser,
Lillian Hellman, Ring Lardner, Jr., Dorothy Parker, Henry
Roth, Nathaniel West. Joining them were academics from such
institutions as Smith, Bryn Mawr, Hunter, CCNY, Sarah
Lawrence, and Harvard. But more surprising were the signa-




all people of independence and considerable mental acuity.
There is no need at this late date to compile yet
another scroll of the "simple-minded." The eighty-eight
signers probably had eighty-eight different reasons for en-
dorsing the appeal, good and sufficient at the time. But one
name must be singled out—Colonel Raymond Robins. In 1917-18
Robins had direct dealings with Trotsky in Petrograd.
Through him certain Bolshevik appeals were transmitted to
Woodrow Wilson and the figures at the Versailles Peace
Conference. In a sense, Trotsky first brought Robins into
the limelight and made his reputation. Even if Robins later
preferred Stalin's "socialism in one country" to Trotsky's
"permanent revolution," his personal relations with Trotsky
should have convinced him that the Old Bolshevik was hardly
a "fascist agent" at this late date. Dreiser may have been
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befuddled. Robins should have known better.
V. The Battle is Joined
By early 1937 the sides were clearly drawn. On one
side were the "Trotskyite renegades," on the other were the
"stinkers." Rhetorical barrages became the order of the
day. For instance, Earl Browder at a mass meeting in
Madison Square Garden placed Trotsky in a class with Aaron
Burr and Benedict Arnold, since the Russian was an enemy of
"Twentieth Century Americanism," i.e., American Communism.
At another gathering of the faithful Browder charged
that
Trotsky was an "'egomaniac firebrand' " running
through a
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world full of explosives. He was applying his torch wherever
he desired, '"hoping for nothing so much as a new world war,
from which alone he sees his hopes of glory and power. 1 1,175
For its part, the Defense Committee responded with press re-
leases that disparaged Soviet justice. Just before the
opening of the Pyat akov-Radek trial, it publicly called on
the Soviet government to delay the proceedings until Committee
representatives could reach Moscow. Modest were the demands:
"'We ask the right of the commission to move freely through
the U.S.S.R., to be present at the forthcoming trials with
stenographers, to interview the prisoners privately.'" These
were just the "'normal'" rights allowed in political trials
in democratic countries.
It was a battle of mimeograph machines and mass
meetings, the advantage clearly lying with the defenders of
Soviet justice. No matter, a steady stream of newsletters,
press releases, and pamphlets were sent out from Committee
headquarters on East 17th Street in New York City. Local
branches were organized in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago,
Minneapolis, San Francisco and Cleveland. Meetings were
held incessantly to spread the message and raise desperately
needed funds. 177 Max Shachtman, James Rorty, and Gus Tyler
of the Socialist Call , for instance, spoke in Boston at the
Old South Meeting House.
Shachtman was particularly active. He embarked on a
speaking junket that took him to Hollywood, where only a
score or so of the local celebrities showed up, mostly
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Europeans of some distinction and political sophistication:
"The native luminaries did not respond. They did not dis-
178play the smallest interest or concern." It was all a bit
discouraging.
"Cut Wire"
The Committee saved its greatest organizing efforts
for a mass meeting on February 9 in the old Hippodrome
theater. It was designed to institute "the public drive of
179
the Committee to create the Commission of Inquiry." Among
those scheduled to speak were the ubiquitous Shachtman,
George Novack, Roy Burt of the Socialist Party, and Angelica
Balabanoff , once close to Lenin and active in Comintern af-
fairs. But the main attraction was the great man himself, or
at least his disembodied voice, speaking directly from
Mexico City via a telephonic connection. Trotsky promised
to speak forty-five minutes in English, and another fifteen
in Russian.
180 This was to be a little like the old days,
when the dynamic orator thrilled the assembled multitudes in
Petrograd's Cirque Moderne.
In the opinion of Max Shachtman the gathering was
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"the most dramatic labor defense meeting in a generation,
in truth, an impressive number of the curious came to
hear
Trotsky, estimated at 6500-6600, including 500 policemen.
The audience patiently listened to the preliminary
addresses,
while waiting for the main event. It waited, and
then
waited some more. There was something wrong
with the con-
nection to Mexico City. Few audiences have
ever presented
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such a picture of "strained attentiveness
, of anxiety,"
later wrote Shachtman: "At the slightest sound from the
amplifying apparatus, which seemed to indicate that a good
telephone connection had at last been established, an im-
pressive silence immediately gripped the assembled thou-
182
sands." But it was not to be. The only words that came
from Mexico City were Trotsky ' s '"heartiest fraternal
greetings,'" spoken alone to Shachtman. Then the connection
183
went dead again.
Deeply disappointed, but also "deeply-stirred," the
audience remained until after midnight to hear Shachtman
read from an advance text flown to New York. In this care-
fully prepared address, Trotsky apologized ahead of time for
his "impossible English," made an impassioned plea for the
formation of a commission of inquiry, and analyzed the
"glaring" contradictions in the first two trials. On the
subject of Pyatakov's phantom flight to Oslo, for instance,
Trotsky declared that Pyatakov had been forced to fly in
"an imaginary airplane, just as the Holy Inquisition forced
witches to go to their rendezvous with the devil on a broom-
stick." But the most dramatic moment of the meeting came
when Trotsky announced (through Shachtman) that he had
nothing to hide and was ready to appear before an impartial
commission
:
I declare: if this commission decides that I_
am guilty in the slightest degree of the crimes
which Stalin imputes to me
,
I_ pledge in advance
to place myself voluntarily in the hands o_f the
executioners of the G. P.
U
.
If the commission finds the trials to be frame-ups, a bullet
would not be necessary for the falsifiers: "No, the eternal
disgrace in the memory of human generations will be suffi-
cient for them! Do the accusers of the Kremlin hear me? I
throw my defiance in their faces. And I await their
184
reply!" This address was published under the title, I_
Stake My Life !
,
and widely disseminated.
What happened to the telephone connection? The
Defense Committee strongly suspected sabotage, but could not
185prove it. The telephone authorities blamed it on "mechan-
ical interferences,'" the kind that could happen at any
I OC
time. Trotsky himself was not ready to charge deliberate
interference, but had strong doubts, especially since the
technicians involved belonged to Lombardo Toledano's union
in Mexico, hardly a friendly organization. The would-be
speaker had been sitting in Rivera's house in front of a
microphone, when the technicians suddenly announced that
there was too much resonance in this room. Then followed a
taxi ride through a dangerous section of the capital to an-
other location, but nothing was ready; indifferent workers
watched as Trotsky himself scurried about looking for the
proper chairs and table. Then the amplifier refused to work,
followed by the suggestion to use a simple telephone appara-
tus, which also proved impossible. All this time at least
two of the workers showed an "attitude not only of negligence,
but also of hostility." In the absence of the necessary
technical knowledge, Trotsky could not affirm that the
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workers were at fault, "but the least that can be said is
that the complete absence of good will certainly aggravated
the technical difficulties and made the transmission of the
187discourse impossible." According to a dispatch to The
New York Times from Mexico, Trotsky dropped all work the
next day to "'find himself,'" as he was "'furiously angry'"
at the whole episode. Much of the city, however, was still
1 88
"'laughing'" over the Trotsky affair.
Liberal Weeklies Wobble
In the meanwhile, the war of words escalated in New
York's various journals. Soviet Russia Today
,
naturally,
took a hard line. There was no "mystery" about the trials
that needed explanation. In support of this position, it
reprinted a whole series of "expert" commentaries on the
trials. The British Labor M.P., D. N. Pritt, was given much
space for his laudatory comments on Soviet justice; he was
'"indeed impressed'" that the Soviet Union could build the
White Sea Canal, among other feats, and also build a "'fine
judicial system and a fine tradition.'" The eminent British
historian, Bernard Pares, after studying the first trial's
record, praised Vyshinsky's examination of the accused as
"•a close work of dispassionate reasoning,'" in which the
guilt of the 16 defendants was '"completely brought home,'"
a rather incredible statement.
189 After the second trial,
Dudley Collard, another British barrister, wrote that he was
convinced of the defendants' guilt, and also complimented
i
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Vyshinsky on treating the accused "with remarkable restraint
and courtesy." Lion Feuchtwanger
, the German novelist, con-
tributed the remark that the Pyat akov-Radek trial had been a
"beacon" to anti-fascist forces, and had built "a new barrier
190
against war." Soviet Russia Today even printed some com-
ments by Newton D. Baker, Woodrow Wilson's anti-Soviet
Secretary of War, in which he assayed Trotsky as probably
" 1 the greatest realist now living, 1 " because he had ap-
parently attempted to form a "'new triumvirate of Hitler,
191Trotsky and Japan,'" an unbeatable combination. For their
own part , the editors of the fellow-traveling journal re-
minded such liberals as John Dewey, Sidney Howard, and John
Dos Passos of Stalin's words in 1931: "'Liberalism towards
Trotskyism , even when the 1 atter is shattered and concealed
,
is stupidity bordering on crime, bordering on treason against
i go
the working class.'" The uncovering of fascist plots in
the Soviet Union should occasion no surprise, as they had
been uncovered in other nations as well:
The difference between the forms these plots
take in the Soviet Union and elsewhere is that
in the Soviet Union there are no elements
either among officers or men in the army, and
no dissatisfied elements among the masses of
the population to serve as grist for the
fascist mill.
Five months after these reassuring words were published, the
high command of the Red Army was decimated in a search for
fascist agents
.
But the editorial comments of The New Republic and
The Nation counted much more in liberal circles than those
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of self-proclaimed "friends" of the Soviet Union. Both
liberal journals had an opportunity, nay, obligation to assay
fairly the Russian enigma, but both chose the path of "agnos-
ticism." In the face of serious questions about the Russian
trials, they advocated a "know-nothing" toleration of the
incredible
.
With the resignation of Freda Kirchwey from the
Trotsky Defense Committee, it was no surprise that The Nation
avoided making a choice between the "intolerable alternatives"
that the two trials had presented. After all, it might well
be "another hundred years before all the actual facts about
the recent Soviet trials are known." In trying to separate
"legal procedures from political realities and both from
matters of faith," The Nation tended to trust the confes-
sions of guilt in the second trial because of the stature of
the defendants and the "relentless piling up of the testi-
mony." One could believe the tales of domestic power strug-
gle, but more difficult was the charge of conspiracy with
fascist powers. "Here one can only suspend judgment." The
charges of foreign conspiracy attempts may have been de-
signed to discredit "Trotskyism" and unite the nation in the
face of war, continued the editorial. But these conspira-
cies raised doubts about placing trust in the Soviet Union;
the regime had actually sowed the seeds of conspiracy by
making opposition illegal. Until stability allowed the
establishment of democratic safeguards, the "sympathetic
outside observer" could merely offer to the Soviet
government
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"a measure of just criticism," while refusing to use the
trials as a curtain to draw down upon Russia's many "positive
achievements in building a collective economy and a
1 94
culture. "L
Its sister publication, The New Republic
, found the
Pyatakov-Radek trial even "more unbelievable and yet more
authentic" than the Zinoviev-Kamenev drama. "It is of
course impossible for anyone sitting in New York to pass a
judgment that is worth anything on these Russian trials,"
wrote the editors. It was equally impossible that any in-
vestigation, as demanded by Trotsky, would have "any value,"
since Trotsky would be the sole witness. Even if he were
guilty, his correspondence would not reveal this fact:
"when you conspire to overthrow the government of the
largest country in the world, you do not put your plans on
paper and keep a carbon copy." Still, although The New
Republic editors believed that the "weight of the evidence"
supported Walter Duranty's confidence in the confessions'
integrity, the whole episode was a "disaster," exposing many
hostile internal enemies of the regime. More important,
just at a time when it seemed true that the world was
divided into two camps, "fascist and democratic," the trials
gave comfort to the fascist forces in Italy, Germany, and
Japan. This was more than a Russian tragedy, the editorial
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concluded, it was "a tragedy for the whole world."
In another editorial on "Russian Politics in America,"
The New Republic regretted that a substantial number of
f
liberals had rushed into the "hot controversy" over the
trials, and thus disrupted the necessary "unity" for ensuring
domestic reforms. Of course, everyone with an intelligent
interest in world affairs should pay attention to this
"remarkable and puzzling event," but it was not necessary
for them to "let their emotions so run away with their common
sense as to fight a sham battle about the trial on this side
of the Atlantic." Around the few known facts an "elaborate
embroidery of speculation" had arisen, but in the editors'
opinion, "fair-minded persons" should avoid drawing final
conclusions until more was known. Minds should be held open
for further evidence; liberals should not join one side or
another of the quarrel. "It remains for us, who have a
larger degree of political freedom, to defend it by fighting
for it at home .
"
It was all so reasonable. Avoid controversy, keep
the faith, and concentrate on nurturing one's own garden.
However, the readers' columns in the two liberal weeklies
soon featured a number of dissenting views. Suzanne La
Follette wrote The Nation that its editorial stand was really
a "rationalization" about different concepts of justice. Be-
cause the trial happened in Russia, not in Germany, the
journal adopted an attitude of Olympian impartiality, and
proceeded by implication "to indorse or at least condone the
whole questionable procedure." With a certain prescience,
she suggested that in ten years this "left-handed indorse-
ment of Stalin's liquidation of the October Revolution
is
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something that its editors would prefer to forget." This
superficial examination, wrote Ms. La Follette, was really
just "a protective show of pseudo-liberal hocus-pocus." 197
In another letter, Franz Hoellering, a refugee from
Hitlerite Germany and a former editor of the Berliner
Zeitung
,
reminded The Nation 1 s editors that if they sus-
pended judgment on the decisive issue of fascist plots, how
could they judge at all: "The really objective observer
will suspend all judgment, and demand evidence again and
again." In a telling remark, he suggested that behind the
editorial was at best "the fear and horror which certain
liberal idealists feel when brought face to face with cruel
198
expressions of moving history." And in "Harsh Words from
a Friend," James Rorty, a freguent contributor to The Nation ,
wrote that for twenty years he had trusted that in a situa-
tion involving moral and intellectual integrity The Nation
would "deal with it honestly and courageously." But on the
test of the Moscow trials it had failed— "patently, grossly,
disgracefully." There was no reason to wait a hundred years
to judge, as Trotsky had already exposed many contradictions
in the testimony. Must we depend on the conservative press,
asked Rorty, to fit these exposures together and draw the
right conclusions? Must we now think of The Nation as "just
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another magazine?"
The New Republic also received its share of dis-
gruntled letters. Weldon Burke accused the journal of
"illiberalism," and charged that it took "a good deal of
training in partisan analysis to hold that because additional
investigation might not conclusively determine some question,
such investigation should not be held." 200 James T. Farrell
and John Chamberlain wrote that the precious rights of polit-
ical asylum and a fair hearing "cannot be consistently de-
fended if we remain silent concerning the Moscow trials."
Another disappointed liberal, Martha Gruening, contended
that one need not be a Trotskyite "to demand more conclusive
proof than this of guilt in a defendant who consistently and
202
steadfastly denies it." Finally a letter appeared, signed
by ten contributors to The New Republic (and all members of
the Trotsky Defense Committee), protesting the editorial
stand of the magazine and urging an impartial counter-trial
203
of the type that followed the Reichstag Fire case . And so
the battle raged.
To wait until the year 2037 before bringing in a
verdict, in line with the slogan, "'the older, the
bolder,'" 204 was to accept the basic integrity of the trials,
if not all their parts. To urge suspended judgment and
unity at home was tantamount to giving Stalin an absolute
free hand and forgiving "the minor peccadilloes of a hard-
working dictator!" 205 And to plead for neutrality was to
deny Trotsky an effective forum from which he could counter
Stalin's calumnies. In effect, both liberal journals
heartedly desired that the disagreeable Trotsky fade from
sight, and not threaten the solidarity of the left, something
of a dream at best. On the grounds of political
expediency,
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Trotsky's reputation was to be sacrificed; alone he could
hardly hope to match the legions of Moscow sycophants eager
to damn his memory for time immemorial. In all fairness,
The Nation and The New Republic hardly whitewashed the
trials. As Frank Warren has written, they did question some
charges and worried over the weaknesses revealed in the
Soviet system, but the "final effect was to prevent a basic
questioning of the verdicts. " Even discussion of the trials
was discouraged. "With partisanship quelled, all that re-
mained was the official version or an agnosticism which
doubted the parts but accepted the whole. In this sense
206
they 'apologized' for the trials."
Declaration of Principles
Under the pressure of incessant leers and sneers
from Party loyalists, the Trotskyite "renegades" felt a need
to define their aims in such a way as to attract the sup-
port of the "silent majority," liberal style. It was all
very well to declare that "those who have something to hide
need fear the truth,"
207 but it was also necessary to answer
some of the many objections to the proposed inquiry, and ap-
peal to traditional liberal sentiments.
A membership meeting was held in the New School for
Social Research on March 1, 1937.
208 Both George Novack and
Herbert Solow addressed the meeting. But it was John Dewey
who insisted on some statement of Committee aims. After
complimenting the "great work" of the Executive
Committee,
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Dewey endorsed Novack's contention that the issues raised in
the Trotsky case ranked with "the historic issues in the
cases of Dreyfuss and Sacco and Vanzetti." In calling for a
declaration of principles, Dewey argued that it would help
the Committee with those who had raised questions about the
Committee's objectives, and also with the larger group of
confused and responsible people who say, "'a plague on both
your houses.'" If the Committee were to mean anything,
charged Dewey, it must form a Commission of Inquiry, but
this required public support. Therefore the Committee must
convince prospective commissions "of our sincerity of pur-
pose and of the honesty and integrity of the plans of pro-
cedure suggested to the Commission, so that it may effec-
209
tively accomplish its task."
On the motion of Professor Dewey the membership
meeting adopted a Declaration of Principles, which read in
part
:
"The American Committee for the Defense of
Leon Trotsky holds that social advance, the very
possibility of human progress, is inseparable
from the establishment and dissemination of
social truths; to let the truth be known is all
the more essential when it is obscure and con-
tested. We hold, also, despite our diverse
political opinions, that the immemorial right
of asylum for political refugees of all shades
of opinion should be universally maintained.
We hold, also, that no man accused of crime
shall be condemned as a pariah on the face of
the earth who has not been given a full and fair
opportunity to present his answer to his ac-
cusers and to argue his innocence.
"We, who today affirm these principles, have
in the past actively defended them more than
once, aiding the fight on behalf of the polit-
ically persecuted of many viewpoints. The
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charge that we were the tools of political
movements with which we disagreed, the charge
that we were obstructing merited punishment,
did not stop us from defending Sacco and
Vanzetti, do not stop us from calling for the
freedom of Tom Mooney or the political pris-
oners of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy,
"This Committee as such is indifferent to
the political program of Trotsky; the over-
whelming majority of our members are not
Trotskyites. But that tradition which we have
in the past made our own would, even if
Trotsky were not known to us as one who for
four decades has opposed the very tendencies
whose agent he is now charged with being, re-
quire today that we intervene between him and
all who would, in advance of any clear verdict
against him, convict him, punish him and
abandon him to the contempt of history. "210
These "principles" had a noble ring, dear to the heart of any
libertarian, but in a sense they were an evasion of the
practical problems facing the Committee.
One could easily agree with Dewey in the abstract
that "no man accused of crime shall be condemned as a pariah
on the face of the earth who has not been given a full and
fair opportunity to present his answer to his accusers," but
what constituted a full and fair opportunity? In the first
place, "what agency is competent to hold an impartial in-
quiry and mete out justice?" 211 Lacking even a tenuous link
to a quasi- judicial organ, the Committee was faced with the
ironic situation of creating a self-appointed capitalist
court to decide a question of Soviet justice. If "legiti-
macy" could not be borrowed from a governmental organ, then
the members of the proposed inquiry must be of such impec-
cable authority that no taint of partiality could fairly
be




endeavors little attention had been given to this situation.
Then, of course, there was also the problem of proper judi-
cial procedures. Was Trotsky to be the sole witness, or was
he to be confronted with his accusers?
A. Statement of Principles had been adopted, but
these practical questions had been given little attention.
Yet the Committee was already committed to forming a
Commission of Inquiry. A whole host of voices were being
raised to begin at once the work of investigating the
charges. Besides the defense committees in Canada, Mexico,
England, France, Czechoslavakia, Switzerland, and Holland,
there were other political groups agitating for a quick in-
quiry. Among them were the Polish Bund, the International
Bureau of the Socialist Medical Doctors, and the Workers
Party of Marxist Unification in Spain (P.O.U.M.), along with
a series of groups associated with the Fourth International.
In the United States such organizations as the Furniture
Workers' Union #1859, the Northern States Power Local Union
160, the General Drivers' Union 544, and the Akron local of
the United Rubber Workers of America all endorsed the idea
212
of an international commission of inquiry. Such endorse-
ments hardly constituted an overwhelming show of support,
but they could not be easily ignored. Some kind of commis-
sion must be formed in quick order.
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The Old Man Fumes
While New York liberals debated Dewey's "principles,"
Trotsky was consumed with impatience in Mexico. From the
first day he stepped on the New World, Trotsky had inces-
santly agitated for the creation of a commission. Yet two
months later little had been accomplished. And there was the
danger that an unfriendly group might utilize a pseudo-
commission to discredit him.
In early March something called the Socialist Front
of Lawyers of Mexico moved to establish just such an inguiry.
Trotsky sensed a danger in such a move. In a letter addressed
to the President of the Lawyers' Front, he contended that
such a proposed inguiry indicated a "lack of confidence
which the Moscow trials have provoked in large sections of
public opinion." However, a New York Committee of "entirely
authoritative composition" had taken upon itself the initia-
tive for establishing a commission, including representa-
tives from the worlds of politics, arts, science, etc. The
Committee's chief task was to "assure to the investigating
commission a composition such that it will enjoy general
authority." Without guestioning the Front's motives,
Trotsky warned that other groups, not motivated by a dis-
interested search for truth, but "by political passions, in-
trigues behind the scenes, and even corruption pure and
simple," might form commissions of inguiry. Therefore, it
would be "disloyalty" on Trotsky's part to aid the Fronts'
proposed commission without permission from the New York
one,
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to which he had already offered his papers. He suggested
that the Mexican commission collaborate with the inter-
national commission and direct its work into channels "which
will protect you from all reproach. 1,213
Trotsky had the jitters. The unhurried pace of dis-
cussions in New York might allow the Stalinists to form
their own "so-called commission." In sharp terms he criti-
cized the New York "'laggards'" on several occasions for
wanting to form an ideal commission of well-rounded propor-
tions, and thus allow his enemies to steal a march on him. 214
One such impatient letter reached Suzanne La Follette, who
reacted with alacrity:
I immediately took up the matter with the
Defense Committee and we proceeded to move
quickly. I think the reason we required
Trotsky's prodding was that we had all
thought of an international commission as
necessarily consisting of Very Important
People. Trotsky took care of that by re-
minding me that the Commission would gain
standing through the importance of its work.
Something had to be done, quickly.
Not only did Trotsky goad such liberals as Ms. La
Follette, but he laid down the line to his followers in
America. In a revealing letter to "all the comrades in the
Committee," dated March 17, 1937, and marked " Confidential ,
"
he gave them their marching orders. For two months, wrote
Trotsky, he had been very cautious about expressing his
"doubts, apprehensions, and criticisms," but now he could
state without hesitation that "the general line of our com-
rades in the committee is not correct." The weakness of
I
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policy, or rather, "the full absence of any policy," was
paralyzing the Committee and threatening to result in an im-
passe. As a result, Trotsky delivered a scolding to his
political pupils.
In the first discussions with George Novack and Max
Shachtman, recalled the restless exile, the central topic
was the immediate creation of a commission of inguiry:
"This was the aim, the real aim, the general aim of all
further work." But two months later he realized that this
question had been pushed aside, "first by the internal crisis
of the committee, and then by the lack of firmness, of
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clarity, of a consistent line." A certain "dilettantism,
joined by a political confusion," had probably created this
situation. No matter, contended Trotsky, "the crisis was
overcome thanks to the masses"; the Hippodrome meeting in
February demonstrated "the desire of the workers to help the
committee." Apparently confusing hordes of curious demi-
intellectuals with "the masses," Trotsky reproved his fol-
lowers for not using this opportunity to present the first
nominees of the commission, and thus decisively encourage
the liberals. But he was also guilty of not foreseeing this
possibility, having believed the Committee would act de-
cisively .
Continuing this partisan analysis, Trotsky expressed
displeasure with the "first draft of the statutes," which re-
vealed a "purely adaptive and expectant" spirit on the
part
of the Trotskyite nucleus. From Herbert Solow
he had learned
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that Dewey's statutes were not a beginning, but "a thing in
themselves, a means of taking up time in the hope that from
good statutes an ideal commission will arise." Such an ap-
proach was clearly unacceptable to the central figure of the
case, hardly a neophyte when it came to liberal tergiversa-
tions :
This is a purely formalistic, purely juridical,
unpolitical and unMarxian conception. A small
inquiry commission, even though composed of
modest rank-and-file people (if the authorities
hesitate) can accomplish some very good work.
When it publishes the first collection of
depositions, documents, etc., about say, the
Copenhagen chapter, it will win an authority,
attract to itself the "nobility" and open up
new possibilities. However, the best statutes
in the world are sterile if the will to create
the inquiry commission immediately is lacking. 217
Even though John Dewey was primarily responsible for these
"unMarxian" statutes, Trotsky "highly" valued his participa-
tion, and understood he could not act otherwise, being not
for Stalin or Trotsky, just desiring to "establish the
truth." This was not the case with the American Trotskyites:
"You know the truth . " They had a duty to preserve their
identity within the Committee, and any declaration of
principles should reflect both parties. In his opinion, a
special declaration should have been issued, setting forth
the Trotskyite position, and stating that an alliance had
been established with "honest liberals" in order to convince
the public of the justice of their case. Such a declaration
would have been of "inappreciable value" in propaganda among




The issue was all important. Not only the trial
question, "but all questions will in the next period be
decided in dependence upon the inquiry commission." Almost
issuing orders, Trotsky stated that the sub-commission dele-
gation to Mexico must be organized in two or three davs.
"Mon Dieu
,
the matter is not so complicated," he chided, if
the Committee were willing to accomplish its duty. At the
same time the list of people for the full commission should
be established, and mandates obtained from international
committees in order to open an inquiry. "This is the only
possibility of regaining the lost time and of beginning a
219
new chapter in the history of the committee."
This sharply-worded communique clearly indicated
theoretical and practical differences within the Defense
Committee. From Trotsky's standpoint, this was but another
tactical alliance with liberal opponents, a constant feature
of "Leninist-Bolshevik" experience, extending back to tem-
porary coalitions with Peter Struve and Paul Miliukov in the
early years of the century. In such cases, the comrades
must strive to maintain their identity, identify the enemy,
and goad their transient allies into decisive action.
However, it was doubtful that John Dewey, Suzanne
La Follette, and Ben Stolberg understood that the Defense
Committee actually constituted a formal alliance between
liberals and Trotskyites. In addition, while Trotsky had
scant patience for abstract declarations, such general
principles were the raison d'etre for liberal participation
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in the effort. Fair play, political asylum, impartial
hearing—these were not just empty words for Dewey & Co.
After all, the liberal members were being violently abused
for the defense of these very same "abstract" principles.
Also, at this late date Trotsky was willing to settle for
any commission, no matter how modest in composition, in line
with the dictum, "a bird in the hand ..." But Suzanne La
Follette and others were concerned with recruiting "Very
Important People" in order to provide at least a veneer of
authority. Finally, Trotsky and his followers knew " the
truth , " and wanted a vehicle through which to propagandize
their message. For their part, the liberals were much less
sure of the case, and wanted to establish the facts before
broadcasting them to the world.
Both sides desired the same goal: a commission of
inquiry to establish the truth. But the liberals were en-
gaged in a quest for the facts, and thereby defend certain
principles dear to their hearts. The Trotskyites knew the
facts, and wanted to disseminate them for political purposes.
The "truth," then, came in assorted sizes, depending on the
angle of vision.
VI. The Dewey Commission Is Born!
The impatient epistles from Mexico had their desired
effect. Under the sting of Trotsky's acid pen, the Defense
Committee abandoned the debate on general principles, and de
voted its energies to creating a commission of
inquiry.
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Mandates were quickly obtained from the British Committee
for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, the French Comite pour
1
' Enquete sur le Proces de Moscou
, and the Czech
Internationales Komitee fur Recht und Wahrheit . 220 The
necessary seed money for such an undertaking was obtained
from Margaret de Silver, a close friend of Carlo Tresca, who
later became his second wife. Impressed by the drama of the
Hippodrome meeting, she donated $5,000 to the cause.
But it was still necessary to recruit public figures
for the "authoritative, impartial, international commission
of inquiry." Faced with a personnel problem, the Defense
Committee took the initiative by "soliciting thirty competent
liberals, radicals and trade unionists committed neither to
Stalin's nor to Trotsky's political views, to serve upon it.
The first of this panel to accept membership constituted
222
themselves into an autonomous body." But willing re-
cruits were hard to come by, for various reasons. Among
those solicited were Edwin Borchard and Thomas Reed Powell
(two jurists), Van Wyck Brooks (writer), Abram L. Harris
(professor), Paul H. Douglas (economist), Frank P. Graham
(New-Dealer), and Gaetano Salvemini (anti-fascist refugee).
223
All declined the honor of joining the Trotsky jury.
"Impossible to Prove a Negative "
The many personal and political reasons for these
figures to refuse the offer remain obscure, but in two cases
there is ample evidence of the motives behind the rejections.
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The Defense Committee made a strenuous effort to enlist the
services of Charles A. Beard and Carl Becker, two of
America's most distinguished historians. The invitation to
serve on the Commission was "a tribute to my sense of fair
play," wrote Beard to George Novack, "even if I may not de-
serve it." After a "careful study" of the many documents in
the case, however, Beard reached certain conclusions which
precluded his acceptance of the offer.
In the first place, Beard wrote that even voluntary
confessions were not positive proof, especially when unsup-
ported by other evidence. "Hence I do not regard the
charges that Mr. Trotsky entered into a conspiracy against
the Russian government as proved beyond all reasonable doubt."
Secondly, Beard argued that Trotsky should be considered
"innocent of these charges until corroborating evidence has
been produced." But the famous historian also asserted that
the proposed commission would be unable to prove Trotsky's
innocence, since it was almost impossible to prove a negative
in such a case:
Naturally, as an old revolutionist, experienced
in the art, he would not keep incriminating rec-
ords of the operations, if he did engage in them.
Furthermore, no person in the world could prove
that he was not engaged in a conspiracy, unless
he had a guard set over him every moment of the
time covered by the charges. In my opinion it
is not incumbent upon Mr. Trotsky to do the im-
possible, that is, prove a negative by positive
evidence. It is incumbent upon his accusers to
produce more than confessions, to produce cor- ^
roborating evidence to specific and overt acts.
I
292
Despite this emphatic refusal, both Louis Hacker and Norman
Thomas attempted to change Beard's mind. However, Beard
once again replied that a sweeping negative could not be
proven, and that a "true verdict" was impossible, without
both sides being heard. Only a "negative or qualified ver-
dict" could be brought in, which would serve "to enrage one
side or the other." But personal considerations also en-
tered into this decision:
Although representatives of both sides who have
come to me now are sweet as honey, they have
written bitter things about me in the past, and
will do so again, no matter what I do. So I
see no way to mitigate the bitterness of the
conflict. It will have to wear itself out. At
all events I am not under the delusion that I
could do anything that would satisfy either
side . 225
Simply put, Beard had no stomach for the bitter attacks that
would inevitably come his way, if he agreed to lend his great
prestige to the Commission's endeavors.
Shortly after Beard's initial refusal, an offer was
tendered to Carl Becker to join the Mexican hearings or the
full Commission. In a short note of regret, Becker cited
2 26
ill health and the press of work for refusing the offer.
Three weeks after the first letter, he replied at greater
length, and informed Felix Morrow that he would not have
served at any rate, irrespective of personal considerations,
since he shared many of the objections raised by Beard. In
addition, he could not understand what Trotsky needed to
be




From the point of view of his own philosophy
and his personal prestige, it would seem to
be his duty to further every effort to over-
throw Stalin and establish true Communism in
Russia. If Trotzky has not, as he asserts,
been involved in the alleged "conspiracy" to
attain that end , the obvious question seems
to be, "Why not"?
No doubt Trotsky had good reasons, concluded Becker, and
these reasons , whatever they might be , were all the "' defense 1 "
227he needed.
Certainly the presence of either or both of these men
in Mexico would have "enhanced considerably the reputation of
228
the Commission." Yet they demurred, unwilling to involve
themselves in a Russian "'family'" squabble. Unlike John
Dewey, these two prominent liberals did not consider the
issues raised in the Trotsky case important tests of domestic
principles, in addition to their enormous implications for
any alliance with Stalin's Russia. Since no "true verdict"
for time immemorial was possible, Beard and Becker preferred
to sit out this fracas. But surely questions of guilt or in-
nocence, judicial procedures, and the nature of evidence were
more than "'academic'" concerns.
229 In a real sense, the
Trotsky affair was testing the entire liberal ethos.
Members of the Sub-Commission
Despite some difficulties in recruiting likely candi-
dates, a sub-commission was ready in early April 1937 to hear
Trotsky's testimony. Three of its members had been active in
the Defense Committee's labors, and continued their
exertions
on the new body. John Dewey agreed to chair
the proceedings,
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with Suzanne La Follette as the sub-commission's secretary.
In addition, the mercurial Ben Stolberg also joined the
, 230select group.
Another Defense Committee adherent scheduled to make
the long trek to Mexico was Carlo Tresca. A refugee from
Italy, Tresca was a long-time anarcho-syndicalist, with an
impressive record in the American labor movement; he had
helped organize the Paterson, Lawrence, and Mesabi Range
strikes in the early years of the century. Tresca had also
been active in the Sacco-Vanzetti defense effort. With his
neatly trimmed beard, pince-nez, big black hat and flowing
cape, Tresca was one of America's most colorful and re-
spected radicals in 1937. The editor of the strongly anti-
fascist paper, 11^ Martello (The Hammer) , he had reportedly
been on the death list of his old friend, Mussolini, since
1931. (In a fifty-year career Tresca had his throat cut, had
been kidnapped, had been shot at four times, and arrested
some thirty-six times.) In addition, he was no friend of
Browder & Co., being a constant critic of the use of GPU
tactics in local political matters. As a New York district
attorney phrased it, at one time or another Tresca had been
"'agin everything.'" One of his enemies finally evened some
scores on January 11, 1943. Tresca was gunned down on lower
Fifth Avenue in Manhatten, a mysterious attack still largely




One member of the sub-commission was already living
in Mexico. Otto Ruehle was a biographer of Karl Marx and,
as a Socialist member of the Reichstag, had joined Karl
Liebknecht in voting against war in 1914. A leader of the
German Sparticist movement, 1919-22, Ruehle had dealt ex-
tensively with Lenin and Trotsky, an experience that still
rankled. According to Ms. La Follette, he was "a bitter op-
ponent of Trotsky politically" and "sharply criticized the
policy of the Bolshevik government under Lenin and Trotsky
towards the socialist movement of Germany," to her, feelings
2 3 3
which surfaced during the hearings. But after the
counter-trial he became "a frequent guest" at Trotsky's
house, and the two old exiles brought out together The Living
234Thoughts of Karl Marx .
Another recruit for the sub-commission was Carleton
Beals, who arranged to meet the party in Mexico. He was one
of Stolberg's "two or three best friends," and it was
Stolberg who suggested his name. Well-known as a writer on
Latin-America, fluent in Spanish, and with special ties to
Mexico, Beals brought his own expertise to the panel, but
had taken no part in the Defense Committee's activities. As
we shall see, however, Beals shattered the sub-commission's
solidarity in Mexico, and later castigated the panel's
"partisanship," much to the delight of its enemies. Beals
*
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staged his own side show to the main event.
Completing the sub-commission was its counsel, John
F. Finerty. In a lengthy career Finerty defended all
kinds
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of political causes. After protecting the American in-
terests of Eamon de Valera in the 1920s, he argued the last
writ of habeas corpus before Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
in the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. During the 1930s he was
the appeal lawyer in the incessant effort to free Tom Mooney
,
and also defended Earl Browder in a case before the Supreme
Court. For many years active in the ACLU and Workers
Defense League, Finerty entered the Rosenberg case in the
1950s, after the initial conviction of the two alleged
2 36
spies. Certainly Finerty had impressive legal credentials,
but he was less than a close student of Marxism and Russian
history, a fact which became quite obvious during the
237Mexican hearings.
Members of the Full Commission
To all intents and purposes, the sub-commission was
the commission of inquiry. Dewey, La Follette, Stolberg,
Ruehle, Finerty, Tresca—they formed the core of the opera-
tion, especially the first three named. But additional
foreign and American commissioners were enlisted to give the
panel a more international and cosmopolitan flavor.
Perhaps the most interesting of the foreign contin-
gent on the full commission was Alfred Rosmer (1877-1964).
Born in Paterson, New Jersey, to French parents fleeing the
aftermath of the Paris Commune, Rosmer returned to France to
become a revolutionary syndicalist and work on La Vie
238
Ouvriere, organ of the General Labor Confederation. One
297
of the few labor leaders to oppose worker participation in
the "imperialist" war, 1914-18, he met Trotsky in wartime
Paris, and helped the Russian organize the anti-war
Zimmerwald and Kienthal conferences. 239 This friendship was
to be "decisive" for his future. Later Rosmer represented
the French Communist Party on the Executive Committee of the
Comintern (1920-21). He was also on the Central Committee
of the French Party and the administrative board of
1 1 Humanite (1923-24). But following Trotsky's example, he
broke with the Party in 1924 and became active in the "Left
Opposition." Rosmer had little use for the French
Trotskyites and their sectarian views, which strained his
relations with Trotsky. Yet the Fourth International was
later founded in his home, and he and his wife remained the
"only intimate friends" of Leon and Natalya during the pain-
ful years of exile. For eight months in 1939-40 the Rosmers
visited the Trotskys in Mexico, and became acquainted with
"Frank Jacson," the Old Man's future assassin. Technically
Rosmer was not a "Trotskyite" in 1937, but he was certainly
^ ^ « 240
no enemy of the Russian.
Completing the international side of the panel were
Wendelin Thomas and Francisco Zamorra. Thomas had led the
famous Wilhelmshaven navy revolt of November 7, 1918, and
was later an independent Socialist and Communist member of
the Reichstag (1920-24). A "bitter opponent" of Trotsky
politically, Thomas "precipitated an acrimonious controversy"
with the former War Commissar over the Kronstadt affair
I
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during the life of the Commission. 241 As for Zamorra, he
was a Mexican journalist of radical persuasion, who had been
an editorial writer for El Universal and on the national
committee of the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico
, a
94?powerful labor organization.
Two other Americans also joined the panel. The
"ACLU representative" was Professor E. A. Ross of the
University of Wisconsin. Later the national chairman of the
Civil Liberties Union, he was a prominent sociologist and
243the author of several works on the Soviet Union. Like
Ross, John Chamberlain had signed his name to a number of
Trotsky Defense Committee releases. A popular figure in the
New York left in the 1930s, and author of Farewell to Reform
(1932), Chamberlain was something of a gypsy writer, working
at one time or another for The New York Times , Fortune , the
Saturday Review of Literature , and the Wall Street Journal
,
among other publications. Currently a syndicated columnist
and contributor to the National Review , he was close to
Stolberg and La Follette, and more or less "pro-Trotsky per-
244
sonally," in the opinion of Louis Adamic. But Chamberlain's
many journalistic labors kept him from devoting much time to
^ _ . 245the Commission.
The Commission Assayed
Two questions remain to be asked, before describing
the Mexican hearings. Was this an "authoritative" Commission?
And was it "impartial"? Even before hearing Trotsky's testi-
mony, the panel's success or failure depended to a large
extent on the image it projected to the public.
George Novack has argued to this writer that, con-
sidering the need for haste and difficulties encountered,
this was the "best possible group" that could be assembled
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at the time. Certainly La Follette, Stolberg, Tresca,
et al. ( were public figures of some distinction, but they
lacked international recognition. Since the Commission was
a self-appointed, unofficial band, lacking legal authority,
its moral authority was all-important. Yet, with the pos-
sible exception of Tresca, it wanted for a labor leader of
real distinction, a Friedrich Adler or even a Norman Thomas
247for instance. It also missed a representative from the
world of letters, who enjoyed great moral distinction. In
this regard, the names of H. G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw,
Andre Gide, and Edmund Wilson come to mind. With the re-
fusal of Charles Beard and Carl Becker to join the under-
taking, the Commission also sorely missed the presence of a
trained historian. For one reason or another, men like
Rabbi Stephen Wise, Gaetano Salvemini, and Arthur Garfield
Hays were not present on the panel , representing the worlds
of God, Anti-Fascism, and Justice. Thus, with the single
exception of John Dewey, the panel was not graced with
majestic figures. But in all fairness, the historic impor-
tance of the undertaking transcended the participants and
conveyed its own authority and grandeur, as Trotsky had pre
dieted.
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As could be expected, the members of the Commission
hotly defended themselves against charges of partisanship.
For instance, Suzanne La Follette wrote that the commis-
sioners, "holding widely divergent political and social
opinions, and none of them being a political adherent of
Leon Trotsky," had united together to find the historic
248truth. There was much validity in this statement. Yet
appearances were just as important as fact, especially with
regard to the sub-commission. There was no use pretending
that the sub-commission had an "impartial appearance,"
charged The Nation
,
since only Dewey and Beals appeared free
of all bias, and Dewey had been active on the Defense
Committee, a "serious liability." The liberal journal re-
minded its readers: "Where a feller least needs a friend is
on an impartial commission investigating his record." All
Defense Committee members and friends of Trotsky should have
been ruthlessly eliminated, and the lists of defense and bar
associations searched for members free from political and
emotional commitments. Failure to do this, concluded The
Nation , meant the Commission's "verdict has been discounted
249in advance .
"
This disparagement was self-serving, as The Nation
had no stomach for an inquiry in the case, impartial or not.
And it was questionable that Stolberg and La Follette were
"warm admirers" of Trotsky, as charged. Yet, six of the
commissioners (Dewey, Stolberg, La Follette, Tresca,
Chamberlain, Ross) had originally joined the "American
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Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky," and the im-
partiality of this body was open to question. 250 Also,
Ruehle and Thomas may have been Trotsky's "bitter" opponents,
but Alfred Rosmer was one of his closest friends. Appearances
may be deceiving, but the conception of the Commission was
hardly immaculate, at least outwardly.
This body became known as "The Dewey Commission,"
and quite rightly. The aging philosopher brought nobility
to the inquiry's labors. On his probity, prudence, and im-
partiality depended the Commission's prestige and historical
reputation.
CHAPTER IV
DEWEY AND TROTSKY IN MEXICO (I)
Both friends and foes of the Commission of Inquiry
ardently wooed John Dewey. The investigation's success or
failure, many observers agreed, depended on enlisting Dewey's
active participation, especially since the inquiry lacked
other "great" names. At the age of 78, Dewey was the pater-
familias of liberalism, the "liberal conscience of America,"
his personal integrity practically unassailable. If he
agreed to chair the Commission, its reputation for imparti-
ality would be immeasurably strengthened. But there was some
doubt whether Dewey, considering his advanced age and per-
sonal predilections, would be willing to undertake such an
arduous and unfamiliar assignment.
At the behest of Sidney Hook, Dewey had signed the
original appeal to secure political asylum and an impartial
hearing for Trotsky. 1 In the ensuing months the famed
philosopher became even more convinced of the need for a
commission of inquiry. But would he himself actually head
the panel? In March 1937 various emissaries approached him
on this question. According to Suzanne La Follette, it was
Hook who once more interceded with Dewey and convinced his
mentor and friend "to take the chairmanship of the commis-




also recalled that Hook approached him. In addition, James
Cannon and Novack—Trotsky's "ambassadors"—visited the aging
liberal, finally persuading him to head the panel. 3 Although
asked by Dewey, Hook has disclaimed all responsibility for
his decision: "I never urged him to accept the invitation."
Instead, Dewey reached this decision "only after he became
aware of the efforts and far-flung stratagems of the
4Communist party to prevent him from going."
Nor were the Communists alone in attempting to dis-
suade Dewey. His family feared for his life in volatile
Mexico, and "implored him not to tarnish the lustre of his
name by participating in a shady and shabby business.""5 In
addition, his colleagues on the Editorial Board of The New
Republic—where Dewey had been an active force for several
decades— also counseled against involvement. (In May 1937
his name was dropped from the masthead as a "contributing
editor." 6 )
But it was the Communist Party, USA, which brought
the greatest pressure to bear on Dewey. At first rumors
were spread that he was "naive" and approaching "senility."
Then, too, he was also charged with being unduly influenced
by two former students and Trotskyites, Hook and Max Eastman,
7
and "signed things blindly without reading them." But be-
fore the Party dared to attack directly his integrity, it
tried to "bribe" him. According to Hook, one "R"— a singer
of slight talent active in the Party's cultural
work— ap-
proached Dewey and suggested a free "'junket tour'" of the
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Soviet Union. When he declined the offer, citing the pos-
sible trip to Mexico, he was told in accented English:
"Trot-sky! Stal-in! We're not interested in
such matters, dear Professor Dewey. Ten years
ago you came and saw the schools of the Soviet
Union: now it is time to come and give another
look. VOKS doesn't care about Trotsky or
Stalin. It cares only that you should come
—
and soon. This month or next. First-class
accommodations all the way and back." 8
But Dewey remained steadfast. Heedless of both flattery and
ridicule, he dismissed all suggestions that "he was placing
himself and his health in jeopardy" and decided to make the
9trip to Mexico.
This decision, wrote Hook, threw the Party into a
"panic. ""^ No longer was Dewey exempt from the more violent
forms of personal abuse. He was placed on the index, and
soon "drew the lightning of Muscovite damnation." 1 "1' Eventu-
ally the Daily Worker described him as a "New Enemy" of
American labor, a "puppet of disruption in America's liberal
and progressive movements," who sounded like Herr Goebbels
when discussing the labor movement. Dewey, it lamented, had
become "the Charlie McCarthy of his former pupil, Sidney
Hook, notorious Trotzkyite, who has led his teacher into a
i2
swamp of filth."
Despite the obloquy, Dewey stood his ground, and
m . 13
soon was at home in the polemical battles over Trotsky.
But his decision to enter this fray and take on this onerous
assignment was not based exclusively on "negative pressures."
There were also intellectual reasons.
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Dewey on The "Great Experiment "
John Dewey's defection to the "enemy" camp was some-
thing of a shock, considering his long-standing admiration
of Soviet achievements, especially in the realm of educa-
tion. This esteem had been reciprocated by progressive edu-
cators in Russia, and until the 1931 "de-Deweyization" cam-
paign, he was widely read and emulated. Indeed, "Dzhon
D'yui" was almost the subject of a personality cult. In
1924, for instance, Anna Louise Strong wrote that Soviet
school reform was "'modeled more on the Dewey ideas of edu-
cation than on anything else we have in America. Every new
book by Dewey is seized and early translated into Russian
14for consultation. Then they make their own additions.'"
In 1928 Dewey joined a tour of American educators to
study Soviet pedagogical practices. His impressions of this
trip were later published in the United States and received
much attention. Although Soviet schools were in recess
during his visit, Dewey did have an interview with N. K.
Krupskaya, Lenin's widow and an official in the Commissariat
of Education. 15 He was also taken to a colony of "wild
children" (
"
bezprizornye " ) , housed in a former palace at
Peterhof. "I have never seen anywhere in the world such a
large proportion of intelligent, happy, and intelligently
occupied children," he wrote of the waifs: they would be a
great credit to any family.
16 Russian school children,
Dewey discovered, were "much more democratically organized"
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than their American counterparts. He regretted that a bar-
ricade of false reports were isolating American teachers
from this experiment, in which "our professed progressive
democratic ideas are most completely embodied." Much could
1 7be learned in Soviet Russia.
There was, of course, the trickly question of indoc-
trination in this system. But Dewey was not overly concerned
with this problem. Education as a means of realizing certain
social purposes, he argued, "cannot be dismissed as propa-
ganda without relegating to that category all endeavor at
deliberate social control," an endeavor he strongly advo-
1 p
cated. Besides, all the flux and change in "transitional"
Russia might create a "collective mentality" very different
from the professed communist dogma:
It seems impossible that an education intel-
lectually free will not militate against a
servile acceptance of dogma as dogma. One
hears all the time about the dialectic move-
ment by means of which a movement contradicts
itself in the end. I think the schools are a
"dialectic" factor in the evolution of Russian
communism.
The Revolution, almost "religious" in nature, had released
great amounts of mental and moral energy, resulting in a new
mentality and a new morality. But the eventual society,
asserted Dewey, would be "unlike the society which orthodox
n , ^ „20Marxian formulae call for.
in these 1928 impressions of the Soviet Union Dewey
had warned against "all generalized views about Russia,"
ad-
vice he failed to heed in his own writings.
21 There was one
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generalized Soviet technique, moreover, that he warmly en-
dorsed for export to America—social planning for collective
ends. In Liberalism and Social Action (1935), Dewey urged
that liberals include social planning and a socialized
economy in their reform programs. A radical "re-formation'"
of society precluded piece-meal remedies: America needed a
"
'social goal based upon an inclusive plan. 1 " Dewey en-
visioned, however, the intelligent application of scientific
methods to social problems, not the use of brute force:
"It requires an unusually credulous faith in
the Hegelian dialectic of opposites to think
that all of a sudden the use of force by a
class will be transmuted into a democratic
classless society. Force breeds counter-
force. ... It is possible to look with
considerable suspicion upon those who assert
that suppression of democracy is the road to
an adequate establishment of genuine democ-
racy. " 22
Social planning, Yes! Coercive force, No! On this question
of the relationship of means and ends Dewey parted company
23
with Soviet ideologues—both Stalin and Trotsky.
This concern over the use of ruthless means to
achieve desirable humanitarian goals also surfaced in the
24
aforementioned article, "Why I Am Not A Communist." There
was a vast difference between communism with a small "c" and
official Communism, contended Dewey; he emphatically rejected
the latter as a panacea for America's maladies, which dif-
fered radically from Russia's problems. It was "nothing
short of fantastic to transfer the ideology of Russian
Communism to . a country which is so profoundly different
in
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its economic, political and cultural history," he contended.
Soviet Party domination in every field of culture, the
"ruthless extermination" of minority opinion, the "verbal
glorification of the mass," the "cult" of the infallible
leadership— all of these Soviet characteristics were a re-
sult of peculiar local conditions. Yet official Communism,
with its "monistic and one-way philosophy of history,"
ignored concrete historical differences and imposed Soviet
experiences as "integral parts of the standard Communist
faith and dogma." Such an outlook, claimed Dewey, verged on
25
"political insanity."
The American philosopher, in addition, recognized
the existence of class conflicts, but doubted that they were
" the means" by which to achieve genuine social progress.
Convinced that the specter of class war had eased Hitler's
path to power, Dewey asserted that even a threat of such
social conflicts in western nations would result in "Fascism
with its terrible engines of repression," a frightening pos-
sibility. Furthermore, class war in a highly developed in-
dustrial society with a strong middle class would either be
drowned in blood or just result in a Pyrrhic victory: "The
two sides would destroy the country and each other."
26
There was another, more personal reason, why Dewey
could not be a Communist. Accustomed to civilized discourse,
he was a genial scholar who found the "emotional tone" in
communist disputes "extremely repugnant." Such courtesies
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as fair-play and elementary honesty in presenting arguments
were more than '"bourgeois virtues, 1 " but habits won only
after a long struggle:
The systematic, persistent and seemingly inten-
tional disregard of these things by Communist
spokesmen in speech and press, the hysteria of
their denunciations, their attempts at character
assassination of their opponents, their mis-
representation of the views of the "liberals " to
whom they also appeal for aid in their defense
campaigns , their policy of "rule or ruin" in
their so-called united front activities , their
apparent conviction that what they take to be
the end justifies the use of any means if only
those means promise to be successful— all
these, in my judgment, are fatal to the very
end which official Communists profess to have
at heart. 27
Such excesses, therefore, were alien to him, and created an
unbridgeable chasm between Dewey and official "Communism."
This increasing distaste for communist practices led
Dewey in the mid-1930s to oppose the Party on a number of
issues. With other "anti-Communist liberals," he denounced
the executions resulting from the Kirov affair. He also op-
posed the Popular Front strategy, despite an intense antip-
athy for all matters fascist. And, reflecting his bitter ex-
perience in World War I, Dewey argued against any "collective
security" agreement with the Soviet Union that might lead
America into another foolish crusade. American democracy





"Truth Is On The March "
Despite a distaste for communist squabbles, Dewey
did agree to investigate the schism between Stalin and
Trotsky. But the personal dispute had no more meaning for
him than "the fight between Schmeling and Joe Louis," wrote
29
one journalist. Nor was the political plight of Leon
Trotsky the central issue for Dewey. If anything, Dewey was
inclined to favor the "pragmatic" Stalin over the "dogmatic"
30Trotsky, as Isaac Deutscher has noted. Even after meeting
the Russian outcast he was restrained in his admiration:
"'Personally, I have always disagreed with the ideas and
theories of Trotsky and I disagree with him now, if possible,
31
more than ever. 1 "
No, the central issue for Dewey was not a defense of
Trotsky, but a defense of American ideals. He feared that
Bolshevism would infect the United States and destroy cer-
tain cherished traditions. As he explained in a number of
32
articles and statements, his liberal faith was threatened.
At the opening session of the Mexican hearings, for instance,
he saw the basic issue as simple: did Trotsky have a right
to be heard before final condemnation?
The right to a hearing before condemnation is
such an elementary right in every civilized
country that it would be absurd for us to re-
assert it were it not for the efforts which
have been made to prevent Mr. Trotsky from
being heard, and the efforts that now are
being made to discredit the work of this
Commission of Inquiry.
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Trotsky's denial of the charges was not a major concern of
the Commission! "That he has been condemned without the op-
portunity to be heard is a matter of utmost concern to the
Commission and to the conscience of the whole world." Dewey
also had a personal stake in leading this inquiry. He re-
gretted that a chairman had not been found whose experience
better suited him for this difficult task:
But I have given my life to the work of educa-
tion, which I have conceived to be that of
public enlightenment in the interests of
society. If I finally accepted the respon-
sible post I now occupy, it was because I
realized that to act otherwise would be to
be false to my lifework. ^
The Trotsky affair, then, was to be a vehicle for the "public
enlightenment" of America.
After Dewey's return from Mexico, he discussed at
some length the importance of this Russian "family squabble"
for American liberals. Before a large gathering at New
York's Mecca Temple (May 9, 1937), he vigorously complained
about the many efforts to sabotage the inquiry: "When did
it become a farce in the United States to give a hearing to
a man who had been convicted without a hearing?" Charging
that those who obstructed this investigation were really
the ones on "trial before the civilized world," he ridiculed
his critics:
It would be impossible to find a grosser ex-
hibition of colossal nerve than is seen in the
impudent proclamation that only those who are
convinced of Trotsky's guilt are impartial and
that everyone is partial who declines to pro-
nounce judgment until both sides have been
heard. 34
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Dewey could sympathize with those liberals who argued that
the Soviet Union was the "one successful attempt of all his-
tory to build a Socialist society," and should not be em-
barrassed. But specific crimes had been alleged. The in-
quiry was concerned with objective fact, not political issues.
It was not "fair or square" to find Trotsky guilty because of
antipathy to his political views:
When confusion of two entirely different mat-
ters is manifested by professed liberals, it
marks an intellectual shirking that is close
±o intellectual dishonesty. More than that,
it is treachery to the very cause of liberal-
ism. For if liberalism means anything, it
means complete and courageous devotion to
freedom of inquiry. 35
Fact, not theory, was the issue here.
But Dewey was not completely oblivious to the broader
implications of the inquiry. In the Mecca speech he declared
that if Trotsky were found guilty, then "no condemnation can
be too severe." If found innocent, however, then the Soviet
regime could not be acquitted of "deliberate, systematic
persecution and falsification." These were unpleasant alter-
natives, but "unwillingness to face the unpleasant is the
standing weakness of liberals." Too often they shirked
decisive action when "faced with disagreeable conditions":
"I cannot believe that a single genuine liberal would, if he
once faced the alternatives, hold that persecution and




Perhaps sensing that even greater shocks would soon
shake America's peace of mind, Dewey concluded his address
with a plea to support the pursuit of justice while there
still was time: "Lines are being drawn between devotion to
justice and adherence to a faction, between fair play and a
love of darkness that is reactionary in effect no matter
what banner it flaunts." Quoting Emile Zola in the Dreyfus
case, he ended with a ringing declaration— '"Truth is on the
o 7
march and nothing will stop it. 1 11
I. Arrival in Mexico
Although Dewey had an ulterior motive in journeying
to Mexico—to reaffirm America's best traditions and expose
alien ideologies—this trip was a hadj in search of a pla-
38tonic ideal. Magna est Veritas et praevalet—this was
Dewey 1 s faith, an almost unshakeable belief in the liberating
power of true fact, once discovered. "Truth," then, was the
quarry. But it is notoriously enigmatic and elusive, and
means different things to different men.
Trotsky, however, already knew the truth. The
Mexican hearings, for him, were not primarily a quest, but
an opportunity to convince the world of his innocence and
strike a mortal blow at Russia's "Bonapartist " regime. Un-
like Dewey 1 s
#
his "truth" was a weapon in the dialectical
struggle, not an ideal in itself.
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Yet the two major figures in the inquiry shared cer-
tain assumptions. Both agreed on the need to ascertain the
simple facts in the case. And both gave little thought to
truth's sometime impotence in the face of totalitarian power.
It was a "piece of idle sentimentality," wrote John Stuart
Mill a century ago, "that truth has an inherent power denied
±o error of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake."
New York to Mexico City
At the beginning of April 1937 the little band of in-
vestigators boarded the train for the long trip southward.
Besides Dewey, the passengers included Ben Stolberg, Suzanne
La Follette, George Novack, and Pearl Kluger. (Carleton
Beals and John F. Finerty would make their own way to
Mexico, while Otto Ruehle already resided there.) Also on
the train was James T. Farrell, who kept a close eye on
... 39Commission activities.
According to the admiring Farrell, Dewey was ex-
tremely sociable during the long journey. He would even
smoke a cigarette and drink a glass of beer! Always "fresh,
alert, and unruffled," Dewey allowed no special considera-
tions because of his age or prestige. Never monopolizing
the conversation, his remarks were made in a "slow and some-
what drawling way," a manner which pleased Farrell: "His
powers of attention, his dry wit, and his extraordinary
keenness of mind were revealed with such modesty and sim-
plicity that they come as a shock." As Dewey conversed, the
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years dropped away from him, and one would forget that "this
kindly old man was John Dewey , " wrote the somewhat awed
Irishman from Chicago: "He was another human being, a mem-
ber of this temporary group.
"
During the trip Dewey spent many hours alone in his
small compartment studying the trial records and the works
of Trotsky. Taking few notes, he found many "inconsisten-
cies" in the verbatim transcripts, a product of "logical
analysis." His thinking was "much sharper and clearer" than
that of the other passengers on the train, claimed Farrell
,
who tended to make broad comparisons with Thermidor and the
41French Revolution. Dewey, then, was "thoroughly versed"
42in the case. And he was completely composed, despite
being far from the cozy confines of his classroom. Dewey
traveled with as little sense of outward excitment "as
though he might have been an unknown man journeying from one
43
town to another in his native Vermont."
Yet there was some tension on the train. Ben
Stolberg and Suzanne La Follette had every intention of
making a sharp distinction between the Defense Committee and
44
Commission of Inquiry, a well-nigh impossible task. And
this aim was made more difficult by the presence of George
Novack among the travellers. Secretary of the Committee and
an avowed Trotskyite, Novack might compromise the mission, a
consideration to which Dewey apparently gave no thought. But
the feelings of Miss La Follette were ruffled, especially
i
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when it was rumored that Stalinists might sabotage the train
45at the Mexican border. Novack could serve as a ready ex-
cuse for such a provocation. As a result, the American
Trotskyite was relegated to the "back of the train" during
the long trip, and kept at some distance from the other
travelers. Once in Mexico Trotsky took Novack aside and
explained that they were dealing with "jittery" intellectuals
Their feelings, however, must be respected, considering the
importance of the work. In order to express "solidarity"
with the American comrade, Trotsky showed him a draft of his
final argument to the Commission and asked for suggestions;
several of Novack 1 s recommendations were incorporated into
46the final version. In this case Trotsky displayed a nice
sense of tact, but the tension between the Committee and
47Commission was far from being guashed.
First Steps
The members of the sub-commission arrived in Mexico
City on the sixth of April. Without delay Dewey granted an
interview to the local press, already bewildered that a
Soviet dispute was being transplanted to Mexico. The fol-
lowing day Excelsior , a major daily newspaper in the Mexican
capital, ran a front-page story on the news conference, com-
plete with a photograph of the commissioners. Dewey as-
sured the assembled journalists that the sessions would be
open to the public, and that representatives of the Mexican
Communist Party were more than welcome to attend the hearings
i
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The "veteran professor of philosophy" also announced that
special police protection had not been solicited, since he
doubted that anyone would attempt '"to obstruct or impede
our efforts to provide Trotsky with the opportunity to pre-
sent the evidence, testimony and documents that he says he
has to refute all of the charges against him by the Moscow
government.'" Stressing the impartiality and integrity of
the commissioners, Dewey declared that the only purpose of
the investigation into the Soviet accusations was to
"'establish the truth about this point which has divided the
working and progressive forces of the world at a moment in
which their unity is imperative in order to fight the re-
actionary forces.'"
The "Comision Norte americano " guickly established
headquarters at the home of Mrs. Robert Latham George; most
49
of the members lived there during the hearings. Also m
the capital were Charles Rumford and Adelaida Walker, Mrs.
George's daughter, who handled press relations for the com-
mission. Charles Walker was said to be a "simon-pure
Trotskyite," reported Carleton Beals. The New Masses , a
pro-Communist journal, also accused Walker of being "an
active Trotskyite propagandist, allied with the Trotskyite
Dunne brothers in Minneapolis."
50 When a New Masses reporter
attempted to gain admission to the hearings, using press cre-
dentials from the Nacional , a Mexican newspaper, Mrs. Walker
said, "'Very sorry, ... but we cannot allow more than
one
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reporter from the Nacional
, especially since they gave us a
very bad write-up yesterday. 1 "
It hardly seems strange that Trotsky wanted a loyal-
ist to deal with the press, but Beals was upset for other
reasons. Rather short of funds, and quick to perceive
slights to his amour-propre
,
Beals complained about not being
quartered in the Walker house: "I and my wife were left to
shift for ourselves, and live apart from the commission in a
hotel, with little knowledge of the inner activities of the
group. I hired my own taxicabs, and it is a long way out to
z — _ 50Coyacan /sic/, and expensive."
Plans to hold the hearings in a large public hall
soon ran into difficulties. If Trotsky defended himself
publicly, there would be trouble, promised the local
Communist Party: the "'revolutionary workers'" would not
permit the outcast to make a public appearance "'for any
reason.'" As a result of such threatening noises, the
hearings were held in Trotsky's "Blue House," which could
only accommodate about fifty spectators. Dewey later ex-
plained it would not have been "fitting" to hold the sessions
elsewhere and thus require additional police protection from
the government.
54 Besides avoiding embarrassment to the
Mexican authorities, however, the change of venue also meant
55
a saving of sorely needed cash.
Yet the police were highly visible. On the opening
day of the hearings, according to one report, about forty
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uniformed police guarded the villa, supported by numerous
agents of the reserved police and by private detectives. 56
Passes were restricted, and armed guards searched each per-
son entering the premises, which caused a certain amount of
discontent among the accredited reporters. 57 The villa it-
self, in the opinion of Beals, was just "a little adobe
house on a frowzy half-cobbled street of stagnant water,"
hardly suitable for such an event. 58 But it was also an
59
"impregnable fortress." Behind the three large French win-
dows in the hearing room were constructed "six-foot barri-
cades of cemented brick and sandbags so that no assassins
might successfully shoot through the windows." Various
secretaries and sympathizers of Trotsky had carried bricks
in order to complete the task in time. 6 *"* But the menacing
atmosphere of the "fortress" was not without its compensating
charms. The participants could see snow-capped mountains
looming in the distance. And "grotesque iMexican idols, for-
gotten gods of another day," dominated the patio, perhaps
6
1
secretly amused by the strange proceedings within the villa.
The rectangular hearing room was partitioned into
sections, not unlike a Moscow courtroom. Trotsky and his
secretaries sat at one end of the room, the two lawyers,
6 2
John Finerty and Albert Goldman, at the other end. To
Trotsky's left was seated the sub-commission, to his right
the gallery, including a number of journalists and photog-
raphers. 63 Among the reporters was Frank L. Kluckhohn of




having publicly questioned its motives; and
Walker kept a wary eye on him. 64
Also in the gallery behind the high railing were the
hosts. The "pistol-toting" Diego Rivera kept busy sketching
cartoons, when not "snoring." He sported a large peacock
plume in his sombrero, while his wife—Frida Kahlo— appeared
each day in a "new Indian costume with magnificent shawls
and heavy silver Tarascan jewelry." Much to Beals' con-
sternation, she constantly chewed gum, "repeatedly drawing
it out of her mouth in a long thread."
Completing the cast were Trotskyite sympathizers and,
according to Beals, the representatives of "a few rump
unions under Diego Rivera's thumb." Vincente Lombardo
Toledano and other major figures in the Mexican labor move-
ment had refused invitations to attend the hearings, not
wanting to lend any prestige to the proceedings and thereby
6 6infuriate their Soviet friends. Those labor officials who
did attend, however, had difficulty in understanding the
testimony, given almost entirely in English. They solved
the problem by "going sound asleep," and during the six and
a half days of the trial, a "chorus of snores" came from the
rear row, "where a solitary gendarme looked bored and puz-
i a .. 67zled.
"
Even if the labor leaders had stayed alert, however,
it is doubtful that they could have materially assisted the
inquiry. Towards the end of the hearings Dewey invited one
such leader—Ramon Garibay of the Casa del Pueblo—to pose
some questions. The response left something to be desired:
1. Why is Stalin persecuting Mr. Trotsky in
this way?
2. Where would Lenin be if he were still
alive today, and if Stalin had the same
power?
3. Has Stalin made a pact with the bureauc-
racy of the world?
4. Is Mr.. Trotsky in accord with the world
proletariat?
Perhaps stupefied by the sheer aridity of these queries,
Trotsky begged off, and promised to take up the questions in
his closing statement. This was the beginning and end of
68Mexican labor participation in the investigation.
The Commission of Inquiry had also made a valiant
effort to enlist the participation of bona fide Stalinists
in the proceedings. The Soviet Ambassador to Washington,
Alexander A. Troyanovsky, and the American Communist Party
had been invited to send representatives, with full rights
6 9
of cross-examination. And the Secretary of the Mexican
Communist Party, Hernan Laborde, had also been invited to
70
attend the hearings. But in declining the invitation,
Senor Laborde declared that to attend the sessions would be
"'to give significance to something which has none. We hope
all serious and responsible organizations will refuse to
participate in the Trotskyite comedy. 1 "
71 The other refusals
from the Stalinist camp were in a similar vein.
For his part, Trotsky had welcomed hostile ques-
tioning from his foes, as a boon to the inquiry's reputation
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for impartiality. According to him,
The Commission has searched candle in hand, for
an authoritative Stalinist or a Stalinist sym-
pathizer who would not limit himself to machina-
tions in the cellars of the GPU, or to calumnies
and insinuations in publications without the
responsibility or honor, but who would have the
courage to openly submit the Moscow accusations
to the control of critics
.
7 2
But there were no takers of this double-edged dare . Instead
,
the Stalinists issued "demonstrative refusals whose haughty
tone tried to substitute for their cowardice," or so charged
73
the disappointed Trotsky.
Thus, Moscow went unrepresented during the Coyoacan
hearings, hardly an oversight on the Kremlin's part. As a
result, the Commission was forced to accept the published
74
court records as embodying "the case for the prosecution,"
an unsatisfactory substitute for hostile cross-examination.
The way was clear for unfriendly critics to claim, with some
75
validity, that Trotsky was merely "investigating" himself.
II. The Hearings Commence
Dewey opened the first session on the morning of
April 10, 1937. Careful to flatter the nervous hosts, he
expressed personal pleasure at finding himself once again in
their "most agreeable" capital. He also asserted that for a
foreigner to defend himself before other foreigners was "an
honor to Mexico, and a reproach to those countries whose
political system or current policy bars the holding of our
meetings on their soil." Believing that no man should
be
condemned without a chance to defend himself, the Preliminary
Commission desired "to congratulate the Mexican Government on
its broad interpretation of the meaning of political democ-
racy, which makes our meeting possible." 76
Opening Statements
Having dispensed with the required amenities, Dewey
read an introductory statement for the panel that attempted
to explain its aims. On behalf of his fellow commissioners,
Dewey declared that the Preliminary Commission was in Mexico
"neither as court nor as jury." On the contrary,
We are here neither to defend nor to prosecute
Leon Trotsky . We are not here to pronounce a
verdict either of guilt or innocence . We are
here as an investigating body . Our function
is to hear whatever testimony Mr. Trotsky may
present to us, to cross-examine him, and to
give the results of our investigation to the
full Commission of which we are a part, . . .
Our sole function is to ascertain the truth as
far as is humanly possible
.
After briefly recounting Trotsky's frustrating efforts to
secure a hearing, Dewey announced that "the conscience of the
world" was not yet satisfied; it demanded that Trotsky have
a chance to answer his critics. Dewey appealed to "every
fair-minded person" to support the Commission, and especially
pleaded with the press "to safe-guard our task by living up
to its own highest tradition of scrupulous objectivity." If
guilty, Trotsky should be condemned, but this was not the





At the onset, Dewey admitted that the charges in the
official Soviet records were the foundation of the investi-
gation. In fact, the "scope and content" of this inquiry
was already determined by the testimony given against
Trotsky in the Moscow trials. As a result, the Commission
was forced to examine "the past activity of Mr. Trotsky and
his faction, and to receive testimony, here and elsewhere,
upon the factual material brought forward by witnesses and
by the accused in the Moscow trials." This was no easy task,
since it was impossible to secure the cooperation of Nazi
Germany and Soviet Russia:
It /Preliminary Commission/ is aware that a
long, tortuous course of events is involved,
every stage of which is beset by bitter con-
troversy. But even were the difficulties
more serious than they are, we should find
ourselves unwilling and unable to take the
.
defeatist position of those who proclaim in
advance that any attempt to ascertain the
facts upon which judgment must finally rest
is. doomed to failure.
To do otherwise, Dewey proclaimed, would be contrary to his
life's work. 7 ^
In reply, Trotsky was both humble and thankful. He
expressed his "profound respect" and "no less profound grati-
tude" to the Commission members for their labors, and
understood that their motives were "incomparably more impor-
tant and more profound than an interest in the fate of a
single person. But all the greater is my respect, and all
the more sincere my gratitude!" He also threw some bouquets
in the direction of the Mexican government for its
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"magnanimous hospitality," and assured his hosts that the
composition of the Commission and the "high authority of its
chairman" precluded any intervention in Mexico's internal
life; his own obligation on this score was "absolutely un-
shakable." Trotsky also thanked the local press for under-
standing that he must both answer his accusers and avoid any
steps which might be unwelcome to Mexican public opinion.
"I express a sincere gratitude to the representatives of the
press for their loyal and sincere regard for the peculiari-
ties of my situation/' continued Trotsky. Certain "unfortu-
nate exceptions," however, need not be dwelt upon; public
. . . 79opinion would judge them as they deserved.
But the dignity of the veteran revolutionary was
also apparent in this opening statement. After begging in-
dulgence for his English— "the weakest point of my posi-
tion"—he asked no further considerations.
For everything else I do not ask the slightest
indulgence. I do not demand any a_ priori con-
fidence in my affirmations. The task of this
Commission of investigation is to verify every-
thing from the beginning to the end. My duty
is simply to help it in its work. I will try
to accomplish this duty faithfully before the
eyes of the whole world. 80
He was anything but contrite. Supremely confident of his
powers of persuasion and the strength of his brief, Trotsky
was ready to fulfill his self-appointed "duty"—to turn the
accusers into the accused.
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Limits of the Investigation
No trial! No court! Then why hold the hearings?
John Dewey, of course, had attempted to make clear that this
was merely a "preliminary" investigation, only concerned
with hearing testimony, gathering facts, and accepting docu-
81
ments. At a later time the full Commission would weigh
the evidence and submit a verdict. But this distinction was
difficult to maintain, especially since Dewey was chairman
of both the preliminary and full commissions. Even the
leading figures in the drama were hard put to treat the
Coyoacan proceedings as just a rather dull curtain raiser to
a livelier production in the future. For instance, Carleton
Beals urged that the sub-commission publish forthwith a
resume of its findings and conclusions, in order to have an
effect on any new Soviet tri als : "The responsibility resting
upon the Preliminary Commission is a heavy one, but it must
be faced, and we must present our honest conclusions at the
8 2
earliest date feasible. 11 And even the defense table ac-
cepted that this was the trial of Trotsky. Though Trotsky
8 3
insisted that he was a "witness," not a "defendant," he
alternated between conducting a defense and building a case
against Stalin. And his lawyer, Albert Goldman, apologized
at an early point in the proceedings for any slips of the
tongue: "I might call Mr. Trotsky the defendant, the ac-
cused, the witness, because it has always been emphasized
that the real defendant in the Soviet court was Trotsky. But
we consider Mr. Trotsky as a witness." He added that the
Trotsky side was attempting to turn the tables on the Soviets
"We feel ourselves to be the accusers, and they the accused."
In truth, the Coyoacan villa had been turned into a
courthouse. Sitting in the hearing room were a "Judge"
(Dewey), "Jurors" (commissioners), "Counsel" (Finerty and
Goldman), and "Defendant" (Trotsky). Certainly this was
Trotsky's day in public court, with the press assembled to
report the proceedings. In Trotsky's mind this may have been
merely a "counter-trial," with the disembodied spirit of
Stalin in the dock, but a trial it was.
And it was a political trial. Dewey had taken great
*
pains to stress that the investigation was concerned with
facts relevant to Trotsky 1 s case , not with abstruse politi-
8 5
cal theories . But was it possible to separate fact and
theory in any matter concerning the Bolshevik Party? At the
first session Dewey asked Goldman to save the Commission from
"embarrassment by excluding all political material which does
not have a direct and close relationship with the charges
made against Mr. Trotsky." The inquiry did not intend to
consider "the political issues" between th Government and
the Opposition. Even though some of this material related
to the charges, continued Dewey, the Commission "will draw a
line strictly between the political issues and the charges
made against Mr. Trotsky." In response, Goldman promised to
limit himself, but added that he had had "some experience in
political trials in the United States, and it is always
difficult to say exactly where the political question ceases
86
to be germane and becomes irrelevant."
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The point was well taken. In "political trials,"
e.g., the Coyoacan hearings, theoretical and factual matters
were inseparately meshed. For instance, it was impossible
to examine Pyatakov's "phantom flight" to Oslo without
raising serious questions about the fairness of Soviet jus-
tice and, by implication, the entire Soviet system. In ad-
dition, Vyshinsky had attempted to prove the "historical
connection" between Trotsky's past activities and the present
charges, a "connection" that the Commission could not fail to
investigate. Yet this line of inquiry opened up a whole can
of worms, such as Trotsky's relations with Lenin, the con-
flicting theories of "permanent revolution" and "socialism
in one country," political factionalism in the 1920s,
etcetera, etcetera.
In a real sense, then, the Soviet system was
on trial. When the Commission's critics charged political
intervention in Soviet internal affairs, they were not over-
stating the case. This was underlined by the final conclu-
sions of the Commission's report, Not Guil ty . The indict-
ments were determined "by the current internal difficulties,
economic and political, of the Soviet regime." Therefore,
"we find that the trials have served not juridical but
political ends." The authors of the final report also con-
cluded, "On the basis of all the evidence herein examined
and all the conclusions stated, we find that the trials of
8 7
August, 1936, and January, 1937, were frame-ups." Trotsky,
naturally, was delighted wirh this verdict, but it was hardly
apolitical in nature.
Conduct of the Investigation
In his opening statement Dewey had declared that the
"impartiality of any investigating body can be judged by one
test, and one test only: the way in which it conducts its
affairs. From this test, the Commission of Inguiry neither
o o
can nor wishes to be exempt."
Following his own advice, the famed philosopher was
a model of restraint during the thirteen sessions. He estab-
lished a sense of judicial decorum in the hearing room, and
was quick to suppress polemical outbursts. When Trotsky re-
marked, for instance, that the only reason Stalin avoided
being branded a German agent in 1917 was that "nobody knew
his name at that time," Dewey immediately stopped him. This
was "purely a matter of Mr. Trotsky's interpretation," and
QQ
"should be struck from the record." " Unwilling to accept
many of Trotsky's statements on face value, Dewey continually
90
asked, "Will that be verified by documentary evidence?"
But the Chairman also had the duty to allow Trotsky great
freedom in conducting his defense. After all, Trotsky was a
voluntary witness before the Preliminary Commission, and his
revolutionary honor was at stake. "Dewey, as Chairman and
as the outstanding member of the Commission, was in a deli-
cate position, one requiring great tact as well as fairness,"
correctly commented James T. Farrell.
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The burden of conducting the "hostile" cross-
examination lay with John F. Finerty. The Commission's
counsel, who missed the first session, was described by
Beals as a "tall, thin, red-brown Irishman, dressed in a
red-brown' suit, with handsome tie and flowing silk ker-
92
chief." Although a veteran lawyer in political cases, his
familiarity with communist matters was slight even though he
once represented Earl Browder in a case before the Supreme
93 . .Court. Solicitous of Trotsky's awkward position, Finerty
continually rephrased the Russian's testimony and on numer-
ous occasions reminded the defense team that these were only
"alleged" charges being considered. For instance, at one
point Goldman referred to Trotsky's "conspiratorial work,"
which upset Finerty 's sense of propriety: "... you had
better use the word 'alleged' for your purpose, because this
94 . ,
record will want to show these things." When it was the
chief counsel's turn to cross-examine Trotsky, he began with
questions that admittedly were "elementary." Others found
them banal and pointless.
95 Finerty asked Trotsky when the
"Communist Party" was organized, the dates of its congresses,
the names of its leading members, the relationship of the
Party and Government, and similar questions. In the process
Finerty wasted valuable time and exposed his ignorance of
Bolshevik history. A quick look at a standard history text
could have avoided such queries as the following: "At that
time /T9067, the Party was composed of what elements?
~
~~ 96
Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, and Social Democrats?
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Carleton Beals, no admirer of Finerty, later wrote
that the lawyer had been "pathetically gentle with Trotsky,"
and when the cross-examination was completed, "Trotsky posi-
tively had wings on his shoulders." Finerty had ignored
many crucial points in the Moscow trials, and for "all
practical purposes," charged Beals, he "merely continued
Goldman's defense of Trotsky; he filled in the gaps left by
Goldman in Trotsky's defense." 97 On balance, this was a
patently unfair description of Finerty 's conduct during the
hearings, yet the American lawyer was hardly a tiger in the
courtroom. Even Trotsky was disappointed with the lack of
vigorous cross-examination. When the Stalinists later ac-
cused Finerty of being too lenient, Trotsky commented:
"Possibly he was. For my part, I hoped for nothing so much
as sharp, distrustful and combative questions." But the
Russian commiserated with the American's position: "My
depositions and documents had completely destroyed the ac-
,,98cusation.
"
In fact, a scant amount of time was devoted to
Finerty' s cross-examination. At the first session Dewey an-
nounced that Albert Goldman would conduct the direct examina-
tion of Trotsky section by section, with the formal inter-
99
rogation to follow each segment. But at the beginning of
the third session this procedure was revised. In order to
"avoid duplication," Goldman was directed to complete his
questioning of Trotsky before Finerty began his interroga-
tion. Questions could be interjected at any time, "but the
main cross examination will be reserved." 100
In line with this modus operandi
, the direct examina-
tion dominated the hearings. The great bulk of the first
nine sessions (#§ days) was devoted to outlining the defense.
And the thirteenth and final session was given to final argu-
ments by Goldman and Trotsky. This left Finerty just three
sessions (1% days) to conduct his "rigorous" cross-examina-
tion. Beals complained that this procedure "smothered"
liberty of action and hindered honest investigation:
We could not run the investigation like a rail-
road train— on schedule. By leaving the entire
cross-examination until the end, the original
defense of Trotsky would be lost sight of, the
points at issue dulled and forgotten, even
with the best of note-taking. No transcript
of the trial was to be available until long
after the sessions ended. This made our work
very blind, and it also made it impossible to
guarantee a correct record. l^ 1
The situation was not quite this bad. Many pointed questions
were asked during the regular examination—some by Beals him-
self. Yet the Trotsky-Goldman team was usually on the of-
fensive. The other participants had to mark time, trusting
that their memories would not fail them when the cross-
examination finally commenced.
During the proceedings the defense introduced a
plethora of documents to buttress Trotsky's case. The sheer
volume of "evidence" was certainly impressive. Yet there
were problems with this material. In the opinion of John
Finerty, all documents were subject to further investigation
and verification: "Any evidence which would not be admitted
as legal evidence in a court, ultimately will not be re-
ceived—that is, evidence not verified by subsequent investi-
102gation." Finerty appeared to imply that the Preliminary
Commission was a "court," one that would enforce standard
judicial procedures on the admission of evidence.
But the defense was quick to question this procedure.
Goldman had already admitted that much of the evidence "would
not be admissible under Anglo-Saxon rules of evidence."
Strict rules of evidence should not apply in this case, he
argued, because the sub-commission was "not a court in the
ordinary sense of the term," being more like "a Congressional
investigation committee," and because the nature of the case
demanded "wide latitude in the introduction of evidence, in
order to get at the truth." To apply strict rules would mean
throwing out most of the evidence, Goldman admitted. This
case was also true of "ninety-five per cent" of the testi-
mony introduced against Trotsky in the Moscow trials. There
was a difference, however. "Whereas our 'inadmissible'
evidence is subject to verification if the Commission is in
the least doubtful of its truth," Goldman added, "the 'inad-
missible' evidence of the Moscow trials cannot be verified."
10
To some degree Finerty retreated on this issue. He
advised the sub-commission that "'the best-evidence rule'"
applied in this case, i.e., the best evidence would be ac-
cepted which conditions permitted. The Commission was in
"a somewhat difficult position," since Trotsky's alleged ac-
complices were dead, and the Soviet authorities refused to
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assist the new inquiry. As a result, it was necessary to
determine "the question of the fairness of the trials by
which the Soviet Government claims to have established Mr.
Trotsky's guilt." But, Finerty asserted, Trotsky's "unsup-
ported denial of his guilt" would not be accepted. Archives,
documents, depositions, sworn statements— all would be ex-
amined and authenticated. 104 In this "practical situation,"
the Commission was attempting to secure the best evidence
that difficult circumstances would allow. But such evidence
would necessarily be incomplete.
How good was the evidence? Besides having published
materials, private documents, and notarized affidavits, the
Commission was offered free access to Trotsky's "archives."
For many months Trotsky has been telling the world press that
his correspondence and private papers would be made available
to any authoritative commission of inquiry . But when Beals
asked if the archives were physically present in Mexico—the
complete archives—Trotsky answered in the affirmative, with
"reservations." After relating two attempts to steal his
records , he declared:
The G.P.U. is professionally interested in this
matter. That is why I declared that my archives
are completely at the disposal of the Commission;
that I am ready to communicate immediately to
the Chairman of the Commission or to the
Commission as a whole in a secret session where
they are, where the originals are and where the
copies are. I am ready to present to the
Commission legal copies as well as originals,
and I beg the Chairman not to compel me or make
me say where all my archives are.
But Beals was not totally satisfied with Trotsky's answer:
"what was the basis of the selection of evidence which you
brought with you which you thought would be most valuable to
this Commission?" They were mostly "copies," adapted to the
indictment, admitted Trotsky, but the original documents
were also available. He further assured Beals that the
archives contained thousands of letters, hundreds of arti-
cles, dozens of books— all of which would prove "that this
man could not commit the crimes of the indictment." 105
Dewey found Trotsky's demurrer, in the circumstances,
quite reasonable, and authorized him to provide in camera
specific information on the archives' location. 10 ^* Access
to both the Mexican and European archives was later granted
107
to the Commission. But a certain amount of damage had
already been done. As expected, the press picked up the
word "copies," and stressed that the Commission was in an
I AO
awkward position. The Nation , for instance, editorially
commiserated with the Commission for being "unlucky" in the
matter of evidence. The discovery that Trotsky had few
originals of his letters must have caused "consternation"
among the investigators: "They had to accept copies of im-
portant documents and take the existence of the originals,
109
for the time being at least, on trust."
To be sure, few, if any, correspondents keep the
originals of their letters, but the seeds of doubt had been
planted. 110 For those already prejudiced against Trotsky
and the inquiry, this was one more indication that
the whole affair was "a farce."
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Trotsky at Center Stage
If the hearings were a personal trial for Trotsky,
he gave little indication of being under great stress. A
close observer of the proceedings, James T. Farrell
, found
the chief witness "infinitely well-poised and seemingly re-
laxed, but with inner intensity." During the daily ques-
tioning he spoke with great precision, his manners "impec-
cable," his gestures "very graceful," but his "entire organ-
ism" appeared at times subordinated to his will: Trotsky's
"volatile" temperament ranged from extraordinary self-control
to "irrepressible irony." To Farrell, he was like a tightly
drawn bow, one that would never snap, but "would vibrate at
the slightest ripple of one's breath." Here was a man of
tremendous intellectual pride, intolerant of stupidity, but
"his simplicity and extra-ordinary graciousness seemed like
an acquisition of experience." In Farrell 's opinion, one
could "properly say that Trotsky was a great man."'''^
But Carleton Beals assessed Trotsky differently
—
picturing him as presenting his "fading record" in a tiny
foreign hamlet, the crumbling walls of the villa underlining
the futility of his position: "Pathos hovers about his proud
head with its wildly ruffled gray hair." Only Beals, of
course, was not under the sway of this "pathos." But the
other commissioners, he claimed, had joined in "the chorus of
sorrow over Trotsky's fallen star." More "Tatar than Jewish,"
asserted Beals, Trotsky proved during the trial the old
Slavic proverb, "'Scratch a Russian, and '" At times
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Trotsky answered questions with "quiet simplicity," occa-
sionally with "lauqhinq condescension" or "frothing defiance,"
but he was always ready to "sacrifice complete honesty of
reply to a quip or bon mot that will set the court laughing."
This was an "embittered man," wrote Beals, only able to hold
his "choleric disposition" in check through superhuman
restraint
:
His mind is a vast repository of memory and
passion, its rapier-like sharpness dulled a
trifle now by the alternating years of over-
weening power and the shattering bitterness of
defeat and exile; above all, his mental
faculties are blurred by a consuming lust of
hate for Stalin, a furious uncontrollable venom
which has its counterpart in something bordering
on a persecution complex— all who disagree with
him are bunched in the simple formula of G.P.U.
agents, people "corrupted by the gold of
Stalin. "112
It should be noted that when Trotsky bared his "sharklike
teeth" during the hearings, it was usually for Seals' bene-
fit.
During the thirteen sessions Trotsky displayed "ir-
repressible irony," "magnificent bursts of eloquence,"
"laughing condescension." Most remarkable perhaps, he could
be loquacious in English, a tongue strange to him. It was,
stated Isaac Deutscher, "as if Demosthenes, his stammer un-
cured and his mouth full of pebbles, had come to court to
fight for his life." 113 Always the perfectionist, Trotsky
was acutely embarrassed by his defective pronunciation and
uncertain grammar. At times the interpreter helped him when
"Quixotic" came out "exotic," or "patient" was confused with
"passions." 114 The most obvious malapropism came when
Trotsky was discussing social contradictions in backward
nations: "Everybody is hungry, and shows that the other has
more." After it was suggested he meant to .say "sees," not
"shows," Trotsky agreed: "Yes, sees— I must follow my ideas
with my English together." 115
Yet his command of English was sufficient to allow
humorous asides and ironic rejoinders. When Albert Goldman
asked him il il was true he omit worked as a lailoi in New
York, Trotsky denied the story: "Unfortunately, I did not
learn any productive trade in my life. I regret that very
116
much."' At another point Carleton Beals reminded Trotsky
that American forces had occupied Soviet soil in 1918 in
order to spread "democracy," and then asked how Trotsky
would proceed to spread his ideas in the United States.
"At the moment, I have not at my disposition any armed force,
nor use of them," he answered: "I believe the danger for
the United States from my side is not so tremendous for a
long period." And he added that Robespierre once stated
people did not like missionaries with bayonets: "Robespierre
117
was right in this question." Deals temporarily withdrew
from the fray.
But there were also moments of dignity and pathos.
To Beals and others, Trotsky explained that he did not hunger
for power, despite stories to the contrary:
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Power is a burden, but it is necessary and an
inevitable evil. When your ideas are victo-
rious, you must accept it. But the mechanics
of power is a miserable thing. If you permit
me this personal observation: During the time
I was in office, the best time was the vaca-
tions when I wrote my books. I consider this
time a longer vacation. I write my books.
It is giving me full satisfaction/ I am pa-
tient and await a new wave, a revolutionary
wave, and then, if I can serve the interests
of the proletariat, I will do anything I can. 118
And power, or the loss of it, had its penalties. When Goldman
asked if the sins of the fathers were attributed to their sons
under Soviet law, Trotsky answered that the confessions were
based, in practice, on persecution of family members. After
Dewey refused to accept this assertion without supporting
evidence, Goldman suggested this was merely Trotsky's
"opinion" on the issue:
Trotsky: Excuse me, it is not an opinion.
It is my personal experience.
Goldman: In what way?
Trotsky: I paid for the experience with
my two children. 11^
During the hearings Trotsky took great pains to
counter the "criminal charges" lodged against him in the
Moscow trials. There was a paucity of material evidence, as
he observed, directly linking him to the plot. A series
of letters (never produced) to Mrachkovsky, Radek , Pyatakov,
and Mural ov, three conspiratorial meetings in Copenhagen,
a short interview in the Bois de Boulogne, a two-hour
discussion in Norway— this was the sum total of
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Trotsky's direct complicity in the conspiracy. In his eight
years of exile some 2,917 working days had been devoted to
writing books and articles that defended socialism, and only
three days to a conspiracy that furthered the interests of
fascism. The figures were rather disproportionate, to say
the least:
The public—that is, the "hypocritical"
—
activity, which served only as "camouflage,"
surpassed my secret— that is, the "genuine"
—
activity almost a thousand times in guantity
and, I venture to assert, egually in guality.
One gets the impression that I built a sky-
scraper to "camouflage" a dead rat. No, it
is not convincing! 120
Not a single piece of concrete evidence was presented before
the Moscow tribunal. Instead, the indictment was built on
confessions, or more exactly, "on recollections of alleged
conversations." With this lack of factual evidence, charged
Trotsky, the judicial inguiry became "a conversation about
121
conversations." The plot had "no flesh and blood."
As a result, the Preliminary Commission was left
only with the confessions. But they would crumble, advised
the chief "witness," once verified. There were too many
characters, circumstances, dates and documents to readily
fit into a libretto. The task would have been too much for
a Shakespeare, but "the G.P.U. does not have Shakespeares at
its beck and call." 122 With considerable relish, Trotsky
donned the disguise of a drama critic to castigate the
dilettantish efforts of the Moscow playwrights. It was an
exercise in malice aforethought, exposing the incongruities
and absurdities of the two judicial farces.
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In particular, Trotsky focused on three episodes or
foreign "threads" in the indictment—Holtzman ' s visit to
Copenhagen, Romm's sojourn in the Bois de Boulogne, and
Pyatakov's flight to Oslo. If these alleged interviews
could be exposed to the light of truth, he confidently de-
clared, then the "main props" of the entire indictment would
12 3crash to the ground. The peculiar conditions of his life
in exile
—
police surveillance, security guards, countless
visitors—would allow him to prove in these three cases a
"•negative fact.'" "To employ legal terminology— I am able
in all important instances, where exact dates are given, to
establish an unshakable alibi." 124
The promise was kept— at least in his opinion. On
these "three decisive points," Trotsky later boasted, the
details of his life were clarified in such detail that "the
falsifiers could not find where to insert a pin." Here the
Coyoacan inquiry reached its "highest point" and dealt "a
125
mortal blow" to the whole of Moscow justice.
III. "Something Rotten In Denmark"
Testimony in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial brought
great renown to Copenhagen's Hotel Bristol. E. S. Holtzman
met Leon Sedov in its lobby prior to their clandestine meet
ing with the Old Man himself. But there was a snag. The
hotel had been demolished many years earlier! "'The evil
that men do lives after them, the good is often interred
with their bones,'" proclaimed Mark Antony. With Danish
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hotels, scoffed Max Shachtman, it was somewhat different:
"their good is not interred with their beams, it lives after
them to form a foyer where the Fascist mad dogs of the
Zinovievist-Trotskyist counter-revolutionary terrorist Center
may meet to plot their evil." 126
Terrorism and the Hotel Bristol
For all its ensuing notoriety, only a few passing
references were made in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial to the
Hotel Bristol and the "terrorist week" in Copenhagen. Ac-
cording to E. S. Holtzman, he met Leon (Lyova) Sedov in
Berlin in November, 1932. Trotsky's son had a suggestion:
"'As you are going to the U.S.S.R. , it would be a good thing
if you came with me to Copenhagen where my father is.'" The
offer was accepted:
Holtzman : I agreed, but I told him that we
could not go together for reasons of secrecy.
I arranged with Sedov to be in Copenhagen within
two or three days , to put up at the Hotel
Bristol and meet him there. I went to the
hotel straight from the station and in the
lounge met Sedov.
From there they went to meet Trotsky, who was in "a rather
excited state," and told Holtzman that it was '"necessary t
1 ? 7
remove Stalin. ' " Later Holtzman left for the Soviet
Union, but the details of his trips to and from Copenhagen
were not included in the testimony.
Another "agent," V. P. Olberg, also planned a trip
to Copenhagen to consult with the Chief, prior to departing
for a terrorist assignment in Russia:
o
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Before my departure for the Soviet Union,
I intended to go to Copenhagen with Sedov to'
see Trotsky. Our trip did not materialize,
but Suzanna, Sedov ' s wife went there. On her
return she brought a letter from Trotsky ad-
dressed to Sedov, in which Trotsky agreed to
my going to the U.S.S.R. and expressed the
hope that I would succeed in carrying out the
mission entrusted to me. Sedov showed me
this letter. 128
Sedov' s wife was named "Jeanne," not Suzanna," but more im-
portant, Olberg stated that Sedov remained in Berlin. Yet
Holtzman placed him in Copenhagen! Prosecutor Vyshinsky
never examined this discrepancy in the trial record.
Two other emissaries also made the trip to
Copenhagen, K. B. Berman-Yurin and Fritz David ( Kruglyansky )
.
Berman-Yurin arrived in the Danish capital from Berlin be-
tween the 25th and 28th of November and was met at "the
station by Grilevich," who took him to see Trotsky. During
the interview in the "apartment," Trotsky "nervously paced
up and down the room and talked of Stalin with exceptional
hatred." He advised Berman-Yurin that the Soviet leader
should be assassinated at a plenum or congress of the
Comintern. Again at Sedov' s suggestion, David also made
the trip from Berlin on "a false passport." As in the case
of Berman-Yurin, Trotsky instructed him to murder Stalin at
an international assembly, in order for the shot "to rever-
1 30
berate throughout the whole world." Both Berman-Yurin and
David left for Moscow in March 1933, and made plans for an
assassination attempt. David managed to smuggle a Browning
pistol into the Vllth Congress of the Comintern, but was
I
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unable to fire at Stalin, as he was too far away. But this
Congress of the Comintern occurred in July-August 1935—that
is, 32 months after the original instructions were given in
1 31Copenhagen.
The story of the meeting in the Hotel Bristol had
hardly been broadcast to the world when it was torpedoed.
On September 1, 1936, the official organ of the Danish
government, the Sozialdemokraten
, revealed that there had
been a Hotel Bristol, but it was demolished in 1917, and
only rebuilt in 1936. In fact, it was opened to the public
during the period of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. 132 Faces
were red in Moscow. Stalin was furious, according to the
NKVD defector, Alexander Orlov, and shouted, "'What the
devil did you need a hotel for! You ought to have said that
they met at the railway station. The railway station is al-
ways there i ' " A special investigation revealed the circum-
stances of the embarrassing lapse. The head of the NKVD
Secret Political Department, G. A. Molchanov, had been
ordered to survey the hotel situation in Copenhagen. In an
excess of caution, he had his secretary obtain the names of
several hotels in Copenhagen and Oslo, but a mistake was
made on the typewritten list. The Copenhagen hotels were
listed under the heading "Oslo," and the Oslo hotels under
the heading "Copenhagen." As a result of this error, the
nonexistent Hotel Bristol in Denmark appeared in the
Zinoviev-Kamenev trial and gained an international reputa-
133
tion, just in time for its reopening.
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Soviet apologists attempted to put a good face on a
bad situation. The ever- reli able D. N. Pritt, drawing on
his judicial experience, claimed that it was not unusual
for "one, or two, or three errors of that kind" to enter
into the court record when there were many defendents. Such
mistakes should "excite no suspicion of any kind" that the
stories had been concocted. 134 And in March 1937 Soviet
Russia Today published a special "radio-photo" from Denmark,
which purported to show that a "Cafe Bristol' 1 was located
next to a "Grand Hotel Copenhagen," and in 1932 even had "a
135common entrance with it." The obvious inference was that
Holtzman had confused the cafe with the hotel. In addition,
New Masses published a letter from one Andor Braun, quoting
at length from an article by Martin Nielsen, editor of the
Copenhagen Arbeiderbl adet
,
a Communist organ. According to
Nielsen, this "'centrally-located Viennese cafe /the
Bristol/ was for years the meeting place of Danish
Trotskyists as well as for Trotskyists who came from a-
broad. ' " A plan of the hotel and cafe showed that the two
were linked by a door: the lobby of the Grand Hotel
Copenhagen immediately adjoined the cafe. Thus M, a for-
eigner would naturally identify the internationally known
name of the Cafe Bristol with the name of the hotel, 1 "
especially since a neon sign, "Konditori Bristol," stretched
* 136
across the front of the combination cafe and candy store.
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Trotsky's Visit to Copenhagen
For once, the Kremlin's dramatists placed Trotsky in
the proper city at the correct time. He had, in fact,
visited the Danish capital in the last week of November,
1932. As he explained at some length before the Preliminary
Commission, a group of Danish students (Social-Democrats)
invited him to give a lecture in honor of the XVth anni-
versary of the October Revolution. Eager to leave his
Turkish isle, even for a brief period, Trotsky accepted the
invitation with alacrity, and sailed from Constantinople on
November 14, 1932. The mysterious voyage of "Mr. Sedov"
and his small party attracted the attention of the world's
press, eager to read ulterior motives into the voyage. Near
Marseilles the nervous Surete had the party off-loaded onto
a small boat, and then rushed its unwelcome guests to
137Dunkirk, where they boarded a vessel for Denmark.
Arriving in Copenhagen on November 23, Trotsky was
immediately spirited away to a rented villa in the suburbs.
He found the furnishings rather "peculiar," as well he might.
Rented from a touring dancer, it featured bibelots, trinkets,
and "alluring" pictures of the owner, all in rather shocking
1 o o
taste. While the local police and loyal followers took
turns guarding the makeshift headquarters, Trotsky worked
assiduously. On November 27th he lectured in German before
an audience of some 2,000 while hostile demonstrators milled
around outside. He also found time to make a gramophone
record for the Left Opposition, a radio broadcast in his
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shaky English for CBS, and a newsreel film for Fox Movietone,
in addition, there were several car trips and meetings with
local intellectuals and students. 139 But much of his limited
time was spent consulting with the twenty-five to thirty
"Trotskyites" who gathered in Copenhagen to consult with the
Chief. It was almost an informal "'international confer-
ence,'" but hardly a clandestine meeting, observed Deutscher:
"Nothing could be less like a meeting of conspirators than
this little gathering of thrilled and rather garrulous de-
votees of an ineffectual sect." 140
Trotsky was eager to remain in Denmark, but his nerv-
ous hosts preferred to be rid of the "escaped lion," who was
becoming an acute embarrassment. A member of the royal
family with fascist leanings, Prince Aage , denounced this
"'murderer of the Tsar's family,'" and declared that if
Trotsky were not expelled, "'there was something rotten in
141Denmark.'" On the other side of the political fence,
local communists rather indiscriminately accused him of being
an agent of the Social Democrats, an ally of Marshall
Pilsudsky, and of being allied with Karl Liebknecht's
142killers. As a result of the growing pressure, the Danish
Social Democratic government unceremoniously sent him packing
] 43
on December 2, 1932, before the visa expired. ' Once again
Trotsky was forced to return to Prince's Isle in Turkey.
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Trotsky on the Bristol
Thus, Trotsky readily admitted that he had been in
Copenhagen at the time, but disputed almost everything else
about "'the terrorist week.'" In particular, he had nothing
but scorn for the GPU explanations of a nonexistent hotel.
He rejected out of hand the allegation that the court stenog
rapher in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial made a "slip of the pen
over such an un-Russian word as Bristol. And he jeered at
the ''saving discovery" of the Comintern that a confectioner'
shop (or cafe) named "Bristol" shared a joint wall with a
hotel
:
To be sure, this hotel is called the "Grand Hotel
Copenhagen," but it is, nevertheless, a hotel.
To be sure, the confectioner's shop is not a
hotel ; still its name is "Bristol . " According
to Holtzman, the meeting took place in the
vestibule of the hotel. To be sure, the con-
fectioner's shop has no vestibule; but on the
other hand, the hotel, which is not called the
"Bristol," does have a vestibule. . . . Now
where did the meeting really take place? In
the vestibule without the "Bristol" or in the
"Bristol" without the vestibule?
To his severely logical mind , the hypothesis that Holtzman
confused the shop and hotel after arranging the meeting with
Sedov was doubly absurd. Even if Sedov and Holtzman did
meet in the vestibule of a hotel of another name, the story
collapsed:
But it is self-evident that Holtzman could have
made a mistake as regards the name of the hotel
only before the meeting. During the meeting
the error must have been cleared up and im-
printed all the more sharply in the memories of
both parties. After the meeting Holtzman could
in no case have spoken of the vestibule—of the
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Bristol confectioner's shop. The hypothesis
thus collapses at the very first touch. 144
The other lame excuse of the Comintern press in the
Bristol matter made no more sense to Trotsky. The Bristol
shop could not have been a meeting place for Danish and tran-
sient Trotskyites, because in 1932 he was unable "to find a
single 'Trotskyite' in Denmark." Besides, it was highly un-
likely that Holtzman, concerned for secrecy, would fix a
rendezvous in a shop known to the Stalinists as a "'Trotskyite
hangout.'" If the shop were well-known to "Trotskyites,"
then Holtzman could not have mistaken it for the "Grand Hotel
Copenhagen" in the first place and would have certainly
shunned it like "a plague" in the second place. "In such a
manner do these people correct the stenographer's 'slip of
the pen' ! 1,145
Sedov's Ghost in Copenhagen
Trotsky confidently asserted before the Dewey
Commission that the nonexistent Bristol Hotel discredited the
accusation. But what "doubly" discredited the testimony was
the absent Sedov. With voluminous documentation Trotsky
showed that his son could not have met Holtzman in the lobby
or anywhere else in Copenhagen. Despite strenuous efforts,
Sedov was unable to leave Berlin in late November 1932. It
was all so mysterious, declared Trotsky:
They /GPU_7 want us to believe that Sedov's ghost
found its way into the ghostly vestibule of the
confectioner's shop, which, after some delay,
was transformed into a hotel by the fantasy of
the agents of the G.P.U. 146
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According to Trotsky and his secretary, Jan Frankel
,
Sedov lived in Berlin from February 1931 to March 1933.
Sedov was naturally eager to make the short journey to
Copenhagen to visit his parents in November 1932. But he
was having increasing passport difficulties with the "inter-
mediary regime of Papen and Schleicher," 147 just prior to
Hitler's ascendancy. On November 1, 1932, his permission
to remain in Germany expired; it was not renewed until
December 3, and then only to January 2, 1933. As a result,
during the month of November Sedov lacked official permission
to remain in Germany, and official permission to return, if
I AO
he did attempt the short trip to Denmark. But with the
issuance of a new visa the problem was simplified; Sedov
could come and go from Germany for at least a month. There-
fore, on December 3, 1932, Mme . Sedova sent a telegram to
Prime Minister Herriot of France, urging that Sedov be
granted a temporary French visa; his parents wanted to meet
him in France on their way back to Turkey. This request was
granted and Sedov met them at a railway station on December
149
5th—but in Paris, not Copenhagen!
At the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky took great care to
document this minor episode, for Holtzman had clearly testi-
fied to meeting Sedov in person at the Bristol Hotel. In
support of the defense contention, scores of depositions,
affidavits, and documents were offered, clearly showing that
Sedov had remained in Berlin during the week in question.
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Acquaintances in the German capital testified to seeing
Sedov there in late November; others in Copenhagen testified
to having telephone conversations with him over the line to
150Berlin. " Also introduced were a photostatic copy of
Sedov 1 s passport, showing the dates of the visas, a copy of
the telegram to M. Herriot, and notebooks and examination
papers from the Technische Hochschule in Berlin, indicating
that Sedov took some exams at the same time he allegedly
visited his parents in Copenhagen. 151 Even more impressive
were letters between Lyova and his parents. On December 3,
1932, as his ship steamed away from Denmark, Trotsky wrote
his son in Berlin
:
Dear Liovoussi atka , so it seems that we
shall not succeed in meeting: between the
arrival of the boat at Dunquerke and the de-
parture of the boat from Marseilles, there is
just time to cross France. To wait for the
next boat (a whole week I) will not, of course,
be permitted us. . . . Mother is very, very
dejected that the meeting did not take place
,
and I also. . . . Nothing to be done. . . .
This document of "exceptional importance" should be subjected
to "chemical analysis," advised the author, in order to
152
verify its date. A series of communications between
mother and son was also submitted to the Preliminary
153
Commission, written in November-December, 1932. ' Alto-
gether the documents placing Sedov in Berlin were "the most





With cool contempt Trotsky dismissed the accusations
made by David, Holtzman, Olberg, and Berman-Yurin
. None of
them had visited Trotsky in Copenhagen. In any event, it
was hardly credible that he would disclose his "terrorist
views" to "chance acquaintances." 155 Fritz David, for in-
stance, was a name completely unfamiliar to Trotsky before
the August 1936 trial. 156 He might have met E. S. Holtzman,
however, in 1926-27. An old member of the Party, Holtzman
was "personally known" to Trotsky and his son, but hardly a
157
close associate.
Valentine Olberg was a different matter. This young
"Trotskyite" had some dealings with Sedov and corresponded
with Trotsky. In 1930 he applied for a position as the
exile's Russi an-1 anguage secretary. But when interviewed by
Franz and Alexandra Pfemfert, two of Trotsky's close friends,
he produced "'the most unfavorable and the most untrust-
worthy impression.'" The Pfemferts found his questions
"'tactless'" and advised Trotsky that "'Olberg has no place
in your house, because in twenty-four hours he would be an
insupportable burden to you and
—
possibly . . . fabricate
1 cp
reports for the G.P.U.'" After this kind of "recommenda-
tion" Trotsky gave no further thought to employing Olberg.
"It is all the more inconceivable that two years later I
should have given him 'terrorist instructions,'" he told the
159
Dewey Commission.
K. B. Berman-Yurin was another enigma. When his
name first surfaced in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, Trotsky
thought he might actually be " Senin-Sobolevitzius " a
Russian-speaking follower who came to Copenhagen in
November 1932. Even in 1932 there was some suspicion that
Senin was a secret Stalinist agent; shortly thereafter, he
and his brother, "Well-Sobolevitzius , " helped split the
Trotskyite organization in Berlin. Although Berman-Yurin
and Senin were not the same person, Trotsky kept a close eye
on the latter, and in 1937 issued a "Declaration" on the
brothers Sobolevitzius . Having heard rumors that they were
involved in "dark machinations," he wanted to clarify the
situation in advance. They were logical candidates for a
- 161
new frame-up.
Trotsky's suspicions were correct. On October 8,
1957, an American court sentenced Jack Soble (alias Senin-
Sobolevitzius) to a prison term of seven years for being a
Soviet spy. At the time Soble revealed that Stalin had been
"obsessed" with knowing about Trotsky's activities. As a
result, Soble had been instructed to report on Trotsky's
every move in the early 1930s. Later he had been in charge
of the Moscow file on Trotsky, before moving to Washington,
where he supervised a series of Soviet agents, including
Mark Zborowski ("Etienne"), a notorious agent provocateur in
the Trotskyite camp. 162 Certainly Soble had every oppor-
tunity to provide the GPU with a detailed description of the
"terrorist week" in Copenhagen. Thus, it is rather peculiar
354
that so few accurate details about Trotsky's brief sojourn
in Denmark actually emerged in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. 163
Dewey Commission Conclusions
The scores of documents and affidavits submitted on
the Copenhagen affair, recording Trotsky's every move in
Denmark, were almost an embarrassment of riches. They tended
to make the same points ad nauseam . But this pedantic effort
had the desired result. The Commission of Inguiry, in its
final report, Not Guilty
,
fully accepted his "alibi."
The Commission naturally devoted much attention to
the ephemeral Hotel Bristol. The fact that the Hotel did not
exist in 1932 was a matter of "common knowledge," and not
open to guestion. There were several reports, however, that
instead of being "demolished" or "razed," it had actually
164been transformed into an office building. Moreover, a
series of photographs of the premises taken at different
times tended to be contradictory; it was far from clear if
in 1932 the Bristol Cafe/Confectionery was actually con-
tiguous to the Grand Hotel Copenhagen and if a common doorway
165
connected the two establishments. But the authors of the
final report accepted Trotsky's argument that since the
Cafe/Confectionery certainly lacked a vestibule, lobby, or
foyer, then the meeting between Sedov and Holtzman took
place "'in the vestibule without the "Bristol" or in the
"Bristol" without the vestibule.'" In addition, Holtzman
could only have mistaken the Cafe for the Hotel prior to the
355
alleged rendezvous; any confusion over the "Bristol" was
hardly credible after the meeting. it also seemed unlikely
that Holtzman would have met Sedov in a notorious Trotskyite
rendezvous after originally refusing to travel with him from
Berlin— "'for reasons of secrecy.'" 166
If Not Guilty was somewhat equivocal on the Hotel
Bristol per se, it was categorical in stating that Leon Sedov
could not have met Holtzman in Copenhagen: "... the evi-
dence proving that Sedov was not in Copenhagen during
Trotsky's sojourn is conclusive." Citing the many affidavits
and documents that placed Sedov in Berlin in late November,
1932—e.g., the attendance book from the Technische
Hochschule
,
his passport, the exchange of letters with his
parents— the Commission of Inquiry affirmed that Sedov could
not have escorted Holtzman to the meeting with Trotsky, as
claimed: "He /Holtzman/ thus relegates the whole interview
to the realm of the imaginary. 11 Only one conclusion could
be reached:
We therefore hold the evidence to prove con-
clusively : ( 1 ) that Sedov was not in
Copenhagen at the time of Trotsky's visit to
that city; (2) that Holtzman did not meet Sedov
and go with him to see Trotsky; (3) that
Holtzman did not see Trotsky in Copenhagen. 167
The Commission was no less harsh in judging the other
episodes during that "terrorist week." The contradiction be-
tween Holtzman' s and Olberg's testimony concerning Sedov 1 s
whereabouts was one "which could have escaped no Prosecutor
in possession of his sense and at all interested in
ascertaining the truth." The discrepancy was so flagrant,
that "one is almost forced to suspect that Holtzman, testi-
fying the day after Olberg, placed Sedov in Copenhagen with
the intent of indicating to the world that his testimony was
false." Moreover, the Prosecutor elicited from Holtzman few
details on how he traveled to Copenhagen or reached Trotsky's
apartment, the nature of the surroundings or the people
present. Thus, even the trial record was "far from con-
vincing" on the matter of Holtzman' s trip. 168
As for the testimony of Valentine Olberg, there was
no question that he had known Sedov, worked for the
Opposition, and corresponded with Trotsky, but there were so
many falsehoods in his allegations, including the way he
contacted Sedov and Trotsky, that it would put "an extreme
tax upon credulity to believe that he was in Russia as an
emissary of Trotsky and Sedov for any purpose whatever."
Not Guilty concluded, therefore, that Olberg' s testimony was
"worthless" as proof of charges against Trotsky and his son,
and found that Olberg "never went to Russia with terrorist
169instructions from Trotsky and Sedov."
Much the same applied to Berman-Yurin and David. It
was doubtful that Trotsky would have asked the "supreme
sacrifice" ( to assassinate Stalin) from a pair of Stalinists,
one who was wavering on the question of terrorism, and the
other who was unknown to Sedov before August 1932. As a re-
sult, the Commission of Inquiry stated that neither Berman-
Yurin nor David visited Trotsky in Copenhagen or received
170
terrorist instructions.
The revelations about the imaginary meeting in a
vestibule without a hotel went far to discredit the first
trial. Not only did news of the exposure spread throughout
the western world, it even seeped into the Soviet Union.
Recently a dissident Soviet historian, Roy Medvedev
, has
written that the Hotel Bristol did not exist in 1932:
"Moreover, a commission headed by an American scholar proved
that Gol'tsman /Holtzman/ had not met Trotsky, and that
Sedov had not gone to Copenhagen on the days indicated. 1,171
Score one for Trotsky!
IV. A Rendezvous In The Woods
A mysterious meeting in a dark allee of the Bois de
Boulogne—this was the second major "foreign thread" in the
Moscow indictment against Trotsky. If it could be proven
that Trotsky had never met Vladimir Romm—his "liaison man"
with Radek and the "parallel center"— then the necessary
172links in the case would be severed. In this case Trotsky
had just such proofs. It was "a gift of heaven" that he
could refute Romm's deposition by offering positive evidence
"I am very well armed," he told the Preliminary Commission.
1
The Testimony of Vladimir Romm
Although merely a "witness" in the Pyatakov-Radek
trial, Romm was brought into court under guard. A veteran
correspondent for Tass, and more recently Izvestia'
s
man in
Washington, he was a well-known figure in the international
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fraternity of newsmen. in the opinion of Walter Duranty, a
reporter present at the trial,
He /Romm/ spoke with the same charm and
courage that made him popular among Washington
newspaper men— one of the most exclusive andintelligent groups in the world and one that
would never tolerate any one shoddy or second
rate .
1
But there was little charm in the tale he related to the
court
.
According to the testimony, Romm had been allied with
the Trotskyite opposition in 1926-27, mostly because of the
"Chinese question." He resumed his underground activities
in 1931 at the behest of an old friend, Karl Radek, 175 who
needed a "liaison man" with the Trotskyite leadership abroad.
As Tass reporter in Geneva and Paris from 1930-34, it was
not difficult for him to carry between the two conspira-
torial centres secret messages, usually concealed in books,
17 6
such as an "Anglo-Russian technical dictionary." In all
he conveyed five messages between the Soviet Union and
177Western Europe, but none were produced in open court.
On one occasion Romm allegedly met Trotsky. In
July 1933, after the journalist arrived in Paris from Geneva,
Leon Sedov telephoned him and arranged an appointment in a
cafe on the Boulevard Montparnasse . Several days later they
met in the same cafe, and then went to the "Bois de Boulogne"
for an interview with the Old Man:
Vyshinsky ; When was that?
Romm : At the end of July 1933.
Vyshinsky ; How long did that meetinq with
Trotsky last? y
Romm: Twenty to twenty-five minutes.
Vyshinsky
: For what purpose did Trotsky
meet you?
Rpmm: As far as I could understand, in
order verbally to confirm the instructions con-
tained in the letter I was taking to Moscow. . .
.
According to Romm, Trotsky approved the creation of a "par-
allel centre," endorsed terrorism and wrecking, even at loss
of life, and quoted the Latin proverb: '"What medicine can-
not heal, iron will heal, and what iron cannot heal, fire
will heal.'" At the end of the discussion Trotsky gave him
a copy of Novikov-Priboi ' s novel, Tsusima
,
which had a letter
1 70to Radek concealed in the cover.
In May 1934 Romm handed Radek' s last letter over to
Sedov, and also announced that he would shortly become the
I zvesti
a
correspondent in America. Sedov responded that
Trotsky wanted to be kept informed of anything interesting
in "the sphere of Soviet-American relations." This concern
followed, according to the son, "'from Trotsky's line on the
defeat of the U.S.S.R. Inasmuch as the date of the war of
Germany and Japan against the U.S.S.R. depends to a certain
extent on the state of Soviet-American relations, this can-
not fail to be of interest to Trotsky.'" But after the mur-
der of Kirov, Trotsky's "special correspondent" in the United
States decided to cease active work, and never sent any in-
179
formation from America to the leader of the conspiracy.
There was a postscript to the Romm caper. The
Congressional Press Association in Washington sent a cable
360






In our dealings with Romm we have foundhim a true friend and advocate of the U.S.S.R
Never once did he even faintly indicate
' lack
of sympathy for or disloyalty toward the
existing government. He did more than any
other Soviet envoy to popularize the Stalin
regime in this country. We hope this testi-
monial can be strongly certified to his judges
and that you will ask Ambassador Davies also
to transmit these representations . 180
This solicitious message was signed by, among others, Arthur
Krock, Ernest K. Lindley, and Erwin D. Canham, and forwarded
to Moscow while the trial was still in progress. 181
In response, Joseph E. Davies, the newly-named
American Ambassador, wrote a personal letter to Arthur Krock
of The New York Times . Romm's testimony, according to
Davies
, who had been attending the trial sessions, was "most
extraordinary," and given in great detail: "The poor devil
did not leave himself a leg to stand on." Although "rather
downcast," Romm looked physically well and his testimony bore
"the earmarks of credibility." Davies would gladly have done
anything for "the poor chap," but after all he was "a Soviet
citizen, knew Soviet law, and entered into the situation
with his eyes open." Any interposition in this exclusively
Russian business might prove "embarrassing" to the adminis-
182
tration, and would be "quite improper." But in February
Davies informally raised the Romm case with President Kalinin,
Premier Molotov, and Foreign Minister Litvinov. He stressed
the beneficial effect on American public opinion if the
Soviet government gave consideration to the character ref-
erences from the Washington correspondents. At that time
Molotov promised nothing, but Davies later learned that Romm
had been sent "to do work in the interior." The action of
the American journalists had saved him, since "'the record
of Romm's activity was very bad,'" confided a Soviet diplo-
183
mat. Although Trotsky could not change the course of
Soviet justice, apparently the Washington press corps had
greater influence.
Incognito in France
As briefly mentioned in a previous chapter, Trotsky
had, indeed, been domiciled in France during July 1933, but
hundreds of miles to the south of the Bois de Boulogne!
Before the Dewey Commission Trotsky narrated how
friends had interceded with the Radical Government of Prime
Minister Daladier to obtain a residence visa in France.
Much to Trotsky's pleasure and surprise, the visa was forth-
coming, but only if he agreed to live a discreet existence
in one of the Southern departments. (The first choice for
J. 84
a place of asylum had been Corsica.r On July 17, 1933,
Trotsky and party sailed from Turkey on board an Italian
vessel, the "Bulgaria." Once again, as with the short
trip to Copenhagen in 1932, reporters awaited "Mr. Sedov" at
Piraeus with inquisitive questions on his plans. There was
also a furious press campaign against allowing Trotsky to
interfere in European politics; a theory popular with the
362
Communists had him coming to France in order to assist
Daladier in preparing military intervention against the
186USSR.
'
while the press speculated on the plans, Trotsky
suffered during the voyage from an attack of "lumbago,"
which caused him pain and made it difficult to breathe. 187
No matter, he was eager to reach France— at almost any price.
But there was danger that Trotsky might receive an
overly-warm reception at the dock in Marseilles. As a result,
Lyova Sedov worked out a stratagem that was "brilliantly suc-
cessful," proudly claimed Trotsky: "We landed on the sea
188(Laughter)." Copying an old ruse, the "Bulgaria" was
halted just short of Marseilles, in order to rendezvous with
a motor boat, which then took Trotsky and his wife to the
little port of Cassis. After a Surete official had presented
Trotsky with a formal decree revoking his 1916 expulsion
189from France, the small group headed north in two cars,
spending the night of July 24-25 in a small inn at Tonneins,
before arriving at St. Palais, near Royan, where a villa had
1 90been rented for the Russian exile.
With pointer in hand, Trotsky traced the route on a
map for the Dewey Commission, and explained how the other
members of the original party had headed in the direction of
Paris
#
as a "political measure of self-defense . " Would-be
followers were supposed to believe that Trotsky also intended
191to make the French capital his final destination. "That
was our purpose—to betray the adversaries, to disorientate
them. That we succeeded—we succeeded very well. The
deposition of Vladimir Romm shows that we succeeded in be-
traying the G.P.U.," declared Trotsky with a certain amount
of smug satisfaction. 192
Arriving at "Les Embruns , " a rented villa, in the
afternoon of the 25th of July, the ailing Trotsky immediately
took to bed. But after an hour the atmosphere became "in-
tolerable, and directly I fell from the bed onto the floor." 193
Some sparks from a passing locomotive had started a fire, one
which threatened the villa. As the flames licked at the
hedges, trees, and fence around the house, Trotsky took ref-
uge in a car. The blaze attracted a crowd of some fifty
people, including policemen, firemen, and the press. In
order to avoid discovery, Trotsky and his wife "presented
ourselves as Americans, in spite of my English (Laughter)."
The local newspaper duly reported that "'an elderly American
couple'" had been present during the fire, which was quickly
194brought under control.
For two months "Les Embruns " (or "The Sprays") was
home for Trotsky, ill with "lumbago" and high fever. "Half
of the time I spent in bed, and half of the time slowly
walking a bit in the garden, and a bit in the house, in the
company of friends who visited me," he informed the Prelimin-
ary Commission. Despite the presence of several loyal fol-
195
lowers, this was a period of extreme ennui for Trotsky.
Even the many visitors who flocked to "Les Embruns " failed
to improve his spirits. Among the Frenchmen, Belgians,
Germans, etc., who took the occasion to consult the great
man— some fifty in all—were Paul Henri Spaak, Ruth Fischer,
Andre Malraux, and Jenny Lee, wife of Aneurin Bevan. 196 At
the beginning of October Trotsky and his wife journeyed to
Bagneres de Bigorre, near the Pyrenees, where his health im-
proved. Finally, in November 1933, the French government al
lowed him to move to Barbizon, a small village near Paris.
Trotsky actually paid several visits to the French capital,
but only months after the alleged meeting in the Bois de
Boulogne with Vladimir Romm. 197
Trotsky on his "Contact Man "
There were so few concrete details in the testimony
of Vladimir Romm that even Trotsky found the whole episode
rather baffling. But Trotsky was determined to expose the
inherent absurdity of the unlikely tale.
Romm? Who was Vladimir Romm? Before Dewey and his
fellow commissioners Trotsky testified that he had never
heard the name until it appeared in the Pyat akov-Radek trial
Nor had he seen it in the columns of I zvestia
,
which he
avoided with a passion: "Only the foreign people think
Isvestia /sic/ is a readable paper." Certainly Trotsky
kept a close watch on articles in Pravda , and followed for-
eign developments in The New York Times , but there was no
need to keep abreast of Romm's articles in the government's
organ. As he explained to Ben Stolberg, "I read a speech by
Litvinov and a speech of Stalin, and then I know what the
correspondence from Washington will convey for a month or




But Vyshinsky had an acute need for a "contact man,"
one who traveled freely in Europe and could provide a link
between the "parallel centre" and its exiled leader. As a
result, by "special appointment of the G.P.U. 11 Romm became
199
a "Trotskyite. " " Romm had the "technical facilities" for
fulfilling the assignment, admitted Trotsky, but the politi-
cal or human motivation was lacking. For years Romm had
evinced no interest in the Opposition. Then he suddenly re-
turned to the fold, but still remained strangely inactive:
Does Romm bear any resemblance at all to a con-
firmed Trotskyite? Hardly; instead, he is as
like a G.P.U. agen t provocateur as one drop of
water is to another
,
provided—provided he
really did commit the acts he describes . As a
matter of fact , all these acts were thought up
retroactively.... 200
Still the Prosecutor, "whom nature has endowed with
201
very sluggish brains," required confirmation that Trotsky
had authorized both Stalin 1 s assassination and the creation
of a "parallel centre. 11 The accused were incapable of taking
"a single step without Trotsky— or rather, they seek to in-
form the universe through every channel that all crimes are
committed only in pursuance of Trotsky's directives," de-
clared the chief defendant in absentia . As a result, Radek
informed Romm of the formation of the bloc in the autumn of
1932, "not at all out of light-mindedness and altruistic
loquacity, so peculiar to him in general," but rather for
the sake of the supreme goal: "The need to help Prosecutor
366
Vyshinsky patch up the looming gaps in the confessions of
Zinoviev, Kamenev and others." 203 And Radek also "'glanced
through'" a letter in Romm's presence (one written in code
and invisible ink!), and then informed him of its terrorist
message. This was a violation of the "most elementary con-
spiratorial rule," but again was of crucial importance to
the Prosecutor's case. 204
But when Vyshinsky threw all "caution to the wind,"
and asked Romm about the date of the alleged rendezvous in
the Bois de Boulogne, the witness specified a "truly fatal
date," which buried the whole trial, in Trotsky's opinion.
The wealth of detail, even minutia, he presented to the
Commission was designed to demolish Romm's story and stand
205in striking contrast to the "system of cowardly reticence."
The Prosecution had avoided asking embarrassing questions on
the details of the meeting:
There is not a single living trace, not a* single
subjective experience, not a single visual im-
pression. Trotsky in an allee of the Bois de
Boulogne remains for Romm a phantom, an abstrac-
tion, a puppet from the folders of the
G.P.U. . . .206
And instead of using an invulnerable intermediary to convey
the book, as any conspirator over fifteen would have done,
Trotsky supposedly confirmed written instructions to an un-
familiar agent, an "authority for nobody," remarked the
veteran plotter: "I appeared in person to consummate the
performance, for the sake of drilling into Romm's head, for
twenty to twenty-five minutes, his future testimony at the
367
trial. The methodology of the frame-up is not distinguished
on 7by refinement."
Other aspects of Romm's testimony also provoked
Trotsky's scorn. The entire episode about Trotsky's interest
in "Soviet-American" relations was probably interjected into
the trial, charged the "defendant," only after it became
known that he was leaving for Mexico: "The imagination of
the G.P.U. sought to overtake in its flight the oil tanker
transporting me from Oslo to Tampico." In the interests of
supplying Japan with oil in case of war, he traveled on a
tanker, "an indispensable vehicle for further operations in
oil," he sneered. In the next trial, Trotsky added, Romm
would probably recall that he had received instructions "to
plug up the Panama Canal and divert Niagara to flood New
York— all this during his hours off duty as correspondent of
208
Isvestia /sic/." On another matter, why should fifty
visitors make the journey to St. Palais, if Trotsky were al-
209 .
ready in Paris at the time? No, the meeting in the Bois
de Boulogne never took place. It coi^ld not have occurred:
If, in general, there exists in this world such
a thing as an alibi, then in the given instance
it receives its most complete and consummate ex-
pression. The unfortunate Romm lied. The
G.P.U. compelled him to lie. Vyshinsky veiled
his lie. For the sake of precisely this lie,
Romm was arrested and included among the wit-
nesses . 210
Romm's Testimony is Assessed
Once again Trotsky had supplied the Dewey Commission
with a surfeit of documentation on the Romm episode.
368
Together with testimony taken by the Commission Roqatoire in
Paris and the sub-commission in New York, 212 there was abun-
dant evidence that Trotsky could not have met Vladimir Romm
in the Bois de Boulogne in late July, 1933. The final re-
port, Not Guilty
,
concurred completely with Trotsky's assess-
ment of the escapade.
According to the authors of Not Guilty
,
"nothing" in
Romm's testimony indicated a prime motive for undertaking
such a risky assignment, and "nothing" indicated why Trotsky
21 3should have trusted him in the first place. It was "in-
credible—indeed preposterous— " that Trotsky would have
rushed to Paris for a brief interview with this unknown
liaison man. With the "fantastic contradictions" about the
parallel center, Romm's testimony was simply "not convincing."
Besides, an abundance of evidence "proves conclusively" that
Trotsky never met Romm in Paris, and that Sedov was absent
from the French capital at the time specified: "The positive
evidence that Romm testified falsely is impressive both in
214its mass and its cohesion."
The only gap in the evidence, admitted the final re-
port, was the lack of supporting documentation from the
French police, which had closely followed Trotsky's activi-
ties in France. At least four attempts had been made to secure
this official record, but to no avail. Not Guilty attributed
this lack of cooperation to the " quas i alliance" of Paris and
Moscow in 1937-38. But it was "reasonable to assume," con-




the French government would not hesitate to re-
veal it; and that its refusal indicates unwill-ingness to embarrass a government with which itis in friendship and virtual alliance. There-fore we hold that the refusal of the French
government to make this record public constitutes
strong presumptive evidence that it does not bear
out the testimony of Vladimir Romm. 215
It is also "reasonable to assume," one might add, that Paris
had no desire to become involved in the Trotsky affair one
way or the other. After all, Trotsky's sojourn in France
had caused the government nothing but acute embarrassment.
Despite this lacuna in the chain of evidence, the
Dewey Commission felt no qualms in absolving Trotsky of any
involvement with Vladimir Romm. Based on the contradictions
in the testimony and positive evidence submitted on Trotsky's
behalf,
We therefore hold that Romm's testimony . . .
is false_. And since his evidence_on this crucial
point /the interview with Trotsky/ is false, it
follows that all his testimony concerning his
alleged activities ... is not worthy of cre-
dence. And since the testimony of Radek to con-
spiracy with Leon Trotsky rests primarily upon
that of Romm . . . , we hold Radek 's testimony
to be also false. We therefore hold that none
of the letters allegedly exchanged between
Trotsky and Radek, whether through Vladimir
Romm or by unspecified means, ever existed, and
that all testimony to the contents of these al-
leged letters is sheer fabrication. 216
Thus, the "proof" linking Trotsky and Radek in a plot disin-
tegrated. This was a logical chain of evidence in reverse.
V. The Phantom Flight To Norway
The third alleged interview between Trotsky and his
co-conspirators occurred in December, 1935. At that time
370
Yuri Pyatakov supposedly flew in great secrecy to Norway.
Along with the rendezvous in the Bois de Boulogne, this was
the only direct link between Trotsky and the "parallel
centre" in the Soviet Union. But it was a "mythical flight,"
asserted Trotsky. The G.P.U. dramaturgists had forced
Pyatakov to use "an imaginary airplane," he once remarked,
"just as the Holy Inquisition forced witches to go to their
rendezvous with the devil on a broomstick. The technique
has changed, but the essence is the same." 217
Pyatakov on the Flight to Oslo
In the second trial Pyatakov testified that both he
and Radek had become deeply disturbed by Trotsky's new line
on "defeatism": His isolation in exile and ignorance of
actual conditions had led to certain "illusions," e.g., the
Soviet Union would inevitably suffer defeat in any war with
218Germany. Pyatakov decided that it was imperative to see
Trotsky personally and discuss the disquieting instructions
that had reached the "centre" in the Soviet Union.
In December of 1935, testified Pyatakov, he made a
trip to Berlin on an official Soviet mission. On either the
10th or 11th of the month he had a brief conversation in
Berlin with Dmitri P. Bukhartsev, yet another correspondent
for I zvesti
a
. At that time Bukhartsev informed Pyatakov
that Trotsky might want to see him. The next day Bukhartsev,
Pyatakov, and "Trotsky's man"—one Gustav Stirner--met in
the Tiergarten. A brief note from Trotsky was handed to
i
Pyatakov: "'Y.L., the bearer of this note can be fully
trusted.'" Stirner, also known as "Heinrich," asked the
high Soviet official if he were prepared to travel by air-
plane to Oslo. Pyatakov agreed, "although I realized how
risky such an operation was; but. . .1 thought it was bet-
ter to take the risk of flying and meeting Trotsky than to
shirk the risk and remain in the state of perplexity we were
in." 219
On the next day—either the 12th or 13th of December--
Pyatakov met Gustav Stirner at the Tempelhof airport, and
received a "German" passport, one which had been procured
through Stirner' s "connections in Berlin," i.e., German of-
ficials. Trotsky's agent had also arranged for a "special
plane" to take Pyatakov to Oslo and back, again with the as-
2 20
sistance of solicitous officials in Berlin. The plane
set off, recalled Pyatakov:
We did not stop anywhere , and at approximately
3 p.m. we landed at the airdrome in Oslo. There
an automobile awaited us. We got in and drove
off. We drove for about 30 minutes and came to
a country suburb. We got out, entered a small
house that was not badly furnished , and there I
saw Trotsky, whom I had not seen since 1928. It
was here that my conversation with Trotsky took
pi ace # 221
For some two hours Trotsky delivered a "veritable phillipic
"
and formulated "very sharply" the general line : Trotskyites
should become the "grave-diggers" of Stalin's state and stage
a coup d ' e t at ; Soviet defeat in the coming war with Germany
was "inevitable"; an increase in "terrorist, wrecking and
diversive activities" was necessary; Rudolph Hess had agreed
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to help the Trotskyite bloc gain power in exchange for cer-
tain territorial and other concessions, signifying a retreat
to "capitalism." What was "new" in this program, declared
Pyatakov, was that the Trotskyite organization was being
"transformed into an appendage of fascism." 222 Apparently
the same day Pyatakov, as perplexed as before, flew back to
Berlin, and told Bukhartsev that he had been to Norway and
seen Trotsky. 223
Pyatakov' s sensational disclosures came during the
evening session of January 23, 1937. Two days later
Aftenposten
,
a conservative Norwegian paper, made its own
disclosures: no foreign plane had landed in Oslo during
December, 1935! An investigation revealed that neither the
Kjeller field (a military airdrome twenty-five kilometers
east of Oslo) nor the Gressholmen field (a small island near
Oslo used for hydro- airpl anes ) had received any foreign
224
civil aircraft during the entire month of December. Then
on January 29 the official organ of the Norwegian government,
Arbeiderbl adet.
,
published an interview with the director of
the Kjeller Airdrome, who declared that only one plane—
a
Norwegian craft with no passengers—had landed at Kjeller in
December. In fact, no foreign planes landed there between
September 19, 1935 and May 1, 1936.
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Faced with a problem of "credibility," Vyshinsky at-
tempted to finesse the situation while the trial was still
in progress. In the evening session of January 27 he sud-
denly returned to the question of the flight, and asked
Pyatakov about the Norwegian airport. This time the defen-
dant recalled it was "near Oslo," not "in Oslo," as he had
claimed earlier in the trial. Vyshinsky then read into the
record a statement from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.
According to the Soviet Embassy in Norway, "'the Kjellere
/sic/ Airdrome near Oslo receives all the year round, in ac-
cordance with international regulations, airplanes of other
countries, and that the arrival and departure of airplanes
is possible also in winter months.'" 226
As Robert Conquest has commented, the official Soviet
agency certified merely the "technical possibility" of a
landing near Oslo, not that it actually happened. 227 This
was a transparent evasion of the critical issue but
Vyshinsky was in an awkward spot.
Sick in Norway
Where was Trotsky in December, 1935? As he testified
before the Preliminary Commission (also see Chapter II), this
was the period of his exile in Norway. From June 1935, until
his internment in September 1936, Trotsky and his wife lived
with the Konrad Knudsen family in the small village of Weksal,
or Vexhall, some 55-60 kilometers from Oslo, a two-hour trip
by car during the winter. Two of Trotsky 1 s secretaries—Jan
Frankel and Erwin Wolff—spent some time in the house, but a
guard was not necessary:
No, no guard. But a guard in the very friendly
family of Knudsen. It was for us very important
to have such a friendly family. In spite of our
differences in political views, they personally
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had sympathies for my wife and myself and mvsecretaries also. They were occupied withthe question of my safety.
. .
During his stay in Weksal Trotsky received ten to twelve
visitors—including Max Shachtman, A. J. Muste, and Harold
Isaacs—but they were required to contact either Knudsen or
his daughter, Hjordis, before being taken to see the Russian
2 28
exile. Trotsky was never alone, even during several
trips to Oslo, as he told Albert Goldman:
Never. It is impossible, Mr. Attorney, becauseif I am on the street and recognized by the
people I am absolutely helpless. I am sur-
rounded by people, and especially in Norway--I
don't speak Norwegian— I must have some Norwegian
people who can defend me.
It was almost impossible, therefore, that a Soviet official
could secretly visit Trotsky without his constant companions
229
remarking on the fact.
December was a particularly trying month for Trotsky.
During the fall of 1935 his health had once again taken a
turn for the worse, and much of October-November was spent
2 30in an Oslo hospital. As he told the commissioners, "The
month of December was the worst month of my life. I was all
231the time in bed.' 1 Although he could not exactly recall
how he spent the 11th and 12th of December (the dates of
Pyatakov ' s flight ) , he did remember a short trip--December
20-22—to a mountain cabin in a rugged area north of Oslo.
With the Trotskys went Erwin Wolff , Knudsen' s son , and
several others, but there were no unexpected visitors from
abroad . Weather conditions precluded cars reaching them
.
As two companions on the trip testified,
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"The winter was extremely severe; the roadless
country was completely submerged by snowdrifts
and gripped by Arctic ice. We remember this
well, because once during the trip Trotsky was
trapped by snow and ice. We were on skis, and
he was not good at skiing; and so we had to
organize a regular rescue operation, and we
were very worried. "232
Despite the change of scenery, Trotsky's health did not im-
prove, and they soon returned to the village of Wexhal
.
The brief visit to the "hut" became important when
the Communist press suggested that this had been the actual
site of the meeting with Pyatakov. According to a report,
there was only one way to explain this "'otherwise completely
unmotivated visit'" to a hut in the wilderness: Trotsky had
to carry out "'some business which had to be hidden from the
public,'" and there could hardly be "'a better place for a
2 3 3
secret conference than this little hut deep in the forst.'"
But as Trotsky noted, for a plane to land on a frozen fjord,
it must be equipped with skis. Yet it would need wheels to
take off from TempelhofI "The hypothesis was contradictory,"
he asserted.
-Then, from a frozen fjord a trip cannot be made
in an automobile. Pyatakov informed them that
he used an automobile. On a frozen fjord he
must use skis— a horse with a sled. He could
not approach my cabin with an automobile,
especially in the mount ains . 2 34
And, considering that Pyatakov specified December 11-12 for
the trip, not December 20-22, these hypotheses about a secret
rendezvous in the snow left "not a shred of Pyatakov' s con-




Trotsky on Pyatakov's "Dream"
At one point in the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky asserted
that Vyshinsky had purposefully shirked his duty and failed to
bring Pyatakov "down from the fourth dimension on to this sin-
ful earth with its customs officials, restaurants, hotels, and
other troublesome details." 236 But in his analysis of the
episode Trotsky made it his business to remind the world of
these "troublesome details.
"
Trotsky readily granted that Pyatakov had made a
visit to Berlin in December 1935. But this was the problem.
"The G.P.U. was afterwards forced to adapt Pyatakov's mythical
trip to Oslo to his real trip to Berlin: hence the unfortu-
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nate choice of the month of December." As for Bukhartsev,
Trotsky had never heard of this "superfluous personage," but
admitted that he served a valuable function in the trial
—
"the 1 messenger 1 in a cl assical tragedy , who announces the
2 38
events which are occurring behind the scenes." In any
event, somehow this "'messenger 1 " had informed Trotsky of
Pyatakov's expected arrival in Berlin, but naturally no de-
tails were forthcoming on how Bukhartsev had accomplished
this task: "In this court room dates and addresses are
239generally avoided like a plague."
At the clandestine meeting in the Tiergarten
Pyatakov agreed to make the secret journey to Oslo, despite
the great risk of discovery. Drawing on his own experience
in the Soviet government, Trotsky claimed that it was all but
impossible to drop out of sight for some forty-eight hours;
the watch over Soviet officials abroad was "extremely strict,"
and at any time, Pyatakov might receive an official communi-
cation from Moscow. 240 No matter, on the morning of December
12 or 13 Pyatakov met "Heinrich-Gustav" (Gustav Stirner) at
Tempelhof Airport and signed a name in the "German passport,"
but what name? "Nomina sunt odiosa." commented Trotsky with
ill-disguised contempt for the lack of details in the testi-
mony. Pyatakov, in addition, failed to amplify the circum-
stances of the flight or mention the inspection of passports
in Norway. "The flight was made, so to speak, in the realm
of dreams, where people glide noiselessly, untroubled by
police or customs officials," scoffed Trotsky. 241
After a hiatus of eight years the two former col-
leagues in the Soviet government finally met, but once again
any "living reality" was omitted from Pyatakov' s testimony.
Instead he offered only "stereotyped commonplaces" about the
interview, i.e., the house was "'not badly furnished.'"
Trotsky considered it significant that Pyatakov had not dis-
cussed the furnishings in the house, the presence of Mme
.
Sedova, or the conditions of the exile's life. In fact, the
defendant's mentors had taught him "elastic formulas and non-
242
commital modes of expression." There was also the guestion
where Pyatakov spent the night, since the plane must have re-
mained in Norway. He might have stayed in a hotel, at the
Soviet Embassy, or with the Trotskys, the last a normal pro-
cedure for a "'fellow-conspirator.'" But it was the better




etT r.t° suffer a lapse of memorythe food, the December night, the danger ofmeeting someone connected with the SovietEmbassy. Better to hold one's tongue. Just
as previously, during the trip, so now inNorway, Pyatakov is like the immaterial
shadow of a dream. Let fools take this
shadow for reality I 243
During the Pyat akov-Radek trial Trotsky had tel
graphed many of these specific questions to Moscow, but
Vyshinsky never asked them of Pyatakov:
If the telegrams from Oslo and my telegraphic
questions did not exist, it would still be pos-
sible to speak of the remissness, negligence
and intellectual poverty of the Prosecutor and
the judges. In the light of the above circum-
stances there can be no question of a judicial
error. 244
And Vyshinsky never directly acknowledged that the Kjeller
airport had not received any foreign planes during December
1935. Even if the GPU were allowed 224 days for Pyatakov'
s
flight (September 19th to May 1st), "even then Stalin could
not save the situation." Only one answer occurred to the
Kremlin. In order to avoid further questioning on the trip
Pyatakov was shot on the 1st of February. But, claimed
Trotsky, enough evidence had been presented to prove that
the flight was nothing but a phantom: "The question of
Pyatakov 's flight to Oslo may consequently, I hope, be con-
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sidered closed for all time."
"Cynical Disregard for Facts"
Once more the Dewey Commission sided with Trotsky's
version of the affair, and scoffed at the Moscow testimony.
Many points in the trial led to the conclusion that Pyatakov'
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flight was a figment of the imagination. The failure to con-
front Pyatakov with evidence that not a single foreign plane
had landed in Oslo at the time specified was "criminal negli-
gence" on the part of Vyshinsky; it provided strong justifi-
cation for the "widespread suspicion that the whole trial was
a frame-up at which the Prosecutor himself connived." 246 The
failure to put Trotsky's telegraphed questions to Pyatakov
was also reprehensible. Vyshinsky should have asked these
questions in any case. But if he had a "decent regard for
the truth," then he certainly should have afforded Trotsky an
opportunity to learn the truth. And the failure to ascertain
the name in which the false passport was issued must be re-
garded "not as an oversight but as a deliberate and dis-
247
creditable evasion."
And so it went. Vyshinsky' s statement on the Kjeller
airdrome could not compensate "for this cynical disregard for
the facts," continued the authors of Not Guilty . Besides, to
state that foreign planes could land year round was not
verification that "a given foreign plane landed at that port
in a given month; more especially in face of a denial by the
officer in charge that such a plane landed." The drive from
Kjeller to Weksal, in addition, took at least two hours by
car, not thirty minutes. If Pyatakov 1 s testimony was cor-
rect, then Trotsky would have had to drive to some suburb
near the airport. But it was "impossible" that Trotsky
could have been absent from Weksal for the time required
(six hours) --without others noticing his absence. In any
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event, Trotsky wrote two letters on December 12, and two
more on December 13: "It seems hardly likely, therefore,
that he would have found time in addition to write long let-
ters, if indeed he had been able to find the inclination on
the day of an interview so unusual." 248
To assume that Trotsky's agents and the officials at
Kjeller, continued the final report, connived at concealing
the landing, would mean that everyone concerned—customs of-
ficials and mechanics—had agreed to keep silent about the
unusual flight. It was too much to believe. "We therefore
regard this theory as farfetched."
We hold that the evidence concerning
Pyatakov 1 s alleged flight in the record of the
trial is open to the gravest doubt; that the
Prosecutor's silence, and that of the Court,
in the face of published testimony impugning
that evidence during the trial, warrants a
suspicion of frame-up; that the doubt which
the record inspires is converted by the
evidence offered in rebuttal into certainty
that no such flight took place. We therefore
find that Pyatakov did not see Trotsky in
December, 1935, and did not receive from him
instructions of any kind; and that the dis-
proof of Pyatakov 1 s testimony on this crucial
point renders his whole confession worthless . 249
*******************
The "folding pocket- si zed airpl ane 11 was the third
link in Trotsky's elaborate alibi. Once again Stalin dis-
covered "the disadvantages of a foreign venue for a f abrica-
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tion," commented Robert Conquest. Along with the Hotel
Bristol and Bois de Boulogne interview, this "mythical
flight" went far to discredit the first two Moscow trials,
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and was widely discussed, even in some Soviet circles. in
Let History Judge
,
Roy Medvedev asserted that Pyatakov had
confessed that "on the night of December 25, 1935 /sic?, he
flew to Oslo for a meeting with Trotsky." But two days
after this testimony a Norwegian paper reported that ,r not a
single plane /si£7n had landed at the airport in December,
and another paper printed a statement by the airport director
on the lack of foreign aircraft arriving in that month. 251
Medvedev 1 s facts were awry, but he understood the main point
at issue.
Trotsky had presented an overwhelming mass of evi-
dence on the three alleged interviews. Here and there one
may question the value of his documentation. Many of the
affidavits and depositions, for instance, were submitted by
friends or followers . In addition , official records in
Denmark, France, and Norway were not made available to the
investigators. And there were some inconsistencies in the
various affidavits
.
But Trotsky had made a strong case against these
accusations. He had accomplished what Charles Beard con-
sidered impossible—to prove a negative . This three-fold
alibi was a major reason for the Dewey Commission to find
him— "Not Guilty." As Professor Dewey later declared, the
mass of notarized depositions tended to prove that the three
alleged interviews 11
1
never took place,'" and thereby helped
25 2discredit the Moscow trials. This was, indeed, the high
point of Trotsky's defense.
CHAPTER V
DEWEY AND TROTSKY IN MEXICO (II
)
The so-called "foreign threads" linking Trotsky to
his "co-conspirators" were, obviously, a major theme in the
Mexican hearings. But they were hardly the sum and sub-
stance of the counter-trial. Besides discrediting the non-
interviews with Messrs. Holtzman, Romm and Pyatakov, Trotsky
was also forced to defend his personal honor and political
career. For the Moscow indictments had accused him of a
variety of nefarious political crimes— from "betraying"
Lenin to "plotting" Stalin's death. In order to refute the
various charges, Trotsky had "to recount the main events of
his career, expound his beliefs, describe and explain the
bewildering changes that had taken place in the Soviet Union
from Lenin to Stalin." As a result, George Novack has
written the record of the counter-trial became a "valuable
compendium of information about the events, personalities,
and problems of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union."
This was "one of the greatest political interviews" ever
published, declared Edmund Wilson, after reading Trotsky's
2testimony. Certainly this testimony comprised an illumi-
nating commentary on Bolshevism and was also a revealing
self-portrait, almost too revealing in certain cases.
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An examination of each and every topic discussed be-
fore the Preliminary Commission would be an exercise in
futility; the complete trial record is, after all, readily
available in most libraries. Yet the full range of Trotsky-,
defense cannot be assayed without analyzing some of the major
themes in the hearings. As a result, three significant
facets of Trotsky's apologia will be examined in this chap-
ter—his analysis of the "historical connection," his re-
futation of the "political charges," and his comments on the
"nature of the trials."
I. "The Historical Connection"
As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, Vyshinsky
made a maximum effort in the Pyat akov-Radek trial to prove
the "historical connection" between Trotsky's conflicts with
Lenin and those with "the loyal guardian of Lenin's behests
3
and the continuator of his cause— Stalin." There was no
accident here: "Trotsky and his friends fought against
Lenin and Lenin's Party, just as they are now fighting
4
against Stalin and the Party of Lenin and Stalin." This
"uninterrupted chain of betrayals," charged the Prosecutor,
began with the birth of the Bolshevik movement. Economism,
Menshevism, Liquidationism
,
Kautskyism, Social Democracy and
national-chauvinism— all of these false doctrines Trotsky
had served in turn. 5 Eventually he became the "central
rallying point" for a multitude of Soviet enemies: bandits,
spies, murderers, and lackeys of capitalism. The Trotskyites
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reached "this shameful end," explained Vyshinsky, because
"they had marched along this road for decades, singing the
praises of capitalism, never believing in the success of
socialist construction, in the victory of socialism." 6
Trotsky sang the praises of capitalism from the be-
ginning of his career? The charge was hardly credible for
anyone with a modicum of historical perspective. Yet there
was a certain logic in Vyshinsky' s allegations— from the
Soviet standpoint. It was difficult for even the staunchest
supporters of Stalin's regime to forget Trotsky's contribu-
tions to Bolshevism, especially during the period of 1917-21.
If the Kremlin could prove that "Judas-Trotsky" had always
plotted to scuttle Lenin's movement, then his alleged al-
liance with Nazi Germany in the 1930s would seem much less
incredible. If, on the other hand, Trotsky could success-
fully prove his lifelong loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, then
the accusations about being a "lackey of capitalism,"
etcetera, etcetera, would appear doubly absurd.
Trotsky and Lenin
Before the Preliminary Commission in Mexico Trotsky
proudly declared that he had just completed "the fortieth
year of my uninterrupted participation in the working-class
7
movement under the banner of Marxism." Much of this period,
he asserted, had been spent in close collaboration with
Lenin, or in preserving Lenin's legacy. It was almost an
unconscious plagiarism of Stalin's boast that he was Lenin's
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legitimate heir, for Trotsky also stressed his unswerving
devotion to the ideals of Ilyich. Yet there were certain
tiffs with Lenin over the years that Trotsky was hard-pressed
to explain.
Point by point Trotsky refuted Vyshinsky's litany of
"historical" sins, and reviewed the highlights of his re-
lations with Lenin. Had he been a Menshevik from 1903 to
1917? Certainly not. With the political organization of
Bolshevism and Menshevism in 1904, "I remained formally out-
side of both factions," Trotsky declared at the Mexican
Qhearings. But he had also attempted to unify the two fac-
tions, believing that the majority of Mensheviks could "be
pushed onto the path of revolution." In this "burning ques-
tion" he had been wrong, Trotsky admitted, and "Lenin was
entirely right." But "my political line, in spite of con-
flicts and polemics, coincided in every fundamental way with
9
the line of Lenin."
If the two political lines were so similar, as
Trotsky claimed, then the violent polemics between the two
leaders after the 1903 Congress of the Russian Social-
Democratic Party would appear inexplicable. In particular,
there was the case of Trotsky's 1904 pamphlet, Our Political
Tasks . A "most despicable pamphlet," Vyshinsky had described
it in the Pyatakov-Radek trial, one in which Trotsky squirted
"venomous saliva at the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism."
10
Trotsky had, indeed, attacked Lenin's "'Jacobinism'"
in this youthful polemic. "'Maximilian Lenin,'" like
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Robespierre, divided people into good and bad citizens. His
"'malicious and morally repulsive suspiciousness is a flat
caricature of the tragic Jacobin intolerance,"' claimed his
former disciple. Trotsky also made ad hominem remarks in
%
describing the self-appointed leader of the Bolshevik faction
" 'hideous, ' " "'dissolute,'" '"demagogical."' 11
This verbal excess was one of many such outbursts
that Trotsky would have preferred to forget, but John Dewey
would not allow the "witness" to slide over the episode.
This was merely "a theoretical and political pamphlet," ex-
plained Trotsky," but "not objectionable," even though it
contained certain errors
:
I can find in this book chapters which are not
so bad. There are chapters which are wrong.
You know, as a young man I characterized Lenin
in a certain spirit, a spirit absolutely not
found in the real relations between him and my-
self. But I corrected, by my subsequent atti-
tude--! corrected the error . But it is not
objectionable and nothing abominable . 12
Certainly this kind of "harsh and forthright accusation" was
hardly exceptional for the time, as the authors of the final
13Dewey Commission report contended , but it raised serious
questions about the "fundamental " coincidence of their
political views
.
There were other disagreements during this bitter
period of wandering in the wilderness . Vyshinsky recalled
Trotsky's part in organizing the so-called "August Bloc"
(1911-12). According to the Prosecutor, "Judas-Trotsky" had
brought together the "lackeys of capital," including
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Mensheviks, ex-Bolsheviks, "flabby intellectuals, and the
refuse of the working class movement." This was a paraphrase
of Lenin's remarks, who also characterized the bloc as I
"'built up on lack of principle, on hypocrisy and empty
14phrases.'" But Trotsky readily admitted this "mistake."
During a period of "dark reaction," he had attempted to
organize such a group, "an emanation of my conciliatory
tendency," but Lenin refused to cooperate. Once again Lenin
"was absolutely right in this question, as subsequent devel-
opments showed." It was a "sterile attempt, and Lenin did
not play with the thing. He gave serious blows to his ad-
versaries." But the epithet— "lackeys of capital"—was
merely "a designation for reformists," claimed Trotsky, just
"a question of a political appreciation and not of criminal
15thought." And Lenin had never intended to call Trotsky a
"Judas." This was just another "frame-up.""'"^
During the war years there were also differences be-
tween Lenin and Trotsky over the slogan-- "United States of
Europe"—which implied that revolutions must simultaneously
erupt in both Russia and Europe. Actually Lenin's criticisms
of Trotsky's slogan were concerned with emphases, not the
core of the argument, but Vyshinsky chose in the second trial
to repeat a favorite Stalinist canard. Without mentioning
the slogan or its background, the Prosecutor flatly stated:
"In 1915 Trotsky came out in opposition to Lenin's doctrine
of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one coun-
try. Thus, he completely capitulated to capitalism over
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twenty years ago!" 17 But Trotsky absolutely denied that he
had ever opposed the law of uneven capitalistic development,
at the center of the controversy. Such a contention was
only "a variety of the banal and trivial distortion" of the
debate over the "United States of Europe" slogan. "The mis-
interpretation of this discussion tries to give the idea
that I denied the unequal development. I believe one must
be absolutely ignored /sic/ to deny such a law." 18
And then there was 1917. In his litany of "betrayals"
Vyshinsky completely ignored Trotsky's contributions to the
October Revolution. But the ex-Chairman of the Petrograd
Soviet was naturally eager to stress his actions in that
climactic year
, and also his complete solidarity with Lenin.
Even before Trotsky reached Russia, Lenin had begun to
praise his fiery opponent. Briefly imprisoned in a
Canadian "concentration camp" under the pretext of being a
German agent, Trotsky received welcomed assistance from his
old foe. "'This is a patent, unheard-of, and malicious
slander of a revolutionary,'" charged Ilyich, soon to be
19
accused of the same charge. Once Trotsky reached
Petrograd, the two leaders buried their old differences.
Lenin even recognized, at least implicitly, the validity of
Trotsky's "permanent revolution," a theory that predicted
the bourgeois revolution would be transformed into a dicta-
torship of the proletariat. "I believe in this question I
was right against Lenin," Trotsky told the commissioners, but
quickly added that Lenin's contributions to the Revolution
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were "immeasurably greater than mine." Lenin, in fact, "was
the teacher. I was the pupil." 20 Finally in August 1917
Trotsky formally became a Bolshevik, but for some time, he




A month earlier the Kerensky government arrested
Trotsky as a German agent; at the same time Lenin fled to
Finland. But with the Kornilov insurrection in August the
government released the 1,1 Bolshevik agents of Germany/" and
Trotsky assumed a leading role in the revolutionary movement,
shortly thereafter being elected chairman of the Petrograd
22Soviet. "I took a direct part in the preparation and
organization of the October Revolution, particularly during
the four decisive months when Lenin was forced to hide in
Finland, " he declared before the sub-commission. Even Stalin
had acknowledged this fact. With a certain relish Trotsky
read from a 1918 article in Pravda , in which his mortal foe
declared:
"All the work of practical organization of
the insurrection was carried out under the im-
mediate leadership of the chairman of the
Petrograd Soviet , Comrade Trotsky . We can say
with certainty that the swift passing of the
garrison to the side of the Soviet and the
bold execution of the work of the Military
Revolutionary Committee the Party owes prin-
cipally and above all to Comrade Trotsky." 23
Yet six years later Stalin asserted that Trotsky had been
111 a comparatively new man in our Party in the period of
October, /and/ neither did nor could play a special part,
24
either in the Party or in the October Revolution.'" Using
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"scientific methods/' Trotsky explained, the Stalin school
now considered "it beyond dispute that I did not direct the
October Revolution but was opposed to it. However these
historical falsifications do not concern my_ autobiography,
but the biography of Stalin." 25
October was perhaps the proudest moment in Trotsky's
long revolutionary career. And his leading role in directing
the Petrograd Soviet and its Military Revolutionary Committee
has rarely been challenged. Yet the "historical falsifica-
tions" of the Stalin school had even permeated the thinking
of a John Dewey. At one point in the hearings Dewey referred
to a "committee of five" which had actually directed the
October uprising: "It is plain that the controlling organi-
zation in the practical work of the insurrection of October
was a Party center composed of Stalin and others around the
Revolutionary Military Committee." Trotsky was upset to
hear this falsification come from the lips of Dewey. No, he
had never been a member of the committee of five because "it
never existed." There had been a plan for Stalin and others
to enter the Military Revolutionary Committee, but "I was
chairman before they were appointed." In any event, they
never took their places on this important body: "It was a
chaotic period, a period of preparation, and the Central
Committee made one decision, and itself forgot about it."
Only in 1924 was this long-forgotten decision of the Central
Committee discovered. At that time the legend of the
directing center was "invented," Trotsky explained. "I heard
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the name only for the first time in 1924. It did not exist
at all." The professor from Columbia was startled by this
contention: "Are you claiming that the earlier history was
falsified?'- "Absolutely," was Trotsky's reply. 26
There was, of course, such a "center" in 1917. At a
crucial meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee (October
16-17, o.s.), "a military revolutionary center" was estab-
lished, consisting of Stalin, Sverdlov, Andrei Bubnov
, Moisei
Uritsky, and Felix Dzerzhinsky. This was to be a liaison
group between the Central Committee and the Military
Revolutionary Committee. But it was "one of those innumerable
committees, not only in Bolshevik experience, that once ap-
2 7pointed never meet," once observed Robert Daniels. Yet
Dewey had assumed as true the existence of this "center,"
which was to figure prominently in Stalin's claims to be the
2 8directing genius of October. Perhaps Trotsky was thinking
of this historical myth when he wrote that the Comintern's
"massive lying campaign" had "penetrated into the minds of
men who are honest and who think. Many of the members of
the sub-commission did not know the real history of the
29Bolshevik Party, especially of its degeneration."
During the Mexican hearings Trotsky also claimed that
he and Lenin had worked "hand in hand" from 1917 to 1924—but
with some differences of opinion:
I recognized the authority of Lenin every time,
but I was sufficiently independent to explain
my opinion openly--openly , even when not good
for me. I believe my relations with Lenin
during the Soviet period were the best.
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There had been, of course, efforts to falsify this relation-
ship. But even in the last months of his life Ilyich recog-
nized "the art of distortion of the nature of the living re-
lationship between Lenin and myself." 30 Despite a few minor
differences of opinion, then, their close ties remained in-
tact until Ilyich 1 s death.
But Vyshinsky had charged that both Trotsky and
Pyatakov had risen "against Lenin in the stern days of
31Brest." Ben Stolberg and Carleton Beals, for the Commis-
sion, were also curious about the sharp disagreement between
Trotsky and Lenin over accepting the German peace terms at
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations in 1918. Such differences,
replied Trotsky, had been "extremely exaggerated" by the
Comintern
:
They were absolutely of a transitory and con-
junctural character- -the differences . I found
it necessary to say to world public opinion
and to the world toiling masses that we wished
to fight against Prussianism, but that we could
not do it . I tried to demonstrate by action
,
the falsehood of the accusation that we had a
secret agreement with German militarism. Lenin
said in answer that it was of certain importance
to show and to educate the masses by action, but
if we perished in this demonstration— the group
that was to take its message to them--how could
they get the message? It was a question by what
line we could continue the fight against German
militarism in order not to perish ourselves
.
In the determination of this line, I had some
practical and empirical differences with Lenin
—
no more. J ^
But these "practical and empirical differences with Lenin"
over Trotsky's policy of "no war, no peace," almost resulted
in Lenin's resignation and an irrevocable split within the
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Bolshevik Party. Fearing such a "split" more than the
onerous peace terms, Trotsky abstained when the climactic
vote was taken in the Central Committee on accepting the
German offer, thus ensuring Lenin's victory. The scars re-
mained for some time within the Party. It was hardly a
"transitory" episode. 33
There were other conflicts with Lenin during the
post-October period. In October 1919 Lenin was ready to
surrender Petrograd to the advancing armies of General
Yudenich; Trotsky said no. "We had heated discussions on
this, and the Central Committee sustained my opinion," re-
called Trotsky before the Dewey Commission: "I went to
O A
Petrograd and we succeeded in saving Petrograd." Then
in 1921 Lenin heeded the advice of some Polish emigrees, and
authorized the invasion of Poland, which Trotsky opposed,
even though he recognized the "superiority of Lenin in this
respect, that he was better informed." According to Trotsky,
this was "a war of defense which, by the logic of the
struggle , transformed itself into a war of aggression against
Warsaw. 11 At a subsequent Party Congress Lenin admitted "he
had made a great mistake. Lenin was a very honest adversary,"
35Trotsky declared. And then there was the Trade-Union con-
troversy of 1921, just another "episodic discussion," as-
3 6
serted Trotsky, completely forgotten a month later.
During this lengthy recital of his relations with
Lenin, Trotsky repeatedly asserted that Lenin had expressed
complete confidence in his colleague, at least after 1917.
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Trotsky was particularly proud of a 1919 carte blanche that
Lenin had signed, in case the War Commissar met opposition:
"Comrades, knowing the harsh character of
Comrade Trotsky's orders, I am so convinved
so absolutely convinced, of the Tightness,
expediency and necessity, for the good of 'our
cause, of the orders he has given, that I give
them my full support."
Although Trotsky never used this document, it was "testimony
to the exceptional confidence of a man whom I consider to be
the highest model of revolutionary morality." 37 He was, in-
deed, proud of such high praise.
Thus, Trotsky accented the "positive" in this narra-
tive, and deemphasized acrimonious conflicts with Ilyich in
past years, especially in 1903-17. All such disagreements,
in retrospect, were "episodic," "false," or of "secondary
importance." If Trotsky gilded the truth in certain accounts,
he also scrupulously avoided any blatant distortion of the
historical record. Vyshinsky's claim that Trotsky had al-
ways fought against Lenin and Lenin's Party stood discredited.
But on one historical issue Trotsky's account was something
less than the full truth. It was an issue that Vyshinsky had
left unexplored, for good reasons.
Lenin's "Testament"
The question of Lenin's so-called "Testament" of
1922-23 is of crucial importance in understanding Trotsky's
plummet from power and Stalin's rise to the apex of the Soviet
hierarchy. If only ... if only, many have mused, Trotsky
had publicized in 1923 Lenin's firm and unflattering appraisal
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of Stalin, then the Soviet Union would have been spared the
worse excesses of the "benevolent Dictator."
Before the Preliminary Commission in Mexico, Trotsky
once again gave his version of the circumstances surrounding
Lenin's "Testament." In the weeks prior to Lenin's second
stroke (December 16, 1922), the two Bolshevik leaders dis-
cussed launching a joint attack against "bureaucratism"
within the governmental apparatus. But Trotsky refused to
form a "sub-commission" to fight this endemic malady; it was
just as important to cripple bureaucratism in the Orgburo and
Control Commission, two Party bodies controlled by Stalin.
Lenin agreed to this caveat: '"I propose to you a bloc.'"
Trotsky was delighted: "'A good bloc with a good man is a
good thing. ' " They agreed to lay plans for the joint cam-
paign within several days, but it was not to be: this was
the last discussion between the two leading Bolshevik
38figures
.
Shortly thereafter Lenin suffered a second stroke.
Increasingly anxious about the future of the Party, a
weakened Ilyich began to dictate his "Testament" on December
23, 1922, really a continuing series of notes, and memoranda,
and articles— all his last writings—which was the true ex-
39pression of his final will, as Moshe Lewin has contended.
In one such note he made his famous assessment of six leading
Party figures, including Trotsky and Stalin. By January 4,
1923, his opinion of Stalin had declined to the point that he
urged the Party to find a way '"to remove'" Stalin from his
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high positions—the famous "Postscript." 40 m subsequent
months Lenin's health and spirits improved somewhat, but on
March 5, 1923, he dictated a final communication to Stalin.
"The last letter of Lenin"- "the last letter Lenin wrote in
his life was the rupture with Stalin," declared Trotsky. 41
The Counsel for the Dewey Commission-- John Finerty—
questioned Trotsky closely about Lenin's letter of March 5
to Stalin. Had Trotsky personally seen the message?
Yes; I was a little sick myself, in bed. The
stenographer of Lenin came to me— a woman with
this letter. It was a letter written to Stalin.
I telephoned Kamenev—they were both against me
at that time, Stalin and Kamenev. I consulted
with him. I asked: "What does this signify?"
Kamenev was absolutely disoriented. I con-
sulted Krupskaya by telephone, and asked her
what this was. She explained that Stalin tried
to surround Lenin to hinder him from having com-
munications with the Party, under the pretext
that he was too sick; that it was not advisable
to give him information. And he treated with
animus Krupskaya, the wife of Lenin, at this
time. Lenin gave him some warning, about two
or three times, and the last time he dictated
this letter. And I gave the advice either to




But it was too late, added Trotsky. Lenin had already suf-
fered a third stroke and lay unconscious.
In further comments on the history of the "Testament,"
or Lenin's specific comments on his colleagues, Trotsky
charged that the GPU concealed it, "in spite of the insis-
43tance of Lenin's widow on publishing it." It was Max
Eastman who first revealed the existence of the document in
441925. But this testimony caused Ben Stolberg to ask:
"Mr. Trotsky, didn't you once disavow Max Eastman's statement
that there was such a thing as Lenin's testament." "Yes,"
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admitted Trotsky, but he quibbled over its substance,
claiming that it was not a testament in a "juridical" sense.
Besides, he had only disavowed Eastman's action, not its
existence
:
I did not deny there was a document, a letterfrom Lenin, but as a document which 'could be
officially named a testament
— in that sense I
made a denial. Eastman published this document
without consulting me and the others, and by
these means he sharpened terribly the inner
struggle in the Soviet Union, in the Politburo,
which was the beginning of the split. We tried
on our side to avoid a split. The majority of
the Politburo asked me, demanded of me, to
take a position toward this. It was a' very
diplomatic document I signed at that time, in
that sense, that it was not a testament, and
that I had never had any connection with
Eastman and so on, at that time. Eastman, I
must say, is my friend, but he is not a member
of our organization, he is not a disciplined
militant of the Party. He is more or less of
a free lance. It is his right, but it is my
right as a disciplined member of the organiza-
tion to disavow him when it is necessary.
But this equivocal explanation failed to satisfy Stolberg,
who kept pressing Trotsky on the subject. "If you ask me,"
Trotsky told Stolberg, "if it was the most clear truth I have
declared in my life, I would answer 'No. 1 It was not the
genuine truth. It was an equivocal document." But as a
political man he had no choice: "It was not a lie, but it
45
was not the full truth."
Finerty quickly realized that this testimony raised
serious questions about Trotsky's basic veracity. How far
might the "present situation" in Mexico and the Soviet Union
require Trotsky to equivocate with the truth, asked Finerty.
The chief "witness" was obviously on the defensive:
i
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I can say that never in my life did I take theinterest
— take the contrary of the truth Ifyou will, in plain words, a lie. I believe inour society, which is very contradictory thatthe conventional rules of conduct in family
society, or corporation—everybody from time totime is obliged not to say the truth. I com-
mitted it sometimes. I believe the question
can be decided only by comparison of the lies
I was obliged to give, and the truth. I be-
lieve in the balance my truths are more heavy
than my lies. It seems to me so, in the moreimportant questions, the decisive questions, in
the questions upon which depend the actions 'of
many people, of friends, of their fate—it seems
to me that I never committed such crimes.
In reply to this revealing statement Finerty stated that the
Commission must judge whether political necessity might af-
fect Trotsky's testimony. This was only right, the "justifi-
cation of the Commission," agreed Trotsky. "The Commission
does not consider me an angel."
These quotations on the final "rupture" with Stalin
and the first publication of Lenin's "Testament" have been
reproduced at some length, because Trotsky's account was an
exercise in selective recall* By discussing only a few as-
pects of the affair , he misrepresented— at least uncon-
sciously—the full story. Trotsky was no "angel" in this
case
.
In the first pi ace , the proposed "bloc " between Lenin
and Trotsky against Party bureaucratism is open to question.
Trotsky, after all, had a well-known weakness for adminis-
trative remedies when faced with political difficulties . In
his "Testament" Lenin had praised the War Commissar as "'the
most capable man in the current Central Committee, 1 " but he
had also stressed that Trotsky was '"too much possessed by
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self-confidence and given too much to the administrative side
of things.'" Certainly Trotsky was a curious choice in
1922 for any attack on bureaucratic excesses in the Party;
during the Trade-Union controversy he had shown himself to
be more bureaucratic than the bureaucrats. The proposed
bloc, in any event, may have been Lenin's device to smash
the "solicitous conspiracy" that kept him from directing
Party affairs. According to Adam Ulam, not only Stalin kept
vital information from the suspicious Lenin. Under a "veneer
of solicitude for his health," the entire Politburo, in-
cluding Trotsky, tried to prevent Lenin's "interference with
their rule and to keep any single politician from gaining
48Lenin's ear." If Trotsky could be enticed into a pseudo-
alliance, then Lenin's isolation would be ended.
It is also doubtful, in the second place, that Lenin
planned a "rupture" with Stalin in March 1923. An irate
Lenin, of course, dictated on March 5-6 a scathing letter to
the comrade from Georgia. After castigating Stalin for being
" ' rude 1 11 to Krupskaya , Lenin gave him a choice : " ' I ask
therefore that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable
to retracting your words and apologizing, or whether you pre-
49
fer the severance of rel ations between us . ' " Thus , Lenin
actually offered Stalin a graceful "exit" from this imbroglio
A simple apology would suffice. And within two days Stalin
dictated just such an apology. If Lenin had seriously de-
sired to sever relations with the Georgian, then a public
ultimatum would have been the better course of action,
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perhaps in the form of a letter to the Central Committee.
During the period of December 1922-March 1923, in actual fact,
Lenin never "screwed up his determination" to have Stalin re-
moved from his posts, to quote Robert H. McNeal. 50 For some
reason Lenin was loathe to press the so-called "rupture" to
its logical conclusion.
More important, Trotsky completely failed to discuss
a third aspect of the "Testament" controversy, one which
covered him with little glory. On the same day that Lenin
addressed the stern letter to Stalin, he also dictated a
warm note to Trotsky; it was telephoned to him and then hand-
carried by two of Ilyich's secretaries. The subject was
Georgia. Always a determined foe of "Great Russian chauvin-
ism," Lenin had concluded that Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and
Ordzhonikidze were unjustly oppressing the Georgian minority
in favor of greater Russian interests. In his note Lenin
requested that Trotsky assume the "'defense'" of the Georgian
minority at the next Party conclave. He also included several
memoranda on the subject, dictated in late December, 1922
and an "article" he had been preparing on Georgia, now
missing. If Trotsky were unwilling to carry out this re-
quest, then the entire dossier should be returned: "'I shall
consider that a sign of refusal from you.'" This collection
of documents was the "'bomb'" that Lenin hoped to explode in
Stalin's face at the Party's Xllth Congress, scheduled for
April of that year. A day later— the 6th of March—Lenin
wrote to the Georgian dissidents, with copies forwarded to
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Trotsky and Kamenev: '"I follow your case with all my heart.
I am appalled by the coarseness of Ordzhonikidze and the
connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing for
you notes ?nd a speech. 1 " 51
Certainly this was Trotsky's great opportunity. With
Lenin's strong support, he had every chance of humbling the
leader of the Party's bureaucracy. Yet Trotsky, also sick at
the time, stumbled, almost a fatal misstep. 52 He may have
verbally accepted the assignment, but he also returned the
dossier to Lenin, after making copies of the memoranda. Soon
thereafter, apparently on the 6th of March, he conferred with
Kamenev, and promised not to start a fight at the forthcoming
Party Congress. "I am for preserving the status quo," he
told his brother-in-law. Trotsky did insist that a radical
change be made in the policy toward Georgia, and that Stalin
apologize to Krupskaya, but agreed not to move against
Stalin, Dzerzhinsky or Ordzhonikidze. This was one of those
53
"'rotten compromises'" that Lenin had been fearing.
Soon thereafter Lenin suffered a third stroke. After
March 10 he was physically unfit to wage any kind of struggle
with Stalin. This was, seemingly, Trotsky's task. On several
occasions he did write on the situation in Georgia, but re-
54frained from directly attacking Stalin. Certainly he was
entirely silent on the existence of Lenin's "bomb" until
Lydia Fotyeva, one of Ilyich's secretaries, formally notified
Kamenev of the Georgian dossier just before the Xllth
Congress opened. Trotsky was caught. Not only had he
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concealed the existence of Lenin's communication, but he had
not fulfilled Lenin's entreaty. "He had shown himself both
devious and fainthearted/ 1 in the opinion of Adam Ulam. 55
Then in an "astonishing" letter to Stalin and the
Central Committee, Trotsky asked permission to forsake
Lenin's trust and not publish the bombshell against Stalin:
"If— on the basis of motive of an inner-Party
nature, the significance of which is self-
evident—no member of the Central Committee will
make this article in one or another form known to
the party or the Party Congress, I on my part,
will consider this as a decision of silence, a
decision which— in connection with the Party
Congress— removes me from personal responsibility
for this article. 56
Stalin, in reply, was both magnanimous and devious. He de-
clared that it was impossible to publish Lenin's notes, yet
criticized Trotsky for concealing them in the first place.
The "canny General Secretary was allowed to pass off this
sleight of hand," Robert McNeal has observed, with some
astonishment. Trotsky quickly accepted Stalin's decision—
a
personal decision—not to publish the documents, and at the
Xllth Congress absented himself when the Georgian affair came
5 7
up for discussion. Thus, Trotsky was personally responsible
for suppressing part of Lenin's "Testament." And he failed
to take up the "defense" of Georgia, Ilyich's final request.
Not a word of this episode appeared in his testimony before
the Dewey Commission
.
There are also other points in Trotsky's testimony
before the Preliminary Commission that can be doubted. Until
1926, at least, Krupskaya expressed little interest in
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publishing her husband's last will and testament. For ex-
ample, when Max Eastman first published the substance of the
document in his 1925 book, Since Lenin Died
,
she repudiated
Eastman's claims that true Leninism was in decline, and
denied that Lenin had expressed in the alleged documents any
"'distrust'" of his colleagues. 58
Eastman, of course, had obtained from Trotsky's own
lips the sensational information about Lenin's final will.
Before publishing the material he consulted two of Trotsky's
closest associ ates--Christi an Rakovsky and Alfred Rosmer--
who approved its release, while a third, Boris Souvarine,
counseled against such an action. As a result, Eastman was
somewhat stunned, to say the least, when Trotsky publicly
disavowed the existence of the document. Among other things,
the Soviet leader accused Eastman in 1925 of making "'falla-
cious and mendacious assertions'" about his relations with
the Politburo. As for the Testament, "'Lenin never left one:
All talk about a secreted or infringed "testament" is so much
59
mischievous invention. . . .'" This disavowal appeared
ridiculous after Krupskaya finally decided in mid-1926 to
smuggle the document out of the USSR. An authentic copy of
the "Testament" was published in The New York Times on
October 18 , 1926.
Trotsky's repudiation of the Testament was a very
"diplomatic" statement, indeed, to repeat his comment before
the Preliminary Commission. It caused him even more grief.
When Stalin finally revealed to the Party in October 1927 the
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existence of Lenin's last will, he also read from Trotsky's
1925 disavowal of the document. At the expense of his rival
Stalin jeered:
"It's Trotsky writing that, not somebody else.
What basis then, have Trotsky, Zinoviev and
Kamenev for flapping their tongues now about
how the Party and its Central Committee 'con-
cealed' the 'testament' of Lenin? Tongue-
flapping is 'permissible,' but there ought
to be a limit to it." 6 l
On the issue of the Testament Trotsky was still "tongue-
flapping," it would appear, as late as 1937.
"Political necessity"—this was Trotsky's dominant
concern in 1923, as it was fourteen years later. If he did
not "lie" about the circumstances surrounding Lenin's
"Testament," he hardly provided the complete story to the
Dewey Commission. And the commissioners appeared to be un-
aware of the discrepancies between his account and the
historical record. Except for Ruehle and Rosmer, the members
of the panel were not close students of Bolshevism. Trotsky's
version of the incident, as a result, appeared only briefly
in the final report of the Dewey Commission, without being
^ , 62disputed.
Democracy and The Proletarian Dictatorship
Many other "historical" crimes were assayed during
the Mexican hearings, sometimes rather superficially. But on
one issue the Preliminary Commission pressed Trotsky with a
certain doggedness. Democracy and the Soviet Union— this
question was uppermost in the minds of the skeptical liberals
on the panel, and their repeated queries on the subject
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irritated Trotsky. Several years later he wrote that a
"Stolberg, lantern in hand, chases after an ideal revolution,
unaccompanied by any excesses, and guaranteed against
Thermidor and counter-revolution," 63 but Trotsky was willing
to celebrate the triumph of the dictatorship, excesses and
all.
John Finerty first questioned Trotsky on the re-
lationship of the Soviets and Party. He wanted to ascertain
at what point the Party became "undemocratic" and prey to
bureaucratic deformities. Even in 1917-18, readily admitted
the ex-Commissar, the government's ministers (commissars)
recognized the overriding authority of the Party. But he
was unwilling to admit that the popularly elected Soviets
were more "democratic" than the Party's bodies:
It was a question— a more provisional question,
depending on the relationship between the Party
and the working class— if they had confidence
in the Party. Only formally, the Party was
less democratic than the Soviets. One time the
people had the fullest confidence in the Party
which guided the people during the October in-
surrection and which gave to the peasants the
soil
.
There was no contradiction between the commissars obeying
the government and also accepting Party direction: everyone
was a Bolshevik, after all. Trotsky explained that when a
commissar stood for election, he announced: "'I am a
Bolshevik, a member of the Bolshevik Party. You know my
program. It is my program, the guide of which is my Central
64
Committee. It is for me the highest authority.'"
I
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But was the Party itself democratically organized,
Dewey wanted to know:
-Was there any organized, recognized
method by which, aside from criticism and discussion, the
worker could control the committees, the different branches
of the Party?" Only members of the Party, not the toiling
masses, could participate in Party elections, answered
Trotsky. Under these circumstances, continued Dewey, how
could this be considered a "democratic" system? Rather
patiently Trotsky explained:
I didn't say it was democratic in the absolute
sense. I consider democracy not as a mathe-
matical abstraction, but as a living experience
of the people. It was a great step to democracy
from the old regime, but this democracy in its
formal expression was limited by the necessi-
ties of the revolutionary dictatorship.
Through the formula of "democratic centralism," he told the
commissioners , the Party exercised its responsibilities
:
".
. . everybody has the same right of discussion, control
and election of the leadership of the Party. The leadership
of the Party has the right to direct the Party and later,
also the country." Certainly this was a dictatorship, since
the Proletariat could not directly form a government, added
Trotsky, but a dictatorship of_ the proletariat, the first
6 5
"experience of genuine proletarian democracy" in history.
"Democratic Centralism" and "Dictatorship of the
Proletariat"— this was ground that Trotsky had covered many
times in the past. But his interrogators, especially Dewey,
were not satisfied with the explanation. Was this not a
dictatorship for, not of, the proletariat? How, asked Dewey,
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could there be a single-party dictatorship if one party could
not completely correspond to a class? This would be a con-
tradiction, agreed Trotsky, but only in normal times:
We never said, Mr. Chairman, that the single
party as an absolute expression of the class
is a normal status. We answered to the
critics: "We are in a civil war. It is not
a measure of democracy, but a measure of civil
war." It was our honest answer.
Not only was the dictatorship sometimes at odds with the in-
terests of its own class, it did not necessarily reflect the
desires of other classes—the peasantry, petit bourgeoisie,
and intelligentsia. Although Trotsky rejected as "pure in-
vention" the charge that he wanted to exclude the peasantry
and petit bourgeoisie from the proletarian dictatorship, he
did admit that conflicts with the peasants were inevitable.
Quoting Lenin, he contended: "'We can accomplish with the
peasants, all the peasants, the democratic revolution, but
when we attempt to set up Socialism, we will have the major-
6 6ity, or a great part, of the peasants against us.'"
Material and cultural scarcities also made the pro-
letarian dictatorship an absolute necessity, alleged Trotsky.
When the table was barren, when "a table d ' hote " was lacking,
then people forgot their manners, and made a dictatorship
necessary: "The reason for the existence of gendarmes is
6 7the misery of the people." But this movement implied that
the dictatorship of the proletariat in any backward and
isolated nation would degenerate into "the dictatorship of
the secretariat," suggested Dewey. That's a "very good
formula," replied Trotsky, but he held his ground: "I must
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answer that even the dictatorship of the secretariat now in
Russia is a very important progress in comparison with the
dictatorship of the Tsar. 1,68
Extending the discussion to the period 1923-27,
Dewey asked if Trotsky had not been disloyal to the Party
dictatorship and its demands for strict discipline. Trotsky's
answer was somewhat disingenuous. In line with the Party
rule— "full freedom in discussion, and discipline in the ex-
ecution of decisions"—he had been completely loyal to the
Party:
I can only repeat that I criticized decisions,
or a number of decisions, before the decision
in the Party; that I criticized them in the
Central Committee after they were accepted by
the majority, but I never acted practically
against the decisions and that is what I con-
sider Party discipline
.
The prohibition of discussion was itself a violation of Party
statutes, a Stalinist " coup d 1 etat in the Party," he asserted
in his defense. And even when the Left Opposition carried
placards critical of the Stalinist regime in an anniversary
parade (November 1927), this was not a counter-coup or a
69
viol ation of Party statutes
.
Despite this line of defense, Trotsky and the
Trotskyites, of course, were eventually expelled from the
Party for just such "viol ations" of discipline . Would Trotsky
have expelled the Stalinist clique for similar violations,
wondered Dewey, if he had the power. Trotsky's reply was
both instinctive and revealing:
I
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You know the first thing I would do? it is to
expel from the Party all the demoralized people
such as Vyshinsky, Yagoda and others who are the
enemies of the working class and who are working
now only for their personal material interest
Not persons with different opinions from mine.
Thet is a different thing. Not I myself would
expel them. I would convoke a conference of
workers: "You may select between honest anddishonest people in the Party." I mean, workersfrom the factories, without ambitions for a
career. I am sure they would make a good selec-
tion. 70
Although Trotsky denied that he would have expelled the
Stalinist faction simply for their political beliefs, his
response was almost a mirror-like reflection of Stalin's
policy. Had not, in fact, "workers from the factories" voted
to expel Trotsky and his faction? On the question of ensuring
Party unity it was often difficult to determine where Trotsky
left off and Stalin began.
This involved discussion of the "democratic" nature
of the Party and its proletarian dictatorship offered little
new in Trotsky's appreciation of the problem. But for the
liberal members of the Commission it was a subject of some
importance, especially for Dewey. In late 1937 he told an
interviewer that Trotsky
has never faced the question whether democracy
within the party can be maintained when there
is complete suppression of democracy outside
the party. The idea of democracy is an ex-
acting master. The limitation of it to a
small group involves such a contradiction
that in the end democracy even within the
party is bound to be destroyed. 71
Yet the Commission's final report, Not Guilty , had little to
say about the subject of "democratic centralism." It did
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contend, however, that Lenin "considered free criticism of
the Party's policy a fundament al right of its members « a
policy he had stressed at the Xth Party Congress in 1921.
This was a curious example, since it was precisely at this
Congress that Lenin voted to restrict intra-P arty democracy.
Not wishing "to invoke Lenin as an infallible authority,"
Not Guilty still left the impression that the Bolshevik
leader had been a staunch supporter of democratic rights
(he was, at times), and that Trotsky supported him on this
issue (he did, also at times.) 72
But the Commission's own transcript of the Mexican
hearings had revealed Trotsky's extreme ambivalence on the
question of "democratic centralism," an inherently contra-
dictory doctrine. Until he renounced the old Party in 1933
and formed a new one, Trotsky had been handicapped in his
struggles with Stalin by a pro forma devotion to the needs
for iron discipline. At times he stressed the need for
democratic safeguards, at other times the need for extreme
discipline, which led Stalin in 1924 to claim that "'democracy
is only a pawn, a strategic maneuver for him /Trotsky/. '
"
Trotsky later wrote that the "equilibrium between democracy
and centralism establishes itself in the actual struggle, at
74
moments it is violated and then reestablished." But the
extreme elasticity of this formulation tended to condone
political expediency.
To briefly review the historical record, in 1904 the
prescient Trotsky predicted that Lenin's organization methods
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would lead to a Party dictatorship:
* the Party organization /the caucus7 atfirst substitutes itself for the Party as" a
whole; then the Central Committee substitutes
itself for the organization; and finally a




But after 1917 the new convert to Bolshevism forgot his own
words. There was no more zealous enforcer of Party statutes
on discipline than Trotsky after the October Revolution.
Even in 1924, when Party rules were handicapping his freedom
of maneuver, he declared at the Xlllth Congress:
"Comrades, none of us wishes or is able to be
right against his party. The party in the last
analysis is always right, because the party is
the sole historical instrument given to the
proletariat for the solution of its basic prob-
lems.
. . . I know that one cannot be right
against the party. It is only possible to be
right with the party and through the party,
for history has not created other ways for the
realization of what is right." 76
Yet at approximately the same time he was also urging a "New
Course" on the Party:
"Away with passive obedience, with mechani-
cal levelling by the authorities , with suppres-
sion of personality, with servility, and with
careerism! A Bolshevik is not merely a dis-
ciplined man: he is a man who in each case
and on each question forges a firm opinion of
his own and defends it courageously and in-
dependently not only against his enemies but
inside his own party . To-day perhaps he will
be in a minority ... he will submit . . .
but this does not always signify that he is in
the wrong. Perhaps he has seen or has under-
stood a new task or the necessity of a turn
earlier than others have done. He will per-
sistently raise the question a second , a third
,
a tenth time, if need be. Thereby he will
render his party a service helping it to meet
the new task fully armed, or to carry out the
I
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necessary turn without organic upheaval and
without factional convulsions . " 77
And so Trotsky swung first to one antipode, then to
the other, fluctuating between the extremes of "democracy"
and "centralism." After the single "dictator" had substi-
tuted himself for the Party and after the Party, "in the last
analysis always right," had expelled Trotsky from its ranks,
he formed his own party. But more than once Trotsky was
called upon to sanction the expulsion of a minority in the
name of "discipline." It was an endless treadmill, one which
the Dewey Commission only dimly perceived.
II. The Political Charges
In the litany of sins attributed to "Judas-Trotsky"
the Soviet indictment specified certain political crimes, in
addition to the aforementioned conspiratorial contacts and
historical transgressions. Trotsky's alleged affinity for
"terrorism," in particular, was a prominent feature in both
the Zinoviev-Kamenev and Pyat akov-Radek trials. There was
also the matter of systematic "wrecking" (sabotage), a major
charge in the second trial. And, of course, Trotsky's fra-
ternal ties to the Nazi hierarchy received great attention,
especially in the Pyat akov-Radek spectacular. In each case
Trotsky was eager to explode the accusations and demonstrate
before the Dewey Commission their inherent absurdity.
Terrorism
!
After the first trial Trotsky declared, in sorrow,
"My_ participation in terrorism is thus a common denominator
of all the confessions." 78 Certainly this "bloody thread"
ran through the indictments in both trials, and was repeated,
ad nauseam, by most of the defendants. I. I. Reingold, for
instance, asserted that only "the idea of a terrorist fight
against the leaders of the Party and the Government" held
together the heterogeneous bloc. 79 The use of individual
terrorism, of course, was incompatible with the Marxist
tradition, but the conspirators had no choice. "They came
to terrorism, to murder," stated Prosecutor Vyshinsky, "be-
cause their position had become hopeless, because they
realized that they were isolated from power, from the working
class. They came to terrorism because of the complete ab-
sence of favourable prospects for them in the fight for
OQ
power by other methods and by other means." The "bestial
rage and hatred" of this association of political assassins
was turned against Stalin and his "glorious comrades-in-
8
1
arms "--Kirov , Ordzhonikidze
,
Zhdanov, Kossior, Postyshev.
In the Pyatakov-Radek trial more details were added
to this picture of widespread terroristic activity. Gangs
of assassins roamed the streets of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev,
Rostov, Novosibirsk, Sochi, and other cities, searching for
their targets. Other names were added to the murderers'
list—Molotov, Kaganovich, Yezhov, Eiche , Beria—but there
was little to show for this feverish enterprise. Sergei
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Kirov, the "Beacon," was struck down; and Molotov was in-
volved in a prearranged automobile "accident." Yet the mur-
derous venture continued, despite setbacks. In particular
there was an effort to fell Stalin. As Trotsky allegedly
told K. B. Berman-Yurin, "'Stalin must be physically de-
O O
stroyed. 1 "
Before the Dewey Commission Trotsky emphatically re-
jected the tactic of individual terrorism on historical and
political, but not moral grounds. Many years earlier,
claimed Trotsky, the Bolsheviki had learned that terrorist
acts—whether successful or unsuccessful—only resulted in
massive repression and the destruction of the best cadres.
"Could the Oppositionists," he asked, "educated upon the
enormous experience of the revolutionary movement, have en-
tertained even a moment's belief that terror is capable of
bringing them closer to power? Russian history, Marxist
8 3theory, political psychology reply: No, they could not!"
In support of this claim Trotsky introduced into the
record a number of his early writings on terrorism. In 1902
the youthful Trotsky had rejected personal vengeance for the
martyrs incarcerated in Tsarist prisons . Instead he favored
revolutionary vengeance : " ' Not for the execution of minis-
ters, but for the execution of the autocracy. 1 " In exile
and in prison , he expl ained , the Marxists debated this "life-
and-death" matter with the Russian terrorists: "How many
times did we break personal relationships on this most burning
of all questions!" This fight against terrorism was not a
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"mystical or religious principle" with the Marxists, but a
question of organizing the workers. As he wrote in 1909,
the concentration of energy on the "'supreme moment- ex-
eluded agitational and organizational activity among the
masses: "'Struggling against terrorism, the Marxian intel-
ligentsia defended their right or their duty not to withdraw
from the working-class districts for the sake of tunneling
mines underneath the Grand Ducal and Tsarist palaces.'"
This tactic was just a "'blind alley'" that played into the
hands of the provocateurs; the system was important, not the
individual. In 1911 Trotsky wrote Friedrich Adler, editor
of Per Kampf
,
that terrorism could produce confusion for only
a short time:
"... The capitalist state does not rest upon
ministers and cannot be destroyed together with
them. The classes whom the state serves will
always find new men— the mechanism remains in-
tact and continues to function. But much deeper
is that confusion which the terrorist attempts
introduce into the ranks of the working masses
.
If it is enough to arm oneself with a revolver
to reach the goal , then to what end are the
endeavors of the class struggle? If a pinch of
powder and a slug of lead are ample to shoot
the enemy through the neck, where is the need
of a class organization? . . . Individual ter-
rorism in our eyes is inadmissible precisely
for the reason that it lowers the masses in
their own consciousness
,
reconciles them to im-
potence, and directs their glances and hopes
towards the great avenger and emancipator who
will some day come and accomplish his mission. 11
Over the years Trotsky consistently argued that individual
terrorism merely substituted itself for mass action. Con-
sequently, in the aftermath of the Kirov assassination, he
rejected Nikolayev's murderous action, and contended that
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both terrorism and bureaucratism overestimated the individual
and disparaged the masses: " Individual terrorism in its very
essence is bureaucratism turned inside out. 1,84
Trotsky's opposition to individual terrorism, how-
ever, was not based on a tenderhearted attachment to the
sanctity of life. There was a political calculation to be
made: would terrorism help or hinder the liberation of the
masses? If such a tactic would aid the working class move-
ment, he informed the Preliminary Commission, "I would pro-
claim it and appeal to the best elements of the working class
to resort to individual terror. Say what is, what is neces-
sary; that is the first rule of my thoughts and my ac-
8 5tions." But on the grounds of expediency it must be re-
jected as a viable tactic:
Trotsky: Politically, economically^ and
strategically, it /individual terrorism/ is
absolutely contrary to the best interests of
the working masses.
Finerty: Without any question of, or any
moral point of view one way or another. Ex-
cluding the moral question, it is not effec-
tive?
Trotsky: If you permit me to say my
opinion : When the oppression of the masses
is so terrible, especially in certain countries,
then every method is morally justified if the
masses can be liberated. It is only a question,
if this method is capable of liberating the
masses or not.
Finerty : Your opposition to individual
terror , while it may be morally justified , is
that it is not an effective political movement
?
Trotsky : Absolutely so.^
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If individual terrorism was politically inexpedient,
however, "revolutionary" terror was a legitimate instrument
in the hands of the masses. Without a sign of remorse,
Trotsky defended the execution of the Tsar and his family
in 1918— "a military measure of a local type or character"—
and argued that the "Red Terror" of the Civil War was a re-
sult of foreign capitalist intervention. Certainly he felt
no guilt about his actions as leader of the Red Army: "I am
ready to carry all the responsibility for all the terroristic
acts committed by the Russian people against their oppres-
8 7
sors." Revolutionary terror was a necessity in the cir-
cumstances :
. . .
In this harsh work I was obliged to resort
to drastic measures. For these I bear full
responsibility before the world working class
and before history. The justification of rig-
orous measures lay in their historical necessity
and progressive character, in their corres-
pondence with the fundamental interest of the
working class. To all repressive measures
dictated by the conditions of civil war , I gave
their real designation, and I have given a
public accounting for them before the working
masses. I had nothing to hide from the people,
as today I have nothincr to hide from the
Commission. 00
CI ass interests—this was the final justification for mass
executions
.
The defense of the "progressive" role of revolution-
ary terror raised other questions. Considering the bureauc-
racy's oppression of the Soviet masses, would Trotsky coun-
tenance the use of revolutionary terror to overthrow the
regime? And would he sanction the "execution" of Stalin?
At the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky testified that until 1933
he had believed it possible to "reform" the Soviet system
through peaceful means, but after the Comintern's defeat in
Germany, he had changed his line: "'The Comintern is no
more a revolutionary organization, and the leading party of
the Comintern, the old Bolshevik Party, is no longer con-
sidered as a revolutionary party. 1 " Only through a new
political revolution could the bureaucratic cadres be removed
Consequently, a 1936 resolution of the Fourth International
stated: '" The working class of the U.S.S.R
. has been robbed
of the last possibility of a legal reformation of the state
.
The struggle against the bureaucracy necessarily becomes a.
89
revolutionary struggle .' "
To advocate a revolutionary struggle was not to
countenance individual terrorism or any "political adventur-
ism, " but it certainly implied the use of violent force on a
large scale . If the regime were overthrown , asked Finerty
,
would it be "a necessary political measure, a defensive
political measure , to execute the bureaucracy? " In answer
to this awkward question
,
Trotsky was somewhat equivocal
.
When the hour of the revolution arrived, he assured Finerty,
"it will be such a powerful uprising of the masses that the
bureaucracy will become immediately disoriented and dis-
organized
,
just as the Tsarist regime in the February revolu-
tion." It was Trotsky's "hope" that at the critical moment
the "powerful and terrible bureaucracy would be absolutely
419
pitiful," but he could not take responsibility for its
course of action. "If the bureaucracy will oppose the
masses, they will naturally take severe measures. But in-




The use of revolutionary force to overthrow the
Stalinist apparatus, continued Trotsky, did not imply the
liquidation of Stalin, as Vyshinsky had claimed. In both
trials the Prosecutor contended that Trotsky had publicly
called for the use of terror in "documents which their
author has proclaimed urbi et orbi . " He cited as proof of
this allegation Trotsky's "Open Letter" of March 1, 1932,
and an article in the Bulletin of the Opposition
,
October,
911933. But in the case of the "Open Letter," which Trotsky
addressed to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee
of the USSR, after he had been stripped of Soviet citizen-
ship, it was Lenin who was quoted on the need to remove
Stalin:
"... Stalin has led you into a blind alley.
Without liquidating Stalinism there is no way
out. You must trust in the working class,
give the proletarian vanguard the possibility
of reviewing the whole Soviet system and
pitilessly cleansing it of the accumulated





1 ast urgent advice of Lenin— to remove Stalin .
"
Trotsky advised the Central Executive Committee in 1932 that
Stalin, without the bureaucratic apparatus, was "'nothing, a
mere cipher. ... It is high time to abandon the Stalin
myth.'" In other words, as Trotsky informed the Preliminary
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Commission, he had only been "invoking Lenin's Testament"
when he recommended that Stalin be removed from his post.
Thus, the terror charge stemmed from "a consciously falsified
interpretation" of an article, which could be checked by any
literate person: "Such are the methods of Vyshinsky! Such
are the methods of Stalin!"
The 1932 admonition "to remove" Stalin, therefore,
did not imply his liquidation. The Soviet authorities at
the time could have unseated him "in a legal way," argued
Trotsky before the Preliminary Commission. 93 But a year
later he had concluded that constitutional means would no
longer suffice in eliminating the ruling clique: "'They can
be compelled to hand over power to the proletarian vanguard
only by force. 1 " Trotsky, of course, had few qualms about
the use of revolutionary violence. "I never passed myself
off as a pacifist, a Tolstoyan, a follower of Gandhi," he in-
formed the commissioners rather needlessly . Serious revolu-
tionaries "never play with violence," but neither do they
refuse to use it "if history does not permit of other methods.
After 1933 he urged the Russian masses to stage a new politi-
cal revolution against the bureaucratic clique , and use
revolutionary violence , if necessary. But revolutions could
not be provoked artificially; they were not made to order:
They spring from the development of society.
They cannot be evoked artificially. It is even
less possible to repl ace revoluti on by the ad-
venturism of terrorist acts. When Vyshinsky
identifies, instead of counterposing, these two
methods—that of individual terror and that of
mass insurrection—he blots out the entire
history of the Russian Revolution and the en-
tire philosophy of Marxism. What does he putin their place? A frame-up! 94
Mass violence, Yes! Individual terror, No! This was
Trotsky's line before the Dewey Commission.
In essence, then, Trotsky asserted that revolutionary
violence could be applied against the bureaucracy, but not
against Stalin personally: "It is not a personal guestion.
It is a guestion of the regime." 95 The bureaucratic appara-
tus had created Stalin after "its own image," and its leaders
varied from one another only "a centimeter or so in height
and a few centimeters in girth." To substitute a Kossior or
Kaganovich for Stalin would change little. As a result, in-
dividual terror appeared 'so pathetic and puny in our eyes,"
he argued repeatedly. 9 ^
Once again the final report of the Dewey Commission,
Not Guilty
,
reflected Trotsky's position, and scoffed at
Vyshinsky's accusations. There were innumerable "terrorist"
groups operating throughout the Soviet Union, yet so little
was accomplished; this "'intense activity,'" one must assume,
"was chiefly in the line of conversation." There were so
"many conversations about conversations on terrorism," con-
tinued the Dewey Commission, that only a careful scrutiny
could reveal "the extreme disproportion between the extent
and duration of the alleged terrorist activity, and its con-
crete result." The few details about the alleged attempts
indicated "such feebleness in planning and such want of
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resolution on the part of the executants as to inspire
skepticism rather than conviction." Famous revolutionaries,
men with records of courage and resolution, had used "dila-
tory and amateurish" means and "questionable agents" in their
alleged plots. It was hardly "credible," especially since
they faced certain death. In short, "revolutionary motive"
was lacking in the State's case.
As for Trotsky's views on individual terrorism, Not
Guilty quoted at length from his historical writings and
testimony on the subject, and found the record convincing.
Certainly the 1932 "Open Letter" could not be interpreted as
a call for Stalin's assassination, since "Lenin's advice to
'remove Stalin' has never been interpreted to imply terror-
ism," declared the authors of the report. This "Open Letter"
could only be regarded as "treasonable" if one accepted the
position that "opposition to the policies of the leaders of
the Communist Party and the Soviet government is synonymous
98
with criminal activity against the Soviet state and people."
In the October 1933 article Trotsky did advocate the use of
force to remove the ruling clique, but Vyshinsky omitted many
passages which showed that Trotsky was calling for revolu-
tionary mass action, not individual terrorism. Prosecutor
Vyshinsky, in his partial quotations, "deliberately identifies
revolutionary mass action with individual terrorism. The
distinction is obvious and historical." Vyshinsky could not
quote him accurately, because "all of Trotsky's writings on
the problem reject individual terror and justify only
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revolutionary mass action." Thus, concluded Not Guilty
, "the
charge of individual terrorism is not only not proved but in-
QQ
credible . "
Doubtlessly "all" of Trotsky's writings on the sub-
ject did reject individual terrorism, but the question re-
mains: why not assassinate Stalin? Certainly the Soviet
dictator expected such an attempt as only logical, considering
the historical circumstances. There had been such an accumu-
lation of power in the dictator's hands, that the image of
the bureaucracy had surely been refashioned in his image, and
not the obverse, as Trotsky contended. As a loyal defender
of classical Marxism, Trotsky tended to overestimate
"objective " forces and underestimate the personal equation
in formulating his revolutionary strategy. If Stalin had
been removed from the scene in 1937, one may speculate, his
epigones would have found themselves floundering between a
demoralized bureaucracy and an embittered population. In
f act , the "logic" of Trotsky ' s position did not completely
exclude such a "solution" to the problem.
In 1919 Trotsky had defended the use of mass terror
against the criticisms of Karl Kautsky. 100 Only through the
systematic and energetic use of violence could the "cl ass
will" of the enemy be broken, for it had an "educative"
value. This was merely a question of expediency, not prin-
ciple. Whereas the Tsar terrorized the workers, the Bolsheviks
applied terror to landlords, capitalists, and generals: "Do
you grasp this . . . distinction? Yes? For us Communists it
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is quite sufficient." Certainly the Bolsheviks rejected the
"Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle" about the
sacredness of human life. To make the individual sacred,
argued Trotsky, "we must destroy the social order which




Again in 1938, some nineteen years later, Trotsky
strenuously defended the use of violence to crush the class
enemy. In a polemic against bourgeois critics of Bolshevik
"amorality ,
" entitled "Their Morals and Ours," Trotsky as-
serted that to condemn civil war terror was merely to embrace
10?
a "counter-revolutionary" morality. Morality, after all,
was just "one of the ideological functions" of the class
struggle; it reflected social development and social interests
and had a definite class character. What served the interests
of the proletarian class and the Party, therefore, was by
definition moral: "To a revolutionary Marxist there can be
no contradiction between personal morality and the interests
of the party, since the party embodies in his ./sic/ con-
sciousness the very highest tasks and aims of mankind." The
end was justified, he informed Max Eastman, John Dewey, and
their kind, if "it leads to increasing the power of man over
nature and to the abolition of the power of man over man."
This meant revolution. The "liberating morality of the pro-
letariat of necessity is endowed with a revolutionary char-
acter," he argued. Only in the "living experience of the
movement" were specific problems of revolutionary morality
clarified, but there was no dualism from means and end: "The
end flows naturally from the historical movement." In short,
anything that "prepares the complete and final overthrow of
imperialist bestiality is moral, and nothing else. The wel-
fare of the revolution--that is the supreme lawi" 103
Trotsky, to recapitulate, was willing to use revolu-
tionary violence in 1937 against the bureaucratic "caste,"
but not against Stalin personally. Yet the Stalinist social
order was "crucifying" the individual worker and the toiling
class as a whole. If the social order could be demoralized
by striking a mighty blow at its leader, was not that a com-
pletely moral act? Although in the last years of his life
Trotsky increasingly stressed the personal evil of "Cain-
Djugashvili , " he continued to view the dictator as an agent
of a new "caste," if not new class. But if he had carried
the logic of moral expediency to the end, he would have seen
that the revolution demanded an assault on the leader in
order to undermine the bureaucracy. In terms of Bolshevik
"morality," it made little difference which blow came first.
Only success mattered, a fact Stalin well understood. "The
welfare of the revolution—that is the supreme law!"
Wrecking !
The most inspired charge in the Pyat akov-Radek trial
involved industrial sabotage. A handful of Trotskyite
"diversionists" had conspired to undermine the Soviet economy
and create mass discontent. Factories sabotaged, trains
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wrecked, mines flooded—these acts of wrecking were specif-
ically ordered by the Trotskyite Chief, despite his long-
standing reputation as a "super-industrializer. 1,104
In his final speech before tne Py at akov-Radek court,
Vyshinsky had argued that there was no contradiction between
Trotsky's public support for massive industrialization in the
Soviet Union and his clandestine campaign to sabotage the
very underpinnings of the economy. In 1926-27, admitted the
Prosecutor, the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang had used "false
and sometimes outwardly seeming 'Left' phrases about 'super-
industrialization,'" but this had been an effort to smash the
alliance of workers and peasants. The chief aim then and now
was to wreck the foundation of the state. Only the means had
changed. "Strictly speaking, these proposals and demands
were on a line with the present acts of diversion and
wrecking. Strictly speaking, there is only a difference in
form between the wrecking and diversive acts of 1926-27 and
those of the present time." Ten years had passed, with the
destructive activities taking much sharper forms, "corres-
ponding to the new conditions, to the conditions of the
fierce class struggle against the remnants of the capitalist
elements." 105 But Trotsky had not changed: he was still an
enemy of the Soviet economy.
With a certain sense of de ja vu , Trotsky informed the
Preliminary Commission that the charge of "sabotage" was an
old accusation, extending back to 1929, but then it was just
a "literary calumny," a link in preparing future judicial
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frame-ups. He explained that the issue of industrialization
had been the "first question" in his conflict with Stalin.
During the 1920s Stalin had been "very timid" on this issue,
but soon the conflict took on a "venomous character," in-
volving questions of democracy and the bribing of function-
aries: "Then we had this feeling, that it was not incidental
differences, but that there were two minds, two methods, two
moods, and two moralities, if you wish. Then it became a
factional struggle." While Trotsky was fighting in 1922-29
for "accelerated industrialization," his policy met strong
opposition: "It was the official name for the Trotskyites at
that time: Super-industrializers . " For instance, when
Trotsky advocated the construction of a hydro-electric sta-
tion at Dnieprostroy in 1926, Stalin ridiculed the proposal:
"'For us to build up the Dnieprostroy station is the same as
1 Of.for a peasant to buy a gramophone instead of a cow.'"
In 1925-26 plans for increased industrialization were
first discussed, but Trotsky was so outraged at the modest
goals envisioned that he labeled them a "'Sabotage of
Industry,'" an incarnation of the spirit of "economic cow-
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ardice." After the first Five-Year Plan was implemented,
however, "impractical men" scrapped all limits, and raised
"the coefficients without paying any attention to the living
conditions of the workers." In 1930, therefore, Trotsky
changed his tune. He incessantly warned against setting maxi-
mum tempos and allowing disproportions between branches of
industry: factories were being built, but not housing for
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the workers. Only free and unfettered discussion and
criticism could correct the serious contradictions within
the economy: "A plan of socialist construction cannot be
arrived at in the guise of an a priori department direc-
tive. For seven years, as he told the Preliminary
Commission
,
I untiringly warned against the ruinous con-
sequences of skipping the period of laboratory
preparation, of putting incomplete plants into
operation, of supplanting technical training
and correct organization by frantic and sense-
less reprisals, and, not infrequently, fantastic
premiums
.
But at the same time he defended the achievements of Soviet
industrialization against various critics. The successes
were "very important," he asserted, but "two or three times
less than they could be under a regime of Soviet democracy." 1 '
Much the same criticism was made of Soviet forced
collectivization. Once again Trotsky defended the
"successes" in collectivizing the Soviet peasantry, but
criticized the attempt to complete the process in the first
Five-Year Plan. Too much was lacking— tractors, roads,
technicians, and a necessary level of culture. Moreover,
the results of the campaign were difficult to assess, since
the statistics on collectivization were "as false as the in-
dictments," having been "totalitarianized. " But Trotsky was
convinced that the struggle had resulted in "hundreds, thou-
sands and millions of exterminated peasants." Hardly known
for his pro-peasant stance, Trotsky still contended that
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... it was necessary to explain to them toteach them, to win them—not to kill the kulak
I am not afraid of the kulak. The kulaks arepeasants who exploit the other peasants. Butthe actions of the bureaucracy were to kill thekulaks and to push, by these methods, the otherpeasants into the camp of the hostile elementsby fear. -LI 0 '
In other words, Trotsky would have followed the same policy,
but achieved better results without the excessive use of
force
.
All of these internal contradictions, disproportions,
excesses— argued Trotsky—resulted in an inevitable crisis.
But these phenomena, "long known as chronic diseases of
Soviet economic life," were then put forward as "the fruits
of a malicious conspiracy which Pyatakov led—naturally,
under my orders." The blame for disorganized plants,
damaged machinery, and industrial accidents should be placed
on the regime's use of naked commands, reprisals and premiums
( "Stakhamvism" ) . "There is not the slightest ground for
dragging a 'Trotskyite conspiracy 1 into this matter," he de-
clared. But Trotsky was ready to admit that some of the de-
fendants might have committed real "errors" in managing the
economy, and even that a few might actually be spies: "It
was possible that some were genuine German and Japanese
agents, and that they committed sabotage on the orders of
the Japanese General Staff. It is not excluded." 11 ^ No
matter, the wrecking charges were still the "crudest part of
112
the judicial frame-up," in Trotsky's opinion.
What was "perfectly incomprehensible" to Trotsky was
that apparently the leadership of the economy resided "not
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in the hands of the
-genial, infallible leader,'" nor in the
hands of his closest collaborators, "but in the hands of an
isolated man, already nine years in banishment and exile."
In the other parts of the indictment;, noted Trotsky, his
followers were portrayed as "an insignificant handful,
isolated from and hated by the masses." But such widespread
sabotage would only be possible "if the entire administrative
apparatus were in the hands of the saboteurs," if Trotskyites
completely dominated the bureaucracy. Moreover, observed the
chief "saboteur," he had done everything to expose the vari-
ous industrial "crimes," or ailments. "All this would have
been extremely clever— if it were not so utterly nonsensical."
The Pyatakov-Radek trial, he commented with some wonderment,
was "intended to personify in Trotsky the causes for the
accidents and disasters." It was rather arcane: "Against
Ormuzd, the spirit of good, was to be set the evil spirit
Ahriman. 1,113
Madness, all I "Assume me to be mad, assume I have
become insane and I elaborate this plan"--to sabotage Soviet
industry—who would join in such a project? The saboteurs
would have been caught immediately and liquidated, argued
Trotsky, without ever tasting power. Besides, men to not
give their lives for false ideals: "It must be a religious
ideal, a political ideal, or a national ideal." But the
necessary motive was lacking in the allegations, the "weakest
114 • •
point" in the wrecking charge. And such a policy, in any
event, would not have helped the Opposition gain power. Only
on a higher political and cultural level could the bureauc-
racy be overthrown. "it is necessary to raise the people,
and not push them into the depths," asserted this classical
Marxist. Industrial sabotage would have disorganized the
economy and signified "the destruction of the best capital
of the revolution, of the old generation of the revolution,
the best fighters of the Civil War who were educated to repre-
sent the great tradition of history." To follow such an
"absurd tactic," declared Trotsky, "would be economic and
cultural suicide. I deny it categorically." 115 No, the only
question here was one of benefit:
Was it advantageous for the Opposition to
enter into an alliance with Hitler and the
Mikado? And, if not, was it not advantageous
for the bureaucracy to obtain from the
Opposition the confession that it was in al-
liance with Hitler and the Mikado?
Merely to pose the question, " Qui prodest ?," or who profits,
was enough to have the first outlines of the answer, in
116Trotsky's opinion.
The Dewey Commission also had few doubts about the
essential absurdity of the "wrecking" charge. After reviewing
Trotsky's voluminous writings on the Soviet economy, the panel
reached certain conclusions: Vyshinsky had "misrepresented"
the Opposition's 1927 platform, and Trotsky had continuously
"defended" industrialization and collectivization, although
criticizing many facets of the programs. The elaborate theory
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of camouflage, therefore, was "untenable." Moreover, wrote
the authors of Not Guilty , the "fabric of the trial was so
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rotten" that it was impossible to ascertain the guilt or in-
nocence of the other accused wreckers. Certainly the means
and motives for embarking on such a massive sabotage campaign
were lacking, inspiring "grave doubt of the charge of sabo-
tage." More likely, as Trotsky testified and other evidence
indicated, the delays and disproportions in the economy were
not the result of sabotage but just "the chronic diseases of
Soviet industry." The expiation of these shortcomings by
scapegoats was the "usual method of whitewashing the regime."
Therefore, the Dewey Commission found the charge of sabo-
taging the Soviet economy, especially as it concerned Trotsky
118
and his son, "not only not proved but not credible."
It is difficult to find fault with this logic. Ap-
parently the Moscow outcry about "wrecking" was just another
example of the scapegoat syndrome. Since someone had to take
the blame for the numerous problems besetting the Soviet
economy, the logical candidate was the "arch-fiend" living
abroad. Nowhere in the Moscow indictments, however, was it
adequately explained how massive industrial sabotage could
bring Trotsky to power. Wrecked trains in Siberia had little
or no political importance.
Agent of the Fascists !
When it was initially charged in the Zinoviev-Kamenev
trial that Trotsky had established fraternal links with the
German Nazis, the accusation was greeted with great skepticism
in Europe and America. The first communique out of Moscow,
433
with its mention of ties to the Gestapo, caused Trotsky him-
self to brand this "'the work of a drunken agent provocateur
and an illiterate one, to boot!'" 119 Yet in the second trial
Vyshinsky elaborated on the accusation: Trotsky had promised
certain territorial, political, and material concessions to
Hitler and the Mikado in exchange for help in regaining power.
In personal negotiations with Rudolph Hess, Vice-Chairman of
the German National-Socialist Party, Trotsky had also pro-
mised to adopt a "defeatist" line in the forthcoming war and
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sabotage Soviet military preparations. "'Hasten the col-
lision
—
provoke war, prepare for the defeat of the U.S.S.R."
—
121this was the Trotskyite foreign policy.
The allegation that he was in the pay of the Germans,
Trotsky told the Preliminary Commission, was another old ac-
cusation. It was the second time he had been so accused.
Both the British and Kerensky's government made the same
charge in 1917: "Today this accusation seems a plagiarism
from Stalin and Vyshinsky. In fact, it is Stalin and
Vyshinsky who are plagiarizing from the Tsarist counter-
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espionage system and the British Intelligence Service."
Two decades ago Lenin had refuted these "filthy insinuations,"
and nothing had changed in the ensuing twenty years. Such a
policy was doomed beforehand:
If I enter into relations with fascists and the
Mikado, I am not a socialist, not a revolution-
ary, but a miserable adventurist. And if this
accusation is proved to be true and correct,
then I lose all. What can I have, except the
power of my ideals for socialism? I compromise
I
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my aim, my ideal, myself. It is so contrary to
all my Marxist education, to all my past— forty
years' work in the masses and through the
masses— if I can conceive of the possibility of
such an indictment.
After reading the trial record, added Trotsky, "I have the
12 3impression of reading Dostoyevsky .
"
Certainly Trotsky had a "very peculiar manner" in
serving his alleged allies. As he informed the Preliminary
Commission, article after article of his in the early 1930s
warned against Hitler's threat to the revolutionary movement
and urged Stalin to join with the German Social Democrats to
fight the Nazis. "'By your policy,'" he reproached Stalin,
"'you prepare a new Wr angel , a super-Wrangel on a world-wide
scale. He will be Hitler.'" But convinced that Hitler would
remain in power only a few months, followed by a Communist
triumph, the Comintern conceded power to the Nazis without a
significant struggle. As for Trotsky, he was branded a
"Left Social-Fascist." This was "one of the most miserable
treasons in history," Trotsky declared before the Dewey
Commission: "I can say that they /the Comintern and its
agents/ were objectively the allies of Hitler in that situa-
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tion, and not myself."
After 1933 Trotsky continued to write numerous
articles castigating the Nazi leadership, and yet, miracle of
miracles, this Jewish Revolutionary entered into negotiations
with Rudolph Hessi It was all so peculiar. His whole life
was just "camouflage" for his "real" work—conspiring with
the Nazis. This "alliance," added Trotsky, made
little sense
from the fascist side. The Nazis would never have allowed
him to fulfill his revolutionary program: "Is it not clear
in advance that Hitler and the Mikado, after using such an
agent to the limit, would fling him aside like a squeezed
lemon?" No, the several variants of the accusation were
"internally meaningless," especially since there was no hope
of escaping detection. Only a "lunatic" could hope to gain
power in this way, he declared. The alliance with Germany
and Japan rested "wholly in the domain of metaphysics," the
"most dastardly of all the police metaphysics in the history
of mankind! 1,125
But would not war spur revolution and help Trotsky
regain power, his critics asked? Granted, war often
sharpened social contradictions and led to mass discontent,
admitted Trotsky, but this was insufficient for the " triumph "
of the proletarian revolution. "Without a revolutionary
party rooted in the masses," he argued, "the revolutionary
situation leads to the most cruel defeats." It was in the
"vital interest" of his movement that war be delayed as long
as possible. Revolutionary situations came and went, but
without a "bold, courageous, consistent revolutionary party"
they came to naught and could be disastrous. A strong revo-
lutionary party might even make war unnecessary. "The more
firm, the more courageous, the more revolutionary the conduct
of the toilers," he contended, "the more the imperialists
will hesitate, the more surely will it be possible to post-
pone war, the greater will be the chance that the revolution
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will occur prior to war and perhaps make war itself
impossible
.
" Certainly the ex-War Commissar had no great
love for military conflicts:
War and revolution are the gravest and most
tragic phenomena in human history . You cannot
joke with them. They do not tolerate dilet-
tantism. We must understand clearly the inter-
relationship of war and revolution. We must
understand no less clearly the interrelationship
of the objective revolutionary factors, which
cannot be induced at will, and the subjective
factor of the revolution—the conscious vanguard
of the proletariat , its party . It is necessary
to prepare this party with the utmost energy.
It was unimaginable , therefore , that the small band of
hounded and persecuted Trotskyites would engage in adventur-
ism rather than preparing their party for the coming struggles.
"Only the cynical contempt of Stalin and his school for world
public opinion, together with Stalin's primitive police




War without revolution, moreover, would signify a
"tremendous historic retreat" and possibly the "decline of
European civilization." 127 Trotsky believed that military
defeat for the Soviet Union would mean "the restoration of
capitalism in a semi-colonial form under a fascist political
regime, the dismemberment of the country, and the wrecking
of the October Revolution." Thus, he advocated the
"unconditional " defense of the Soviet Union in any war with
the imperialists. Again and again Trotsky broke with col-
leagues on this ticklish question. In his view war threatened
"the new social basis of the U.S.S.R., which represents
a
tremendous step forward in the development of mankind." This
was a "deformed" workers' state with a "deformed" socialist
economy, he admitted, but it was still a workers' state.
Thus, the Trotskyites defended the Soviet Union as "an in-
heritance of the October Revolution, as an open door to a
1 2 8better future, in spite of Stalin and Vyshinsky."
This complicated position meant that in case of war
Trotsky would be a "good soldier" for the Soviet Union,
"sabotage the war machinery" of Germany and Japan, and yet
prepare a proletarian revolution in Britain and France. Even
if they were allied with Stalin, he feared that these
bourgeois nations would impose social and economic conces-
sions on the Soviet Union, and force it to become another
"bourgeois state." If Soviet Russia resisted, France and
Great Britain would join her enemies 'to stifle the Soviet
Union at the end of the war." The French proletariat, there-
fore, should actively oppose their own bourgeoisie in order
to hinder the imposition of a "bourgois regime or capitalist
regime" on the Soviet Union at the end of the coming war.
Only the "consciousness of the revolutionary masses" could
guarantee against the triumph of reaction and fascism. This
was the only hope
:
The defeat of the Soviet Union is inevitable
in case the new war shall not provoke a new
revolution. I believe it is impossible, it is
incredible, that a new war will permit capitalism,
decadent capitalism, to remain as it is. The
revolution is inevitable. But if we theoreti-
cally admit war without revolution, then the de-




Was, then, Trotsky a "defeatist?" In the Moscow
trials, of course, he had been tarred with this epithet, and
at one point Vyshinsky had even "quoted" Trotsky as writing:
"'We must restore the tactics of Clemenceau, who, as is well
known, rose against the French Government at a time when the
i 30Germans were 80 kms . from Paris.'" The chief "witness"
in the Coyoacan hearings had only scorn for this charge.
Clemenceau, after all, was known as "'the father of victory'"
in France, and had never organized an insurrection.
Vyshinsky and the regime were merely justifying interior
violence by citing a danger of war-- "cl assic subterfuge of
Bonapartism i " When Trotsky first brought up Clemenceau 's
experience, he was only attempting to stress the need for
free criticism even during wartime. But Trotsky no longer
invoked the example of Clemenceau, he told the sub-commission,
because "the Bonapartism of Stalin has barred the road to
legal reform." Free criticism— in peacetime or wartime—was
no longer possible. The Clemenceau accusation, in any event,
was just another Stalinist device. "And it is of such
shoddy tricks that the whole accusation is made up. Lies
and frame-ups! Frame-ups and lies! Sum total—the firing
a -131squad. "
The final report of the Dewey Commission devoted a
lengthy chapter— "The Charge of Agreements with Foreign
Powers"— to a discussion of Trotsky's "defeatism" and his
"links" with the fascists. As in the case of the other
charges, the testimony in the Moscow trials was compared
to
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the testimony in the Mexican hearings, to Trotsky's writings,
and to the many affidavits in the Commission's possession. 132
All of this evidence indicated that Trotsky had "steadily ad-
vocated the defense of the Soviet Union," not defeatism, and
that he and his followers had never "had any connection with
agents of German fascism," despite the Moscow charges. 133
Even Radek and Vyshinsky had admitted that the policy of
"revanche" with the fascists had little hope of success and
could only result in the destruction of the Trotskyite
"bloc." Thus, either Trotsky understood that this policy
would be "self-defeating" or his published articles on de-
fending the Soviet Union were a reflection of his true
opinion. Either way, the accusation made little sense.
In order to accept the Moscow conclusions, added
Not Guilty , one must believe that "Trotsky is the most in-
teresting case of split personality in all history, or accept
the Prosecutor's contention that his public activity con-
stituted nothing but an elaborate camouflage for his secret
counter-revolutionary intrigues." The Commission agreed
with Trotsky, moreover, that the activity ascribed to him was
characterized by an "extraordinary stupidity." And his pub-
lished writings had followed "a consistent theoretical line,"
one "diametrically opposed" to the accusations in the two
Moscow trials. Although the Commission was unwilling to take
a position on Trotsky's aims and methods, it did state that
his career had been "that of a man of extraordinary intel-
ligence and ability. To believe that his prodigious public
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activity was intended merely to cloak conspiratoral enter-
prises as stupid, inept and feeble as those ascribed to him
in the trials, would be to abandon any claim to common
sense." Therefore, the charge of conspiracy with foreign
power was "not only not proved, but preposterous." 134
Thus, Trotsky and the Dewey Commission agreed on the
"stupidity" of the charge. But it is possible that they
both missed a "signal" from Stalin to Hitler as was discussed
in the first chapter. Trotsky himself had once remarked that
surely Berlin and Tokyo realized the Moscow accusations on
135foreign alliances were "sheer twaddle." If the charges
were inherently absurd— "sheer twaddle"—then why make them?
At one point in the Mexican hearings the partici-
pants touched upon another explanation for making this
particular charge. When Miss La Follette asked Trotsky's
opinion of a possible Moscow-Berlin wartime alliance, the
"witness" responded that the possibility was "not excluded,"
but attributed such a desire to a segment of the bureaucracy:
"I believe that the accusation against me is directed
against a certain part of the bureaucracy," which feared the
-I o c
consequences of war. At another point he agreed with
Miss La Follette that Stalin was using this charge for his
own reasons:
Yes, it is very possible. Many symptoms
indicate that Stalin has to fight a certain
part of the bureaucracy which will assure its
position at any price, even at the price of
an alliance or friendship with Hitler. Stalin
is, I suppose, not inclined now to go along in
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this way, but will expose this tendency by the
specter of Trotskyism: "It is Trotsky's
policy; we will execute everybody who is of
the same opinion." This is not an opinion on
my part, only a supposition.
And when Otto Ruehle cited an article in a Prague newspaper
on the possibility of a secret understanding between Moscow
and Berlin, Trotsky replied that this was "an affirmation of
my hypothetical opinion, a partial affirmation." But whether
this was a serious ploy or just a "diplomatic bluff" to force
closer French-Soviet relations, he could not say: "I don't
137know. But every bluff can become serious."
Was the charge against Trotsky of conspiratorial
links with the Fascists merely part of the "frame-up" or an
elaborate and intricate pas de deux between Moscow and
Berlin? Only the Party archives in the Kremlin can answer
this question with certainty. But with a certain amount of
historical hindsight it appears that Stalin was not engaged
in a "diplomatic bluff." The "foreign policy" attributed to
Trotsky in the Moscow trials bears a striking similarity to
the subterranean Soviet policy in those years, which only
surfaced in August, 1939. If Trotsky was a stalking horse
for Stalin's new policy toward Hitlerite Germany, the Russian
exile remained unaware of his role in the drama. He accepted
the accusation at face value.
III. The Nature of the Trials
Despite innumerable volumes written about the "show
trials," they have remained essentially an enigma to this day
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Some of the major questions asked in 1936-38 are still being
discussed. Why did the Old Bolsheviks capitulate so easily?
Why did they make such abject confessions during the trials?
And perhapr most perplexing of all, why were the trials
staged in the first place? To all of these questions Trotsky
had ready answers in 1937, based on a lifetime in the revolu-
tionary movement and many bitter experiences at the hands of
Stalin.
Karl Radek and Capitulation
Nothing disturbed Trotsky more than the sorry spec-
tacle of once-proud revolutionists bowing before the
Dictator's knee and begging for absolution. Beginning in
1927 he watched in impotent rage as his former associates
responded to Stalin's siren song and were turned into swine.
As each one capitulated Trotsky violently broke relations
with them, no matter how intimate the ties had been, and
condemned each and every one to historical damnation. Yet—
cruel jest—these very capitulators emerged in 1936-38 as
his "co-conspirators" in an elaborate plot to overthrow the
regime
!
Before the Preliminary Commission in Mexico Trotsky
attempted to explain his chilly relations with previous as-
sociates. "It is a historical and political law," he testi-
fied, "that the relationship between the Oppositionists and
the capitulators was all these years more bitter than the re-
lationship between the Oppositionists and the Stalinists."
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Capitulation to him was a form of "political death," as he
once warned Zinoviev and Kamenev. In the late 1920s and
early 1930s Trotsky devoted at least 84 articles to this de-
grading behavior, and was unsparing in his vitriolic abuse
of the practice. As a result, there was no possibility of
forming a new bloc with Zinoviev and Kamenev: "My apprecia-
tion of them, my total contempt after the capitulation, my




During the Coyoacan hearings Trotsky was systemati-
cally questioned about his relations with each of the
capitul ator-conspirators . Only for a few of his former as-
sociates did he temper his criticism. Trotsky praised
Mural ov, for instance, as an "exceptionally honest man,"
whose false deposition reflected the fear of a "simple
140
soldier" that the state was in danger. As for Christian
Rakovsky, "my geniune old friend" for some thirty-five years,
Trotsky refrained from attacking him and suggested that
141
Rakovsky might soon become the victim of a new frame-up.
But he described Smirnov's capitulation as differing "little
from the cowardly declaration of Radek." As for Pyatakov--
"the first • Trotskyite' who capitulated publicly"— he was
"'politically finished'" a long time ago and could not be
relied on when great questions arose, as Lenin once con-
*
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tended and Trotsky repeated.
Trotsky took great pains to disassociate himself from
Zinoviev and Kamenev, even though the latter was his
brother-
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in-law. At some length he recalled that they had been "ad-
versaries of the October insurrection," and members of the
"Troika," which directed the Party in 1922-25; Zinoviev and
Kamenev were even more "embittered adversaries" of Trotskv
143than Stalin at the time. For the commissioners he re-
viewed the split (1925-26) in the Troika— "the explosion was
absolutely unexpected by me"— and the subsequent joint bloc
in 1926-27. With the failure of this alliance Trotsky's
group was prepared to accept expulsion from the Party, but
•".the Zinoviev group would avoid the expulsion at any price,"
and capitulated. After 1927 Trotsky broke with his erstwhile
comrades. In subsequent years he characterized them as
"'weathercocks and turncoats'" and wrote that their personal
fate was "profoundly tragic." Despite their character de-
ficiencies, however, Trotsky never doubted that Zinoviev and
Kamenev had rejected personal terrorism and taken no part in
Kirov's assassination. "Real terrorists" would have begun
with Stalin, but Zinoviev and Kamenev were serving the
u . 144dictator, not attempting to assassinate him.
In order, however, to explain the psychology of the
capitulators Trotsky chose the "clearest and most typical"
example—Karl Radek. He had in mind not "arbitrary psycholo-
gical improvisations" after the fact, "but objective charac-
terizations based on unimpeachable documents" which had been
written years earlier. Since Radek had been described by
some foreign journalists as giving the "least artificial"
testimony during the trial, it was important for Trotsky's
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defense to demonstrate that on the defendants' bench sat "not
the real Radek, as nature and his political past made him,
but a 'robot 1 out of the laboratory of the G.P.U." Such a
study wouia help to clarify the role of the other accused iri
145the trials.
According to Vyshinsky, Radek was one of the "'most
able and persistent Trotskyites
,
1 " intimate with "'the big
chief of this gang, Trotsky.'" But "the big chief" found
this characterization an exercise in "inept jesting"
:
Radek ' s outstanding characteristics , as a




undependability , a predisposition toward falling
into panic at the first sign of danger, and ex-
hibiting extreme loquacity when all is well.
The qualities make him a journalistic Figaro of
first-rate skill, an invaluable guide for
foreign correspondents and tourists , but ut-
terly unsuited for the role of conspirator.
Among informed persons it is simply unthinkable
to speak of Radek as an inspirer of terrorist
attempts or the organizer of an international
conspiracy
!
Trotsky conceded that Radek knew something of international
relations; he had been a member of the Council of the People's
Commissariat of Foreign Relations after the Revolution. But
Soviet diplomats complained that "'anything said in Radek'
s
presence is spread all over Moscow by the next morning. 1
"
Lenin refrained from discussing secret matters in Politburo
meetings when Radek was present, and even Stalin asserted in
1924: "'Most men's heads control their tongues; Radek's
tongue controls his head.'" Who could believe that Trotsky
would place in charge of a grandiose project an "individual




capable of expressing serious ideas only 'by accident 1 ?" 146
According to Trotsky, the Bolshevik "literary repre-
sentative" in Stockholm— Radek—returned to Russia only at
the end of 1918; he had not played a role in the Revolution. 1
Trotsky also skipped over Radek' s significant role in
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several German insurrections, but did quote from a 1923
Radek article, "Leon Trotsky, the Organizer of the Victory."
"The need of the hour was for a man who
would incarnate the call to struggle, a man
who, subordinating himself completely to the
requirements of the struggle, would become
the ringing summons to arms, the will which
exacts from all unconditional submission to
a great, sacrificial necessity. Only a man
with Trotsky's capacity for work, only a man
so unsparing of himself as Trotsky, only a
man who knew how to speak to the soldiers as
Trotsky did—only such a man could have be-
come the standard bearer of the armed toilers.
He was all things rolled into one." 14
"
This article "astonished me by its exalted tone," declared
Trotsky, but was important when compared to Radek 1 s later
150
writings, where Trotsky became "'nothing.'"
From 1923-26, according to Trotsky, Radek had
"vacillated" between the Russian Left Opposition and the
German Communist Right Opposition, but for the next three
years ("an unusual period for him!") he had belonged to the
Left Opposition. At the end of 1927 Radek was banished to
Siberia with hundreds of other oppositionists.
151 For about
a year, thereafter, he "tried to stand erect" and attacked
other capitulators. In May 1928, for instance, Radek wrote
to Preobrazhensky that: "'I reject Zinovievism and
Pyatakovism as I reject Dostoievskyism . Doing violence to
447
their convictions, they recant. It is impossible to help the
working class by falsehood. Those who remain must speak the
truth.'" And in October 1928 he protested to the Central
Committee on the conditions of Trotsky's exile: '"We cannot
remain silent and passive while malaria eats away the strength
of the fighter who all his life has served the working class
and who was the sword of the October Revolution.'" But by
the middle of the next year he had capitulated and told some
fellow exiles: "'I have completely broken with L.D. From
now on we are political adversaries. . . . With the collabora-
tor of Lord Beaverbrook we have nothing in common. ' " Quickly
Radek's work took on "'an exceptionally despicable charac-
ter,'" wrote one exiled oppositionist. And Rakovsky ob-
served that each new capitulator was obliged '"to kick at
Trotsky'" using hoofs shod with " • Radekist nails.'" Trotsky
reciprocated the verbal abuse in 1929:
"In capitulating, Radek strikes himself from
the roll of the living. He will fall into the
category of the half-doomed, half-pardoned,
headed by Zinoviev. These people fear to utter
a single syllable aloud, fear to have minds of
their own, and thus live in constant dread of
their own shadows.
Henceforth, Trotsky declared, Radek became the "symbol of the
most degrading forms of capitulation and the knifing of
152
yesterday's friends."
At this point in time occurred the execution of Jacob
Blumkin. This GPU agent with a "conflict of loyalties," was
the first Party member liquidated for an "inner party
offence,
153
an offence no graver than being in contact with
Trotsky."
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It was Radek, charged Trotsky, who betrayed Blumkin.
Curious was the career of the unfortunate Blumkin.
As a young Social-Revolutionary in 1918 he had shot Count
Mirbach, the German Ambassador, which was the signal for a
general uprising against the Bolsheviks. The Party "offi-
cially had to prosecute him," Trotsky told the Dewey
Commission, but actually allowed Blumkin to disappear.
During the Civil War he reappeared as one of Trotsky's most
trusted and courageous aids: "I employed him in my military
secretariat and throughout, when I needed a courageous man,
Blumkin was at my disposal." Nominally a member of the
Opposition in the 1920s, he was close to both Trotsky and
Radek, but finally capitulated in "a very modest manner,"
154
and continued his work for the Party.
In the summer of 1929 Blumkin unexpectedly arrived in
Constantinople. According to Trotsky, this was an official
mission for the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs," but in actual
fact this was GPU business. By chance Blumkin met Leon
(Lyova) Sedov on the street and insisted that Trotsky grant
him an interview. "'Absolutely impossible. It is too
risky,'" was Trotsky's first reaction to this request, but
then relented and received his former colleague for a
lengthly discussion. When Blumkin returned to Soviet Russia
he informed Radek of the interview, who then "denounced
Blumkin immediately to the G.P.U.," claimed Trotsky. It was
"such a stupid thing" on Blumkin' s part, one that Trotsky
would never have advised. But in December of 1929
Trotsky
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got a measure of revenge. He denounced this ," betrayal 1 M
and charged that Radek had lost the last remnants of moral
equilibrium. ' 11 In the future he would stop "'before no
vileness.'" Henceforth the Opposition considered Radek a
"traitor" as well as a capitul ator
.
155
In this account of the Blumkin affair, however,
Trotsky had omitted one fact: Blumkin had carried a secret
letter from Trotsky to the Opposition in the USSR. The young
GPU agent also had plans to use Turkish fishermen for
smuggling the Bulletin of the Opposition across the Black Sea
Only later did Trotsky admit to the Dewey Commission the
existence of the secret communique , but contended it had only
a "general political character," and was not addressed to
Radek. The message was so general and trivial, agreed Isaac
Deutscher, that it was "feckless of Trotsky and Blumkin to
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take any rish at all in transmitting it."
There are other curious aspects of the affair. One
may doubt with Isaac Deutscher that the meeting in
Constantinople was just a "chance encounter. " In addition,
onthere is a possibility that Blumkin was sent to spy
157
Trotsky, or even assassinate him. And Radek may have
viewed Blumkin 1 s confession as a test of his loyalty, or even
a provocation, and felt he had no choice but to inform his
158
masters of the meeting in Turkey.
In any event, the break between Radek and Trotsky was
complete after Blumkin' s execution. Soon Radek was one of
Stalin's loyal courtiers, and became "'quite notorious in his
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new role as Stalin's personal friend, 1 " an informant wrote
159Trotsky. In subsequent years Trotsky castigated this
"
' lightminded man,'" while Radek denied that the War
Commissar had ever played a leading role in the Civil War;
in August 1936 he even wrote an article entitled, "The
Zinovievite-Trotskyite Fascist Gang and Its Hetman Trotsky."
Finally it was Radek 1 s turn to take a place in the dock, with
"the Damocles sword of the death penalty" suspended above his
160
head, observed Trotsky with a certain lack of sympathy.
This elaborate review of Trotsky's stormy relations
with Radek was presented for one reason only: it was un-
thinkable that Trotsky would conspire with the likes of a
Radek. On the contrary, he was "an old capitulator, the be-
trayer of Blumkin, demoralized agent of Stalin and the
G.P.U.," perhaps the "most perfidious of all my enemies."
And only capitulators like Radek, "who had passed through the
school of recantation, self-abasement and self-vilification,"
were presented in open court. "Such is the method of Stalin.
Such is the present political system in the U.S.S.R. The
case of Radek is only the most striking example.
Although Trotsky once admitted that Radek had lent
"a shadow of probability to the accusations" by remaking them,
he was unwilling to admit that Radek had struggled to under-
mine the State's case.
162 Yet Radek may have attempted a
"last service" to Trotsky with his wicked comments at
the
expense of Vyshinsky, as discussed in Chapter I.
Angelica




the enemies of the Revolution: "'These would be his enemies
163too.'" The common enemy in this case was possibly Stalin,
but Trotsky was unforgiving.
Trocsky's withering contempt for capitul ators , it
should be noted, may have been a reflection of his own brush
with the dreaded "disease." For in 1926 he came perilously
close to becoming a "capitul ator" himself. Both Trotsky and
Zinoviev at the time agreed to a truce with the Politburo:
the oppositionists would not recant their criticisms of the
Stalinist system, but swore to abide by Central Committee
decisions and to cease factional activity. On October 16 the
following statement appeared in Pravda :
"We consider it our duty openly to confess be-
fore the Party that in the struggle for our
opinions ... we have taken steps that were a
violation of party discipline and have trans-
gressed in the direction of factionalism the
boundaries set by the party for intra-party
ideological struggle. ... We hope the cessa-
tion of struggle on the part of the Opposition
will make it possible for expelled comrades,
having acknowledged their mistake, to return
to the ranks of the party. ... We promise the
party all possible cooperation in its . . .
struggle against a recurrence of such viola-
tions of discipline in the future." 164
Several observers of Soviet affairs, most notably Max Eastman,
have considered this "momentous political lie" the beginning
of a sorry parade: "Signed by Trotsky and his co-leaders,
it
was the first of a long series of capitulations which
con-
tinued for over a decade, until finally the last trace
of any
objection to Stalin's dictatorship, or any private fireside
murmur against it, was wiped out in the Great
Purge of 1936
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165to 1939." But Trotsky's "capitulation" stopped there.
For the next decade he stood erect, while many of his former
colleagues groveled at Stalin's feet.
This 1926 incident was omitted in Trotsky's testimony
before the Preliminary Commission, and failed to appear in
the final report, Not Guilty . But the commissioners were
impressed with the vehemence of Trotsky's contempt for his
"co-conspirators." It was "at least questionable," asserted
Not Guilty
,
that Trotsky would have directed such scathing
epithets against his alleged followers, knowing these com-
166
ments would undermine their position within Russia. Al-
though Trotsky might have formed a new political "bloc with
Zinoviev and Kamenev against Stalin, it was doubtful that he
would have joined with them in a secret terrorist conspiracy;
for such a "risky" enterprise one needed accomplices upon
"whose loyalty one can place absolute reliance." Trotsky,
apparently, had "very little reason to trust them in an al-
liance as dangerous as an underground conspiracy." In addi-
tion, the prolonged struggle of Rakovsky and Mural ov to avoid
capitulating undermined the hypothesis that Trotskyists re-
turned to the Party "in pursuance of a deliberate policy of
duplicity" inaugurated by Trotsky. If this theory were cor-
rect, why did not all of Trotsky's followers return forth-
with to the Party? Based on testimony given by Victor Serge,
Anton Ciliga, and "Tarov," the authors of Not Guilty also
noted that "mutual distrust" between the Trotskyists and
Zinovievites, even in exile and prison, which again raised
453
doubts about a "legitimate basis" for any new terrorist
167bloc. Thus, the Dewey Commission had little faith in
Vyshinsky's elaborate theory about the "deceitful"
Trotskyism, who wormed their way back into the Party's bosom
under false pretenses.
Confessions 1
In contrast to the capitulations, Trotsky gave meager
attention during the Mexican hearings to the "voluntary" con-
fessions. To some degree he shared the public's sense of be-
wilderment in trying to explain the inexplicable:
. . . the history of the revolutionary and
counter-revolutionary struggle alike knows of
no case in which dozens of seasoned conspira-
tors
,
over a period of years, committed un-
paralleled crimes, and, after their arrest,
despite the absence of evidence, confessed
without exception, betraying one another and
furiously blasting their absent "leader."
How do criminals who yesterday assassinated
leaders, shattered industry, prepared war
and the dismemberment of the country, today
so docilely sing the Prosecutor's tune?
Trotsky granted that the " epidemic character of the confes -
sions " was a fundamental feature of the Moscow trials, but
he was not prepared to offer a definitive judgment on their
raison d'etre . "In the nature of the case, I am not obliged
to answer these questions," he contended, since it was im-
possible to question Yezhov, Yagoda, Vyshinsky, Stalin, or
the victims themselves. "That is why the Commission cannot
fully uncover the inquisitorial technique of the Moscow
trials." But the mainsprings of the technique were apparent.




fighters, but docile capitulators , " in his opinion. 168 in
other words, the confessions were only a logical product of
the capitulations, obtained through prolonged exposure to
GPU "educational" methods.
Yet not all the accused had been "docile capitula-
tors." John Finerty, for one, was curious about N. I.
Muralov's motives in confessing. In response to Finerty 1 s
questions, Trotsky presented several possible explanations
for Muralov's confession in the second trial. As Trotsky
noted, his former colleague spent eight months in prison be-
fore finally giving way. But the interrogators showed him
"one confession after another," which undermined his resolve.
A promise of clemency was also involved, in Trotsky's opin-
ion. "Even a heroic personality such as Muralov asserts the
will not to be assassinated, not to be executed. He had
done what he promised to the end. And then in a very sober
form he declared, 'If you can save my life, good.'" If only
he had the confessions in hand, Trotsky would show Finerty
"all the ties, the inquisitorial mechanics of the extortion
of confessions, because these mechanics are very individual."
The interrogators had time, they were "psychoanalysts." But
the desire to live was paramount: "When anybody has to
choose between death at one hundred per cent, and death at
ninety-nine per cent, when he is in the hands of the G.P.U.,





Trotsky also credited the arrest of family members
as an important factor in obtaining confessions. Noting that
his son, Sergei, was under arrest in the Soviet Union,
Trotsky suggested the likely GPU technique for putting pres-
sure on the entire family:
If we were in Russia, the mother would be ar-
rested, I would be arrested. They press her
with the thought. "If you will save your son
you must confess your man /husband/ to be such
and such a criminal." . . . They address the
son and they say, "If you want to see your
mother free, you must confess that and that."
I believe it is very probable the son could
confess. Then they come with the confession
of the mother to me and ask me, "What will
you do?"
Trotsky admitted that this was a "very difficult" situation,
one which occurred thousands of times. Pyatakov's wife was
arrested eight months before her husband, he recalled. In
his last words before the court, Pyatakov declared, "'I lost
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all, my family and all.'"
Trotsky testified, therefore, that the wall of con-
fessions, arrest of relatives, and sheer instinct for sur-
vival explained in part the phenomenon, but he emphatically
rejected the hypothesis that Bolsheviks were conditioned to
surrender in this fashion. The counsel for the Commission
was curious about Trotsky's reaction to this popular theory:
Finerty: Is there anything in the Bolshevik
—
the old Bolshevik Party—discipline , on the atti-
tude of the members of the Bolshevik Party towards
the Party, that would psychologically expose them
to serve the Party at the expense of personal
honor, by confessing anything that was not the
truth?
Trotsky: No. The Bolshevik discipline
was very strong, very often severe. But it was
a discipline of dignity, revolutionary dignity;
it was discipline based on discussions, inner
struggles, and then democratic decisions.
Such degrading confessions, continued Trotsky, could only
"demoralize" the Party, which depended on human beings, not
robots: "The method of a revolutionary is a combination of
dignity and the spirit of concession and sacrifice. It is
absolutely impossible to ask from him such degrade /sic/
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actions as in the Moscow trials."
But in the case of Mural ov, Trotsky admitted, the de-
sire to serve the Party may have been a contributing factor
in his final confession; the "psychosis of war" was used to
force submission to the Party. Comrades like Muralov only
saw Soviet newspapers, and thus for years only read that
Trotsky was acting against the Soviet Union, that he was "in
alliance with Lord Beaverbrook and Winston Churchill." These
reports shook their confidence. Then came the argument:
"Stalin is the chief of the country. If we
fight against Germany and Japan, we will fight
under the leadership of Stalin. You are a
friend of Trotsky, but you can't invite him to
come here. In the situation his activities are
prejudicial to the defense of the Soviet Union."
Muralov hesitated for eight months, but then broke down and
satisfied his accusers in every way. Trotsky could not be-
lieve that Muralov actually believed the accusation, but it
was possible that the exile's critigue of the ruling caste
"seemed to him prejudicial for the defense of the Soviet
Union." This motive was probably more important
to Muralov
than the promise of clemency, suggested Trotsky. For Muralov
was "in the full sense of the word a heroic personality." In
fact, he was a "pure man, an absolutely pure personality." 172
Following the lead of Trotsky, the authors of Not
Guilty declared that it was "impossible to pronounce upon
the motives which prompted the accused and witnesses to„con-
fess." But to a greater degree than Trotsky, this report
stressed the element of "duress" in obtaining the confessions.
Depositions were introduced once again from Ciliga, Serge,
and "Tarov," giving first-hand evidence of the coercion used
to force incredible statements. As a result of this testi-
mony, the Commission was convinced
that the extortion of confessions through tor-
ture, both mental and physical, is a common
practice of the Soviet police today. We find
that this testimony, taken in connection with
the fantastic discrepancies which we have
pointed out in the confessions of the accused
and witnesses in the two Moscow trials, and
the demonstrated falsity of the testimony im-
plicating Leon Trotsky and Leon Sedov, justi-
fies the presumption of duress in the obtaining
of these confessions . 173
A close study of the trial records, in addition, indicated
that pressure was used to force the confessions of Smirnov
and others. The accused resisted their captors for long
periods of time; only after "repeated interrogations and con-
frontations did they consent to make the confessions which
cost all but four of them their lives." According to Soviet
law, as defined by Professor M. S. Strogovich in Criminal
Trials
,
a Textbook for Law Schools and Juridical Courses, and
edited by no less an authority than Andrei Vyshinsky,
this
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procedure for obtaining confessions was "in violation of the
immunity conceded to accused persons," and "itself constituted
duress," at least in the cases of Smirnov, Mural ov, and
174Radek. Thus, force was the key to obtaining confessions.
In all fairness to Trotsky, he did comment at length
on the mechanics of forcing admissions in a number of
-i n c
articles written before and after the Coyoacan hearings.
But unlike the authors of Not Guilty
,
he tended to underplay
the element of "duress," even though he was one of the first
observers to style the entire process a "devilish conveyor,"
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one which fed on its own victims in an endless progression.
The "konveer " system has been subject to numerous and
extended analyses, but several of its most prominent facets
should be mentioned here. In the "long" variant, one which
lasted from four months to two years, the accused was allowed
ample time to re-evaluate his entire career. Such victims as
Nikolai Bukharin and "Rubashov" in Darkness at Noon eventually
became morally isolated and saw no recourse except to return
to the Party's bosom, even at the cost of self-annihilation.
This method, akin to Trotsky's emphasis on "moral torture,"
had the virtue of making subsequent recantations highly un-
i
likely. But in the "short" variant, rarely lasting more than
a week, relays of interrogators ceaselessly bombarded the
victim with questions. Systematically deprived of nourish-
ment and sleep, until there was a "severe toxic effect" with
resultant hallucinations, the subject was often forced to
stand at tip-toe (stoika) until the feet swelled
into
"shapeless lumps," or compelled to sit on a stool until the
groin was inflamed and extremely painful. Few, if any of the
victims successfully resisted this form of "duress," which




And outright torture was also used, which Trotsky
178had tended to doubt. After August 1937 the GPU interroga-
tors were free to use physical pressure at will; Stalin had
authorized such methods, as there was no reason his secret
service should be "'more humanitarian'" than the bourgeois
179
secret services. Kidneys were systematically beaten,
cigarette butts were snuffed out in human flesh, husbands
were tortured in front of their wives, or vice versa, and so
it went. 180 No less an authority than Nikita S. Khrushchev
contended that only physical pressure explained the confes-
sions :
Only in one way—because of application of _
physical methods of pressuring him /the victim/,
tortures, bringing him to a state of uncon-
sciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking
away of his human dignity. In this manner were
"confessions" acquired.
Kossior, Chubar, and many other prominent Party figures were
. , ,
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exposed to this kind of persuasion.
Perhaps most important, Trotsky failed to perceive
the overwhelming need of the Party's apostates —perhaps a
majority—to confess and be re-united with their brethren.
At one time Trotsky had advised all members "'to stand
at at-
tention'" before the Party,
182
and, in a sense, they were
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following his advice when they confessed. Above all, there
was a need to purge a pervasive sense of guilt. As one
victim of the system wrote, most Soviet citizens carried
with them "a consciousness of guilt, an inexplicable sense
of sin, a vague and indefinable feeling of having trans-
gressed, combined with an ineradicable expectation of in-
evitable punishment." The interrogators used this sense of
guilt to obtain the necessary admissions. The accused, for
instance, were reguested to suggest their own hypotheses
for being arrested. These guestions were designed "to pro-
183duce the bricks for the subseguent guilt edifice."
This technigue was doubly effective with Party mem-
bers. Having devoted their lives to the "instrument" of
history, they were unprepared for a final rupture in the
twilight years of their service. And they were exhausted,
as Arthur Koestler has observed:
"It was the past that was telling on them, the
years of conspiracy, prison and exile; the
years of the famine and the Civil War; and
sticking to the rules of a game that demanded
that at every moment a man's whole life should
be at stake. They were indeed "dead men on
furlough," as Lenin has called them. Nothing
could frighten them any more, nothing sur-
prises them. They had given all they had.
History had sgueezed them out to the last drop,
had burnt them out to the last spiritual
calorie; yet they were still glowing in cold
devotion, like phosphorescent corpses." 184
Then these "phosphorescent corpses" were accused of heinous
crimes against the Party, endangered by enemies both within
and without. Only by confessing the incredible could they
render a "last service" and strike a blow against the
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opposition. It was an intolerable choice, to keep silent
and die, to confess and die. But many lacked the moral re-
solves to resist the Party's pressures. To tell a "useful"
lie and be saved was preferable to dying outside the fold,
just as Dostoevsky once asserted he would choose Christ over
the truth, if it became necessary. As a result, a "peace
pact" was made with Stalin and his minions to avoid a non-
party hell. "I" gave way to the imperative "We." Not all
the accused, it must be stressed, surrendered to this logic;
Abel Yenukidze, for instance, preferred to die rather than
humili ate himsel f publicly . But others forsook their egos
and personal honor at the behest of the Party. " Partiya eto
nado, prichyem sdes moral ' ?" The Party needs this, so why
185bring ethics into it? The contract was made.
There were other aspects of the confessions that
Trotsky tended to downpl ay- -the mass character of the phenom-
enon, the use of Aesopian language in court, the degree of
186
resistance in some of the testimony. Despite his acute
understanding of the capituation process, he was still
stunned when "hysterical flagellants" indulged in these
"ritual rites of the church." With Friedrich Adler, he could
only compare the mystery to a "typical inquisitorial trial,
with every witch full-heartedly repenting of her evil re-
lations with the Devil." The supremely rational Trotsky, in
the last analysis, was simply unprepared to decipher the
187
work of the Devil.
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Why Stage The Trials ?
The motivation underlying the decision to stage
"show trials" remains somewhat murky to this day. But in
1937 Trotsky analysed for the Dewey Commission the rationale
behind the Kremlin's judgment. Stalin and the bureaucracy,
in his opinion, had no other choice.
"Show trials" were not entirely foreign to Trotsky's
experience. In 1918 he advocated the production of a great
trial-demonstration with Tsar Nicholas II in the dock. In
1922 he was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the
public trial of the Social-Revolutionary Central Committee.
And his faith in such spectaculars led him in 1931 to make "a
grievous error of judgment," in Deutscher's opinion. For he
accepted at "face value" the fraudulent charges against the
Menshevik Union Bureau. "It was a great error on my part,"
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he later admitted, one that he deeply regretted.
But the Moscow trials of 1936-38 were another matter
entirely. Before the Dewey Commission he attempted to put
them in perspective. Certainly these dramas reflected more
than just a personal struggle between Stalin and Trotsky:
Each of us is drawn into this drama as the
representative of definite ideas and principles.
In their turn, the ideas and principles do not
fall from the sky, but have profound social
roots. That is why one must take, not the
psychological abstraction of Stalin as a "man,"
but his concrete, historical personality as
leader of the Soviet bureaucracy. One can
understand the acts of Stalin only by starting
from the conditions of existence of the new
privileged stratum, greedy for power, greedy
for material comforts, apprehensive for its
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positions, fearing the masses, and mortally
hating all opposition.
Stalin, in Trotsky's view, was just a creature of the bu-
reaucracy, which had raised on its shoulders "the man who
best, most resolutely and most ruthlessly expresses its in-
terests. Thus, Stalin, who was once a revolutionist, became
189the leader of the Thermidorian caste."
But this "caste of upstarts," he continued, had in-
creasing difficulties: to cover up its "social ulcers" it
was forced to lie, "a vital political necessity." Soon the
spiritual atmosphere of the Soviet Union was "completely im-
pregnated with the poison of conventionalities, lies and
direct frame-ups." But when the falsifications were ex-
hausted, the bureaucracy turned to criminal accusations,
charged Trotsky:
To justify the repressions, it was necessary to
have framed accusations. To give weight to the
false accusations, it was necessary to reinforce
them with more brutal repressions. Thus the
logic of the struggle drove Stalin along the
road of gigantic judicial amalgams.
Stalin had become the victim of his own bureaucracy, this
Frankenstein, and attempted to satisfy his " soif " or thirst
with salt water, i.e., with a geometric progression of
190frame-ups
.
There was also an important international reason for
the purges and trials—to crush the Fourth International.
According to Trotsky, the bankruptcy of the Comintern was so




Since 1933, the idea of new revolutionary
parties under the banner of the Fourth
International has met with great success in
the Old and New Worlds. Only with diffi-
culty can an outside observer appreciate
the real dimensions of this success . It
cannot be measured by membership statistics
alone
.
The general tendency of development
is of much greater importance . Deep in-
ternal fissures are spreading throughout all
the sections of the Comintern , which at the
first historic shock will result in splits
and debacles. If Stalin fears the little
Bulletin of the Opposition and punishes its
introduction into the U . S . S . R. with death
,
it is not difficult to understand what
fright seizes the bureaucracy at the possi-
bility that news of the self-sacrificing
work of the Fourth International in the ser-
vice of the working class may penetrate into
the U.S.S.R. 191
In other words, the tiny Fourth International was a mortal
threat to the Soviet regime, one that must be crushed.
As Trotsky testified at the Coyoacan hearings, there
was a symbiotic relationship between the Comintern and the
Bureaucracy. The moral authority of the Soviet leaders
rested in large part on the Comintern, this "Tower of Babel
of slanders and falsifications erected over a period of
thirteen years." In turn, the moral authority of the
Comintern rested exclusively on the political and moral
strength of the Soviet bureaucracy:
This Tower of Babel, which frightens its own
builders, is maintained inside the U.S.S.R.
with the aid of more and more terrible repres-
sions, and outside the U.S.S.R. with the aid
of a gigantic apparatus which, through re-
sources drawn from the labor of the Soviet
workers and peasants, poisons world public
opinion with the virus of lies, falsifications
and blackmail. Millions of people throughout
the world identify the October Revolution with
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the Thermidorian bureaucracy, the Soviet Union
with Stalin's clique, the revolutionary workers
with the utterly demoralized Comintern appara-
tus .
The first "great breach in this Tower of Babel," argued
Trotsky, would produce a final collapse, and also "bury be-
neath its debris the authority of the Thermidorian chiefs."
As a result, it was for Stalin "a life-and-death question to
1 9?kill the Fourth International while it is still in embryo!
Thus, the purges and trials were aimed at the
Trotskyites and at Trotsky personally, at "enemy number one"
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( vrag nomer pervyj ). To recapitulate Trotsky's argument,
the trials were long in preparation, as the bureaucracy in-
creasingly lost control of its policies. Falsification fol-
lowed falsification, repression followed repression, until
more and more victims were included in the ever-expanding
circle of frame-ups. Caste privileges, immense inequalities,
economic excesses— all of these called for scapegoats. Hence
the various alleged conspiracies, for the GPU argued, "'If
the alliance does not exist, it is necessary to fabricate
it.'" But from Stalin's "devil's kitchen" even "spicier
dishes" were still to come, predicted Trotsky. Still, there
was no hope for the regime. Trotsky was completely confident
that the trials had been "cruel" fiascoes. "Saving tempo-
rarily Stalin's rule, the bloody purge has shaken asunder
the social and political props of Bonapartism. " The
bureaucracy, devouring itself, cried out in a frenzy for more
vigilance against its foes— the Trotskyites—but this was
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"the cry of a beast mortally wounded." To Trotsky, the con-
vulsions of the purge had great symptomatic importance: this
was the regime's last crisis, its "death agony." 4
At the center of Trotsky's analysis was the re-
lationship of the bureaucracy and its "leader-victim,"
Joseph Stalin. As in the case of the Kirov affair, however,
Trotsky had difficulty in isolating Stalin's role in the
purge. Stalinism was but a "cipher" in the realm of ideas,
he contended, and Stalin himself was known for his "congeni-
tal empirical narrowness." Then came his criminal role in
history: "It is so criminal that revulsion is multiplied by
horror." Originally Stalin sought support from "revolution-
ary elements," but an abyss had opened between these elements
and the privileged bureaucrats. As a result, all those with
close ties to Bolshevism were being purged. Trotsky warned
that in the near future even Stalin would become a "burden
to the ruling stratum," for the more he dispensed with as-
sistance, "the closer draws the hour when he himself wilJ.
prove needed by nobody." Quite possibly the counter-
revolutionary bureaucracy would make short work of Stalin,
probably charging him with "Trotskyism." No matter how he
fell, Stalin would depart from the scene laden with crimes--
"not only as the grave-digger of the revolution but as the
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most sinister figure in the history of mankind."
Yet Trotsky also argued that Stalin was directing the
"cleansing." After he purged the upper echelons of the
bureaucracy, then he must deal with the intermediate
layer of
467
the "Postyshevs , " and, of course, there was the layer of "in-
different administrators, if not plain shysters and career-
ists," which Stalin understood better than anyone else.
"Therefore he feels that after stif ] ing the masses and ex-
terminating the Old Guard, the salvation of socialism lies in
him alone." He must, in Trotsky's view, strive for the
"juridical confirmation of his personal power, whether in the
capacity of 'leader' for life, president with extraordinary
power, or finally, crowned emperor." Opposition to these
"Caesarist plans" would arise, however. Before Stalin fell
into the abyss, crowned or uncrowned, he would try "to ex-
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terminate all the best elements of the state apparatus."
In short, the trials and purges were directed pri-
marily at the chief international threat to the ruling
stratum—Trotsky. But unresolved in his thought was whether
Stalin purged the bureaucracy and remnants of October to en-
sure his own survival, or whether the bureaucracy purged old
Bolsheviki as a threat to its privileged status, a tendency
that would lead to Stalin's own demise. Was, therefore,
Stalin victim or master of the purge? A fundamental under-
standing of the purge's raison d'etre rested on the answer
to this guestion.
There are almost as many interpretations of the purge
as there are commentators on Soviet affairs. But the question
remains: Zachto ? Why? What for?
197 Some ingenious theories
have been produced to explain the mystery of the purge
phenomenon. To mention a few of the more fanciful
theses,
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there is the "Book-of- Job" hypothesis: the sufferings were
tests of faith, with the true believers finally being re-
united with the regime. In the "Jews in the Wilderness"
theory, the Russians had forty years to wander in the wilder-
ness; once they had forgotten the fleshpots of Tsarist Russia
they could enter the Promised Land of Socialism. And then
there was the straightforward explanation of a former presi-
dent of the International League of the Godless: an increase
of sunspots had caused the purge.
^
But most serious explanations of the purge have re-
flected one of two basic approaches: the "cleansing" was a
reaction to Stalin's personal and political needs or the ob-
jective requirements of the bureaucratic system. One politi-
cal argument, popularized by Isaac Deutscher, theorized that
Stalin's aim was "to destroy the men who represented the
potentiality of alternative government, perhaps not of one
but of several alternative governments," especially since
war with Hitler had become a distinct possibility. The ac-
cusations were shameless inventions, but based on a
"grotesquely brutalized and distorting anticipation of pos-
sible developments." 1" George Kennan has also stressed that
Stalin was faced with either fighting the German leader or
coming to terms with him. In either case he would be "ex-
posed to severe criticism among his comrades at home," hence
the need to liquidate physically anyone "who could possibly
profit from the inevitable political embarrassment which
Stalin now saw looming up for himself."
200 And Robert Tucker
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has suggested that Stalin was preparing to collaborate with
Hitler, not wage war against him; anti-fascist Bolsheviks
like Bukharin were purged as a class in order to soften the
impact of eventual detente .
This complicated theory of "external-internal dia-
lectics" had additional domestic ramifications. In the
"Party Struggle" or "Bonapartist 11 hypothesis, the insecure
dictator required a disciplined organization and cowered
populace which
,
incidentally, would further his lust for per-
sonal aggrandizement and self-glorification. Less flattering
was the contention that Stalin had a "Caesarian Persecution-
Mania," like Ivan the Terrible, which led to the elimination
202
of his closest advisors and supporters. In this connection
Tucker has written: "Not the needs of the Soviet system but
Stalin's own needs, both political and psychological, under-
lay the events of 1937-38 in Russia." The trials, in particu-
lar, served "the psychological symbolic function of ration-
alizing Stalin's own mental world," argued Tucker, and were
"vehicles for the acting out of something similar to a para-
noid delusional system complete with central theme (the great
conspiracy) and malevolent pseudo-community ('Bloc of Rights
203
and Trotskyites , ' etc.)."
None of the above theories are mutually exclusive,
and all probably contain a modicum of truth. But a second
basic approach stressed the impact of objective social forces.
The theory of "Neo-Absolutism" contended that the basis of
power in Soviet Russia resided in office-holding, as it
did
470
in Ptolemaic Egypt. Built into the system was a continuous
power struggle between the supreme ruling group and the mass
of office holders, with the inert masses sometimes siding
with the ruling clique. In the "Social Supply" theory, a
corrective to "Neo-Absolutism , " the political elite desired
to exterminate a mandarine class of hungry party activists
without destroying the basic social structure of the bureau-
cratic state. The GPU was given the task of managing the
"social conveyor," banishing the new privileged class to the
lower depths, while raising to the top new bureaucrats. 204
A more sophisticated version of this theory was put forward
by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who argued that the "permanent purge"
in a totalitarian system provided security for the leader-
ship through the unremitting elimination of both actual and
potential opposition. This constant process weeded out
careerists, helped eliminate stagnation, and furthered social
mobility, while directing aggression away from the regime.
In essence, it was "a utilization of coercive techniques of
totalitarian government for the achievement of not only the
negative objectives (elimination, intimidation) but also the
positive objectives (efficiency, discipline, loyalty) of the
totalitarian regime." This technique of totalitarian govern-
ment arose from inherent strains within the system, and was
channeled into achieving specific political and socio-economic





Merely to enumerate conflicting theories of the purge
is enough to underline the basic weakness of Trotsky's analy-
sis. In the first place, it was highly doubtful if the purge
was aimed directly at Trotsky. At most, as he once admitted,
Stalin created the figure of an "arch-conspirator" in order
to strike his internal foes and stage a " preventive civil
206
war , " More important, Trotsky wavered between attributing
the purge to objective social needs (the bureaucracy) and
personal desires (Stalin). As a result, he seriously under-
estimated its strength and scope—the establishment of a new
"equilibrium of forces
,
11 the elimination of potential enemies
#
the revolution within the Party , the complete cowering of the
populace, and the immense strengthening of Stalin's personal
position . The purge and show trials were hardly fiascoes or
signs of weakness. On the contrary, they were manifestations
of strength, the final triumph of a totalitarian dictator
over a docile Party and prostrated nation. And they signi-
fied the end of Trotsky 1 s hopes to wage a new political
revolution within the Soviet Union. If " Judas—Trotsky 11 was




In the closing moments of the Mexican hearings
Trotsky once again expressed his radiant faith in the future,
one which had been strengthened by the Commission's labors:
Esteemed Commissioners! The experience of
my life, in which there has been no lack either
of successes or of failures, has not only not
destroyed my faith in the clear, bright future
of mankind, but, on the contrary, has given it
an indestructible temper. This faith in reason,
in truth , in human solidarity , which at the age
of eighteen I took with me into the workers 1
quarters of the provincial Russian town of
Nikolaiev—this faith I have preserved fully
and completely. It has become more mature, but
not less ardent . In the very fact of your
Commission 1 s formation— in the fact that , at
its head, is a man of unshakable moral author-
ity, a man who by virtue of his age should have
the right to remain outside of the skirmishes
in the political arena— in this fact I see a
new and truly magnificent reinforcement of the
revolutionary optimism which constitutes the
fundamental element of my life.
Trotsky had "warm gratitude" for all the participants in the
proceedings, but he signaled out Dewey for special praise,
stressing his "profound respect to the educator, philosopher
and personification of genuine American idealism, the scholar
who heads the work of your Commission. (Applause)"
1
This eloquent peroration concluded one of "the
greatest and most dramatic moments in the life of Leon
Trotsky," remarked James T. Farrell, for at long last he had
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refuted the charges of Vyshinsky and Stalin. 2 Dewey realized
that this was Trotsky's moment to stand alone, and quickly
brought the hearings to a close: "Anything I can say will be
3
an anti-cl? max. "
~
The American educator left almost immedi-
ately, "moved deeply" by Trotsky's final remarks, and even
more moved by the presence of Mme . Trotsky-Sedova, "a faded,
tired-looking, brave woman," on whose face appeared to be




History had been made in Coyoacan, even though the
"academic atmosphere" of the hearings was more characteristic
of a Ph.D. examination than a trial before world public
opinion. The chief participants parted with pride in their
mutual achievement, and new respect for each other's gifts.
Dewey still considered Trotsky a rather "tactless man," and
regretted that his "brilliant native intelligence /was/
locked up in absolutes," but admired the intellectual per-
formance: the Russian had said nothing "foolish" in eight
days of testimony. Many years later Dewey recalled with ad-
miration '"the intellectual power with which Trotsky had as-
sembled and organized the mass of his evidence and argumenta-
7
tion and conveyed to us the meaning of every relevant fact.'"
For his part, Trotsky sincerely admired Dewey's efforts.
Originally the Russian "defendant" had feared the elderly
American philosopher might be too far removed from the issues
and even fall asleep during the hearings. After reading
several of Dewey's theoretical works he still tended
to
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identify his pragmatism with crude British empiricism, but
Trotsky appreciated the moral stature of the American: "His
respect for and gratitude to Dewey were personal. He saw
gDewey's idealism as genuine."
But not all was bucolic in the lush setting of the
Blue Villa. Tempers had become frayed around the edges. In
one of the last sessions, for instance, Albert Goldman had
come to "blows" with the stenographer-typist, who had briefly
ceased working in order to distribute a mimeographed state-
ment to the press. Trotsky's secretary separated the two
combatants, but the tiff was front-page news in the Mexican
Q
press. This was just a pale reflection, however, of a much
livelier dispute which marred the Commission's illusion of
complete harmony. At the beginning of the twelfth session
Carleton Beals dramatically resigned from the panel, a "bomb-
shell" which stunned the other commissioners and gave critics
an opportunity to slander the Commission's endeavor.
I . "A Pink Tea Party"
Carleton Beals had received a last minute invitation
to join the sub-commission in Mexico at the suggestion of Ben
Stolberg, who greatly admired Beals' honesty and journalistic
gifts. As a result, the Commission wired an invitation to
Beals in California, but the journalist was rather "broke" at
the time. Therefore, the Commission raised "$250 to enable
him and his wife to drive to Mexico City in their
car," re-
, , . .
1°
called Suzanne La Follette.
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Although not a figure of international stature, Beals
brought certain assets to the Preliminary Commission. A
native of Kansas and grandson of Carrie Nation, he had roamed
the world as a journalist for the North American Newspaper
Alliance and other enterprises, covering Mussolini's rise to
power, the Scottsboro trial, and even securing an exclusive
and much- acclaimed interview in 1928 with General Sandino,
the idealistic leader of the Nicaraguan insurgents. Along
the way he had been the principal of an American High School
in Mexico City and become fluent in Spanish. Beals also
found time to write scores of books on America and Latin-
America^ including at least two on the locale of the hearings,
Mexican Maze (1931) and Porfirio Diaz (1932). 11 Thus, Beals
was well-acquainted with Mexico and had many contacts in the
capital city.
But Beals was also a prickly character, almost ex-
cessively proud of not being in anyone's camp. In the view
of the Daily Worker he had pursued "a career of facile politi-
cal adventurism, changing his colors with ease as the occa-
1
2
sion requires." But in Louis Adamic's opinion, Beals had
a " 1 toughie ' " personality, "a kind of subdued, held-in
Hotspur, with hard words for sentiments, and an inclination
for 'quick-conceiving discontents .' " He was also "intensely
self-conscious" about his independence and love of danger.
As Adamic asked in his diary:
Is he /Beals7 naturally independent, or is it an
effort to be so? His independence has a hasty,
assertive quality, though he tries to disguise
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it in matter-of-f actness . It can be reckless
and rash; one better not offend it! And it may
be quick to perceive or interpret offense where
none is intended, or where there is an omission
of recognition of it. . . .1 doubt if he gets
along well with very many people at close
quarters for any length of time. He likes
(probably needs) to stand out in situations in
which he finds himself. It is possible that
he and Ben are such good friends because Beals
is so seldom in New York and they see one an-
other briefly only two or three times a
year. . . .13
This "friendship" was to be severely tested in Mexico City.
Neither Stolberg, Trotsky, nor the other commissioners ap-
peared to understand that Beals needed special attention, if
he were not to take "offense" at the first opportunity.
Beals already had his own opinion of Soviet justice,
as he expressed to V. F. Calverton of Modern Monthly , "a kind
of intellectual brokerage house for revolution." Variously
described as a "'colossus of left-wing literature,'" a
'"Peter Pan of piquant paganism,'" and an "'ideological
racketeer,'" Calverton attempted to include in his personal
journal anything and everything "Modern," from sex to psycho-
analysis to Marxian dialectics. Conceiving himself as a
kind of "Lenin-Casanova- Pericles , " he opened his pages to
both Stalinists and Trotskyites, but alienated the former
14
when he took a firm stand against the Moscow trials. Soon
thereafter, as we shall see, Calverton was to throw Beals to
the wolves over his conduct in the Mexican hearings.
But in March 1937 Calverton invited the intrepid and
belligerent journalist to participate in one of his patented
symposia, "Is Trotsky Guilty?" Beals wrote rather
facetiously that the trials were in 11 the best Grand Guignol
style, but the show stopped at Act 1. and I want my money
back.'" As for the question of Trotsky's guilt,
"Once the wily serviter /sic^ of Kind /s±c/
Tutankamen, dressed up in a red kerchief on
his head, a dress suit with tails and no
pants, tried to smash other people's peanuts
with a sledgehammer, and merely hit his own
toe. A loud shriek is not evidence."
In addition to these frivolous remarks, however, Beals also
expressed his opinion of the trials' effect on public senti-
1 5
ment toward the Soviet Union: "Entirely unfavorable."
Thus, Beals was hardly a "Stalinist stooge," as later
charged, but once in Mexico he became "aloof," rarely visited
the Commission 1 s headquarters , and "was constantly with
people who were known to be against the purposes of the
Commission," charged the Dewey panel in a later statement:
"We made every effort to secure his full cooperation. Ob-
viously, we failed." Beals, not surprisingly, saw the prob-
lem from a different perspective: the other commissioners
allowed the writer and his wife "to shift for ourselves,"
1
6
and excluded them from "the inner activities of the group."
The stage was set for one of Beals' "'quick-conceiving dis-
contents . ' 11
Signs of "division" between Beals and the other mem-
bers of the sub-commission surfaced soon after the hearings
had commenced. At the beginning of the third session Beals
interrupted the examination to make a statement for the rec-
ord. He took issue, in particular, with Dewey's opening
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declaration, "since I was in no way consulted regarding the
formulation of or the contents of the statement which was
issued to the press as the official position of the
Commission." He took pains to declare that he approved
giving Trotsky a fair hearing and was "honored and glad" to
be a member of the Commission:
But I wish it definitely on record that I engage
in the work of this Commission without any prior
commitments. I do not subscribe to the doctrines
of Mr. Trotsky or to any of the groups that util-
ize his name. I am not motivated by animosity
toward any existing government involved or toward
any partisan groups that favor or oppose Mr.
Trotsky. I should not wish that the work of
this Commission be improperly utilized by any
such groups against any person or government.
After Beals had made clear his independent stance, he cor-
rected Dewey in the interest of actual accuracy on extraditing
Trotsky from Mexico to the Soviet Union (it was impossible,
since diplomatic relations were lacking), and urged that the
Preliminary Commission submit a report of its findings, even
before the full Commission met. He concluded this personal
protest with assurances that he had not "the slightest hint
of antagonism toward the other members of the Commission."
On the contrary, his purpose was "purely constructive and
in




Dewey was taken back by this declaration.
Rather
tartly he took "responsibility" for the error
on extradition.
He also welcomed the assistance, particularly
since Beals
"was not here in time to be consulted in
the preparation of
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the statement" that was read at the opening session. But
Beals had, as it turned out, been present when the final
draft was discussed, if not in the early part of the week
when the opening declaration was first discussed. "I am
sure that if we had had the benefit of Mr. Beals' counsel,
that address would have benefited," added Dewey. There the
matter lay for the time being, but Beals had served notice
that his need to make "independent opinions" and "construc-
tive suggestions" might upset the equanimity of the Commis-
19
sion.
During the ensuing hearings Beals was practically
the only member of the panel who questioned Trotsky's word
and asked embarrassing questions, both in his opinion and
that of the other commissioners. Again and again Beals
rather testily demanded "proof" for some of Trotsky's al-
legations, even when the subject under discussion was a mat-
ter of common knowledge. When Trotsky contended, for in-
stance, that Soviet pressure had led to his internment in
Norway, Beals quickly asked: "Will you present proof of
that pressure?" At another point Beals demanded "evidence"
that the GPU might have followed Trotsky in France (July 1933),
a question that bewildered the Russian refugee:
You know, this question makes me a bit perplexed.
Excuse me, Mr. Commissioner. You see, all the
trials are directed against me. The G.P.U.
wants to give me a vital blow. It is the aim of
all the trials. It signifies that before the




Trotsky added that every functionary of the Comintern and
foreign politburos was "an agent of the G.P.U." But Beals
would not be put off: "I was just asking for evidence of
your statement. You made a statement, and I was wondering
whether you could prove it." When Trotsky admitted this was
just his "conclusion," not a matter of certain knowledge,
his interrogator replied: "I might have the same conclusion,
on
but I have not the proof."
And so it went. It was Beals who forced Trotsky to
admit that not all of his archives were in Mexico. It was
also Beals who suggested that Trotsky had once written for
the Hearst press, an unpardonable offense to the revolution-
ary movement, and that Jan Frankel , one of the Old Man's
secretaries, might lie to aid his chief's case. It was this
dogged journalist, in addition, who discovered that Trotsky
had only minimal contacts with the Soviet Union, which made
it practically impossible for the oppositionist leader to
encourage mass revolutionary action against the bureaucracy.
When Beals suggested that Trotsky might cede territory to
Nazi Germany in order to gain power, "analogous" to Lenin's
action in 1918, he found himself "the cynosure of glowering
eyes." In the gallery Rivera told his friends, "'That is
Carleton Beals. He's a G.P.U. agent.'"
21 It was Beals,
finally, who questioned Trotsky closely on his policy toward
the Spanish Civil War. Apparently he believed that the
Spanish "Trotskyites " were actually fifth-columnists
sabotaging the loyalist cause. When Trotsky defended the
481
tactic of waging a revolution within the revolution, even at
the price of unity, Beals was shaken: "This would mean, by
the policy you follow, the probable victory of Franco, would
it not?" Trotsky argued that it was the Comintern's narrow
program which would actually assure Franco's victory, but
22Beals had put him on the defensive.
Trotsky later argued that Beals had tried to "support
the official Moscow version and to expose contradictions in
my answers," but the Russian was "grateful" for this approach;
he had all the "facts." After Trotsky answered each question,
"this singular member of the Commission kept silent, com-
2 3pletely disorientated." The other commissioners, however,
were clearly uncomfortable with Beals' tactics, even though
his "hostile" questions were a counterweight to Finerty's
rather gentle interrogation. According to the journalist,
Once, at a sharp interrogatory of Trotsky, Ruehle
shuddered at my elbow, " Sehr Schade I Sehr Schade I
"
How sad! How sad that I should speak in a per-
emptory tone to the master! Thereafter, every
time I asked a question, Ruehle would writhe in
his seat and emit a series of low groans, like
a man in pain.
While the other commissioners, like Stolberg, asked "a few
erudite, very respectful interrogations," Beals had hundreds
of additional questions to ask, sharp questions, but that
would merely have made him "a nuisance in the eyes of the
commission, invariably hostile toward my line of questioning,
24
which almost invariably they sought to interrupt." There
is a hint of paranoia in Beals' remark, but without a
doubt
his queries were the most provocative of the
hearings, and
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often exposed chinks in Trotsky's armor.
Beals' short and unhappy career as a member of the
Commission came to an abrupt end at the close of the eleventh
session. VThen he asked Trotsky at one point when the con-
troversy over socialism in one country first erupted, the
answer was 1924, a date Beals believed suspect. In order to
elicit more information on the tactic of "world revolution,"
he then inquired whether Trotsky had even known Mikhail
Borodin, a Comintern agent who later gained a certain fame
by advising the Chinese Kuomintang in 1925-27. No, Trotsky
did not know Borodin personally, but of course knew him by
reputation, and might have met him several times. The
journalist, however, pursued this line further:
Beals: He /Borodin/ came secretly to Mexico
toward the end of 1919 or toward the early part
of 1920.
Trotsky: Yes?
Beals: He founded the first Communist Party
in Mexico. He at that time made the statement
that he was an emissary of yours.
Trotsky: Of mine? At that time I was in my
military train. I forgot all the world geography
except the geography of the front.
Beals: The reason I ask that is, that at
that time he stated there was a controversy along
these lines in the Soviet Union.
Trotsky: May I ask the source of this sen-
sational communication? It is published— no?
Beals: It is not published.
Trotsky: I can only give the advice to the
Commissioner to say to his informant that he is
a liar.
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Beals: Thank you, Mr. Trotsky. Mr.
Borodin is the liar.
Trotsky: Yes, it is very possible. 25
At this point the line of questioning was shifted, and soon
thereafter Dewey "lifted" the session, to Beals' consterna-
tion, for the Borodin question was left hanging. 26
It was all rather innocent, not to say trivial, but
the Borodin affair caused an uproar in the Commission, pro-
voked an angry outburst from Trotsky, and caused Beals'
resignation. John Finerty, in particular, was incensed with
Beals' provocative question. Immediately after the public
session ended, apparently, Finerty informed the sub-commission
that questions "based on private information were highly im-
proper, would be sufficient cause for mistrial in any ordi-
nary court, and that he could not continue as counsel if they
were to be permitted in future." According to a later re-
port of the Commission, Beals then "angrily declared that
27
either he or Mr. Finerty must leave the sub-commission .
"
Beals, rather naturally, had a different view of the
meeting. A "junta" had taken him to task on his line of
questioning, but he suggested his "word" was as good as
Trotsky's, and promised to take the stand in his own defense;
years earlier, in fact, he had published the record of
Borodin's activities in Mexico. The Commission, however,
had no intention of putting Trotsky in a "tight spot."
Finally Beals stung Finerty with the remark that at least he
could not be accused of being Trotsky's own lawyer:
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''Mr. Beals," he raged, "henceforth our re-
lations will be purely official, not personal.
"They shall not even be official," I an-
swered. "Either you cease to be lawyer of
this commission or I leave the commission."
At this point Miss La Follette "burst into tears," according
to Beals. "This is a great historical occasion, Carleton;
don't mar it," she supposedly said: "'Tell Mr. Finerty
you're sorry.'" Instead, Beals guickly left the meeting.
"The commission, alarmed, pattered after me. I was through."
That night (April 16) the Commission called a special
conference to discuss the uproar, one Beals supposedly pro-
mised to attend: "But although we waited for him until mid-
29
night he did not come." In the meantime Trotsky was pre-
paring his own counter-attack. Fresh from the bitter
Norwegian experience, Trotsky feared that Beals' question
had been designed to compromise his standing with Mexican
public opinion, and thus make any further stay in Mexico im-
possible. 30 As a result, the morning session of April 17 be-
gan with Goldman reading a statement for Trotsky. The chief
"witness" admitted that he had been completely taken back by
the question on Borodin, but wanted to reiterate certain
points: "Mr. Beals' informant is a liar. The falsehood
which he had utilized has a definite purpose—to compromise
my situation in Mexico." Once again Trotsky denied having
personal relations with Borodin or sending him to Mexico on
a clandestine mission. Furthermore, he requested that
the
Commission launch an investigation into the source of
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Beals' information, which involved the journalist's "personal
honor." Such an inquiry, claimed Trotsky, would discover
another plot, "a new amalgam created with the purpose of pre-
venting me from unmasking the judicial crimes in Moscow."
If Beals were not directly and consciously involved in the
"new intrigue," he should provide all the necessary explana-
tions in order "to unmask the true source of the intrigue." 31
The Commission, in a private session, had already
"formally expressed itself as aware of the complete impro-
priety of Mr. Beals question , " replied Dewey, but a new
development made the requested investigation quite difficult.
He then read a letter from Beals addressed to the Chairman,
dated April 17:
Kindly accept my irrevocable resignation
from the Commission. This step is for the best
interests of Mr. Trotsky, the Commission and
myself
.
The important purpose, among others, for
which I became a member of the Commission,
namely: to give Mr. Trotsky the opportunity
which every accused person should have, to pre-
sent his full case to the world, has been ful-
filled to the extent possible with the present
arrangements. Unfortunately, I do not consider
the proceedings of the Commission a truly seri-
ous investigation of the charges. For this and
other reasons, my further participation in the
work of the Commission, now that the sessions
have been completed, would not prove fruitful.
In commenting on this letter of resignation, Dewey immediately
took issue with several of Beals' allegations: the resigned
commissioner had received "full opportunity to ask questions"
and it was an "obvious error" to state that the hearings
had
already been completed. Furthermore, Dewey regretted
that
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Beals had "prejudged" the case before the "preliminary"
hearings had ended or the full Commission had a chance to
study the evidence. Besides, every member understood from
the beginning of the inquiry that he had the right to submit
"an independent or minority report to the full Commission." 32
This almost trivial but embarrassing affair might
have ended here, but once again Beals felt "offended" and
took his case to the Mexican press. Convinced that Dewey had
3 3
"twisted" the meaning of his simple resignation statement,
he rushed into print an explication de text . "Why does he
/Dewey_/ distort the meaning of my resignation and ascribe to
me motives I do not have and have not stated?" No, Beals
had not "prejudged" the case; he was still in the "dark" on
the trials and the guilt or innocence of Trotsky. The resig-
nation had merely been intended as "fair judgment on the
commission and it's intolerable methods." To label the
panel's efforts as an investigation, he continued, was "to
sully a fair word." The Commission's methods were just "a
schoolboy joke," and the hearings merely "a pink tea party
with every one but myself uttering sweet platitudes." Beals
reiterated his criticism of the Commission's procedure and
scope, and emphatically denied he had had full freedom of
questioning, no matter what Dewey contended. In particular,
the offended journalist attacked the "banal" cross-examina-
tion, conducted in "such kindergarten fashion and with such
eager adoration for Mr. Trotsky by the commissioners as to
make the proceedings the laughing stock of any
intelligent
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person." As a result, he could only resign, his "minority"
report
:
"How can I possibly pass on the guilt or
innocence of Trotsky if the very foundations
of the commission's work are eaten with the
termites of partiality? No fumbling over
documents later in New York can overcome the
commission's errors already committed here in
Mexico. For me to bring in any other minority
report than that of my resignation would be to
commit a grave injustice to Mr. Trotsky.
Self-righteous to the end, Beals concluded that the Commission
could "pass its bad check on the public if it desires, but I
will not lend my name to the possibility of further childish-
34
ness similar to that already committed."
Once in the limelight, Beals found it difficult to
relinquish his new-found pre-eminence. Critics of the
Commission, especially communist editors, were eager to re-
print Beals' remarks on the hearings; he was good copy and
his "purple prose" read well. Despite protestations from
the "cynosure" of the controversy that he wanted to avoid a
"squabble," he returned to the attack in a long article for
the Mexican press, which eventually found its way to The
Saturday Evening Post . Published under the title, "The
Fewer Outsiders The Better," this inspired "hatchet job"
took to task Trotsky, Dewey, and the other commissioners.
(Many of Beals- remarks in the Post article have already
been
quoted in earlier sections of this paper.) The essential
point of this clever effort, however, was that only
Beals
had asked penetrating questions of Trotsky; the
other in-
vestigators had "fawned" over him and allowed
the hearings
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to be pervaded by an "air of hushed adoration for the roaster."
Suzanne, her head on her hand, gazes stead-
fastly, her eyes filled with expectant worship.
Benjamin Stolberg—mustache, face, hair all one
ash-gray color—nods, chuckles, snorts under-
standing^ at each of Trotsky's sallies. Mr.
Otto Ruehle, the former Reichstag member, who
knows no English, never lets his eyes stray
from the master's face. Doctor Dewey stares
abstractedly, quizzically, once or ^twice asks
a very, very respectful question. Everyone is
so deucedly rapt.
Beals could not, in good conscience, be a part of this
"chummy clubroom," and so resigned from the Commission. A
"sadder and wiser man," he added a final remark: "a plague
35
on both their houses."
Although Beals' resignation and subsequent tirades
were hardly "fatal" to the Commission's work, they could not
be left unanswered. An interim report of the Preliminary
Commission reviewed the affair (most of the points already
mentioned), and disputed many of Beals' allegations. It
concluded:
Much as we regret the resignation of Mr.
Beals, it does not disturb us. The Commission
is investigating a great historic controversy.
Powerful interests are engaged in attempting
to disrupt it and sabotage its work. 3
gore
efforts of this kind may be expected.
And Trotsky also took a turn at puncturing Beals' balloon.
According to the miffed Russian, Beals had taken "the place
of individuals of greater authority who were prevented at
the
last moment from coming to Mexico," and had actually been
"pushed into the Commission only in order to explode it from
the interior," a doubtful assertion since Stolberg
was
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responsible for Beals' invitation. Trotsky also claimed the
commissioner's questions were "deliberate provocations" and
Beals had been seen collaborating with Messrs. Lombardo
Toledano, Kluckhohn and "other 'fiiends' of the GPU." 37
Trotsky also wrote of the erstwhile investigator:
I do not say that Mr. Beals, former corres-
pondent of TASS, is now also a paid agent of
Moscow. I can admit that he is a half-
conscious instrument in the hands of the GPU.
But this changes nothing. He applies the same
methods as the professional agents of the GPU.
For his part he adds only a certain amount of
disinterested confusion. 38
Once again Trotsky branded a political foe with the GPU
stigma, a "slander" rather beneath the great man.
Seven months later Trotsky got a small measure of
revenge, using the dubious method of "blacklisting," essen-
tially. Beals, in the meanwhile, had been subjected to a
personal attack in the pages of Modern Monthly by Ernest
39
Sutherland Bates, one that he found "a bit underhanded."
But worse was to come. In October 1937 V. F. Calverton of
Modern Monthly wrote to "Dear Comrade Trotsky," soliciting
an article for a forthcoming "war issue" in his magazine.
Trotsky replied on October 15, 1937, that the presence of
Beals on Calverton' s editorial board precluded him from con-
tributing to the issue, especially since Modern Monthly ap-
pealed to Marxism and the revolution: "I consider it im-
possible to carry any responsibility not only for Mr. Beals
himself but also for the publication which tolerates
him in
its ranks." Contending that Stalinism was the
"syphilis"
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of the workers' movement, and any direct or indirect carriers
of the contamination should "be submitted to a pitiless
quarantine," Trotsky charged that Beals was only using the
magazine to preserve his mask of independence:
If the name of Mr. Beals remains on your
list only through over-sight (and I should be
glad to hear from you that this is the case)
then you can immediately correct this error.
In the opposite case I shall be forced to ask
you to publish this letter in your magazine
in explanation for my taking away my name from
the roll of your contributors . 40
To underline the seriousness of the threat, Diego Rivera
also wrote Calverton that Beals' attitude had been that of
"an absolutely dishonest agent of the Moscow hangmen." Re-
moval from the editorial board, however, was not sufficient
in Rivera's opinion: he must be " ejected " from Modern
Monthly with an accompanying statement publicly explaining
the action. If this action were not taken, Rivera would re-
41
move his own name from the list of editors.
The unhappy Calverton was on the spot. The prestige
of his personal hobby-horse would suffer if Rivera and
Trotsky dropped by the wayside. Yet Beals was a personal
friend. In this awkward situation Calverton decided to
temporize. He wrote Trotsky in December that Modern Monthly
had "spared no effort in carefully analyzing the alleged
proofs which have been available" on the charge that Beals
acted for the GPU. A careful study of all the relevant
docu-
ments led to the conclusion that "Carleton Beals is not,
and
at no time, was an agent of the G.P.U." But,
continued
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Calverton, the "nature" of Beals' conduct affected the maga-
zine and seriously impaired his value as an associate of
Modern Monthly
.
In order to avoid any misunderstandings,
therefore, Beals had been "dropped from the Board." But
Calverton hastened to add that this action should not be
interpreted as indicating "agreement with the view that he
acted as a G.P.U. agent." And the pages of Modern Monthly
,
as before, were open to all "honest radicals who wish to ad-
vance the revolutionary cause. Accepting dictation from no
individual or faction, its editorial policy continues in-
42dependent and non-partisan."
Despite brave words to the contrary, Calverton had
bowed to the pressures of Trotsky and Rivera. And only after
the fact did he inform the journalist of his ouster from the
editorial board. He wrote Beals that it was a "curious and
most difficult situation" he found himself in, but the en-
closed copy of the December letter to Trotsky was "suffi-
ciently explanatory" of the problem. In short, Beals was
out. As Calverton told his old friend,
I am sure that your motivation in the Trotsky
business was decent and honest and fairminded
(I should qualify that, however, Carleton, with
the remark that I think your Borodin question
was unwise and unjustified) , but at the same
time the editors of the Modern Monthly feel
that the implications drawn from your position
in the matter would lead, if you continued to
be an editor of the magazine, to a misinter-
pretation of the periodical.
Certainly Beals could appreciate the situation and understand
that his name should be removed from the masthead: "I am
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sure that you will have no quarrel with us in this connec-
tion." Besides, continued Calverton, "you have done very
little work on the magazine for a long time anyway, so your
not being on the board would not make very much difference
to you." Calverton concluded this letter of dismissal with
the hope that the political disagreement would not "alter
43
our friendship which I continue to cherish."
In fact, Beals took his dismissal in "good humor,"
and replied to Calverton that he was amused by the "wild and
hysterical battle" that had apparently swirled around his
head: "Everybody seems to have stuck up a dummy called
Carleton Beals into which they have been plunging their
verbal bayonets. I wish them all success in such brave
storming of the revolutionary battlements." He added that
Trotsky, the "wounded lion in Coyoacan," revealed all the
44
symptoms of a "disordered temperament."
For a while, anyway, Beals was the center of a storm
of controversy. Trotskyite circles in New York "buzzed"
with the rumor that Beals had "'gone Stalinist.'" As for Ben
Stolberg, he was "too pained" to say anything about his erst-
while friend, while Suzanne La Follette was "'simply puzzled'"
over the affair. Louis Adamic mulled over the resignation
and attributed it at least partly to Beals' independence,
which "the setup of the Commission had, somehow offended.
He resigned amid a confusion of superficial motives,
which be-
45
came less convincing the more he explained them."
i
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Yet Beals received some consolation, in addition to
the abuse. Distinguished periodicals gave him free public-
ity. In reporting the resignation, News- Week called Beals
an "authority on Latin America," while Time wrote he was an
"authority on Central America." The Nation asserted that
the Commission's impression of bias was "reinforced" by the
resignation and accusations of Carleton Beals. Her sister
journal, The New Republic
,
declared that the resignation of
this "well known American writer" had somewhat "impaired"
the usefulness of the investigation. And Bertram D. Wolfe
wrote also in New Republic that the Preliminary Commission's
work would have carried more weight if it had followed Beals'
line of "thinking up searching and embarrassing (if sometimes
indelicate, or irrelevant) questions." In the opinion of
Selden Rodman of Common Sense , however, Beals had asked "un-
fair questions and precipitated his own resignation, thereby
striking (whether deliberately or not) a serious blow at the
Commission's impartiality, but not proving himself thereby a
46
' Stalinist. 1 "
There was little glory in this "minor" episode for
any of the participants. Undoubtedly Beals had been treated
in a shabby fashion by the Commission, yet his question on
Borodin was "indelicate" in the extreme. Then Dewey offended
Beals anew, which resulted in intemperate and provocative
articles appearing in the Mexican and American press under
Beals- imprimatur. And Trotsky jumped to the unjustified
conclusion that Beals, at least "objectively," was serving
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the GPU; he then used pressure tactics to sever the American
journalist from the editorial board of Modern Monthly
, with
Calverton's lukewarm agreement. Much of the blame for the
clash must be laid to simple "personality" differences,
which could have been mitigated, if not totally avoided.
But the Commission's reputation for impartiality was tar-
nished, and Beals' own reputation suffered. Dewey and his
panel had seriously misjudged the situation. The only winner,
in fact, was the American Communist Party, which repeated
ad nauseam Beals' uncharitable comments about the "pink tea
x. „47party.
"
II. First Reviews of the Mexican Hearings
The "counter-trial" in Coyoacan had barely come to a
close before the Commission received its first notices.
Trotsky, rather predictably, found much to praise in the
hearings. The communist press, also rather predictably, had
nothing positive to say on the proceedings. And the
"bourgeois" and liberal journals were successfully able to
restrain their enthusiasm for the just-completed inquiry.
All in all, the notices could have been better.
Trotsky's Appraisal of the Preliminary Commission
The "wounded lion" of Coyoacan had good reason to
praise the efforts of Dewey & Co. The mere fact that the
hearings had been held in the first place was a major triumph,
For years he had been demanding the creation of an
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international commission of inquiry, without success. "The
day I received the telegram about the creation of your sub-
commission was a great holiday in my life," he informed the
panel in Mexico. Trotsky was confident that with the help
of the Commission's efforts, the conscience of the world
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would score "one of its most splendid victories."
With the completion of the initial investigation, he
could appraise its labors and his own performance. Of course
the "raucous barkings" of Soviet sympathizers would continue,
but this should not affect anyone, in line with the old
proverb: "'The friends bark, the caravan goes on its way.'"
The allegation that this was a "biased" commission, in par-
ticular, should be ignored, for it included many distinguished
members and was led by Dewey, "one of the veterans of American
liberalism," declared Trotsky, normally a foe of liberals of
any hue. "Contrary to absurd Comintern press statements, not
one of the members of the commission was or is among my
political friends." Their only partiality, he added with
some satisfaction, was in not believing "the word of Yagoda,
Vyshinsky, nor of Stalin himself. They want proofs, they
ask for them. And it is no fault of theirs if Stalin refuses
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to give what he does not have."
Even the pedantic Trotsky was somewhat surprised
that the Preliminary Commission took such "extraordinarily
broad views of its work," with the final transcript
amounting
to some 250,000 words. "Whoever wants to learn
the truth, or
at least to come near to it, should begin by
comparing the
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two stenographic reports, the one from Moscow, the other
from Coyoacan," he advised curious students of the trials.
Not all subjects were adequately examined, however. The ses-
sions devoted to his political biography and relations with
Lenin might have been "more thoroughly" covered, in his
opinion: "It is possible that this first part of the in-
vestigation would then have given a more rounded-out politi-
cal picture. But all I could do was refer to my different
works and ask that they be added to the file." And when the
political charges were under investigation, he could use
only "a twentieth part" of his material: "The main diffi-
culty was in selecting promptly the most striking documents,
the briefest texts, and the simplest arguments." And Trotsky
regretted that the majority of the members tended to believe
that the Stalinist bureaucracy was "the inevitable product of
revolutionary dictatorship," which Trotsky would not admit,
naturally
:
The profound difference between the formal
democratic way of thinking and the dialectic,
when faced with historical problems, will
forcibly emerge from these passages of the
Coyoacan investigation, showing how far from
"Trotskyism" is the majority of the members
of the Commission. 50
But the chief "witness" was supremely confident that
on the "three decisive points" of the Moscow charges (alleged
interviews with Messrs. Holtzman, Romm , Pyatakov), the details
of his "life were clarified in such detail that the
falsifiers
could not find where to insert a pin." This was
the "highest
point" of the inquiry. In the little blue
house judgment had
already been reached, predicted Trotsky; the rest was only a
matter of time and printing the record. The investigation
would continue: "I can ask for nothing more. The New York
International Commission will resume its work. The verdict
5
1
it will formulate will enter into history."
Communist Criticism of the Commission
Whitewash I This was the considered opinion of
Trotsky's well-wishers within the communist orbit. Soviet
Russia Today called the hearings a "farce" and New Masses
echoed the charge, recalling Marx's dictum that history re-
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peated itself, first "'as a tragedy and then as a farce.'"
And Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, in a speech before the
National Press club in Washington, ridiculed the inquiry, be-
gun with such fanfare: "But this unfortunate commission has
been a flop; the mountain has given birth to a mouse. In
spite of the fanfaronade this result was expected." Only a
"biased" commission could hope to investigate a conspiracy in
the Soviet Union by holding a few days of hearings in Mexico
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and listening to only one man—Trotsky.
The Daily Worker , naturally, spared few adjectives
in condemning the "whitewashing expedition" which was on the
rocks
:
It is hard to make out now who is investiga-
ting whom in the "bed-room trial" taking place
in the boudoir of Diego Rivera; whether Trotsky
is still "investigating" himself, or whether he
is trying to distract public attention from his
failure to wipe away one scintilla of the moun-
tains of evidence against him by_ turning the
searchlight on his earstwhile /sic/ associate,
Carleton Beals.
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Soviet courts had "finally and irrefutably exposed" Trotsky's
plotting with German Fascism and Japanese militarism: "The
rump jaunt to Mexico City could, therefore, only have been a
crude whitewash or a consummate farce. It turned out to be
both." It was an "occasion for Homeric laughter," jeered
the Daily Worker
,
that Trotsky had first helped condemn him-
self with this "'investigation,'" and then turned "savagely"
on his former protector and "paranoically " demanded Beals'
investigation as a "'plotter.'" With Beals' "walk," the only
"'investigators'" left were those who had distinguished them-
selves by attacking the Soviet Union, or those who, if they
continued with "the whitewashing farce," would end by con-
demning themselves in the opinion of all honest friends of
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the Soviet Union and world peace."
To show its lack of prejudice, the Daily Worker also
reprinted an amusing piece from the Providence Evening
Bulletin
,
which portrayed Trotsky as the prosecutor, chief
witness, defendant, and counsel in the hearings, all but the
judge, "an oversight."
"Mr. Trotzky, for the prosecution: Ladies
and gentlemen, I shall bring before you a per-
fectly innocent man, a patriot with a heart as
big as all outdoors, a lover of animals and
little children, a deep thinker arid a beautiful
soul which I shall lay bear /sic/ in all its
innoc.
"Mr. Trotzky for the defense: I object!
I object! The prosecution is taking the words
right out of my mouth. (Objection overruled.)
Thank you .
"
When the "witness" finally took the stand he declared:
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"Mr. Trotzky himself: Deus ex machinal
where shall I begin. Rooshia I love. The
Rooshians are as dear to me as my heart's
valves. Stalin I love, though I bleed for
him. I have said so in many, many letters
to Izvestia, our beloved house organ. "55
And so it went. The Coyoacan investigation was a fit subject
for burlesque, not sober attention.
"Bourgeois" and Liberal Reaction
Neither News-Week nor Time was willing to concede
that the Preliminary Commission had made a concerted effort
to uncover the truth about the Moscow trials and Trotsky's
guilt or innocence. According to News-Week , in a "sunny-
blue" Mexican villa the "septuagenarian" Dewey had presided
over "the most harmonious Trial by Jury since Gilbert and
Sullivan." Trotsky had been allowed to thunder "sublime
denunciations" during the "august proceedings." In fact,
"no one contradicted him; there was no prosecution." The
jury had returned to New York to deliberate but spies were
predicting a verdict of:
I am right , and you are right , ^
And all is right as right can be .
Time magazine also stressed the age of "kindly, grizzled"
Professor Dewey and the lack of serious content in the
"elaborate mock trial" in Mexico City. The Commission
had
proved "nothing at all," except that Trotsky, for
eight years
"a disowned and virtually impotent revolutionist,"
had become
„57
"the most important revolutionary extremist in
the world.
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Journals such as Common Sense found some merit in the
proceedings, 58 but not The Nation
, which continued its nega-
tive coverage of the defense effort. According to an edito-
rial in Freda Kirchwey's periodical, "we have gained the in-
escapable impression that the whole performance so far has
been a waste of time, effort, and money." A final judgment
could not be pronounced until the full Commission produced
its verdict, but the "whole procedure seems to us doomed to
futility for the same reasons that the preliminary hearings
in Coyoacan were futile." In support of these "reasons" the
editorial cited the appearance of bias in the commissioners,
the resignation of Beals, and the lack of original documents.
Apparently the investigation did produce evidence that
Trotsky had not been visited by Pyatakov or Romm, certainly
"crucial points" in the case, but not "sufficient" to estab-
lish his innocence:
But they /the crucial points/ cannot be proved
because the evidence cannot be subject to the
scrutiny and attack that would be provided in
any ordinary court of law. That, in fact, is
the fatal flaw in the whole effort to solve
this burning question through the amateur ef-
forts of an unofficial commission, however well-
meaning. Even after the final verdict has been
rendered we shall still not know whether Trotsky
is innocent or guilty. Skeptics who from the
first have refused to accept without reservation
testimony presented in ex parte proceedings will
continue in their present state of uncomfortable
a. • 59agnosticism. J:7
In line with its policy not to stir up partisan squabbles on
the left, The New Republic refrained from covering the
Mexican hearings. But the issue could not be avoided,
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altogether. Then why not banish the whole affair to New
Haven? The editors of The New Republic requested the expert
opinion of Professor Fred Rodell (Yale Law School) on the
trial records and Trotsky's published testimony. The learned
jurist replied:
"After reading all the material, I feel that
I know just as little about what really happened
as before I started. I might just as well have
read "Alice in Wonderland" and then tried to
write up the trials. Briefly, the reports were
not convincing to me, in either direction. There
was nothing sufficiently tangible for me to feel
this is true, or this isn't true. Nothing but
words and words and talk and talk; ... So far
as I'm concerned the whole thing might still
have been a frame-up or every word might have
been gospel truth.
"The Trotsky side's material does bring out
the helter-skelterness , the occasional contra-
dictions, the absence of convincing proof which
I felt when reading the reports. But the
Trotsky stuff is not affirmatively convincing
either. It is purely defensive, critical, in-
tent only on showing the absence of a cold case
on the other side. The two cancel each other
out and leave, to my skeptical mind, exactly
nothing.
Rodell added that he was "'completely neutral, or agnostic'"
on the issues raised. Until more proof was available, any
6 0judgments would just be "'wishful preconceptions.'"
This "know-nothing" attitude, of course, reinforced
The New Republic'
s
own feelings on the trials. "Why should
American liberals take part in a violent quarrel based on
insufficient evidence," asked the editors, "particularly in
view of the fact that unity is necessary on the tasks facing
us in the United States?" Judgment need not be suspended
forever; the facts would come out some time. "But in the
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meantime it is more courageous to admit that a conclusion is
impossible than to attempt to reach one." 61
"Agnosticism," therefore, still reigned supreme in




Amid the faint praise and caustic attacks, the
Commission pursued its business, preparing for the day when
a final "verdict" would be issued in the case. But between
May and December— something of an anti-climactic period
—
various problems had to be overcome. In the first place,
momentum must be maintained, primarily by keeping the
Commission's labors before the public eye. There was also
the prosaic task of soliciting funds to underwrite the con-
tinuing investigation: affidavits were being collected and
checked, other hearings were being held. And it was neces-
sary to dampen the open rift between the Trotskyites and
Socialists, on the one hand, and Trotsky and Wendelin Thomas
on the other, which threatened the equanimity of the Commis-
sion. The inquiry's difficulties, therefore, were far from
over.
Mecca Meeting
The incomplete press reports from Mexico and the one
sided appraisals in American periodicals threatened the
Commission's public support. As a result, it was necessary
to explain the Commission's work in Mexico and
answer its
critics, before apathy and cynicism ruled supreme.
Another
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"great" meeting, therefore, was called for May 9, 1937, to
be held in New York's Mecca Temple. The public was urged to
attend (and make donations) in order to learn: "What
(-> 3Happened at the Trotsky Hearings in Mexico?"
Once again a large crowd, some 3,500 people, packed
the Mecca Temple to hear Finerty, Stolberg, La Follette, and
Dewey discourse on the sojourn in Mexico. An interim report
was presented to the meeting, as already mentioned. Besides
refuting Beals' accusations point by point, this report dis-
cussed the function and scope of the Mexican hearings, along
with some of the documentary evidence already gathered.
Dewey & Co. also commented on Trotsky's demeanor as a wit-
ness :
It is an established rule even in legally con-
stituted courts that the bearing of the witness
may be taken into account in weighing the value
of_ his testimony. Throughout the hearings he
/Trotsky/ seemed eager to cooperate with the
Commission in its efforts to ascertain the
truth about all the phases of his life and his
political and literary activity. He answered
readily and with every appearance of helpful-
ness and candor all questions put to him by the
counsel for the sub-commission and by its mem-
bers .
The interim report stressed that the Mexican inquiry had only
been an exploratory operation. It should continue, however.
In the opinion of the Preliminary Commission, "Mr. Trotsky
has established a case amply warranting further investiga-
tion." Therefore, it was recommended that "the work
of this
Commission proceed to its conclusion,"
64 hardly a bombshell
under the circumstances.
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But the highlight of the meeting was Dewey's speech,
"'Truth is on the March.'" To the assembled multitude Dewey
promised that the various trial records, affidavits, and
transcripts would be "even more minutely" examined than pre-
viously. Only then could a final judgment be rendered. Yet
he also declared: "The only three matters of fact upon which
there was a show of independent objective evidence have been
subjected to grave doubt," a clear hint of the Commission's
final verdict. In addition, Trotsky's public record stood
in "striking contrast" to the Moscow charges, and the offi-
cial trial records showed "the absence of cross-examination
upon every vital point as well as many gaps, inconsistencies
and contradictions." But the public could judge for itself,
added Dewey. Not only would the findings be published, but
the verbatim transcript of the Mexican hearings and the docu-
mentation in the case would also be issued. "All fairminded
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persons will be in a position to judge for themselves.
Dewey also took the opportunity to lecture his lis-
teners on the liberal faith and castigate his critics, as
already mentioned in an earlier chapter. In addition, how-
ever, Dewey chided Ambassador Troyanovsky on the assertion
that the investigation was a "'flop!'" It was only
natural
that the Soviet official wanted to becloud the
issues: "It
seems to be part of his official job." But Dewey was
sur-
prised that liberals permitted "their eyes to be
blinded by
the smokescreens so deliberately emitted,"
for Troyanovsky
had virtually invited the American
public to be "incautious
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and credulous"—i.e., to accept Moscow's version of the af-
fair. For the Commission's part, it was going to be extremely
"'cautious and skeptical'" in weighing the evidence, and ac-
cept nothing on faith. There was only one aim: "discovery
of the truth as far as that is humanly possible." To repeat,
66
"•Truth is on the march and nothing will stop it.'"
Money and Other Matters
In the meanwhile, George Novack and the Trotsky
Defense Committee made every effort to secure the necessary
funds to support the Commission's work. "News Bulletins"
were distributed— in exchange for fifty cents. As Novack
wrote in one appeal of many to the Committee's "friends,"
"This tremendous task requires finances.
Not for the Commissioners. They are giving
their time and energy at great sacrifice. But
they require court stenographers, technical
assistance, translators, materials, expense of
hearing rooms, etc. etc. If they can sacrifice
so much to carry out this grave responsibility,
the rest of us owe them the little material as-
sistance they require. They are giving far
more than you are being asked to give."
After all, as Novack stated in another letter, '"Truth is
on
the march,'" and mere money problems should not be
permitted
to impede its progress. Donations arrived at the
Committee's
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New York headquarters, but debts also mounted.
A pressing need was to finance the activities
of two
other sub-commissions. Of the sundry, and
perhaps spurious




Enqueue sur le Proces de Moscou was the
most active. It
established a Commission Ragotoire and held
eleven hearings
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in Paris between May 12 and June 22, 1937. Chairman of the
Paris sub-commission was G. E. Modigliani, the artist's
brother and a member of the Executive Committee of the Labor
and Socialist International. The other members, as could be
expected, were a mixed lot. They included Mme. Cesar Chabrun
(Chairman of the Committee for Aid to Political Prisoners),
Maurice Delepine (member of the Permanent Administrative
Committee for the French Socialist Party), Jean Galtier-
Boissiere (editor of Crapouiliot )
,
Jacques Madaule (a
Catholic writer and professor), and Jean Mathe (former secre-
tary of the French National Union of Postmen). This group
heard testimony from Victor Serge, Eugene Bauer, Franz and
Alexandra Pfemfert, and most important, from Leon Sedov.
Much of Sedov' s testimony, in particular, was later included
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in the Commission's final report.
In addition, a New York sub-commission held five
hearings on July 26-27, 1937, in order to corroborate some
of the information gathered in Mexico. Stolberg, La Follette,
Alfred Rosmer, Carlo Tresca, and Wendelin Thomas constituted
this panel, assisted by the lawyers, Finerty and Goldman. A
variety of witnesses were heard, including B. J. and Esther
Field, A. J. Muste, Sara Weber, Max Shachtman, Herbert Solow,
Max Sterling, Davis Herron, Harold Isaacs, and Viola Robinson.
Few if any major details were added to the case, but the
testimony tended to support Trotsky's claims that he could
not possibly have met Pyatakov and Romm, as Moscow
claimed.
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Meanwhile, Miss La Follette labored to arrange the
mounting evidence into a logical sequence. Letters went back
and forth between New York and Mexico City, with requests for
additional material and the verification of certain aspects
of the developing case. Lacking secretarial help, the
Commission's factotum was forced to memorize the Moscow trial
records (not indexed) and compare them with the evidence sub-
mitted to the inquiry. The product of her arduous work was
a veritable mountain of folders containing affidavits, de-
positions, and extracts from the testimony. She also pre-
pared precis of the evidence in the cases of Holtzman,
Romm, and Pyatakov, which were models of lucidity and
coherence. Then in September the full Commission held ple-
nary sessions in New York, and discussed the evidence pre-
sented by Miss La Follette. At the session of September 21,
the members signed a statement of their general findings, and
commissioned La Follette, Dewey, and Stolberg to write the
final report. 70 One suspects, in any event, that only these
commissioners fully graspe the complicated case. Most of
the other members were "decoration," to some extent. In ef-
fect, the findings of the Dewey Commission were the opinions
of Dewey, La Follette, and Stolberg, the "real" commission
of inquiry.
More Purges and More Dissension
The work of Miss La Follette and the other commis-
sioners was given added urgency with the stunning news
from
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Moscow in June that the leadership of the Red Army had been
liquidated. Marshall Tukhachevsky and most of the Army's
general staff had been accused of treason and then swiftly
71
executed. A definitive analysis of the trials and purges
was even more imperative than before, especially since the
liberal magazines were showing new signs of confusion over
the incredible events in Moscow.
The New Republ ic
,
for instance, had begun to have
serious doubts about the state of Soviet "morale" and the
loyalty of Soviet officials: ". . .if high officers in the
army cannot be depended upon for loyalty, it is hard to know
where loyalty could be found." The magazine still held no
brief for the Trotskyites 1 effort "to make an issue of these
trials for political purposes," and doubted that Trotsky
would be "any less inflexible and ruthless than Stalin—In
fact, there is a good deal of reason to suppose that he would
be more so." But a nation "shot through with espionage and
suspicion" was one in which "real progress" could hardly be
expected. All these plots and counter-plots were bound to
have "a chilling influence" on those who wished better for
the Soviet Union:
The blow that these incidents have delivered to
the prestige of the Soviet Union throughout the
world is at present beyond measure. Communists
should not deceive themselves as to the reason;
it is not just wicked Trotskyites or faint-
hearted liberals who are responsible. The events
themselves are of historic significance and carry
their own implications.
And The Nation also expressed "deep dismay"
over the execu-
tions of the generals and predicted that
its international
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effect would be "unfavorable." In the editors' opinion, the
"mystery that still obscures the earlier trials undoubtedly
7 1accounts for the suspicions that surround the present one."
Both magazines, obviously, were in need of informed guidance.
Rather naturally, the communist press thundered that
the Red Army purge was just another great chapter in Soviet
74history: the state, as a result, was stronger, not weaker.
Trotsky, on the contrary, felt that the Red Army had been
dealt "a fearful blow," with the interests of Soviet defense
sacrificed "to the interests of self-preservation of the
ruling clique." But theoretically, at least, he was ready to
admit the existence of a potential plot. In a long analysis
of the army's "decapitation," he denounced the accusation that
the generals were German agents as "so stupid and so shame-
less that it does not merit refutation." Yet the General
Staff might have tried to free itself from the Politburo's
yoke, fearing involvement in the purge: "From this to an
outright conspiracy is still a long way. But under the con-
ditions of a totalitarian regime it is already the first step."
Admitting much "guesswork" in his analysis, Trotsky suggested
that Stalin feared the army:
Bonapartism always has the tendency to assume
the form of naked rule by the sword. Regard-
less of the real or alleged ambitions of
Tukhachevsky, the officer corps must have been
increasingly steeped in consciousness of its
superiority over the dictators in waistcoats.
. .
. The danger was too apparent. As yet
there was not a conspiracy—that is certain.
But it was on the agenda. The bloodletting
had a preventive character. Stalin made use
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of a "happy" incident to teach the officer
corps a bloody lesson.
Certainly the situation was becoming more desperate. This
was the "beginning of the end of the Stalinist dictatorship,"
75in his hopeful opinion.
Also in the summer of 1937 Trotsky was forced to
analyze another Soviet cause celebre—Kronstadt. Some of his
associates and followers, both in America and Europe, were
beginning a painful re-interpretation of Bolshevism,
searching for the "fatal flaw" or "original sin" in Leninism
that had led to Stalinism. Several of them, including
Eastman, Serge, Boris Souvarineand Anton Ciliga, located the
genesis of the political malady in the suppression of the
Kronstadt uprising of 1921. Trotsky, of course, had been
War Commissar at the time, and took responsibility for the
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bloody extinction of the sailors' revolt.
This rather hoary controversy would have had little
bearing on the Dewey Commission's investigation, except that
several of its members already tended to identify Stalinism
and Trotskyism as "Siamese twins." In addition, however,
Wendelin Thomas, a member of the Commission and ex-Communist
deputy in the Reichstag, on his own initiative sent
some
questions to Trotsky, ostensibly in connection with the
in-
vestigation. Arguing that there was a basic similarity
be-
tween Bolshevism and Stalinism, he cited as proof
Lenin's at-
titude toward the Mensheviks, toward the independent
Makhno
bands in the Ukraine, and toward the Kronstadt
insurgents.
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This demarche "precipitated an acrimonious controversy," and
threatened the friendly ties between Trotsky and the
77Commission
.
Trocsky tended to doubt that Thomas' questions had a
"direct relationship" to the New York investigation, but was
willing to defend once again the Party's suppression of the
1921 insurrection. Unlike his critics, he saw nothing ideal-
istic or romantic in the sailors' revolt. The "best, most
sacrificing sailors," those who had played a heroic part in
the October revolution, were long gone. What remained, in
Trotsky's opinion, was "the gray mass with big pretensions
('We are from Kronstadt'), but without political education
and unprepared for revolutionary sacrifice." In fact, the
uprising was dictated by the simple desire to obtain privi-
leged food rations during a period of acute scarcity. Almost
immediately, he claimed, reactionary elements within Russia
and white emigres abroad took up the cause of the insurrec-
tion:
The victory of this uprising could bring nothing
but a victory of counter-revolution, entirely
independent of the ideas that sailors had in
their heads. But the ideas themselves were
deeply reactionary. They reflected the
hostility of the backward peasantry to the
worker the conceit of the soldier or sailor
in relation to the "civilian" Petersburg, the
hatred of the petty bourgeois for revolutionary
discipline. The movement therefore had a
counter-revolutionary character and since the
insurgents took possession of the arms in the




Trotsky also wrote Thomas that Stalin's forgeries did not
flow from the alleged "'amoralism'" of the Bolsheviks. On
the contrary, the system of falsification reflected the need
of the Stalinist bureaucracy to conceal its struggle to ob-
tain undue privileges at the expense of the masses. Instead
of seeking an explanation in "the material conditions of
historical development," chided Trotsky, "you create the
theory of 'the original sin,' which fits the church but not
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the socialist republic."
This controversy over Kronstadt persisted into the
winter of 1937-38, with Trotsky forced more than once to
amplify his remarks on the "counter-revolutionary" nature of
the uprising. 79 It overlapped with another "acrimonious"
dispute, this time between Norman Thomas' Socialists and
Trotsky's American followers. As will be recalled, the
Trotskyites "dissolved" their sect in March 1936 and entered
the Socialist Party. This fortuitous marriage of convenience
materially aided the effort to secure asylum and a "fair
hearing" for Trotsky. In fact, the Socialist Party took the
lead in establishing the "Provisional" American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky in October 1936. During the
en-
suing months Norman Thomas, Roy Burt, and other Socialist
leaders continued to back the inquiry, despite bitter re-
proaches from the communist press. Even after the
Mexican
hearings a resolution of the National Executive
Committee of
the Party continued its "'endorsement'" of an
impartial in-
vestigation for Trotsky, although it refused to
commit itself
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to the "'precise findings'" of Dewey's commission of in-
80quiry
.
In fact, the marriage of the Trotskyites and
Socialists was already close to annulment. The refusal of
the Trotskyites to liquidate their organized factions or
suppress their "literary" organs rankled. As a result, in
March 1937 the Socialist Party held a special convention in
which internal organs were banned, a move aimed primarily at
the Socialist Appe al
,
a Trotskyite periodical in Chicago.
Local Socialist Party organizations also began to expel their
Trotskyite "comrades" in the summer of 1937. Almost every
expulsion notice was greeted with great rejoicing by the
Daily Worker , and variations of the homily, "We told you so!"
Even Pravda gave some attention to the rift in the Socialist
organization. 81 Finally in September the National Executive
Committee formally ousted the Trotskyite faction. As a re-
sult of this bitter experience, Norman Thomas and the
Socialist Call cursed the Trotskyites and Stalinists alike,
both sectarians in their affinity for splits and repression,
8 2
"children born of one womb."
Certainly the initial good will and solidarity that
had led to the founding of the Trotsky Defense Committee was
severely weakened, if not shattered. But the split in the
Socialist Party, like the Kronstadt controversy, had only a
marginal effect on the continuing investigation. After all,
the Dewey Commission had already agreed in September 1937
on
its basic findings in the case. No longer was
Socialist
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support of such paramount importance, as it had been in 1936.
When the final verdict was finally issued in December 1937,
the Socialist Call duly reported the Commission's findings,
but with a noticeable lack of enthusiasm. The bloom had gone
8 3
out of the al 1 i ance
.
IV. "The Case of Leon Trotsky"
Nagging, if minor problems continued to plague the
investigation. The Defense Committee suffered yet another
8 3
resignation of a prominent backer. Material witnesses re-
fused to testify before the commission of inquiry; in one
case a Stalinist "secret agent" may have even destroyed some
84
correspondence germane to Trotsky's case. And the attacks
continued unabated, with Corliss Lamont, for instance,
piously hoping that Dewey, "stung by the comments on the
tragic farce he has acted out on the Trotsky Defense
Committee,"
would not slip into the ranks of "professional haters
and
baiters" of Soviet Russia. "I have always had a
profound
respect for Professor Dewey both as an individual
and a
philosopher," wrote his colleague at Columbia, "and
I should
hate to see him mar his career by finally and
irrevocably
8 5
turning against the Soviet Union."
But, at long last, the Commission's work
was to bear
fruit in the publication of the transcript
of the Mexican
hearings, perhaps the most enduring monument
of the inquiry's
arduous effort. A Chicago Trotskyite,
Albert Glotzer, had
been the official stenographer in
Mexico, laboring to follow
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the many shifts and turns in the testimony. During the last
session Glotzer informed Dewey that he had "most of the rec-
ord finished," and was going to stay several days to "finish
the transcript before I leave Mexico." Apparently, how-
ever, Glotzer only finished the transcript back in America
—
from "cold notes" — a difficult task, since the true text had
to be established by asking the various participants what
they had meant by such and such a passage. Glotzer had
publicly stated he would remain in Mexico in order to mis-
lead any would-be thieves who might have plans to appropriate
8 7
the notes, according to Suzanne La Follette.
There were several other difficulties to be overcome,
however, before the transcript actually appeared in book-
stores. According to Miss La Follette, some Trotskyite mem-
bers of the Defense Committee desired to expropriate the
record of the counter-trial for their own purposes; Felix
Morrow, James Burnham and George Novack were actually en-
gaged in negotiating the publication of the text. But James
Rorty and Suzanne La Follette firmly informed Trotsky that
without sole control of the verbatim transcript there would
be no commission of inquiry. As a result, Trotsky
directed
his American followers to cease their efforts to thwart
the
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Commission's right to publish the record. But when the
in-
vestigating panel approached Harpers & Brothers on the proj-
ect, the publishers agreed to print the bulky record
only if
the Defense Committee purchased " 2^000 copies in
advance,
»




therefore, the Defense Committee advertised a special:
workers could purchase the 617-page volume at "half-rate,"
89two dollars a piece for a paper-bound edition.
In September the first review of The Case of Leon
Trotsky appeared in the Soci alist Appe al . This Trotskyite
organ found the verbatim record impressive, to say the least:
Never, from a purely legal point of view, has
a refutation been so completely and relent-
lessly established in a case of like nature
and magnitude. 90
Shortly thereafter James T. Farrell contributed a similar re-
view to the Saturday Review of Literature . Farrell , hardly
a neutral observer, used this opportunity to take pot shots
at The Nation and The New Republic for questioning the
Commission's impartiality and yet accepting the impartiality
of Justice Hugo Black, then under attack for once being as-
sociated with the Klu Klux Klan. "I merely think that sauce
for the goose is sauce for the gander," remarked Farrell,
ever ready to score a point at the expense of these liberal
magazines
.
In Farrell' s opinion, the primary question in
Trotsky's case and the Moscow trials was one of "fact," and
the basic test was one of "verification," echoing Dewey's
point of view. On the alleged interviews with Holtzman,
Romm, and Pyatakov the Moscow court offered no
corroborative
evidence, but Trotsky's defense was based on a whole
series
of documents and affidavits: "These go to
constitute an




court." There was also the test of "probability," added
Farrell. Trotsky had examined every possible circumstantial
deduction relevant to the charges with "brilliant and ruth-
less logic," and thus passed Farrell' s test. His final
speech, in particular, would most likely "go down in history
as one of the greatest indictments of all time," for it con-
tained "a closely reasoned and brilliant analysis of every
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aspect of the Moscow trials." Farrell, in short, was a be-
liever.
Other appraisals followed, including two in British
periodicals. An unsigned review in the Times Literary
Supplement compared the Mexican hearings to the London in-
quiry in the Reichstag fire case:
There is a necessarily unsatisfactory element
about such proceedings. No formal issue con-
fronts the 'court.' There is no indictment,
no law to be administered, and no power to
obtain vital evidence, even where it is known
to exist.
But Professor Dewey had presided over the Mexican trial with
"great fairness," and "considerable impartiality" had been
shown in the selection of members. According to the London
review, much attention should be paid "to the success with
which Trotsky has refuted the meager fragments of circum-
stantial evidence produced at the Moscow trials." It had
been shown beyond a "reasonable doubt," besides, that Trotsky
had not met his three alleged contacts. "Nobody interested
in the unraveling of this tangled skein can neglect this
mass of evidence elicited by the Commission."
92 Kingsley
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Martin in another British periodical, The New Statesman and
Nation
,
agreed that the verbatim transcript emphasized "the
substantial reasons for doubting parts of the confessions,"
but argued that "the evidence cannot in the nature of things
be conclusive." And he guestioned whether the judges in the
counter-trial were in a "better position to reach a fair
conclusion" than the Russian judges who condemned Trotsky:
"The one court heard only the case for the prosecution, the
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other court listened only to the defense."
Writing in Common Sense
,
Michael Ross reviewed both
the transcript of the Mexican hearings and the record of the
Pyatakov-Radek trial. "Intellectuals who are half-ashamed
of their love for thrillers can openly enjoy these two books
on the Trotsky Mystery," wrote Ross in his mock-serious re-
view. There was "a plethora of clues," and following the
thriller technique, the reader might decide the real criminal
was "the least suspicious of all the characters." To Ross,
the Moscow transcript was "amazing and nauseating in its
revelation of degradation," while the Trotsky transcript was
"much better theatre," since his speeches often sparkled
"with the logical clarity and wit of a Shavian hero against
the background of the ignorance of Finerty, the Commission's
counsel .
"
But the chief conclusion of Ross was one also reached
by Beals and other Americans: a plague on both their
houses.
Reflecting the position of Common Sense ' s editors, he argued
that a belief in Trotsky's innocence did not mean
Trotskyism
had any importance for America in the political field; and a
belief in the validity of the Moscow trials did not convert
"the Soviet Union into a Utopia or make Stalin and Browder
our guides in social thought and activity." On the contrary,
Americans should learn from the "tragic mistakes" that had
accompanied the first attempt to construct a planned, profit-
less economy. The Soviet Union had registered "tremendous
advances" in industrial production and social services, "but
its methods, absolutism and terror, cannot be ours," since
the American goal was the transformation of the nation "into
a more rationally organized society." On the contrary, this
goal would not be helped "if we shackle our minds in the
strait jacket which the Russians call Marxism." In short,
argued Ross, the "self-appointed popes" of Bolshevism and
their "interminable disputes" had no meaning for American
94progressivism.
But the most important critiques of The Case of Leon
Trotsky appeared in The Nation and The New Republic . In each
case the reviews, and reviewers, were something of a surprise
For The Nation , Edmund Wilson wrote that the Mexican record
was "a remarkably interesting document, which makes one
realize the inadequacy, if not frivolity, of the newspaper
accounts of the Mexican hearings." One of the first members
of the Trotsky Defense Committee, Wilson contended that
the
counter-trial made public "a great deal of material which
helps to establish his /Trotsky's/ innocence." Stalinists,
of course, could claim that the conspirators
had covered
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their tracks, that the Commission members were Trotskyites,
and that the documents were forgeries. "But what seems to
me of overwhelming impressiveness is the review of Trotsky's
whole career, " wrote Wilson, who noted the extreme dispro-
portion between the time Trotsky devoted to his public
activities and to his secret "plotting." Those people out-
side Russia who still swallowed the trials, wrote Wilson,
were no doubt: "naive persons who cannot believe that Soviet
officials would do such things as would be implied by the
frame-up of the Old Bolsheviks, persons so ignorant of
Russian politics and history that they are disqualified from
holding an opinion, and fanatical or job-holding partisans
who, . . . take the position that all methods are permissible
for the maintenance of the Stalinist power." Those puzzled
by the trials, however, should compare the official accounts
with the Trotsky record, "one of the greatest political in-
terviews ever printed," in which the commissioners managed to
cover "an enormous amount of ground," in Wilson's opinion.
From the viewpoint of the ordinary reader, it was possible
that Trotsky's world view was presented here more impressively
and more effectively than in his pamphlets and other writings,
where the technical language of Marxism sometimes gets between
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us and the events."
In the course of this review Wilson had, in effect,
thrown down the gauntlet to the "naive" editors of The Nation .
And Bertram D. Wolfe, in a review for The New Republic,
also
took issue implicitly with the prevailing Weltanschauung
of
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that magazine. Veteran of innumerable sectarian struggles,
Wolfe was no friend of Trotsky's, but brought considerable
expertise to the subject of the trials. He had approached
this "bulky report with considerable misgiving," he wrote:
The whole idea of the "Impartial Commission"
seemed such a preposterous one. Fathered by
Trotsky partisans, it had of necessity to be
one-sided and reduce itself to a stage for a
single, all-important actor. The Commission
was chosen with some ineptness to include a
majority (Stolberg, Ruehle, La Follette
—
three out of five) already publicly on record
as convinced of the innocence of the
" accused.
"
Of the remaining members, Beals resigned before the hearings
were completed and Dewey's "undoubted impartiality" was "no
guarantee that he would be equal to judging the intricacies
of Russian factional strife." These misgivings were deepened
by the earlier portions of the stenogram: Goldman was "a not
very effective" defense attorney; Finerty showed no awareness
that he might have strengthened the investigation by "really
trying to break down" some of the testimony; Dewey asked
"naive" questions designed to convince Trotsky of the superi-
ority of a "liberal philosophy" to the tenets of a prole-
tarian dictatorship and social revolution; and Stolberg,
Ruehle and La Follette asked leading questions aimed at
shedding light "on their pet doctrinal puzzles." Only Beals
had asked "searching and embarrassing" questions, though
sometimes "indelicate" or "irrelevant," in Wolfe's opinion.
Despite the "ineptness of the procedure," the out-
lines of Trotsky's case became steadily clearer to
Wolfe as
the hearings continued. In fact, "all else became dwarfed
and unimportant, until audience, attorneys and Commission
seemed to disappear and the 'investigation' became at last a
monologue cf the exiled War Commissar"—expounding his
doctrines, fighting for his revolutionary honor, turning
the accusers into the accused. Wolfe, in particular, was
impressed by Trotsky's "powerful closing speech," which
should not be missed by anyone desiring to discover the truth
about the perplexing trials: "in retrospect the chief func-
tion of the Commission turns out to be that it served as oc-
casion and sounding-board for this speech."
But there were still "painful and intolerable di-
lemmas" to be faced, since it was difficult to believe that
Trotsky had conspired with Germany and Japan to hasten war,
and egually difficult to believe that the leadership of the
Party and Comintern had framed the accusations and executed
innocent men. "Yet one of these two series of monstrous
and discreditable hypotheses must be true," wrote Wolfe. A
study of the trials and counter-trial records, however,
helped remove "from the realm of merely subjective preference
the choice between them." Admitting that he had previously
given "credence rather to Stalin than to Trotsky," Wolfe as-
serted that a re-reading of all the transcripts "carried
literally overwhelming conviction that Trotsky could not
have done the things charged against him in the Zinoviev-
Kamenev and Radek-Pyat akov trials."
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Moreover, contended this ex-Communist
, the subsequent
"epidemic of executions" of various Trotskyites
,
spies,
wreckers, traitors, etc., had been on "such a scale as to
make the Mexican hearings largely superfluous." In pic-
turing Trotsky as in control of virtually all leading posts
in the Soviet Union, "Stalin has literally proved too much
and reduced the original charges to absurdity." But Wolfe
concluded that Trotsky faced a new dilemma:
Throughout the hearings he maintains that the
others were being tried and executed merely to
make a case against him . Now it is becoming
clear that he has been made into a devil
largely to make a case against others— leaders
of a new opposition which has grown up against
Stalin and his methods among his closest sup-
porters. What then happens to Trotsky's cen-
tral theory that the entire military and
police and party and state machinery were so
degenerate that no opposition could any more
arise within the Party, and that a new revolu-
tion was necessary as the only road to reno-
vation?
in Wolfe's opinion, Trotsky had been completely silent on the
issue, since "he has no way of squaring his theory with what
. . 96
has long been his central position."
Many prominent periodicals neglected to review the
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record of the Mexican hearings. But the Commission's ef-
forts and Trotsky's logic were beginning to have an effect.
Certainly the largely favorable reviews in The Nation and The
New Republic could not help but shake some complacent opinions
and keep open the question of the Moscow trials' integrity.
The "painful and intolerable dilemmas" which Wolfe had out-
lined would not disappear by themselves: at some point a
choice must be made.
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V. "Not Guilty 1"
With considerable fanfare the climactic meeting to
present the Commission's verdict was announced for the
evening of December 12, 1937. Special invitations were is-
sued and Committee members were urged to reserve ten-seat
boxes in the Hotel Center. Press releases were prepared to
appear in the next day's papers. Unfortunately for the
meeting's organizers, the headlines on December 13 were
dominated by the news that Japanese warplanes had sunk the
US gunboat "Panay," but the gathering still received consider-
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able attention.
George Novack presided over the meeting attended by
some 2,000 people, curious to learn the final verdict. First
La Follette, then Stolberg, Wendelin Thomas, John Chamberlain,
and Carlo Tresca addressed the meeting, discoursing on their
personal reasons for joining the inquiry, and stressing the
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"impartiality" of the Commission. Finally, Professor Dewey
addressed the meeting, and attempted to put the entire in-
vestigation into perspective. That the report was as "nearly
100% water-tight and fool-proof as any such document can pos-
sibly be," declared Dewey, was a result of "the constant, de-
voted and intelligent work of our Secretary, Miss La
Follette," to whom "an inexpressible debt of gratitude" was
owed. The only way to repay her was to contribute to the
final publication of the Commission's findings. After re-
viewing the backgrounds of the commissioners and various
efforts to slander them with the stigma of "'Trotskyism,'"
Dewey predicted: "The efficacy of truth once made known is
so great that I forsee the day in the not distant future when
every honest liberal who reads the pinal Report will be grate-
ful to the Commission for undertaking against seeming odds
its historic task." He further predicted that as new evi-
dence became available, "every finding of the Commission will
be confirmed to the hilt as this new material becomes public.
I am so confident in this matter that I am willing to stake
•
.4 ,,100my reputation upon it."
In this lengthy address Professor Dewey also reviewed
some of the more glaring contradictions in the Moscow testi-
mony, such as the many dates assigned for the formation of the
"united center" and "reserve center," mutually contradictory
dates many times over. And on Radek's contention that some
fellow "conspirators" understood his state of mind merely by
seeing him on a Moscow street, the Chairman commented: "I
submit that anybody who can swallow this series of Alice-in-
Wonderland testimony can swallow anything." Together with
the other evidence and documentation, "every honest and in-
telligent person should agree with the Commission in being
appalled by the utterly discreditable character of the whole
Moscow trial proceedings, at once flimsy and vicious." It
was possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of "a frame-up," added Dewey: ". . .1 submit that the
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Commission has done just that."
From Dewey's perspective, the implications of the
findings were "profoundly disturbing." The Soviet regime
was attempting to identify political opposition to itself
with criminal activity against the Soviet Union. And com-
munist parties throughout the world were using the "vicious
' Trotskyist-terrorist-fascist-amalgam ' " as a means of de-
stroying opposition and justifying assassination. In America
the Communist Party had used this "strictly amoral tactic,
indistinguishable from the tactic of Fascism," to slander
opposition and disrupt the forces of economic and political
progress, which could not be too strongly condemned, declared
Dewey. A disciplined organization was repudiating "the prin-
ciples of truth and justice upon which the foundations of
civilization are laid." This development signified in Dewey's
opinion the "extraordinary corruption of the idealistic
heritage" of the Russian Revolution, and also signified a
10 2
"danger" against which all Americans must guard themselves.
Finally Dewey read the verdict in the form of twenty-
three paragraphs, each one linked to some aspect of the Moscow
"case" against Trotsky. Independent of other evidence, the
full Commission of Inquiry found:
(1) That the conduct of the Moscow trials
was such as to convince any unprejudiced per-
son that no effort was made to ascertain the
truth.
(2) While confessions are necessarily en-
titled to the most serious consideration, the
confessions themselves contain such inherent
improbabilities as to convince the Commission
that they do not represent the truth, irre-
spective of any means used to obtain them.
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There followed the Commission's conclusions on such subjects
as Holtzman's alleged meeting with Sedov and Trotsky in
Copenhagen, Romm's "interview" with Trotsky in the Bois de
Boulogne, and Pyatakov's "flight" to Oslo—none of which ever
took place. In addition, the alleged letters from Trotsky
containing terrorist instructions "never existed." He had
always "been a consistent opponent of individual terror,"
never advocated "sabotage as a method of opposition to any
political regime," and "never" instructed any of the accused
to enter into agreements with foreign powers against the
Soviet Union, having "always uncompromisingly advocated the
defense of the U.S.S.R." In addition, Trotsky "never recom-
mended, plotted, or attempted the restoration of capitalism
in the U.S.S.R." In fact, the Prosecutor "fantastically
falsified Trotsky's role before, during and after the October
Revolution." But the final paragraphs were the capstone of
the entire investigation:
(22) We therefore find the Moscow trials to
be frame-ups.
(23) We therefore find Trotsky and Sedov not
guilty. 1° 3
VI . For and Against
With the completion of the Commission's major task,
a fatigued Dewey should have been allowedsome rest. But it
was not to be. The very next evening (December 13) he de-
bated with Corliss Lamont over the CBS radio network the
significance of the Commission's findings. The bulk of his
I
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address was devoted to assaying the importance of the Moscow
trials for America, these "living events on the consequences
of which the American people and our democracy are involved,"
and which had disrupted anti-Fascist unity in Spain and were
dividing the American labor movement. Dewey was also con-
cerned that Soviet sympathizers were advocating a common
front with Stalin if the USSR went to war: "Remember how we
got into the last war in order to make the world safe for
democracy and you will not dismiss this organized propaganda
with a laugh." In the light of the danger of being dragged
into war on Stalin's side, "who will say that the truth about
the Soviet Union is of no significance to us here in America?"
Profoundly disturbed by the parallels he perceived between
Soviet Russian and Fascist Germany, Dewey argued that a
"country that uses all the methods of fascism to suppress
opposition can hardly be held up to us, a democracy, as a
model to follow against Fascism." Even though he disagreed
with the theories of Trotsky even more than before, "the
claims of justice, truth and humanity come first." Political
expediency should not be allowed to transcend these ends:
"If we do not insist upon putting truth and justice first,
„1° 4
the liberal movement is doomed.
In reply, Lamont "most deeply and sincerely" regretted
that his former teacher had aligned himself with the "pro-
fessional enemies" of the Soviet people. Trotsky had been
found as innocent as "a seraphic angel," but the Commission's
inner purpose had been to "whitewash" him and a
majority of
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its members had been "hopelessly prejudiced" in his favor.
In support of this criticism of the Commission, Lamont quoted
from the "eminent author," Carleton Beals, and from the let-
ter of resignation of Mauritz Hallgren. Lamont resented in
particular the Commission's general attack on the Soviet
government, that "old Communist bugaboo," which had been the
"chief stock in trade of Fascists and reactionaries," eager
to justify war and crush democratic liberties. After men-
tioning Soviet "progress" in a number of fields, Lamont
claimed that the government had "no military or aggressive
designs against any other nation on earth." In fact, the
"Soviet regime and its achievements are indivisible; and we
cannot believe that its system of justice is completely out
of step with its splendid accomplishments in practically all
other fields." After making this rather incredible argument,
Lamont concluded that most Americans were friendly toward the
USSR, whose basic "ethical principle is loyalty to the wel-
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fare and progress of all mankind."
Less respectful was the immediate reaction of
Ambassador Troyanovsky, which forced Dewey once again to
publicly defend the Commission's work. It was all a "white-
wash," of course. The Soviet diplomat also found the
'"cordial relations between Trotsky and his committee . . .
really touching.'" More important, Dewey had embarked on a
dangerous path:
"Is it astonishing that the representative
of the commission seems to hesitate in his choice
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between the Soviet regime and fascist regimes?
From sympathy for the Soviet Union through
hesitation in the choice between the Soviet
Union and fascism, to embracing reaction and
red-baiting is a logical path for Trotskyist
sympathizers and their supporters."! 06
But in reply Dewey warned of a possible new "frame-up" in
Moscow to "besmirch this Commission and discredit its work,"
and repeated that "the systematic use of the technique of
political frame-up is a danger against which our own people
st guard themselves without illusion and without compro-
ise." Rather unkindly he mentioned that Troyanovsky had
mu
m
had "nothing" to do with the October Revolution and was not
"an Old Bolshevik." Possibly, therefore, the Soviet diplomat
considered himself "immune in the present 'purge,'" a sug-
gestion which must have brought a shudder to the Ambassador's
heart
.
No holds were barred, henceforth. Dewey had declared
himself an enemy of the Soviet regime and suggested the
similarity of the Hitlerite and Soviet systems, a view he
was to develop more fully in subsequent years. For their
part the communist spokesmen now considered Dewey a
"Trotskyite , " "red-baiter," and incipient ally of fascism.
The verdict— "Not Guilty"—had opened an unbridgeable chasm
between "critical" liberals of the Dewey type and "friends"
of the Soviet Union. Open war had been declared.
"The Hour of Truth Has Struck "
Trotsky had been vindicated! His gamble in placing
his personal reputation and revolutionary honor in the
hands
of American liberals had finally reaped the desired dividends.
Apparently forewarned of the impending verdict of "Not
Guilty," Trotsky had prepared beforehand a telegram to be
sent to the Dewey Commission. It was "impossible to imagine
a more terrible verdict," he cabled the panel, for it accused
the Soviet rulers of committing a "' frame-up , " of attempting
"
'
to deceive ' " the toilers of the world, and of being
" unworthy ' " of serving the Socialist movement. In his view
the verdict had "immeasurable political importance"; the use
of lies, slander, and frame-ups in the Soviet Union had re-
ceived "a terrible blow." According to Trotsky, the
Commission, in aiming "to serve the truth," had also "served
the liberating struggle of all mankind." Henceforth, "the
work of the commission as well as the names of its partici-
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pants belong to history."
Trotsky, in particular, was pleased that the verdict
affirmed the trials' basic fradulence: such a statement was
a valuable political weapon in the struggle with Stalin. As
he declared in a written statement to the Mexican press on
the last phrases in the verdict, "Two lines in all! But
there are few lines which have such weight in the library of
humanity." Not only had the Commission found him innocent,
but it had taken "upon itself an enormous moral and political
responsibility" by declaring the trials to be frame-ups. The
only possible answer was more violence: "With such an argument
one can annihilate an opponent, but not assassinate the voice
of the world's conscience. The decision of the Commission
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cannot be affected by revolver or knife. It cannot be
drowned in water." Stalin and his lackeys, gleefully de-
clared Trotsky, had been "branded forever as the perpetrators
of the greatest crimes in history." In his opinion,
The drawing-room chatterers, disguised as
revolutionaries, the male and female votaries
of the solemn anniversaries of the Soviet
bureaucracy, the lawyers who make their careers
upon the shoulders of the workers— is it neces-
sary to give their names?— and all the other
intriguers and charlatans who have permitted
themselves to play with my political honor and
even to make capital for themselves in this
manner, all these gentlemen, one after the
other, will be called to order by public opinion.
It was all over. The "hour of truth has struck. No one will
be able to turn the wheel of justice backward. Every new
revelation will reinforce the crushing verdict and extend the
a- *» "j. i ,,109radius of its action."
In answer to some guestions posed by the Mexican and
foreign press at this December 13 briefing, Trotsky again
stressed the political importance of the verdict, in contrast
to Dewey's emphasis on the triumphof truth and justice.
Stalin's victims would eventually be rehabilitated, Trotsky
claimed, but for "Stalin there is no rehabilitation," for he
would only leave the stage "covered in disgrace." Even the
trumpet of truth would not immediately cause the walls of
Jericho to fall, but Trotsky expected the Commission's ver-
dict in the long run to have "tremendous political conse-
quences both in relation to the Comintern and to the Soviet
bureaucracy." The authority of the Comintern would be under-
mined by the judgment, and thereby deliver "a severe blow" to
the Soviet oligarchy. The Commission's verdict would also
become one of the "elements" in the internal struggle, for
the left opposition had been cleared of disgusting slander:
"The verdict thus heightens the chances for a progressive up-
rising. In this lies its greatest historical service."
There was every reason for optimism:
Humanity has developed from the ape to the
Comintern. It will advance from the Comintern
to actual Socialism. The judgment of the
Commission demonstrates once more that the
correct idea is stronger than the most power-
ful police force. In this conviction lies the
unshakable basis of revolutionary optimism.
Despite Trotsky's rather fulsome public praise of the
Commission's work, he had some private reservations. He re-
sented Dewey's alleged obiter dictum during the meeting in
the Hotel Center that Stalinism was a logical outgrowth of
Bolshevism. According to George Novack, Trotsky felt that
Dewey had "abused his post" and used the "wrong platform" to
present private opinions: it was "unjudicial," and "unwar-
ranted," and "not compatible" with the Commission's assign-
ment. And James Cannon also charged that Dewey was "'not
wholly impartial,'" and had taken advantage of the occasion
•"to attack the theory of socialism,'" which was a departure
from '"strict morality.'"
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Dewey, of course, had stressed the importance of the
verdict for America, while Trotsky had stressed its political
weight in the continuing struggle with Stalin. Although
the
investigation had reinforced Dewey's deep suspicion of
Bolshevism—whether Leninist, Trotskyite, or Stalinist—
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apparently he refrained from directly attacking the theory of
socialism while announcing the verdict. But, in a sense,
Russian Marxism had been at the center of the Dewey
Commission's deliberations. Implied in the verdict was not
only a judgment on the Stalinist variety but on all forms of
the ideology.
Response of Friends and Foes
Following the December 12 meeting, the Commission's
verdict was already inscribed in history, but both its short-
run and long-range effect was yet to be ascertained. Almost
immediately a few periodicals greeted the judgment with con-
siderable favor. An editorial in The New York Times , for in-
stance, briefly declared that the Dewey report was a "minority
vote against Stalin," and reflected "a giant body of world
opinion" on the trials. 112 Norman Thomas rather cautiously
contended in the Socialist Call that the report could not be
dismissed out of hand. It should be judged on the basis of
evidence and on the basis of the "high character and disin-
terested loyalty to truth as must be attributed to Professor
Dewey." 113 And the Socialist Appeal in a characteristic re-
view asserted that the "commission report was the greatest
triumph of truth against frame-up" since Smile Zola had ex-
posed the Dreyfus trials. "It was a mortal blow to
114Stalinism.
"
But the forces opposed to the Commission of Inquiry
were more vocal, at least in terms of volume and
violence of
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abuse. An article in Soviet Russia Today
, for instance, con-
tended that Dewey apparently did not speak or read Russian,
and had no access to information except that provided by his
Trotskyist friends. John Chamberlain? He was an editor of
Fortune: enough said. Stolberg? He had engaged in "red-
baiting" since 1925. "Dewey and Chamberlain and Stolberg.
While fascist armies torture the people of Spain and China,
this trio and their associates defend the agents of fascism
in the Soviet Union." In fact, they had joined "Berlin, Rome
and Tokyo in the campaign 'against communism,'" and were
"eager pushovers for every fake concocted by Trotsky's ex-
perts .
But the remarks in Soviet Russi a Today were rather
subdued compared to some of the comments in the Daily Worker .
This communist daily reported that the so-called Trotsky
Defense Committee had submitted "its elephantine report" and
come to "its shameful conclusion." Exposed as "part and par-
cel of the Trotzkyite propaganda apparatus," the Committee's
report presented no new evidence to disprove the conspiracy
between Trotskyism and Hitler, and was nothing but "an en-
cyclopedia of Trotzky's speeches and writings and constitutes
in its entirety a grovelling paean of praise to Trotzkyism."
Perhaps referring to The Case of Leon Trotsky , not the
Commission's final report, the Daily Worker further contended
that "every syllable" of Trotsky's writings reeked with
"ferocious calls for murder and violence against the Soviet
Government," and only added new confirmation to "the
monstrous
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guilt of Trotzky's conspiracy." The Committee had become
part of "the coalition of American fascist reactionaries,"
and ended "as a sneaking piece of deception, behind whose
window dressing stands the director of the puppets, the con-
spirator and co-worker of the Gestapo, Trotzky." As for
Dewey, he had, "alas," become the "Charlie McCarthy" of
Sidney Hook, who had led his teacher into "a swamp of
116filth." The Worker also charged that Dewey was a "puppet
of disruption" in the American progressive movement, sounded
like "Goebbels" on the Soviet Union, and had wiped out his
117
standing "as a liberal."
Other Party organs also chimed in with savage judg-
ments on Dewey's apostasy. The Communist , for instance, as-
serted that the elderly American educator had knowingly
joined "the camp of the Trotskyite fascist gangsters," and
was spreading "poisonous hatred" of the Soviet people: "No
honest person will want to have anything to do with this man
Dewey." 118 And Robert Forsythe (Kyle Crichton) in the pages
of the New Masses contended that Dewey was "a most disarming
old gentlemen," but capable of "great viciousness , " as when
he warned in his CBS broadcast against joining forces with
the Soviet Union in the forthcoming war. Dewey had ceased
being "disarming" and graduated into "dishonesty," charged
Forsythe, "not downright, vulgar, beautiful dishonesty, but
dishonesty of the sort which comes from presenting a problem
falsely and arguing furiously and righteously from that
basis." He had become a " propagandist for fascism,
precisely
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because he had misstated the problem of war for America." 119
These ad hominem remarks became the order of the day.
Instead of dealing with the substance of the final report,
the Party oracles chose to strike directly at Dewey and his
cohorts, and brand them as proto-f ascists . As Eugene Lyons
wrote, Dewey went from being the darling of the red press to
being an ogre, and drew "the lightning of Muscovite damna-
1 70tion" after his efforts to investigate Trotsky. A 1947
article in The Bolshevik
,
for instance, included Dewey among
the "Philosophizing Armor-Bearers of American reaction."
Another piece in the same Soviet ideological journal called
him "a faithful lackey of the imperialist bourgeoisie," whose
instrumentalist philosophy attempted to provide the "im-
perialist bourgeoisie with means and methods of suppressing
the class consciousness of the workers." A "bitter opponent
of Marxism," he had turned into "a vicious enemy of the Soviet
Union and joined hands with the Trotskyite agent, Sidney
Hook." 121 And an article in the 1952 Bol ' shaya Sovetskaya
Entsiklopediya /Large Soviet Encyclopedia/ described him as
a "reactionary bourgeois philosopher," whose ideology served
the interests of aggressive American imperialism:
The philosophy of Dewey is the philosophy
of war and fascism. Dewey is a herald of con-
temporary imperialistic reaction, the ideologue
of American imperialism, a violent enemy of the
USSR, land of the people's democracy and revolu-
tionary theory of Marxism-Leninism. 122
But it was difficult to dismiss the verdict out of
hand. Even The Nation and New Republic appeared somewhat
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shaken by the final report. "The Commission, although ham-
pered by limited resources and much opposition," commented
The Nation
,
"worked hard to assemble evidence to support its
preliminary findings published seven months ago, and the
document which has resulted from its labors is both an im-
pressive defense of Leon Trotsky and an attack on the Soviet
trials which resulted in his 'conviction.'" Many "damaging
discrepancies" in the charges against Trotsky were exposed,
and the "inherent improbability" of his complicity in the
crimes was shown. But the former objections to the investi-
gation were still "sound," declared Freda Kirchwey's journal.
Trotsky's evidence could not be tested by counter-evidence in
the possession of the Soviet government; and his testimony
could not be subjected to cross-examination. In addition,
the Commission was at least "partly suspect" as being pre-
committed to a belief in Trotsky's innocence:
It goes without saying that Trotsky has not
been proven guilty by any process that could
be acceptable to a dispassionate observer;
but ex parte and extra-legal proceedings, how-
ever"thorough, cannot prove his innocence. At
the most they can produce an amplified restate-
ment of the case of the defendant- it was a
mistake to call it a "verdict ."
The New Republic was a little more cautious. After
briefly reviewing the chief points in the Dewey verdict,
the
liberal journal declared that a "detailed comment on these
extremely serious charges must wait until we have
had an
opportunity to examine the full text and learn
how much new
evidence the committee has assembled."





The New Republic always wanted more time, hoping that
the Trotsky affair would disappear-
-was coupled with the re-
gret that the Commission had not examined more fully the
question of "a widespread conspiracy" against the Soviet
regime. Most Americans, it added, were more concerned with




In effect, therefore, The New Republic refused to
comment on the Dewey Commission's verdict, while lamenting
that it had not embarked on another investigation altogether.
But no longer did this liberal magazine explicitly defend the
Moscow trials or automatically accept Trotsky's guilt, in
contrast to its position sixteen months earlier. Public
opinion was moving, if not in Trotsky's direction, at least
away from Moscow.
VII. Aftermath
Trotsky was tired. The many months of gathering af-
fidavits, issuing statements, and preparing testimony had
taken their toll. The Dewey Commission's verdict had been
greeted with "great joy" in the Blue House, but nothing was
changed. The judgment had little or no immediate effect in
Europe, where the gathering storm of war preoccupied the
public. And the "nightmare" continued, with more news from
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Moscow of arrests and executions.
The Russian refugee returned to his various literary
projects, working twelve-hour days with little respite. Each
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day, however, he took time to feed his beloved rabbits, and
occasionally there were "war expeditions" into the country-
side to collect huge cacti. Visitors came to the door of
the villa from time to time, and so did tragedy. One after
another of his secretaries and associates met untimely deaths
under mysterious circumstances. Then in February 1938 his
son—Lyova—unexpectedly died in a Paris hospital, the cause
of death something of an enigma, perhaps one concocted by GPU
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"physicians." This was a shattering loss for Trotsky and
his wife; with some dread associates in Mexico remembered the
1911 suicide of Paul and Laura Laf argue (Marx's daughter).
There were other fears , moreover . Vincent e Lombardo Toledano
and his Mexican Confederation of Labor stepped up the cam-
paign to expel Trotsky, the "Standard-Bearer of All Enemies
of Labor." There was more than a hint of violence in the air.
An attempt on his life would come as a surprise to hardly any-
128




The work of the Dewey Commission was almost completed.
Only Not Guilty had to be prepared for publication. But in
March 1938 began the trial of Bukharin, Rykov , and Company--
"The Great Trial." This final act in the tragic-comedy once
again involved Trotsky and the commission of inquiry. From
Mexico, in fact, Trotsky announced the trial was to some de-




When news reached New York of the impending Bukharin-
Rykov trial, Suzanne La Follette reacted almost automatically.
A statement condemning the new "frame-up" was issued in the
name of th^ investigating commissicn. It reviewed the
earlier '"demonstration trials'" and predicted that the
Bukharin-Rykov drama would produce "similar demonstrable
falsifications of fact and history." And the Commission's
statement repeated an earlier warning, "that the systematic
use of the technique of political frame-up is a danger
against which the American people must guard themselves with-
1 30
out illusion and without compromise."
This declaration was printed in The New York Times on
March 2, along with a similar statement issued by the Trotsky
Defense Committee:
"Like its predecessors, this will not be a trial
at all but a well rehearsed theatrical presen-
tation based upon the ability of the G.P.U. to
extort false 'confessions' from the actors in
order to destroy, morally and physically,
Stalin's political opponents. ..."
Among those "supporting" this declaration, reported the Times,
were sixteen Committee members, including B. Charney Vladeck,
Norman Thomas, Franz Boas, John Dos Passos, Horace Kallen,
Alexander Goldenweiser , William H. Kilpatrick, Joseph Wood
Krutch, William Ellery Leonard, Ferdinand Lundberg, Gorham




Howard, and Gaetano Salvemini.
These "premature" condemnations of the Moscow trial,
even before it started, created a contretemps in New
York,




firmly wedded to their respective "truths." The Daily Worker,
in particular, was outraged by the Committee's audacity, and
began to poll the members who allegedly were "supporting" the
accusation. In its issue of March 5 appeared a triumphant
revelation: "Trotzkyist Forgery Repudiated By Four Alleged
'Signers' of Letter for Investigation of Trial." In a
"desperate effort" to discredit the trial, the Defense
Committee had resorted to "deliberate forgery of prominent
names," claimed the communist organ. The energetic Worker
had solicited statements from Professors Boas, Leonard, and
Goldenweiser , all of whom denied that they had authorized the
use of their names in connection with the statement.
Ferdinand Lundberg and Gaetano Salvemimi , in addition, also
expressed some surprise over the declaration, of which they
lacked foreknowledge. This was a "smear," contended the
Daily Worker , on the part of Trotskyites, who were resorting
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to "duplicity, forgery, trickery."
Corliss Lamont also utilized this "forgery" in an in-
spired effort to split the forces opposed to Soviet justice.
On March 5 he sent a telegram to Professor Dewey, vacationing
in Florida:
Surprised to see in the New York Times of March
second that the Commission headed by you without
waiting to hear one word of the testimony in
present Moscow treason trials denounced these
trials as frameups. This is precise opposite of
experimental scientific methods advocated in
your philosophy. Committee for Defense of
Trotsky issued similar statement with Times
printing sixteen signatures. Professor Boaz
/"sic/, Goldenweiser, Leonard and Ferdinand
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Lundberg have publicly repudiated use of their
names as unauthorized and several others are
expected to do so. Sorry to bother you but as
Chairman of organizations, you must necessarily
expect constant involvement in these issues.
Would appreciate a wire collect.
I
33
Concerned for the "good names" of misguided liberals, Lamont
followed up this wire with a series of phone calls and
"circular" letters to the Committee's membership. The
"shocking use of names under false pretenses," he wrote,
showed how liberals were being exploited on the Committee by
"an inner group of professional Trotskyites . " Lamont also
charged that both the Defense Committee and Dewey Commission
had abandoned any pretense of impartiality in their precipi-
tous condemnation of the trial: "May I ask how many of you
134
approve of this method of prejudging the trials?"
The "forgery" episode was easily explained. The com-
munication printed in the Times (March 2) had been typed on
Committee stationery, which also listed various members. Ac-
cording to an editor of the newspaper, "'We considered that
we were entirely justified in presuming that it was presented
as the opinion of the Committee, and we saw no reason for not
selecting sixteen prominent names among those presented as
members of the Committee making the appeal.'" Lamont was
somewhat chagrined with this simple explanation. He had only
reached the "natural conclusion" that the sixteen members had
signed the statement, in the sense they gave permission, even
if they had not "physically affixed their signatures to a




But George Novack was unforgiving. He wrote Lamont
that he was just shedding "crocodile tears" over ruined repu-
tations; Lamont had helped to slander these names originally.
The secretary of the Defense Committee, however, could under-
stand the millionaire's "desperate mood," for he had defended
"an abominable mass slaughter" for eighteen months, and was
"knee-deep in blood." A few lies must have seemed a cheap
price to pay if these murders could be made "a contribution
136to civilization." And so ended a minor "frame-up," New
York variety.
The "Great Frame-up "
The third and final "show" trial opened in Moscow on
the second of March. Little was changed from the earlier
trials. The Bukharin-Rykov extravaganza was held in the same
former ballroom, where nobles had danced under the cheerful
frieze of dancing girls. But a "casually grim atmosphere"
now gripped the hall. V. V. Ulrikh was once again the pre-
siding judge, but more obese than ever, with "rolls of fat"
bulging over his collar. Andrei Vyshinsky was nattily attired
in a blue suit and appeared to one reporter as a "successful
American business man in a small Middle Western City." And
in the gallery sat the "hoi-polloi" or the "'proletarian
aristocrats,'" laughing and chattering, who had come to be
"horrified, and perhaps even terrified," wrote one British
observer, "by a spectacle which would partake at once both of
137
the medieval morality play and of the modern gangster film."
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Also in the courtroom were a dozen NKVD "giants,"
keeping a watchful eye on the twenty-one defendants behind
the "flimsy pine fence," which served as the dock. Their
prey again was most distinguished, including three members
of Lenin's Politburo. Nikolai Bukharin, the Party's "be-
loved," had been a leading theoretician and chairman of the
Comintern. Alexei Rykov had held a number of major govern-
mental posts, including that of Premier. And Nikolai
Krestinsky had been Moscow's Ambassador to Berlin in the
1920s and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in
the 1930s. Also in the dock was the brilliant Christian
Rakovsky, a veteran of the revolutionary movement and perhaps
Trotsky's closest confidant in the movement. From the Party's
underworld came Genrikh Yagoda, police agent extraordinaire ,
and former chief of the NKVD. Rounding out the twenty-one
defendants were ex-Commissars, nationalist leaders, respected
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physicians, and close associates of Party notables. "'What
a flock of carion crows (a crew of desperadoes gathered),
what a medley of raiment and faces,'" wrote a correspondent
139
for the Daily Worker
,
quoting Pushkin.
"For sheer blood and thunder the indictment left
140
nothing to be desired," observed Fitzroy Maclean." This
mixed bag of Trotskyites, Zinovievites , Rightists, Mensheviks,
Socialist-Revolutionaries, and bourgeois nationalists—the
"Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites "—were accused of a myriad
of crimes, which tied together the multiple threads of the
far-flung conspiracy. Economic crimes, for instance,
had
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reached new heights of daring. The ex-Minister of the
Timber Industry—V. I. Ivanov—had helped cause a paper
shortage, thereby striking "a blow at the cultural revolution,
interrupting the supply of exercise books and thus rousing
discontent among the masses." M. A. Chernov, who had once
been Minister of Agriculture, had overseen the artificial in-
fection of pigs with "erysipelas" and the "plague." Isaak
Zelensky of the Consumers' Cooperative had been even more
imaginative. In order to arouse worker discontent, members
of his organization had actually thrown "glass" and "nails"
into butter, which made it all that "tastier," noted
Vyshinsky. At this startling revelation a "grunt of rage
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and horror rose from the audience."
Even more startling revelations were to come. To the
consternation of the gallery it was revealed that the deaths
of V. R. Menzhinsky (GPU chief), V. V. Kuibyshev (Party
leader), A. M. "Maxim" Gorky and his son, M. Peshkov, had
been "medical murders." A series of eminent doctors and
close associates of the murdered men testified on the methods
used for encouraging their untimely deaths. A Dr. Kazakov
had prescribed for Menzhinsky' s heart condition a medication
of "lysates of thyroid gland, hypophysis and the medullar
stratum of the suprarenal gland"— a rather unusual prescrip-
tion. P. P. Kryuchkov. Gorky's secretary, had gotten Peshkov
drunk and left him unconscious on a bench in the cold; when
pneumonia resulted, champagne and a laxative were prescribed.
Kryuchkov had also arranged for Gorky, who had a history
of
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tuberculosis, to sit near bonfires, for the "smoke of the
bonfire naturally affected Gorky's weak lungs." When the
writer returned to Moscow and caught the grippe, Drs
.
Pletnev and Levin gave him large doses of "digalen" (digi-
talis) and "camphor." Death resulted in June 1936, prior to
142the first show trial.
And then there was the "Bloodhound Yagoda," some
kind of "abnormal and evil figure," wrote Mikhail Koltsov, a
143leading Soviet journalist. Formerly the feared head of
the NKVD, Yagoda had become "a broken, white-haired man,"
whose once jaunty toothbrush moustache had a rather "pathetic
144
air." He was in a daze during the court proceedings. Al-
though Yagoda resisted Vyshinsky's blandishments in his first
appearance before the court, the "poor battered wreck"
finally admitted responsibility for most of the heinous
crimes outlined in the case. Not only had he been involved
in the assassination of Kirov, but he had facilitated the
deaths of Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Gorky, and Peshkov. After
his removal from the NKVD post in September 1936, in addition,
Yagoda ordered that his office be sprayed several times with
a solution of mercury mixed in acid, an ingenious effort to
"poison" his successor, Nikolai Yezhov. But Yagoda managed
to undermine the state's case in several instances, and in-
serted one telling point in the record: "Had I been a spy,
I assure you that dozens of states would have been compelled
.,145
to disband their intelligence services.
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The chief attraction of the trial, however, was "that
damnable cross of a fox and a swine," Nikolai Bukharin. His
distinguished reputation was systematically undermined during
the trial until a new portrait emerged: "a demon, complete
with horns, hooves and tail, a traitor, a spy and a capitalist
mercenary, a sinister figure, skulking in the shadows, poi-
soning Soviet hogs, slaughtering Soviet stallions, slipping
powdered glass into the workers' butter." Although
Bukharin accepted "general responsibility" for the bloc's
activities, and pleaded guilty to "the sum total of crimes
committed by this counter-revolutionary organization," he
steadfastly denied any part in Kirov's assassination, any de-
sire to eliminate Stalin, any wish to "open" the front in
case of war, and any conspiratorial ties to foreign intel-
ligence agencies. 147 In particular, he rejected the allega-
tion that he had plotted Lenin's death in 1918 at the time of
the Brest-Litovsk controversy. There had been a plan to ar-
rest Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov, admitted Bukharin, but this
did not imply loss of life, contrary to Vyshinsky's allega-
tion. In fact, as Bukharin reminded the Prosecutor,
You arrested me, that is an act of violence;
however, I am still alive, but perhaps I will
not be alive and I am almost certain of it, yet
I am still alive, which is testified to bv the
fact that I am speaking from this dock. 1
Bukharin's many asides, highly gualified admissions,
sarcastic rejoinders, and outright denials of fact severely
tried Vyshinsky's patience. The learned professor
lectured
his less-educated tormentor on the meanings of
certain
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Russian and German words, and even discoursed on Hegel 's
philosophy. Vyshinsky ordered him to stop this "pettifogging"
and refrain from hiding behind "a flood of words/ 1 or he
would cut short the interrogation. In his final speech the
Prosecutor exclaimed:
Philosophy and espionage, philosophy and
wrecking, philosophy and acts of diversion,
philosophy and murder, like genius and vil-
lainy, are two things that do not go together!
I know of no other instances— this is the
first instance in history of a spy and a mur-
derer using philosophy, like powdered glass,
to hurl it into his victims 1 eyes before
dashing his brains out with a footpad 1 s
bludgeon. 149
This "garrulous little gentlemen , " to quote Vyshinsky
,
repre-





and inhuman villainy." He was also following "definite
150 . .tactics." In the opinion of Robert Tucker, these "definite
tactics" were an exercise in using Aesopian language or the
"technique of indirection to transform his trial into an




But whether Bukharin was using "veiled" or "Aesopian"
language to turn Stalin into the accused, he appeared to have
accepted the Bolshevik logic of offering a "last service" to
the Party. In his final plea he explained his reasons for
confessing:
Because while in prison I made a revaluation of
my entire past. For when you ask yourself: "If
you must die, what are you dying for?"— an abso-
lutely black vacuity suddenly rises before you
with startling vividness. There was nothing to
die for, if one wanted to die unrepented. And,
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on the contrary, everything positive that
glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new
dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end
disarmed me completely and led me to bend my
knees before the Party and the country.
In other wcrds, it was better to die within the Party then
to live outside its folds, branded "an enemy of the people." 152
There were many other important facets to this trial,
the longest and most complicated of all the proceedings.
Alexei Rykov also attempted to refute some of the specific
terrorist charges, but his testimony lacked coherence, per-
haps because of a liquor problem. He appeared "to have gone
to pieces completely," wrote a British observer, and punctu-
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ated his incoherent utterences with "inane giggles."
Christian Rakovsky implicated Max Eastman, among others.
Supposedly Great Britain accepted Rakovsky as the Soviet
ambassador in the 1920s, only after Eastman assured London
154
that the diplomat was on "intimate terms" with Trotsky.
Faisullah Khodjayev and Akmal Ikramov testified that they had
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attempted to turn Uzbekistan into "a British Protectorate."
And Zelensky
,
Zubarev, and Ivanov admitted that they had
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been Okhrana agents before the Revolution. ' But the most
pathetic admission came from Rosengoltz. After his arrest
the NKVD discovered sewn into a pocket a small piece of bread
wrapped in cloth. Inside the bread was a message: his wife
had written eight verses from the 68th and 91st Psalms. This
was a kind of "family talisman," Rosengoltz told a smirking
Vyshinsky, one that was supposed to bring him "good luck."
At that there was a "roar of laughter" from
the gallery and
the court broke up in an "atmosphere of general hilarity." 157
In his closing statement Vyshinsky demanded that "the
traitors and spies who were selling our country to the enemy
I CO
must be shct like dirty dogs.* ,J- JO But this was a super-
fluous appeal, since even the defendants had realized they
were doomed; Pravda had called for their swift destruction
before the trial opened. On March 12th President Ulrikh read
in a "toneless voice" the verdict. Eighteen of the twenty-
one defendants had received the supreme penalty— "to be shot,
with the confiscation of all their personal property." Only
Dr. Pletnev (25 years), Rakovsky (20 years), and Bessonov
159(15 years) were spared, at least temporarily.
Trotsky and the "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites "
When news of the new trial reached Trotsky in Mexico,
he immediately prepared his staff to issue daily statements
during the trial's run. As one secretary has written, timing
was absolutely "crucial," in order to take advantage of in-
ternational attention: "Even hours could make a difference."
The Old Man worked eighteen-hour days in order to refute the
accusations before public opinion tired of the bloody drama
in Moscow. The impact of his daily statements on the trial
was "devastating," claimed Joseph Hansen, for the swift re-
sponse to the initial indictment exposed "the frame-up before
the show even opened, turned the trial against Stalin in the
eyes of world opinion from the first day, and each day became
worse." Once again the chief defendant succeeded in
"turning
,,160
the tables on Stalin, becoming the chief accuser.
One may doubt Hansen's claims. True, Trotsky's
statements on the trial received considerable attention in
the world press, but there was a certain lack of "punch" in
the counter-accusations. It was as if both Stalin and
Trotsky were going through previously rehearsed roles learned
by heart, with little or no deviation. From Moscow, as usual,
came claims that Trotsky had sent innumerable letters to his
co-conspirators (all burnt, of course), and met with them for
clandestine interviews (few details provided). If this trial
were an "answer" to the Dewey Commission, as Trotsky claimed,
then Stalin had learned little about shoring up the weak
points in his "frame-up." In fact, the "sameness" of the
case implied Stalin's contempt and lack of concern for
Trotsky's valiant efforts to expose the contradictions in the
charges
.
There were so many juicy morsels in the Bukharin-
Rykov trial that Trotsky, in a sense, took a "back seat" to
the likes of Bukharin, Yagoda, etc. True, he was still one
of "the inspirers" of the conspiracy. But unlike the first
two trials, the final verdict did not assert that "enemy of
the people TROTSKY" had been found guilty and would be tried
if found on Soviet territory. Instead, there were variations
on old themes, played out by the four alleged "Trotskyites"
in the dock—Krestinsky, Rosengoltz, Rakovsky, and Bessonov.
According to Rakovsky, the Trotskyite conspirators
had attempted to juggle "three cards" at the same time in
tt •
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their feverish attempt to regain power in the Soviet Union.
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The first "card" involved the Germans, a threadbare charge,
but the indictment announced that Trotsky had actually been
a German agent since 1921! He had arranged an alliance with
General Seeckt, Commander-in-Chief of the German Reichswehr.
In exchange for espionage information conveyed by Krestinsky,
Rosengoltz, and Bessonov, and permission for German espio-
nage "bases" to be established secretly on Soviet territory,
the German army provided Trotsky with a yearly subsidy,
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amounting to two million gold marks from 1923-30. The
second card concerned the British: Trotsky had been their
agent since 1926! In fact, he had helped the conservative
government of Great Britain in 1927 to arrange the raid on
the Arcos office (Soviet Trade Mission) in London which re-
sulted in a rupture of diplomatic relations. And there had
also been plans in 1928 for Trotsky to use British help to
escape from exile in Alma-Ata. As for the final card, it
was Japanese. Rakovsky in 1934 made a trip to Japan, where
he contacted Japanese intelligence officers, and relayed in-
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formation to Trotsky on the developing alliance. At one
and the same time, therefore, Trotsky had been a German,
British, and Japanese agent!
In reply, Trotsky admitted that after 1921 the
Reichswehr and the Kremlin had secretly helped each other
militarily, but this was a Politburo decision, not a personal
one, and Stalin himself was "a most dogged partisan of col-
laboration with the Reichswehr and Germany in general."
Be-
sides, there was no reason for Trotsky to chose a
"disarmed
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and humiliated Germany" as an ally in 1921. As for the
gigantic subsidy, amounting to over a million dollars, Trotsky
noted that his son had lived and died in extremely "modest
circumstances," and such a large sun in his own budget could
not remain unnoticed: "So large a sum must leave some mate-
rial trace." He challenged Ambassador Troyanovsky to launch
an investigation into his finances. The alleged ties with
Great Britain and Japan also made little sense. But Trotsky
noted Stalin had become less strident in his anti-German
propaganda. The inclusion of Great Britain, in particular,
in the conspiracy was meant as "a diplomatic warning" to
Prime Minister Chamberlain. "Thus, even in my 'betrayals,'
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I continue to perform a patriotic function."
Such an enormously complicated conspiracy, of course,
required many surreptitious contacts—both meetings and com-
munications. The Bukharin-Rykov trial abounded in undocu-
mented allegations that the Trotskyite conspirators had con-
tacted Trotsky and his son on many occasions. For instance,
Rosengoltz supposedly met Sedov at Felden (Austria) in 1933
and at Karlsbad ( Czchoslovakia) in 1934; but Sedov lived first
in Germany (1933) and then France (1933-34), and could not
travel to either Austria or Czechoslovakia. Bessonov, in
addition, supposedly met Trotsky in July 1934 (Paris) and
received a letter from him in early January 1937. But in
July 1934 Trotsky was under strict French police surveillance
and could not have met Bessonov without being detected.
And
in December 1936-January 1937 he was on board the
"Ruth,"
steaming to Mexico and out of contact with the world. In
another geographic fantasy, Krestinsky met Sedov in
Kissingen (Germany) in September 1929 (when Trotsky's son was
living in Turkey), and had an interview with Trotsky in the
Italian spa of Meran around the 10th of October, 1933. But
at that time Trotsky was a patient in France closely watched
by doctors and police agents. In each case Trotsky referred
skeptical critics to documents in the possession of the Dewey
Commission to buttress his claims. But after the exertion
made earlier to demolish the alleged interview in the Hotel
Bristol, for instance, there was little reason to launch a
full-scale exposure of the new allegations. The point had
been made many times— ad_ nause am . 166 Once again the GPU's
calendar did not mesh with the calendar used by Trotsky and
his son.
In the third trial other details were added to com-
plete the picture of Trotsky as the arch-conspirator. Ac-
cording to Bessonov, Trotsky had a deep hatred for Gorky,
that "intimate" friend of Stalin's, and relayed instructions:
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"'GORKY must be physically exterminated at all costs.'"
And Trotsky was willing to encourage Tukhachevsky ' s military
"coup," but feared that the general was a "Bonapartist " type,
who might not allow Trotsky to return to Moscow after the up-
rising. 168 Even more important, Bukharin and others testified
that Trotsky participated in the alleged 1918 plot to arrest





But perhaps the most painful accusation in the entire
trial for Trotsky came from Rakovsky, his old friend. In his
final plea he told the court:
Citizen Judges, I share the State
Prosecutor's regret that enemy of the people
Trotsky is not here in the dock alongside of
us. The picture of our trial loses in com-
pleteness and depth because of the fact that
the ataman of our gang is not present here.
. . . I regret his absence here for considera-
tions of a political nature. I am sorry, be-
cause Trotsky's absence in this dock means
that no matter how his opportunities may be
limited, his activities will continue, and
this presents a danger, even if a small one,
for the international labour movement. It is
true that even beyond the Mexican meridian
Trotsky will not escape that complete, final,
shameful ignominy which we all are undergoing
here. 170
In effect, Rakovsky announced that a death sentence hung over
Trotsky's head, one that was redeemed in August 1940.
If the accusations were basically the same, so was
Trotsky's response. The sadistic charges represented the
"delirium of a lunatic armed with enormous power," saturated
with "the spirit of totalitarian idiocy ," in his opinion:
It is with almost _a physical effort that J_
tear my own thought away from the nightmarish
combinations of the OGPU and direct them upon
the guestion , "How and why could all this be
made possible ?
More than ever he was convinved that the incredible accusa-
tions prefigured the end of the regime, which he compared to
the "odor of decay" that had arisen from the Rasputin affair
at the end of the Tsar's reign: "The ruling layer capable of
disgorging such gases is doomed. The present trial is the
,.l 7 l
tragic death-struggle of the Stalinist dictatorship.
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Trotsky still considered Stalin a victim of his own
politics, "forced to drink salt water in order to quench his
thirst." But this "outstanding mediocrity" had become the
"
'
Czar ' " of a " caste of rapacious parvenus ," who felt
threatened by the living traditions of October. Supported by
the totalitarian apparatus and unlimited material resources,
he created even "spicier" dishes until he decided "to ravish
the conscience of the world," with yet another trial. The
defendants in the trial used Yezhov's "illiterate cribs,"
but behind the scene "Cain-Djugashvili rubs his hands and
cackles evilly," charged Trotsky, whose personal distaste for
Stalin was becoming more pronounced. But the rats were
leaving the sinking ship, hatred was accumulating around
Stalin, and terrible revenge hung over his head. Another
bureaucratic "'genius'" would only succeed him, if he were
struck down. But Trotsky confidently predicted:
The monuments he /Stalin/ built to himself will
be destroyed or put in museums of totalitarian
gangsterism. But the victorious working class
will look through all the trials, public and
secret, and erect on the squares of the liberated
Soviet 'union monuments to the unfortunate victims
of the Stalin system of baseness and dishonor. 1 ' 2
The rehabilitations did begin in 1956, but the representative




Even before the Bukharin-Rykov trial began, the
Executive Board of the American Committee for the
Defense of
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Leon Trotsky had voted to disband (February 17, 1938). But
a final membership meeting was held in the Hotel Center on
March 9 "to try to save the lives" of the new defendants
standing trial in Moscow. Approximately 2,000 people at-
tended, but they only contributed $370.68 to the Committee's
coffers. No matter, George Novack was highly pleased with
the meeting:
The turnout and enthusiasm generated by our
meeting is a new testimony to the achievement
of the Committee in illuminating American pub-
lic opinion on the issues which concern us. So
great is that achievement that the Communist
Party is losing its head with rage. It has be-
gun a new campaign of slander against the
Committee
.
Novack, in particular, was gratified that during the Lamont
"forgery" affair, the Committee's membership had rallied
around the Executive Board. This support proved to him that
"an unbreakable phalanx of fighters for democratic rights
173
enlisted under our banner."
Besides speeches from Suzanne La Follette, Eugene
Lyons, Carlo Tresca, Bertram Wolfe, and Max Shachtman, the
gathering in the Hotel Center heard prepared messages read
for Norman Thomas and Horace Kallen. The Socialist leader
took the opportunity to condemn the Soviet Union, unfit in
his opinion to lead the working class or mankind: "There is
no good society which can exist shot through with lies, ter-
rorism, plots, counter-plots and everything else revealed by
these trials." Still perplexed by the issue of the confes-
sions, Thomas declared that these exercises in self-abuse,
in
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any event, constituted "an irreparable injury to the movement
for true socialism." Certainly the accusations against
Bolshevik leaders were "incredible" and "Stalin's own thirst
for blood is pathological." Thomas concluded that progres-
sive forces in America needed to free themselves from these
174Soviet conflicts.
Kallen, always concerned for refugee rights, informed
the meeting that their specific tasks with regard to Trotsky
has been accomplished, but the problem of providing political
refugees with the right of asylum and equal justice before
the law was more critical than ever: "These rights are as
old as civilization. They are a part of the great tradition
of free society." But they were threatened everywhere in the
world which, in turn, threatened "all values which democracy
has bred and is nourishing." In the opinion of this liberal,
even though Trotsky was a communist revolutionary, he was "an
apt symbol of the necessity to make secure beyond question
the right of asylum and the right to equal justice." For,
. . .
democracy requires the right of asylum and
the right of equal justice shall be recognized
everywhere, and for everyone, beyond question.
If they can be established for the terrible
Trotsky, they can hardly be denied to the
anonymous, stateless multitudes who are in
flight from persecution, cruelty and demorali-
zation at the hands of the anti-democratic
dictatorships of the world. Leon Trotsky is
the symbol of them all.
In the future, added this noted philosopher, it would be
recognized that Dewey's work had grown out "of the highest
tradition of liberty and justice of our country." Dewey,
I
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indeed, was among the foremost liberals holding aloft the
torch of this tradition: "In him and through him the soul
of America speaks, and speaks for all suppliants of the right
of asylum and equal justice before the law." 175
On March 21 the Executive Board met to conclude the
business of the Defense Committee. It voted to send to the
membership a referendum ballot, requesting approval to dis-
band the enterprise. And a "Liquidating Committee" was pro-
posed to assume control of the Committee's assets, and reduce
the "considerable deficit" that was reflected in its accounts.
In fact, the total bank credit at the time was a mere $9.53.
Against liabilities of $3,258.04, the Committee only had as-
sets amounting to $2,251.33. And the bulk of these "assets"
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represented 1,350 unsold copies of The Case of Leon Trotsky .
As a result, Novack sent out one last appeal to the membership,
urging that each supporter contribute another $10 in order to
reduce the "book" deficit of $1000. This was the "final
voluntary effort" requested by the American Committee for the
177
Defense of Leon Trotsky.
CONCLUSION
Leon Trotsky and the other participants in the Com-
mission of inquiry had few doubts about its historical sig-
nificance. According to the chief witness in the case, it
"would not be an exaggeration to say that the decision of the
Commission will enter history as the most important of all
verdicts ever pronounced by any court."''' And the final re-
port of the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky
proudly claimed:
The prime agency in interesting public opin-
ion in the issue of investigating the Moscow
trials, not only in this country but the world
over, has been our Committee. The motto which
we carried on our bulletins was: "Let the
truth be known." Today we can say that our
banner has been planted on a high peak where it
waves for all to see.
2
This self-approbation was hardly surprising, of course, but it
need not be taken at face value. Important questions remain
to be answered. In line with Dewey's goal, did the Commission
of Inquiry vindicate "truth and justice" with its investiga-
tion? And in line with Trotsky's aim, did he clear his polit-
ical name and turn his accuser--St alin— into the accused?
In a narrow sense, both the American Committee for
the Defense of Leon Trotsky and the Commission of Inquiry ful-
filled their self-appointed tasks. Certainly the Defense




in Mexico. And it was the decisive force in creating the
"international" commission of inquiry. This Commission, in
turn, undertook a painstaking and basically impartial in-
vestigation of Trotsky with considerable integrity. Its
final verdict— "Not Guilty"—was not universally accepted
when issued, but with the passage of time it has gained
greater weight. In December of 1937 Dewey predicted that as
new evidence appeared, "every finding of the Commission will
be confirmed to the hilt as this new material becomes public.
Within certain limits Dewey's prediction has been vindicated
in the ensuing years. Nikita S. Khrushchev's 1956 "Secret
Speech" was, in a sense, just the continuation and cumulation
4
of the Dewey Commission's labors.
Yet the investigation was not without flaws, which
affected its reputation in 1936-33. Certainly the very name
of the Defense Committee caused unnecessary complications.
"The American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky"
—
this was not a "neutral" sounding organization. To some de-
gree, the communist claim that this was a "Trotskyite" front
was deserved, considering the work of George Novack, Felix
Morrow, and others. This stigma, in turn, unfairly sullied
the good name of the Commission of Inquiry, a progeny of the
original organization. It is hard to fault The Nation and
other periodicals when they criticized the close ties between
the two groups, which at least conveyed the "appearance" of
bias. Instead of picking wholly impartial jurists, theolo-
gians, historians, etc., the founders of the investigative
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body named three Defense Committee members—Dewey, Stolberg,
La Follette—on the preliminary commission. The investiga-
tion was hardly a "whitewash," but it was somewhat tainted
by its membership.
Any self-appointed investigative body has certain
built-in handicaps. Lacking any kind of quasi- judicial or
governmental legitimacy, it can only depend on its reputa-
tion and the conduct of the investigation to lend authority
to the findings. In this case, John Dewey was the "moral"
authority and arbiter for the commission of inquiry. His
great prestige and judicious bearing gave dignity to the en-
deavor. Certainly the work of the commission reflected his
scholarly habits and personal integrity. But even Dewey was
not without faults. During the Mexican hearings he should
have insisted on a much more rigorous examination of the
"accused." Although it proved impossible to include a
"Stalinist" in the counter-trial, Moscow should have been
represented in the Blue House, even if only by a "court-
appointed counsel" for the Kremlin. The only commissioner
truly antagonistic to Trotsky—Carleton Beals—resigned in
disgust, partly as a result of his own prickly disposition,
and partly as a result of Dewey's inept handling of the af-
fair. Perhaps most important, Dewey should have followed
his own good advice and avoided political controversies as
much as possible. Almost imperceptily the investigation be-
came as much concerned with the nature of the Soviet system




was extremely difficult to separate the two aspects of the
inquiry. But the Commission transcended its own mandate, to
Trotsky's glee and its critics • despair . Thus, the final
sentences of Not Guilty declared:
. . .
the indictments and confessions in the
widely publicized series of trials of alleged
plotters against the Soviet regime were deter-
mined in each case—including the trials of
August, 1936, and January, 1937—by the cur-
rent internal difficulties, economic and
political, and by the current situation in
the foreign relations, of the Soviet regime.
In other words, we find that the trials have
served not juridical but political ends.
5
This was, on balance, "political intervention" in the inter-
nal affairs of the Soviet Union, as Corliss Lamont and other
critics correctly charged.
On certain subjects, such as Lenin's "Testament,"
the investigators were unable to challenge Trotsky's testi-
mony because of their ignorance of Soviet history. But they
grasped the most important points of Trotsky's case, developed
their own evidence, and presented their conclusions in a
logical and lucid manner. If truth was not on "the march"
after their efforts, certainly it was a little farther down
the road. By preserving their faith in the worth of truth,
justice, and fair play, Dewey & Company stood in dramatic
contrast to the political and moral expediency practiced by
many leading American liberals and radicals in the late
1930s. The Moscow trials and subsequent Dewey Commission
provoked a crisis of conscience that undermined faith in the
Popular Front and the Soviet Union as the leader of
"the
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forces of peace." The editorials in The Nation and The New
Republic during the Bukharin-Rykov trial, for instance, re-
flected increased doubt about the integrity of Soviet justice
and the value of being aligned with the Soviet Union. These
doubts were reinforced ten-fold when the Soviet-German Non-
Agression Pact of August 1939 was signed, a "climax of
smaller but cumulative crises," in the opinion of Norman H.
Pearson. In hindsight, it "was a better preservation of
values to have used them than simply to have stood pat," he
added. In this context, John Dewey and his ilk provided a
service by standing firm for their values, and thus providing
a lesson to other liberals, one only partially learned after
1939.
Perhaps most important in the long run, the investi-
gation of the Dewey Commission had "unexpected consequences,"
just as the purges did in the Soviet Union. Dewey personally
became more intransigent toward the Soviet Union and more
enamored with the United States. In an interview granted
just after the final verdict was announced, Dewey declared
that the "great lesson to be derived from these amazing
revelations is the complete breakdown of revolutionary
Marxism." Americans, in particular, should be aware of the
whole question of "truly democratic methods of bringing about
social changes and of truly democratic methods of approach
to social progress." As he did in his debate with Trotsky
over the question of means and ends, Dewey asserted
that the
methods employed decided "the ends or consequences
that are
actually attained." If Soviet methods were merging with
those of Hitlerism, asked Dewey, then how could Americans
rely upon them? "The essence of fascism is no sweeter if
called by some other name." The many revelations of the
trials had been "a bitter disillusionment" to Dewey, who no
longer viewed the Soviet Union as a highly important social
experiment. The prevalence of ignorance and widespread lying
in the USSR meant real progress was practically impossible:
"For truth, instead of being a bourgeois virtue, is the main-
7
spring of all human progress."
Dewey's tendency to see all versions of Marxism as
tainted— "Siamese Twins" in their degeneracy—was echoed by
other liberals in the late 1930s. And when it became in-
creasingly likely that Soviet Russia and Hitlerite Germany
might become new bedfellows, Dewey and others took the lead
in rejecting both varieties of "fascism." In May 1939 there
appeared a "Manifesto" in The Nation urging the creation of a
Committee for Cultural Freedom. Announcing that the "tide of
totalitarianism" was rising throughout the world, and
threatened the integrity of the artist, writer, scholar, and
scientist, this proclamation asserted that the totalitarian
idea was already "enthroned in Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan,
and Spain." Instead of resisting and denouncing all attempts
to "strait- jacket the human mind," these states glorified,
"under deceptive slogans and names, the color or the cut
of
one strait- jacket rather than another." Unless combated,
the
specter of totalitarianism would spread to America:
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We therefore call for the formation of a
Committee for Cultural Freedom, an organiza-
tion independent of control, whether open or
secret, by any political group, pledged to
expose repression of intellectual freedom
under whatever pretext, to defend individuals
and groups victimized by totalitarian prac-
tices anywhere, to propagate courageously the
ideal of untrammeled intellectual activity.
Among those joining together on the least common denominator
of a civilized culture— "the defense of creative and intel-
lectual freedom"—were a number of names associated with the
Dewey Commission. Besides Dewey, others signing their names
to this "manifesto," included Adamic, Calverton, Chamberlain,
Eastman, Hook, Kallen, La Follette, Lyons, Dos Passos, Rorty,
Q
Stolberg, and Thomas. Many of these people became violent
anti-communists after World War II and contributed "their
quotas to the ideological virulence of the Cold War," as
Novack has stated; and its adherents were strongly repre-
sented in the original call for the creation of a Committee
for Cultural Freedom. And the Committee for Cultural Freedom
took a leading ideological role in combating communism—with
the financial assistance of the C.I. A. —in the 1950s. The
experience of "defending" Trotsky had soured a significant
9
segment of the radical left on any kind of Marxism.
*************
The "counter-trial" was only a qualified success for
Trotsky. Certainly he had little choice but to stage some
form of a judicial inquiry. Although much of the world press
was willing to publish his articles on the trials,
these
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episodic statements could hardly counter successfully the
massive "lying" campaign being conducted by the Comintern and
its agents. A dramatic confrontation with Stalin, even if
only his specter, was a necessity. The great orator, in
short, needed a platform.
But the Dewey Commission was not the ideal body to
vindicate the political reputation of a professional revolu-
tionary. The absence of representatives from the two so-
cialist internationals meant that this was scarcely a
"workers' court." In addition, the panel missed the presence
of a Gide, Shaw, or Malraux, an international intellectual
leader who could command respect outside the United States.
Alfred Rosmer, Wendelin Thomas, and Otto Ruehle were not
"moral" leaders of world stature. Instead, Trotsky placed
his honor in the hands of American liberals and radicals,
for whom he normally had the utmost disdain. Basically the
Dewey Commission was a "liberal" court trying a Bolshevik
revolutionary, something of a historical jest.
Trotsky, however, was correct that even if the
Commission lacked "VIPs," it would gain prestige as the case
unfolded. The "defense" he presented was detailed, coherent,
and well-nigh irrefutable in many important aspects. "By the
end no question had been left unanswered, no important issue





10 The eminent historian was exag-
gerating, for on his relations with Lenin, in particular,
Trotsky's testimony left much to be desired. Yet his
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painstaking and pedantic effort to document the impossibility
of meeting Messrs. Holtzman, Romm, and Pyatakov as stipulated
in the Moscow indictments bore fruit. Henceforth any serious
study of the Moscow trials had to take into consideration
Trotsky's "alibi" on these three decisive points, which went
far toward discrediting the trials themselves. To a large
degree, he had succeeded in proving "a negative fact."
But the Mexican '"counter-trial" had also exposed some
limitations in his own understanding of the purge phenomenon.
Trotsky expressed scant interest in the black wave of NKVD
agents who were terrorizing millions of innocent victims.
Like Khrushchev, his concern was for unjustly accused Party
members, most of all for Trotskyites. Never did he emphati-
cally condemn the purges or show trials without qualification;
he saved his condemnation for Stalin's "falsifications" and
"frame-ups," not the Bolshevik tendency to cleanse the Party
publicly of unwanted members. As a result, it was sometimes
difficult during the hearings to understand where Trotsky
left off and Stalin began. In addition, his oft-repeated
assertion that the trials represented the regime's "death
agony" revealed a serious misunderstanding of Stalin's
strength. Instead of fearing Trotsky and the Fourth
International, Stalin was using the "devil-figure" of Trotsky
to justify a "social prophylaxis" of immense dimensions. If
Trotsky had not existed, Stalin would have needed to create
him. The exiled Russian leader provided a "last service" to
Stalin by becoming the pretense for his final "coronation."
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With Trotsky's help, Stalin became the undisputed master of
the Party and nation after the purge was terminated. In fact,
the end of the purges signaled the beginning of Trotsky's
own "death agony." For Stalin no longer needed him. Execu-
tion followed in 1940.
Certainly Trotsky's defense and the Dewey Commission's
verdict undermined Soviet prestige, but not fatally. Only
four months after the verdict was announced, Stalin staged
the Bukharin-Rykov trial, with scant regard for contradic-
tions or inconsistencies in the case. This act was almost a
slap in the face for Trotsky and Dewey, expressing Stalin's
contempt for his critics. Apparently the Soviet dictator
still considered that Western public opinion would "swallow"
almost any tale, no matter how absurd. "Faith" in the Soviet
Union survived even the most damning exposures, simply be-
cause it was a matter of the "heart, not head." And even
after the war he returned to this genre, authorizing a series
of "show" trials in the eastern satellite nations. Thus,
Trotsky's rational analysis of the "frame-up" did not
seriously affect western "gullibility," and proved almost
useless as a political weapon to bring about Stalin's down-
fall. Trotsky had "truth" on his side, but Stalin had power.
At least in the short run the totalitarian apparatus was
triumphant over the isolated seekers of truth. Stalin, not




Trotsky did not live to see the verdict of "not
guilty" vindicated by the passage of time. But against great
odds, the lonely exile fought for his personal and profes-
sional honor, certainly a heroic undertaking. Eventually, as
he predicted, some of "the unfortunate victims of the Stalin
system of baseness and dishonor" were rehabilitated, even if
the new Soviet leaders did not erect statues to them in
Russian squares. 11 But the monuments to Stalin did come
down, and he was judged responsible for the great "frame-up,"
both in the West and in the East. Decades after the counter-
trial Stalin had been turned into the "accused," Trotsky's
great goal in beginning the unequal battle to expose "the
greatest falsification" in all of history.
He had triumphed in the main, with one great ex-
ception. The rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky in the Soviet
Union is still unfinished business. When, and if, a monument
to Lev Davidovich Trotsky is erected in Moscow, then his
triumph will be complete. And the final verdict of "Not
Guilty" will be rendered.
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from 1934 to the Present (New York: Random House, 1961 )
,
p. 15, and Conquest, Great Terror
, p. 569, as well as
Nicolaevsky ' s own explanation of this document in Power and
the Soviet Elite
, pp. 3-9. In general, the "Letter is r~
liable, although Trotsky had his doubts. In a letter to Miss
Suzanne La Follette, dated August 17, 1937, Trotsky warned
that the "Letter" had "no documentary value," being a com-
pilation of various people and sources, containing hypotheses,
genuine facts, and rumors: "The use of this letter can be
made only with the greatest caution." See Letter, Leon
Trotsky to Suzanne La Follette (August 17, 1937), Dewey






"Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky, Power
and the Soviet Elite
,
p. 30.
29The Riutin case was mentioned in each of the three
major show trials. In addition, Stalin's telegram from
Sochi to the Politburo, dated September 25, 1936, which
ordered Yagoda's removal from his NKVD p_ost, also declared,
"'The OGPU /the predecessor to the NKVD/ is four years behind
in this matter,'" i.e., unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievi te
bloc. Almost exactly four years earlier occurred the con-
troversy over the Riutin Manifesto. See N. K. Khrushchev,
"The Crimes of the Stalin Era," Special Report to the 20th
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, annotated





Boris Nicolaevsky was the principal authority for
the thesis that Kirov advocated a "reform program." However,
except for some economic reforms, he was unable to support
his view with solid evidence. See "Letter of an Old
Bolshevik," "Murder of Kirov," and "More on Stalin and Kirov,"
in Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite , pp. 34, 77, 92-
92, 102.










Nicolaevsky, "Murder of Kirov," in Nicolaevskv^wer and the Soviet Elite, pp. 92-93.' Although at ?he'
Sstead'o^-G^^f 5/ 11 1934 StaUn WaS named Secretaryins ad of "General Secretary" of the Party he was listeahead of the other three secretaries, and there waslessening of the personal adulation directed his
Nicolaevsky, "Murder of Kirov," in Nicolaevskvlower and the Soviet Elite
,
p. 96.




35TLermolo, Face of a Victim, pp. 17-20, 65-66, 80.
36
"Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky, Power
and the Soviet Elite
, p. 41.
37
Ibid., p. 39. Also see Conquest, Great Terror
p. 51, and Medvedev, Let History Judge, p. 158, as well 'as









Medvedev, Let History Judge
, p. 158. This Soviet
historian contended that Nikolayev made two abortive attempts
to reach Kirov before December 1, 1934; Khrushchev made the
same assertion in 1961. But others disagree. W. G.
Krivitsky has placed the single attempt around October 15th,
while Nicolaevsky and Orlov have suggested November 20th was
the likely date for the first and only failure. For more on
this disagreement see Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin
Era," New Leader
, 1956, p. S22, and Conquest, Great Terror
,
p. 47, for another Khrushchev statement. Also see W. G.
Krivitsky, I_n Stalin' s Secret Service (New York: Harper &
Brothers Publishers, 1939)
, p. 184; "Murder of Kirov," in
Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite
, p. 95; and Orlov,
Secret History
, pp. 17-18.
41Lermolo, Face of a Victim
,
p. 286. Medvedev, in
Let History Judge, p. 159, claims that at the "Moscow Station"
in Leningrad, Stalin struck F. D. Medved (head of the NKVD in
the city) in the face without removing his gloves. Nicolaevsky,
in "Stalin and Kirov," Power and the Soviet Elite
, p. 100,
agrees that Stalin traveled to Leningrad by train, but
Geoffrey Bailey /pseud^/, The Conspirators (New York: Harper
& Brothers Publishers, 1960 ) , p. 169, states that Stalin and
his coterie traveled in two separate planes, one carrying
Yagoda.
T*+ H^!!C°Tq!f St ' Great Terror, p. 51. Also see MedvedevLet istory Judge
, p. 159. »
43There are various Soviet accounts of Borisov's fatalaccident In the Bukharin-Rykov trial it was stated thatBonsov had a share in the assassination of Kirov " soYagoda and Zaporozhets arranged the "accident" in order toeliminate a dangerous witness. in 1956 Khrushchev declaredthat this car crash occurred in "an unusually suspicious
circumstance;" in 1961 he declared that the "lorry" had beendeliberately driven into a house, quoting its driver.
Medvedev has asserted that NKVD agents used "crowbars" onBonsov in the back of the truck, but Orlov has stated thatBonsov actually talked to Stalin before the dictator hadhim liquidated. See People's Commissariat of Justice of theU.S.S.R.
,
Report of Court Proceedings in the case of the
Anti-Soviet " Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites " (Moscow":
People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1938),
pp. 558-59. Hereafter cited as " Bloc of Rights and
Trotskyites
.
" This passage appears in Tucker and Cohen,
eds., Great Purge Trial
, pp. 479-80; since the pagination in
this trial record varies somewhat from the original, these
page references will henceforth be included in brackets,
where they differ. Also see Khrushchev, "The Crimes of 'the
Stalin Era," New Leader
, 1956, p. S22, and Conquest, Great
Terror
, pp. 49-50, for Khrushchev's 1961 remarks at the
XXIInd Party Congress. In addition, see Medvedev, Let
History Judge




p. 51. "The Soviet press
was presently to wax eloquent over the 'Beloved Leader's'
grief, as with tears streaming down his cheeks he bent over
and brushed with his mustachioed lips the waxen face of his
murdered 'Paladin,'" commented Geoffrey Bailey, Conspirators
,
p. 169.
45Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin Era," New
Leader, 1956, p. S22. Signed by A. Yenukidze , this decree




46 See Bailey, Conspirators
, pp. 169-70, and Lermolo,
Face of a. Victim, p. 105, as well as Pravda , December 5, 1934.
"On the floor of a large, brightly lighted room
piled one on another, in grim disarray, were blood-soaked
bodies with crushed skulls and distorted faces. There must
have been a hundred of them," reported Lermolo, Face of a
Victim
, p. 51, on her visit to the cellar of the NKVD prison
in Leningrad. Also see loc . cit . , pp. 263-65, for other de-














°therS find this estimate much exaggerated.See Solzhenitsyn on Soviet Penal System" /extracts from TheGulag; Archipelago, 1918-1956 /, New York Times
,
December 29~




Armstrong, Politics of Totalitarianism
, p. 23,
citing a Pravda announcement, December 23, 1934.
51 See Orlov, Secret History
, pp. 23-24, for a discus-
sion of Nikolayev's stubborness under questioning, which ap-
parently necessitated a change in script.
52Medvedev, Let History Judge
, p. 164.
53People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.,
Report of Court Proceedings in the case of the Trotskyite -
Zinovievite Terrorist Centre~TMoscow: People's Commissariat
of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1936), p. 142. Hereafter cited
as Trot skyite-Zinovievite Centre . In his final speech at the
August 1936 trial, Vyshinsky quoted from the secret proceedings
of January 15-16, 1935, to show the "double-dealing" and de-
ceitful tactics of Zinoviev and Kamenev. See loc . cit .
,
pp. 134-45, 142-44, 147-48.
54Conquest, Great Terror
, p. 58, quoting Pravda ,
January 24, 1935.
55During the Bukharin-Rykov trial P. Bulanov testified
that Yagoda had shown "unusual solicitude" for the arrested
Chekists. He had looked after their families and sent them
to camp in "a special through car." See "Bloc of Rights and
Trotskyites
,
" p_. 559. _/Tucker and Cohen, eds., Great Purge
Trial
, p. 48CK_/ For more on the tender treatment of the ar-




, p. 59; and Hyde, Stalin , p. 312.
Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin Era," New
Leader, 1956, p. S22. (Also see Nicolaevsky ' s comment on
Zaporozhets at the bottom of p. S22.)
iy d
without having to serve the full term of their sentences."
See " Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites , " p. 35; Conquest, Great
Terror, p. 60; and Hyde, Stalin , p. 312.
I
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57In "Letter of an Old Bolshevik," it was stated thatIn December, 1934, an increased interest suddenly began to
'
be manifest in the assassination of Stolypin, which bore manypoints of resemblance to the murder of Kirov." See "Letter"in Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite
, p. 43. More ex-plicitly Orlov, writing later, declared that by late 1936 the
"fact that the Leningrad NKVD had had a hand in the murder of
Kirov became widely known in the apparatus of the Central
Committee of the party." See Secret History
, p. 249.
58In the Bukharin-Rykov trial Bulanov testified that
Yagoda had once said he had a "reliable man," in Leningrad,
namely Zaporozhets, who "so arranged matters as to facilitate
the assassination of Kirov by Nikolayev. To put it plainly,
it was done with the direct connivance, and consequently with
the assistance of Zaporozhets." Although Yagoda generally
agreed with this statement, at one point he added, "It was
not like that, but it is not important." Later he declared
that he had resisted Yenukidze's instructions on assassinating
Kirov, because he would be one of the first prominent leaders
blamed for:the act. See "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites ,
"
pp. 558-59, 376, 572-73, 786. /Tucker and Cohenx eds.,
Great Purge Trial
, pp. 479-80, 334, 493-94, 675V Most
likely, as Conquest has suggested in Great Terror, p. 46,
Yagoda was attempting to indicate by his resistance that
"Yenukidze" was merely a key word for "Stalin," the actual
leader of the plot.




60Quoted in Conquest, Great Terror
,
p. 50.
^Svetlana Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a. Friend
,









Armstrong, Politics of Totalitarianism , p. 22.






"Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky, Power
and the Soviet Elite , p. 59.
580
66Quoted m Beck and Godin, Russian Purqe n 13Also see pp. 13-19 for a discussion-fay the of henew mood in the Soviet Union at the time.
67_See, in particular, Louis Fischer, "The New SovietConstitution," Nation




'Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky Power
and the Soviet Elite, p. 60. —^L
70
At the time of his death it was announced that the
cause had been heart disease. But in the Bukharin-Rykov
trial it was charged that Kuibyshev had purposefully beengiven incorrect medical treatment. See Conquest, Great
Terror
, pp. 83^84, and " Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites ,"
pp. 536^37. /Tucker and Cohen, eds.. Great Purge Trial
p. 472_V ~ a '
71See Conquest, Great Terror
, pp. 15-17, Hyde, Stalin
,
p. 313, and Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, Vintage Books (New York: Random House 1964)
pp. 403-04.
72For a discussion of these repressive moves see
Orlov, Secret History
, pp. 32-38; Schapiro, Communist Party
,
p. 404; and Conquest, Great Terror




74 .Nicolaevsky, "The Rehabilitation of Yenukidze," in
Power and the Soviet Elite
, pp. 223-34. In the Bukharin-
Rykov trial Petersen was named by Rykov and Bukharin as one
of those participating in the proposed "palace coup_. " See
" Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites ," pp. 177, 419. /Tucker and
Cohen, eds., Great Purge Trial




, pp. 205-09, 224-26. This
account must be used with some care, since much of it was
based on prison gossip. Also, she clearly placed the inci-
dent in "the summer of 1932," and claimed that Nadya
Alliluyevna was "shocked" by Stalin's behavior; she committed
suicide in November, 1932. In repeating this tale, however,
Hyde placed the attempted assassination in 1935, or sometime
before Yenukidze 's fall from grace. In addition, Orlov has
written of a "'princess'" in the Kremlin, and Nicolaevsky has
suggested she was Countess Orlova-Davydova , later shot for
attempting to take Stalin's life. Accounts vary, but ap-
Soviet Elite, p. 224.
581
Several observers have claimed some kind of connection between the murder "attempt" and^uHnfe^ fallSee Conquest, Great Terror
, p. 89; Hyde, Stalin p. 327
IS^/p:"^^" 1011 °f Alk the
77
Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters
, pp. 40, 122-23.
78T
/jr w *
n January 1938 Trotsky wrote an extremely warm
I for him) eulogy of Yenukidze, the "Biblical Abel" toStalin's "Cain." He favorably described the Georgian's mild
character, strong attachment to Lenin and himself dislike
of Stalin, and efforts to mitigate the harsh treatment meted
out to the "Old Bolsheviks." In conclusion, Trotsky stated
"With him, the old generation of Bolsheviks disappeared fromthe scene—he, at least, without self-humiliation." in this
article Trotsky revealed several anecdotes almost gossipy
in nature about the "domestic" life of the Kremlin. See Leon
Trotsky, "Behind the Kremlin Walls" (January 13, 1938) in




ed. by George Breitman
and Evelyn Reed (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp.




, p. 313. Also quoted in Hyde
Stalin
, p. 327.
80See Conquest, Great Purge
, pp. 88-89; Orlov, Secret
History
, p. 312; and Nicolaevsky, "Rehabilitation of'
Yenukidze," in Power and the Soviet Elite
, pp. 218-25.
81 See Orlov, Secret History
, p. 313, and Hyde, Stalin
,
p. 369. In the Bukharin-Rykov trial it was stated that the
"case of A. S. Yenukidze was tried by the Military Collegium
of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. on December 15, 1937."
However, his "corpse" figured prominently in the trial.
Rykov, Bukharin, and Yagoda testified that Yenukidze was a
"mainstay" in the plot to stage a "palace coup," had ordered
Kirov's death, and had a hand in the "medical murders." See
" Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites , " pp. 35, 177, 390-91, 570-
75. _/Tucker and Cohen, eds., Great Purge Trial
, pp. 35, 177,
351-52, 490-95^/
82
"Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky, Power
and the Soviet Elite
,
p. 57.
8 3Conquest, Great Terror
, pp. 87-89, citing Trotskyite -
Zinovievite Centre
























the S^le|l^e?np01 t 3BOlSheVik '" " ^^Y. P°«er
A copy of this letter from the "Smolensk Archives-was provided courtesy of Prof. Robert H. McNeal. In some
o£?M^1S lGtter included accusations not mentioned in thefficial summary of the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial- a detailedcomparison of the two might prove fruitful. In the officialsummary of the trial, based on the account in Izvesti a only76 pages out of 171 were devoted to the testimony of the de-fendants; the rest of the English-version consists of theindictment and Vyshinsky's summation speech. Other summariesappeared in International Press Correspondence
. September 101936, and Rundschau
, September 1, 1936. As far as this
writer knows, no one has compared the press reports of theZinoviev-Kamenev trial, official English summary of its pro-
ceedings, and daily accounts of the testimony in Pravda.Such a study might produce some surprising discrepancies.
After the Pyat akov-Radek and Bukharin-Rykov trials, Moscowissued "verbatim" accounts of the proceedings, but 'here againthere is some evidence that judicious cuts were made.
90
Robert H. McNeal, "The Decisions of the CPSU and
The Great Purge," Soviet Studies
, XXXII (October 1971)
180-81.
91Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, "Secret Letter of the TsK VKP (b):~ On the
terroristic activity of the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-
revolutionary bloc," July 29, 1936, Smolensk Archives
, pp.
13-14. A short section of the "Secret Letter" is translated
in Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule
,
p. 233. It is also
mentioned in Schapiro, Communist Party




92Walter Duranty, "Proof of a Plot Expected," New York
Times
,




94Harold Denny, "Trials Dramatize Soviet Struggles,"
New York Times
,
August 23, 1936, IV, p. 5.
95Orlov, Secret History
,
p. 159. Also see Conquest,
Great Terror
,
p. 105, and Harold Denny, "16 in Soviet Admit





Joshua Kunitz, "The Moscow Trials » New MassesOctober 20, 1936, p. 4. ' m ,
97





^ Passes for the trial were gi^en to low-level






than their suPeriors. If any of the defendantsspoke out of turn, the NKVD "workers" had instructions











August 31, 1936, p. 17.
101
"With Despair," Time
, March 14, 1938, p. 21.
102^,Conquest, Great Terror
, pp. 104-05. In January 1946
a British section of the Fourth International reminded the
High Tribunal at Nuremburg of the charges against Trotsky in
the Moscow purge trials. In addition, a British committee,
led by H. G. Wells, and an American group, headed by Norman
Thomas, petitioned the Tribunal to question Rudolph Hess and
Alfred Rosenberg about Trotsky's alleged ties to the Nazi
leadership. In May 1946 Albert Goldman, Trotsky's former
lawyer, demanded the right to cross-examine witnesses and
examine documents, a demand supported by Natalya Sedova.
But Washington, London, and Paris joined with Moscow to
squash any attempt to reopen the old charges. For more on
this belated attempt to clear Trotsky's name see the New York
Times, March 27, 1946, p. 12; Victor Serge, Vie et Mort de
Trotsky (Paris: Amiot *Dumont
,
1951), p. 26ln; and Joseph
Hansen, "Forward" to Leon Trotsky, Stalin' s Frame-up System
and the Moscow Trials (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1950),
pp. xix-xx.







August 31, 1936, p. 16.
105Orlov, Secret History
,
p. 328. Also see pp. 329-39




August 31, 1936, p. 16.
The editors of Time also cooperated with Stalin in underlining
the anti-semitic undertones of the trial. Under the pictures
of Zinoviev , Kamenev , and Trotsky were helpful captions
,
reading, respectively , "ne Apfelbaum , " "ne Rosenfeld, " and
"ne Bronstein." See loc. cit.
,
p. 17. At least ten of the
584






ld Denny» "I 6 in Soviet Admit 2 Plots to KillStalin and Others," New York Times
,














Evdokimov was a veteran Party member
and one time Central Committee member. V. A. Ter-Vaganyan
was a Party ideologist and leader of the Armenian Bolsheviks.
S. V. Mrachkovsky had long been active for the Party in the
Ural region. I. P. Bakayev was a former head of the Petrograd
Cheka and member of the Central Control Commission. Y. A.
Dreitzer had been a Civil War hero and chief of Trotsky's
bodyguard. The eight lesser figures in the trial were:
I. I. Reingold, R. V. Pickel , E. S. Holtzman, F. David
(Kruglyansky)
,
V. P. Olberg, K. B. Berman-Yurin
, M. I. Lurye
,
and N. L. Lurye. See Trot skyite-Zinovievite Centre
,
pp. 38-'
39. Olberg, David and Berman-Yurin had more than casual ties
with the NKVD. See Orlov, Secret History






, p. 32. According to Orlov, Secret History
,












p. 26. For further information on the various
"attempts" against Stalin's life, see loc . cit
.
, pp. 59-61,






















123Harold Denny, "Trotsky is Called Real Conspiratorin Anti-Soviet Plot," New York Times_. August 21, 1936, p. n.
124Conquest, Great Terror
, p. 123.
125Tucker, "Introduction," to Tucker and Cohen edsGreat Purge Trial, p. xix.
126Quoted in Leites and Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation
,
p. 276. Although copious quotations make this original study
all but impossible to fathom, the authors have made a careful
study of the reasons for capitulation, the modes of confes-
sion, various tactics of resistance, and the use of veiled
language, using a quasi-psychological approach that is both


































139This "Open Letter" (March 1, 1932) was in response
to the Soviet decree of February 20, 1932, depriving Trotsky
of Soviet citizenship. It was printed in Russian, German,
French, Belgian, Spanish, Greek, and American periodicals.
See Max Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial (New York: Pic
Publishers, 1936), pp. 79-80.
14QTrot skyite-Zinovievite Centre , p. 43.
oneer
141
iSid. , P. 52. The "letter" was brief to a f a„HAccording to Dreitzer's testimony it read-
main tas^efore^s: that
'
tod^ - ^ave the following
To remove Stalin and Voroshiloy
"•3 Tn thf°




I e event of war, to take advantage of everysetback and confusion to capture the leadership?." SeeTrotskvite-Zinovievite Centr. p. 22 . Also see pp. 99 and
^J°r ^° °ther ?ieCSS ° f " evidence": a secret code (notproduced in court) based on certain pages of The ArabianNights and Olberg's Honduran passport ( produced"^ court )™a llttle or no relationship to the case, except to'show that one could obtain a passport from certain Hondurandiplomats— for a consideration.
142,According to Orlov, in May 1936 the NKVD producers
of the upcoming drama met with Stalin to go over the scriptAt that time G. A. Molchanov displayed a special diagramfeaturing multi-colored lines, indicating how and whenTrotsky had made contact with his many emissaries. Although
the diagram looked "imposing and linked Trotsky firmly with
the chiefs of the conspiracy in the Soviet Union," Stalin
was not overly impressed with this example of bureaucraticlegerdemain and pointed out that none of the accused could
testify to having personally received instructions from
Trotsky to commit various terroristic acts. As a result,
the NKVD hastily surfaced David and Berman-Yurin from its
German apparatus; they were instructed to testify about
meeting Trotsky in Copenhagen in December, 1932, and re-
ceiving orders to eliminate Stalin. See Orlov ,' Secret
History
, pp. 107-08, and Hyde, Stalin
, pp. 367-68^




145T , .,Ibid. p. 66
.
146.,.,Ibid. p. 70.
147., .,Ibid. pp. 42, 52.
148 T , . ,Ibid.
,
p. 110.
Ibid. pp. 152, 140.
^^Shachtman , Behind the i






















±£10.., pp. 152-53. Zinoviev and Kamenev reannp=roHin Moscow in mid-1933, after yet another capTtulatfon^
*
156 T ,Ibid
. , pp. 157-58.



























. , p. 133.
167Ibid
.
, pp. 135-37. These phrases are an accurate
description of Stalin's behavior toward Kirov, as Conquest
has implied, Great Terror, p. 51.
168Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre
, pp. 138-40. Sup-
posedly Stalin's favorite bedtime reading was The Prince
.
But in 1936 the implied comparison of Stalin and Machiavelli '
s
hero was no longer acceptable. One Soviet medievalist, who
had missed this exchange on The Prince in the trial, continued
to lecture his students on Marx's admiration for Machiavelli.
He was censored for being politically indifferent. See Beck





170Harold Denny, "Bolshevik Linked in Plot Ends Life,"
New York Times
,





Harold Denny, "Bolshevik Linked in Plot Ends Life,"
New York Times, August 23, 1936, pp. 1, 7.
tempered. His confrontation with Smirnov back ?fr^H „caused the latter to withdraw any thou^ of confelsina
pp. 101-06. Yet another defector source W G Krlvi fc^Trv"
'
^Jg^.S^.SSES^. PP. 198-204, 'has descr bed ^
'
nfS5 r Y 5 her°1C behavior during an examination lastingysST"C^nU °USly"When he dr°ve his interrogatedA. A. Slutsky, to distraction. At one point he toldSlutsky,
-You can tell Stalin that I loathe him andboasted that when Molotov attempted to bribe him "'I scatin his face.'" Finally Mrachkovsky bowed to the 'argumentthat one must remain within the Party even unto death andhe wept, along with Slutsky. At the confrontation
Mrachkovsky and Smirnov cried on each other's necks butSmirnov would not capitulate until later, after Mrachkovskyhad signed his confession.
174












178Ibid., p. 173. Ter-Vaganyan had been one of the
last to give a full confession (August 4, 1936) during the
preliminary examination. At that point his interrogator
suggested the Party might still find useful work for him.
It is reported he replied: "'I have not the slightest de-
sire to be in a high post. If my party, for which I lived,
and for which I was ready to die any minute, forced me to
sign this
,
then I don't want to be in the Party. Today I
envy the most ignorant non-Party man. 1 " Quoted in Conquest
Gre at Terror
, p. 134.
179Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre, pp. 170-71. This is
a classic example of what Leites and Bernaut have called the
"rules of translation," where the accused were convinced
that there was some kind of equivalence between the opposi-
tion they felt and the extreme offenses to which they con-
fessed; unintended consequences of certain thoughts were
"translated" into deliberate aims. See Leites and Bernaut,
Ritual of Liquidation
, pp. Ill, 250. But Tucker has con-
tended that these "rules"—e.g., anti-Stalin equals "counter-
revolutionary," oppositional activity equals "treason," etc.
were actually forced on the defendants. See his "Introducti











eTtenli7^^^J,±St^Y ' P " 166 and Harold De™y.
New York T?me Auo£l 24 1936 n f S" 1 f6d Leade-."




, p. 171. Also seeHarold Denny, Soviet Sentences 16~~to~Die in piot to Kill RedLeaders," New York Times. August 24, 1936, p. 3
183The King asked the jury to consider its verdict
"'No, no! said the Queen, 'Sentence first-
verdict afterward.'
"'Stuff and nonsense!' said Alice loudly.The idea of having the sentence first!'












Ibid., pp. 267-69. Also quoted in Conquest Great
Terror
, p. 117. '
187Quoted in Hyde, Stalin
, p. 343. At a drunken NKVD
debauch in December, 1936, which Stalin attended, K. V.
Pauker, something of the court buffoon, gave an impression
of Zinoviev's last minutes before death: "'Please, for God's




cried Zinoviev on his knees. Since his Chief was convulsed
with laughter, Pauker gave a repeat performance, this time
adding, with hands raised, "'Hear, Israel, our God is the
only God!'" Pauker had to stop, as the general hilarity was
too much for Stalin. See Orlov, Secret History
, p. 353.











191Liberal reaction to this trial in America will be
discussed at greater length in Chapter III. However, an acute
observation by the "reactionary" magazine, Time (August 31,
1936, p. 18) should be noted here.
590
f . .
"Perhaps the most significant Moscow fact was fch** =+&££^£^m sSs^l
that every plot against him failed; and finally so 'wise thata whole boxful of Bolsheviks intent on killing^ Sd nottry to justify themselves by uttering one critical or abusiveword against the Perfect Dictator." o
1
!
2sr Friedrich Adler, The Witchcraft Trial in Moscowwith a Preface by Norman ThornaFTNew York: Pionee r 'Publishers, 1937), pp. 6-7. From Moscow Harold Denny re-ported that this appeal caused much indignation and was con-sidered a "stupid maneuvre. See Harold Denny "SovietSentences 16 to Die in Plot to Kill Red Leaders'" New YorkTimes
,
August 24, 1936, p. 3. —
193Quoted in The American Committee for the Defense ofLeon Trotsky, World Voices on the Moscow Trials : A compila-tion from the Labor and Liberal press of the worlds/compiledby Sidney Hook and Max Nomad/ (New York: Pioneer Publishers







p. 43. Pritt's analysis is also discussed
in Adler, Witchcraft Trial
, pp. 16-22; Conquest "The Great
Purge," Encounter
,
XXI (October, 1968), 86; and'soviet Russia
Today
,
Vol. 5 (November 1936), 8.
196
"Letter of an Old Bolshevik," in Nicolaevsky Power
and The Soviet Elite
, p. 64. '
197See Trotskyite-Zinovievite Centre
, pp. 55, 65, 73.
In his preliminary testimony Kamenev, in speaking of various
ways to gain power, said, "Besides, we considered it not ex-
cluded that taking part in the organization of the new
government authority would also be the Rights—Bukharin,
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, p. 8. The Norwegian government feared that
the GPU would place "an infernal machine on the ship, " wrote
Trotsky : "My wife and I could by no means consider the
latter fear as unfounded. Our own security coincided in this
instance wi th the security of a Norwegian vessel and its
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Leon Trotsky, "Statements in Tampico" (January 9,1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky , 1937-38
, p. 23, reprintedfrom the New York Times
, January 10, 1937, p. 9, under thetitle, "Trotsky in Mexico Asks Trial in Plot by ImpartialBody." Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 354.
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 354. Also see Serge,Vie et Mort de Trotsky
, p. 256, and Leon Trotsky, "Why TheyConfessed Crimes They Had Not Committed" (January 1, 1937),in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, p. 13, reprinted from
Les Crimes de Staline
. On board the "Ruth," Trotsky also
wrote, "The year that is now ending will go down in history
as the year of Cain." See Leon Trotsky, "Zinoviev And
Kamenev" (December 31, 1936), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,1937-38
, p. 11, reprinted from Fourth International, August,
1941.





191Leon Trotsky, "In Mexico" (January 9, 1937), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, p. 21, reprinted from
Fourth International
,
June, 1941, under the title, "Pages
from Trotsky's Journal." After the fourth paragraph, this
article must have been written several weeks after its date.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, p. 356. But in a per-
sonal interview (New York CiTfyl TTovember 9, 1971), George
Novack denied that he had been on the cutter, only meeting
Trotsky later that day.
192Serge, Vie e t Mort de Trotsky
, p. 257.
193Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
193 7-38
, p. 21. But not all was peaches and cream that first
day in Mexico. Trotsky and his wife were locked in a stifling
hotel room for three hours, while Shachtman went to get some
fresh fruit for Natalya, but when he returned, admitted with
a laugh, "'I forgot it.'" Trotsky did not credit Shachtman
with bad intentions, but observed, "'It's just that he does
nothing seriously. But I could not forget his leaving us
like that, especially leaving Natalia after she had been
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197George Novack, "Trotsky's Views on Dialectical
Materialism," in Leon Trotsky : The Man and His Work, p. 94,
reprinted from International Socialist Review
, FaTTT 1960.Also see Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky
, p. 256, and Leon
Trotsky, I_n Defense if Marxism (New York: Merit Publishers,
1965), p. 114.
198
"Trotsky Is At Villa of Rivera in Mexico," New York
Times
,
January 12, 1937, p. 9.
199Quoted in Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky
, p. 257. A
slightly different translation of this passage appears in
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 356, but Deutscher says the
comment was made on the train trip.
200Quoted in Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky
, p. 257.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 356, and Trotsky,




201These details are taken from Betty Kirk, "Mexico's
Fiery Cellini," New York Times Magazine
, April 25, 1937, VIII,
p. 29, and Joseph Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyoacan," intro-
duction to Leon Trotsky, My_ Life : An Attempt at an Auto-
biography
, A Merit Book (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970,)
pp. x-xi.




203See Bertram D. Wolfe, The Fabulous Life of Diego
Rivera (New York: Stein and Day, 1963), pp. 44, 244. This
was Wolfe's second effort at a biography. Earlier he had





,rWolfe, Fabulous Life, pp. 150-51, 216-23.
Quoted in Ibid., p. 386.
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Fabulous Life, pp. 336-40. During the greatb ttle over Rivera's mural in Rockefeller Center (1933)eventually demolished on orders of the youthful Nelson
'
Rockefeller, many Americans sprang to Rivera's defense,including Carleton Beals, Freda Kirchwey, and Suzanne LaFollette, future members of the Trotsky Defense Committee
or Dewey Commission.
Ibid
. , p. 234.
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2H«See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 359, and Wolfe,
Fabulous Life
, p. 70. At one point Trotsky wrote that theOctober revolution had found her greatest interpreter in
Mexico. Rivera's "magnificent frescoes" were inspired by
"the mighty blast of the proletarian revolution." Without
October, Rivera's penetration into the epic of work and
insurrection would never have "attained such breadth and
profundity." Even the gashes made in the murals by Catholics
and Stalinists had their uses. "These cuts and gashes give
even greater life to the frescoes. You have before you, not
simply a 'painting,' an object of passive esthetic contem-
plation, but a living part of the class struggle. And it is
at the same time a masterpiece." See Trotsky, "Art and
Politics" (June 18, 1938) in Partisan Review , V (August-




, pp. 240-48, 395-98. Besides
Wolfe's detailed portrait of Frida Kahlo, also see Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast
, p. 359.
214Joseph Hansen, Trotsky's secretary at the time,
contended that the two families frequently visited each
other, and made excursions into the countryside. But Wolfe
was close to the Riveras in the late 1930s and wrote that
they saw Trotsky and his wife less often than generally be-
lieved: "They dine together occasionally, confer lengthily
by telephone, have taken several vacation trips together
through the countryside." See Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyo-
acan," in Trotsky, My Life
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D^n^T^f^^f SO°n clashed - Trotsky could not^tandiego's fabulous fantasy, but for a time the painter deferred/ Politician in the Iatter's field." Wolfe also conten-ded that Rivera's outrageous invention of '"facts'" in nolitical matters drove Trotsky into such a towering rage thathe and Natalya packed their bags, and left them on the side-walk, until they could find other housing. See FabulousLif
e
, p. 7.
See Hansen, "With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky,My Life
, pp. xx-xxi . * 1
217See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, pp. 384-86, for an
exchange of letters between Trotskv and his wife over this
rather pathetic "flirtation," which strained their relation-
ship.
218 0See Hansen, With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky,
My Life




"Trotsky Tiff" (April 24, 1939, p. 24), reported
that after the split, Trotsky insulted Rivera by sending him
a check for 200 pesos, about $40.00, as rent for the Blue
House. Rivera sent the check to a Marxist magazine and
resigned from the Fourth International.
219Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 445. Hansen wrote
that after the split, "I don't think that Trotsky's personal
regard for Diego was changed in the least. His admiration
and appreciation remained and he still talked about him as
if their friendship had not been affected. Trotsky didn't
really consider Diego to be wholly responsible in politics;
his imagination tended to run away with him." See Hansen,
"With Trotsky in Coyoacan," in Trotsky, My Life
, p. xxi.
And in early 1939, defending Rivera against certain personal at-
tacks, Trotsky wrote: "Rivera represents an exceptional
case because he maintains complete moral independence towards
the bourgeoisie. Precisely for this reason, he has the right
to be respected by every socialist worker and sincere demo-
crat." See Leon Trotsky, "Ignorance Is Not a Revolutionary
Instrument" (January 30, 1939), in Writings of Leon Trotsky ,
1938-39
, ed. by George Breitman and Evelyn Reed (New York:
Merit Publishers, 1969), p. 96, reprinted from New Interna-
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p. 22. Also see A. Montes, "Mexican~"unTons Assail Trotzkyas an Enemy," Daily Worker
, December 17, 1936, p. 3.
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December 30, 1936, p. 11, and "Trotsky & Woe," Time
,
January 11, 1937, p. 22.
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"Trotsky Expected at Tampico Today," New York Times
,
January 9, 1937, p. 2.
233Quoted in Joseph Hansen, "The Attempted Assassination
of Leon Trotsky," in Leon Trotsky : The Man and His Work
,
p. 7, reprinted from Fourth International
,
August, 1940.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 357.
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New York Times
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ui cn J, 1937). Also see Case of Leon T^otsky_,
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, p. 361. L
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Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,193 7-38
, p. 22. "
243
A. Vyshmsky made this charge in People's Commis-
sariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., Report of Court Proceedings
in the case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre ( Moscow:
People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1937), p.
467. Hereafter cited as Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Centre
.
244See Ibid













. pp. 61, 63.
250-.. ,Ibid. pp. 124--25.
Ibid.
,
p. 489. The charge of desiring a restoration
of capi tali sm had no t appeared in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial
,
August , 1936 , but had figured in the accusations made against
the ex-Bol sheviks in the aftermath of the Kirov affair.
252Ibid















pp. 496-97. Also see p. 9 on the "Clemenceau"
p. 56.
.
PP- 7-8- Also see pp. 113-14, 483, 491, and
'
tor additional testimony on "concessions." Herr Hessappears on pp. 64 and 106. Vyshinsky argued that the "agree-ment" with the fascists was really just an "embroidered
capitulation, the Trotskyite surrender to the mercy of the
conquerors, that this was bondage, that to accept such an
agreement meant crawling into the wolfs mouth while consoling
oneself with the idea that the wolf is not wicked and will
not gobble one up." The situation also reminded the Prosecutor
of the fable, "The Lion Goes Hunting," by Ivan A. Krylov, one ofStalin's favorite authors. See loc
. cit
. , p. 483.
259Ibid
. , p. 66.
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270Ibid
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271^ /x Ibid
. , p. 495.
272Thi s logic f ol lows the Bol shevik theory that "the
end is in the beginning. 11 In other words , smal 1 acts have
enormous consequences, and political positions must be
considered in terms of their consequences ( posledstviya )
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277Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotsky
, p. 265.
2 78Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 360.
Trotsky even believed that his new refuge in Mexico might
have ended any hesitation that Stalin had about staging the
new trial: "It now became necessary, at any cost, and as
soon as possible, to drown the forthcoming revelations by
the sensation of new accusations." At the last minute fresh
elements had to be sketched into the geographical framework
of the trial: "Only because it lacked sufficient time, did
the GPU find it impossible to arrange for me a meeting with
Japanese agents in the Mexican park of Chapul tepee . " See
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is also translated in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 361.




282Leon Trotsky, ,fA New Moscow Amalgam" (January 22,
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, p. 26, reprinted
from The Truth ( About the Moscow Trial
s
) , a single-issue
tabloid paper published by Pioneer Publishers in April , 193 7
,
under the original title, "The Meaning of the Moscow Trials."
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Trotsky Archives : T3978 (January 20, 1937).
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In the Trotsky Archives are a multitude of articles
dealing with the Pyatakov-Radek trial, from T3978 to T4076.
285Trotsky Archives : T3983 (January 22, 1937).
Trotsky, "A New Moscow Amalgam," in Writings of Leon
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290Trotsky Archives : T3986 (January 23, 1937). Formore on Muralov also see T4016, "Mouralov" (January 26, 1937).
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Trotsky Archives: T4004, "Rakovskii" (January 25,
292
,
See Trotsky Archives : T4002, "Mdivani" (January
25, 1937), and T4028, "The conveyor of frame-ups at work"(January 28, 1937).
293Trotsky Archives : T4010, "The 'voluntary' confes-
sions of the accused" (January 26, 1937). Also see Leon
Trotsky, "The Last Words of the Accused" (January 30, 1937),in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, p. 37, reprinted from
Bulletin of the Opposition
, No. 54-5. This article is
listed in the Trotsky Archives under the number T4050
(January 30, 1937).
294Trotsky Archives : T4006.
295Trotsky Archives : T4006. Also see T3988 (January
23, 1937) for additional comments on V. Romm. Trotsky also
wrote about the Tass correspondent in "On Romm" (January 24,
1937), and "Romm Frequented Dark Paris Alleys" (February 15,
1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, pp. 32, 40-41.
The first article is reprinted from the New York Times
,
January 25, 1937, p. 3 under the title, "Trotsky Renews
Denial." The second one appeared in Truth
,
April, 1937.
296Trotsky Archives : T4018, "An Important Declaration
of Mr. Trotsky" (January 27, 1937); T4020, "Moe konkretnoe
predlozhenie Moskovskomu sudu" (January 27, 1937); T4047,
"The construction of the trial" (January 30, 1937). For
additional comments on the "flight," see Trotsky, "Pyatakov'
s
Phantom Flight to Oslo" (January 27, 1937), and "Story Vague
on Time, Place" (February, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky ,
1937-38
, pp. 33-34, 38. The first article appeared in Truth ,
April, 1937; the second one also is reprinted from this
source.
29 7
Trotsky Archives : T4076, "Finale?" (February 1,
1937). This article also appears under the title, "The End?,"
629
in Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937-3 8, pp. 38-39 rpnrinf.nfrom Bulletin of The"^^^^ 54-L For furtneranalysis of the trial see Trotsky, "A New Moscow Amaxqam »in Writings of Leon Trotsky
, 1937-38
, p. 30. Also see inArchives T3978 Tj^y 20TT937)? and "How andwhy did Soviet citizens accuse themselves of crimes thevdidnOt commit" (January 29, 1937). n y
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Trotsky Archives ; T4041.
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29 !Q^Le°n wr°^SkY ' "Stalin in Partial Retreat" (January
,
iy j /; , m Writings of Leon Trotsky
, 1937-3 8, p 36reprinted from the New York Times
, January 30, 1937, p ' 2
1937)
artlCle iS listed in the Archives as T4044 (January 29,
193?
3 ° QTrotsky Archives: T4068, »' Saved •" (January 31,
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302Trotsky Archives : T4071.
303Trotsky Archives : T3983 (January 22, 1937). Similar
sentiments appear in Leon Trotsky, "Whose Conspiracy" (January
23, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
, 1937-38
, p. 32. Thisdispatch to the Manchester Guardian was reproduced from Labor
Action (San Francisco), February 6, 1937.
304Trotsky Archives : T3990 (January 23, 1937). This
article is the same as Leon Trotsky, "Why This Trial Seemed
Necessary** (January 23, 1937), in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, p. 31, reprinted from the New York Times
,
January 24,
1937, p. 28, under the title, "Trotsky Derides Charges at
Trial.
"
305Trotsky Archives : T4054 (January 30, 1937).
Ibid
. ,
T4076, "Finale?" Shortly after Trotsky
arrived in Mexico, he sent a telegram to Norman Thomas, John
Dewey, and the Defense Committee: "UPON SETTING FOOT NEW
WORLD SOIL I HASTEN TO GREET COMMITTEE WHICH TOOK INITIATIVE
IN FIGHT FOR FULL IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION TRIAL SIXTEEN STOP
PLACE MYSELF ENTIRELY AT DISPOSAL COMMITTEE AND PREPARED TO
PROVIDE IT ALL POSSIBLE INFORMATION FURNISH DOCUMENTS ANSWER
ANY QUESTION THAT MAY INTEREST COMMITTEE STOP NEEDLESS TO SAY
IS NOT MERELY QUESTION CONCERNING ME AND SON AGAINST WHOM
MOST IGNOMINIOUS ACCUSATION IN ALL POLITICAL HISTORY HAS BEEN
LAUNCHED NOR FATE OF DOZENS AND HUNDREDS ACCUSED BUT QUESTION
INVOLVING FATE OF SOVIET UNION AND EVEN WORLD LABOR MOVEMENT
FOR YEARS TO COME STOP CONCEALMENT OF FACTS SILENCE DOWNRIGHT
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he Mexican hearings Carleton Beals pressedTrotsky on this issue, implying that the extradition challengewas something of a sham, since Mexico and the Soviet Unionlacked formal diplomatic relations. Somewhat stung, Trotsky
replied: "The absence of relations between these two coun-tries is not imputed to me even by Vyshinsky." CounselFmerty interjected that extradition was possible if both
nations recognized the necessity of such a step. And AlbertGoldman, Trotsky's lawyer, later added that the Kremlin
could ask for extradition through a "mutually friendly power-"Trotsky was prepared to journey to any country that had an
extradition treaty with the Soviet Union, if the Kremlin
accepted his "challenge." But Trotsky appeared to have lost
some points on this exchange. See Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp.
3, 66-67, 69-70, 110-11. On another matter, Trotsky prepared
a formal request to the President of the Council of Ministers
of France, demanding a formal investigation of the charges
that he passed on information to Vladimir Romm on French
soil. But apparently the letter was never sent. See Trotsky
Archives : T4338.1, "A Monsieur le President du Conseil des
Ministres de France" (February 26, 1937).
309
"Britain and France Move for Balkan Compromise As
Anger Rises at Geneva," New York Times
, December 9, 1934,
pp. 1, 8. This proposed agreement was mentioned in the
Moscow demarche to Oslo. See Harold Denny, "Moscow Asks
Oslo to Expel Trotsky As A Conspirator," New York Times
,
August 30, 1936, p. 1.
^"^Leon Trotsky, "On Sending Terrorists to the USSR"




p. 19, reprinted from Les Crimes de Staline . In an earlier
article, Trotsky discussed the Litvinov proposal on terror-
ism. Even though Marxists reject individual terrorism, he
wrote, "this has never prevented us from always siding with
William Tell and not with the Austrian despot Gessler. The
Soviet diplomacy, on the other hand, is now discussing
jointly with the Gesslers how best to exterminate the Tells.
By his participation in the international stalking of terror-
ists, Stalin supplements in the best manner possible his own
terroristic stalking of the Bolsheviks. . . ." See Trotsky,
"Stalin's Revolutionary Prisoners" (January 15, 1936), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky , 1935-36 , p. 106, reprinted from the
New Militant, February 1, 1936, under the title, "Tell the
631
rt^Lt^onir Stalin ' S ° f Revolutionists
Trotsky Archives; T4041 (January 29, 1937)Deutscher cites this article on p. 362 of Prophet Outcast-,but gives the incorrect date. However, inHInf^xI^of^epreceding page he provides the correct one.
312Trotsky Archives: T4388.1, "To the Juridical




1938 ]- This letter also appears as, "A Letter to theLeague of Nations," in Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1937-38
?S; Q I ,
2
'-
rePrinted fror" the Socialist Appeal, April 2 3,1938, but is incorrectly dated March 21, 1938. In thisletter he cited the mysterious deaths of Ignace Reiss, his
son, Lyova, and various collaborators, as evidence of the
need for an international inquiry.
313Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, p. 24.
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Ibid .
317Leon Trotsky, "An Interview for Americans" (January




reprinted from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
, January 17, 1937,
under the title, "Leon Trotsky tells his Story." The inter-
viewer was Julius Klyman.
318See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, pp. 30, and 264, for
mention of their 1930-31 correspondence and the 1933 visit.





ed. by George Breitman and Bev Scott (New
York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), pp. 331-38. This article,
reprinted from The Modern Monthly
,
March, 1935, attempts to
describe his August, 1933, discussions with Trotsky in St.
Palais. At one point Malraux wrote of Trotsky: "You belong
to those proscribed persons of whom they cannot make an
emigre. In spite of all . . . the heroism that shook the
Winter Palace now feels itself humiliated by your solitude."
319Quoted in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, 370, from a
summary of the speech in the Trotsky Archives .
3 ?n
See Bulletin of the Opposition , No. 21-22 (May-
June, 1931), pp. 30-35, for Trotsky's review of The
Conquerors . This review was also published in The Militant ,
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, March 27, 193?"









USe indignation." And In New Masses, I, 1 , p. 1, an editorial sneered at Trot sky'saccusation: "We leave it to the psychoanalysts of Health
f "Yqiene: is Trotsky's charge political paranoia oT^simply lying?" K
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The Nation, March 27, 1937, p. 351. Also seeDeutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 339. Malraux's reply wasalsopnnted in Soviet Russia Today, April, 1937, n. 7
p. 24, letter to New YorkTimes
.
323Leon Trotsky, "Some Concrete Questions for MrMalraux" (March 13, 1937), in Writings of Leon Tr^^W.
1937-38, pp. 74-75, supplied by George Novack. Apparentlythis was a reply to Malraux's letter, yet it was writtenbefore the Malraux piece appeared in print. Trotsky never
made amends with the French writer. in December, 1938,
Trotsky remembered his great hopes for Malraux's literary
career, but charged that the writer had become "a reporter
for the GPU, a purveyor of bureaucratic heroism in prudently
proportioned slices, just so long and so wide. . . . The
fate of Malraux is symbolic for a whole stratum of writers,
almost for a whole generation. It is the generation of
those who lie from pretended 'friendship' for the October
revolution." See "Leon Trotsky to Andre" Breton," in
Partisan Review
,
VI (Winter, 1939), 126-27; the letter is
dated December 22, 1938. It also appears as "Za Svobodu
Iskusstva" in Bulletin of the Opposition
,
No. 74, February,
1939, pp. 15-16, and in Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, pp.
433-34.
324Bernard Wolfe, "Press Release" (June 20, 1937),
Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), in the Trotsky
Archives
. Shaw's communication was dated June 20, 1937, and
partially appears in "Trotsky Ends Vacation," New York Times
,
July 29, 1937, p. 5, and Deutscher, Prophet Outcast , p. 369.
On July 21, 1937, Shaw wrote, "'The strength of Trotsky's
case was the incredibility of the accusations against him. .
• . But Trotsky spoils it by making exactly the same sort
of attacks on Stalin. Now I have spent nearly three hours
in Stalin's presence and observed him with keen curiosity,
and I find it just as hard to believe that he is a vulgar
gangster as that Trotsky is an assassin.'" According to
Deutscher, Shaw viewed this conflict as between not right
and wrong, but between two rights, much as he portrayed in
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^fCver: ^§2hgt Armed, pp. 167-69, and Leoni y, ^905 (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 389-400.
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, 1935, p. 80. At oth^rtimes Trotsky called forTm^Ftlal^uiries 'to v atethe Kirov affair, charges against Trotskyites and Zinovievi tes
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. , pp. 366-67.
329
Ibid
. , pp. 367-70.
330M^ore details on these commissions will be presentedin the next chapter.
331Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 364.
332This discussion closely follows Deutscher, Prophet
Outcast, pp. 363-65. Also see Serge, Vie et Mort de Trotskv,
p. 265. L
333Trotsky, "In Mexico," in Writings of Leon Trotskv,
1937-38
, p. 22. L
334Kaganovich's threat is discussed in Trotsky
Archives : T4057, "Kaganowitch predicts my end" (January 31,
1937)
.
The quote is from Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, p. 24.
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call it "Out of Step,"
. ... I've always been out of step.
A premature Marxist. A premature anti-Communist.'"
122See Lyons, Red Decade
, p. 343. Among the "prime
movers" of the undertaking were John Dewey, Benjamin Stolberg,
Horace M. Kallen, and Suzanne La Follette.
123For more on Hook see Current Biography
, 1952, ed.
by Anna Rothe and Evelyn Lohr (New York: H. W. Wilson
Company, 1952), pp. 269-71, and Contemporary Authors
,
Vols.
11-12, ed. by James M. Ethridge and Barbara Kopala (Detroit:
Gale Research Company, 1965), p. 182. v
124For a particularly controversial article see Hook,




125James T. Farrell, a private interview in New York
City, March 2, 1972. Also see Selden Rodman, "Trotsky in
the Kremlin: An Interview," Common Sense
, VI (December,
1937), 19, and Editorial, "The Trotsky Commission," Nation
,
May 1, 1937, pp. 496-97.
126See editorial, "Trotsky Investigates Himself,"
New Masses
,
April 20, 1937, p. 28, and Marion Hammett and
William Smith, "Inside the Trotsky 'Trial,'" New Masses,
i
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April 27, 1937, p. 6; also see the editorial, "Mr. StolberaDisposes," New Masses
,
May 18, 1937, p. n. Many of the
y
same criticisms of Stolberq and La Follette were made in
"Mexico Expedition Loaded With Trotzkyi tes , " Daily Worker,April 10, 1937, p. 2. Both publications took part i cular
exception to Ms. La Follette' s reviews of two books on thePopular Front in France ( Nation
, September 26, 1936, pp.371-73). At that time she contended that the Front tactichad failed, and that "fascism is to be defeated only by the
arming of the working class against a fascist coup, by revo-lutionary changes in the military personnel, by reorganization
of the police, by a desperate fight against finance capital."
127See Stolberg's comments in "Violence, For and
Against; A Symposium on Marx, Stalin, and Trotsky," in
Common Sense
, VII (January, 1938), 21.
128 AAaron, Writers on the Left
, p. 457n.
129
"The New Freeman," Time
, October 16, 1950, pp. 46-48.
130Adamic, My_ America
, p. 73. Stolberg admitted that
he admired Trotsky, but was no partisan of his views. See
"Violence, For and Against," Common Sense
,
VII (January,
1938), 21. "I think very highly of Trotsky as a historian,
writer and man of action. ... I certainly do not follow
his revolutionary leadership." After a review of The Revo -
lution Betrayed , in the Nation
,
Trotsky said of Stolberg,
"'I see that you are not a Marxist.'" For the review see the
Nation
,
April 10, 1937, pp. 401-04. Also see Trotsky, In
Defense of Marxi sm
, p. 92. For an obituary of Stolberg see
the New York Times
,
January 22, 1951, p. 17.
131Adamic, My_ America
, pp. 83-84. In 1938 Malcom
Crowley accused My_ America of "'smelling of Stolberg and red
herring.'" Quoted in Warren, Liberals and Communism
, p. 121.
132Quoted in Lyons, Red Decade
, p. 330. In a review
of the "Red Terror," Granville Hicks asserted that he knew
of only one effort by the Party to suppress a book—Stolberg's
Story of the C.I.Q . See "How Red Was the Red Decade?,"
Harper's Magazine , Vol. 207 (July, 1953), 56. When Stolberg's
book was serialized in newspapers of the Scripps-Howard chain,
the Party was beside itself and spared no adjectives in des-
cribing the betrayal of this "renegade ," 'gangster of the pen,"
"putty-faced underground Trotzkyite," who was "infected with
the leprous taint of Trotskyism." For a representative
selection of articles see the Daily Worker : Adam Lapin, 'CIO
Organ Hits Poison Pen Red-Baiters Who Knife Labor," January
15, 1938, p. 1; "Brophy's Attack On Stolberg Wins Labor's
Approval," January 24, 1938, p. 1; January 25, 1938, p. 6;
January 26, 1938, p. 1; editorial, "The CIO Smites A Coughlin
Bed-Fellow," January 26, 1938, p. 6; January 27, 1938, p. 1;
January 28, 1938, p. 3; February 1, 1938, p. 1; February 2,
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1938, p. 6; Mike Gold, "Thousands of Readers Have MarchedAway from the Scripps Papers," February 2, 1938, p 7-February 5, 1938, pp. 5-6; February 8, 1938, p. 6;*HarrisonGeorge, "Life in a Leper Colony With Stolberg," February 10,1938, p. 7; February 11, 1938, p. 5; February 15, 1938, p. 7.
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, pp. 213, 437. Also see pp. 172, 457n for
more on the NDCPP. Novack claims that Rorty helped write
the Manifesto supporting Foster and Ford in 1932. See Novack,
"Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s," International Social ist
Review
, Vol. 29 (March-April, 1968), 27~.
135Aaron, Writers on the Left
, pp. 261-62. Hook, Eliot
Cohen, and Solow were also involved in this proposed study.
136Novack, 'Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s," inter-
national Socialist Review
,
Vol. 29 (March-April, 1968) 27.
Also see Lyons, Red Decade
, p. 145, and Aaron, Writers on
the Left
, pp. 172, 4577^
137Socialist Call
, June 5, 1937.
138Editorial, "From Rorty to Hearst," New Masses
,
June 22, 1937, pp. 14-15.
139Rorty, "Mobilizing the Innocents: Communism Behind
the Scenes," Forum and Century
, XCIV (January, 1938), 43-47.





In 1955 Rorty denounced censorship of libraries.
See "The Libraries In A Time of Tension," Commentary , Vol.
19 (January, 1955), 30-37. Born in 1890, he wrote several
books of verse, Our Master's Voice (1934) on advertising,
and with Moshe Decter, McCarthy and the Communists (1954),
the last sponsored by the American Committee for Cultural
Freedom.
142See Richard Schickel, "James T. Farrell: Another
Time, Another Place," Esquire , LVIII (December, 1962), 157,
et seq . Also see C. Hartley Grattan, "James T. Farrell:
Moralist," Harper's Magazine , Vol. 209 (October, 1954), 93,
et seq .
143Quoted in Aaron, Writers on the Left , pp. 316-19,
449-50. Also see Farrell, "A Note on Literary Criticism,"
Nation , March 4 and 11, 1936, pp. 276-77, 314-15. For a
vigorous counter-attack see New Masses , June 23, 1936, pp.
23-24; August 18, 1936, p. 23; September 22, 1936, p. 36;
and December 1, 1936, pp. 23-24.
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Aaron, Writers on the Left
, pp. 318-19.
145
Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey
, aSymposium edited by Sidney Hook, pp. 363^647 Also see
f^/i1 '? eulo<3y of Trotsky, "Leon Trotsky," Partisan Review ,VII (September-October, 1940), 388-90.
146See Letter, "That Man Again," New Republic
, January
12, 1938, p. 287. Dwight MacDonald protested this "literarylynching," and contended that although Farrell had his
"faults" as a novelist, this did not justify such "a childish
and malicious outburst" as represented by the letter from
East St. Louis, Illinois. See "Farrell Finale," New Republic
,February 16, 1938, p. 48. For more on the "elaborate pat-
tern of calumny" against Farrell see Lyons, Red Decade
, pp.335-36. Also see Schickel, "James T. Farrell: Another Time,
Another Place," Esquire
, LVIII (December, 1962), 274. in a
private interview (New York City, March 2, 1972), Farrell
implicated Malcolm Cowley as the leader of this organized
campaign.
147The novelist quoted these remarks in "James T.
Farrell on James T. Farrell" (a reply to Edmund Wilson's




Aaron, Writers on the Left
, p. 393. When Granville
Hicks, after breaking with the Party in late-1939, published
a mimeographed bulletin for other refugees, Farrell dubbed
it a "'Stalinist Lonely Hearts Club.'" See Lyons, Red
Decade
, p. 363. Farrell also took the Nation to task for
its analysis of the Moscow Trials. See "Challenge from Mr.
Farrell," the Nation
,
September 30, 1939, p. 359, and Warren,
Liberal s and Communi sm
, pp. 213-14.
149 /For more on Hook see Current Biography , 1952 (New
York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1952), p. 271, and 200 Contem-
porary Authors , ed. by Barbara Harte and Carolyn Riley
(Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1969), pp. 109-11.
150Hicks, "How Red Was the Red Decade?," Harper '
s
Magazine , Vol. 207 (July, 1953), 54. A list of these "pre-
mature anti-Communists" appears in Lyons, Red Decade , p.
326. It includes Dewey, Eastman, Stolberg, Dos Passos,
Edmund Wilson, Rorty, Hook, Farrell, La Follette, Charles
Rumford Walker, Charles Yale Harrison, V. F. Calverton,
Evelyn Scott, and Ludwig Lore, among others. All of those
named participated, to some degree, in the activities of
the Trotsky Defense Committee.
151Novack, "Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s,"






McCarthy' "MY Confession," in On the Contrary(New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1951 )TppT~8 2^881
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, pp. 97-98. In her story "Portrait of the
Intellectual as a Yale Man," The Company She Keeps (New York-
Harper, Brace and Company, 1942), Mary McCarthy devoted con-
siderable attention to the Trotsky affair in the mid-1930s.
Her hero, Jim Barnett (a fictionalized portrait of John
Chamberlain), attended Defense Committee meetings, where the
members "wore an expression of injury, of self
-justification
,
a funny, feminine, 'put-upon' look, just as if they were all,
individually, on trial." He used to wish, after listening to
letters from the "Old Man," that Trotsky could be held in-
communicado until the investigation was over: "The Old Man
did not understand Americans." But he also noticed that his
magazine, "The Liberal ," no longer invited Trotskyites to
review books, as if it were trying to make itself "as neutral-
colored as possible and fade discreetly into the sourrounding
landscape." As for Dewey, Jim Barnett was bothered by this
apotheosis of the cracker-barrel spirit deep in conversation
with a Shachtman or Stolberg; it was "like finding your father
in bed with a woman." But Dewey took to it "like a duck to
water." Whenever Jim heard that "dry voice" swell out in a
mass meeting in anger or eloquence, "he squirmed in his seat,
not knowing whether to feel embarrassed for Dewey or for
himself." Jim began to believe the stories of persecution.
See loc . cit
. , pp. 218-19, 220-29.





. , pp. 100-02. Also see McCarthy, "Portrait of




, pp. 80-81. See Pravda , "In the
Last Hour," February 7, 1937, p. 1, for the assertion that
Adamic had "broken with the committee." In 1951 Adamic was




Adamic, My_ America , p. 82.
16Q Ibid
.
, pp. 84-85. Kenneth Durant was the first
Tass correspondent in the United States, and press secretary
to Ludwig C. A. K. Martens, the unrecognized Soviet envoy
in this country after the Bolshevik Revolution. His father
helped build the Moscow-St. Petersburg railroad. Durant
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hiS obituarY see New York Times
, December
1 » ±y / Z , p. 42.
Lyons, Red Decade
, pp. 252, 324-25.
162
Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey
, aSymposium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 356-57*; For other overt
efforts to discourage Committee partisans see "Boudin CallsTrotzky 'Appeal' An Attack," Daily Worker
,
February 13,
1937, p. 6, and Milton Howard, "A Letter to Ernest L. Meyer
on His Membership in Trotzkyist 'Defense'," Daily Worker
,February 15, 1937, p. 6. Meyer was also attacked by Morris
U. Schappes in an "Open Letter," New Masses
, March 2, 1937,
p. 21. This pressure eventually forced an open protest
from Dewey, Kallen, and other Committee members, who com-
plained about the visits, telephone calls, and letters.
See "Trotsky Inquiry Under Fire Here," New York Times
,
February 17, 1937, p. 4.
163Lyons, Red Decade
, p. 252. Also see "Aid and Com-




, 7, and The American Committee for the Defense of
Leon Trotsky, Report (March 21, 1938), p. 7. Frederick L.
Schuman claimed that he had joined the Defense Committee in
the autumn of 1936, but had resigned on February 10, 1937,
when the Committee began to organize "an 'investigation'
whose chief function would necessarily be that of publicizing
Trotsky's attacks on Stalin." This writer, however, has been
unable to find Schuman ' s name on any of the membership lists.
See "Leon Trotsky: Martyr or Renegade?," Southern Review
,
Vol. 3 (Summer, 1937), 70n.
164Hallgren, Why I_ Resigned From the Trotsky Defense
Commi ttee
, pp. 1-6. A letter from Hallgren on his resigna-
tion appeared in the New York Times
,
February 5, 1937, p.
20, followed by replies from George Novack ( New York Times ,
February 6, 1937, p. 5), and from Suzanne La Follette ( New
York Times
,
February 8, 1937, p. 16). Also see American




Hallgren, Why I_ Resigned From the Trotsky Defense
Committee
, pp. 7-14. Parts of this letter appeared in New
Masses
,
February 9, 1937, pp. 19-20, and the Daily Worker ,
February 4, 1937, pp. 21-22. In the same issue, p. 2, the
Worker published a special editorial on his resignation--




166See "Readers' Forum," New Masses , February 16, 1937
A slightly different version appeared in Pravda ,
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"In the Last Hour," February 7, 1937, p. 1. m a private in-terview (New York City, March 2, 1972), Farrell stated thatGannett had believed the Committee had been misrepresented
to him—by Farrell.
167
"Readers' Forum," New Masses
, February 16, 1937, p.21. The same quote appeared in Pravda, "in the Last Hour,"
February 7, 1937, p. 1.
168See "Readers' Forum," New Masses
,
February 16, 1937,
p. 21. Both Jaffe and Bowman reacted adversely to a story
in the New York Times ("Trotsky Backers Act To Clear Him,"
February 1, 1937, p. 12), which they interpreted as a commit-
ment by the Committee to clear Trotsky, even before the
testimony was heard. Vera Boudin and Dorothy Brophy, an old
Socialist, also attacked the Committee. See "Readers' Forum,"
New Masses
,
April 6, 1937, p. 21. The Daily Worker published
a number of stories on the resignations: "Gannett and Jaffe
Resign from Trotzkyist 'Defense' Committee," February 6, 1937,
p. 1; "Nine Resign From Trotzky 'Defense'," February 12, 1937,
p. 2; "Poet Quits Committee for Trotzky," February 17, 1937,
p. 2. The Worker '
s
honor list of nine included: Sara Bard
Field, Manuel Komroff, Freda Kirchwey, Mauritz Hallgren, Lewis
Gannett, LeRoy Bowman, Jacob Billikopf, Sam Jaffe, and Evelyn









"Corliss Lamont, Now 70, Is Still Active," New York
Times
,
April 2, 1972, p. 22. For twenty years Lamont was a
director of the American Civil Liberties Union, before be-
coming chairman of the more militant National Emergency
Civil Liberties Committee.
173Corliss Lamont, "An Open Letter to American Liberals,"
Soviet Russia Today , Vol. 6 (March, 1937), 14-15. Parts of
this "Open Letter" also appeared in the New Republ ic , February
24, 1937, pp. 75-76. It also was printed in the Daily Worker ,
February 9, 1937, p. 2, and quoted from in M. Olgin, "Respon-
ses to the Trial of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center,"
Pravda
,
February 10, 1937, p. 5.
174For information on Robins and Trotsky see George
Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (New York: Atheneum, 1956/
1967), pp. 99-100, 113-16, 193, 397-401, 496-500, 505-06,
514-17.
See the New York Times , January 21, 1937, p. 9, and





With attacks on Trotsky. See, for instance, editorial,
'The Common Enemy of Humanity," February 1, 1937, p 6 and
"18,000 In Garden Vow To Drive Trotzkyism Out Of The LaborMovement," February 6, 1937, p. 1, The issue for February
8, 1937, p. 4, was filled with news of anti-Trotsky meetings
— "Chicago CP. Leader To Talk on Trotzky," "Amter to ExposeTrotzkyism in Rally at Boston on February 14," "Hathaway ToTalk on Trotzkyism," "Amter To Talk On Trotzkyism In Harlem."
A favorite ploy at these meetings was to compare Trotsky to
Aaron Burr. An elaborate version of this analogy appears in
Earl Browder, "Lessons of the Moscow Trials," Communist,
XVII (April, 1938), 306-21. :
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"Urges Soviet Admit Observers at Trial," New York
TJjnes, January 10, 1937, II, p. 3. Responding to an erron-
eous report that the Bukharin-Rykov trial was soon in the
offing, the Defense Committee in March 1937 made the same
demands of Soviet Ambassador Troyanovsky, and described its
members as "'staunch friends of the Soviet Union,'" something
of a jest under the circumstances. See Socialist Call,
March 13, 1937, p. 5.
177American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 5-6. Among other publications,
the Committee published six issues of a printed bulletin,
not located by this writer.
1 78Max Shachtman, "Radicalism in the Thirties: The
Trotskyist View," in Simon, ed., As We Saw The Thirties
,
pp. 40-41.
1 79American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 4-5.
180This information comes from a poster in the folder
marked, "Of The American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky," Tamiment Library, New York University.
181 Max Shachtman, "Introduction," to Leon Trotsky,
I Stake My Life 1 , (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937), p. 2.




"Wire Break Balks Trotsky As 6,500 Await Speech
Here," New York Times , February 10, 1937, p. 1.
184Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, p. 5, and passim . The
abbreviated Russian" version ol this speech, "Russkaia rech
na mi tinge v zale ippodroma v Niu-Iorke" (February 9, 1937),
is listed as T4090 in the Trotsky Archives , Harvard Univer-
sity. For an accounting of the money spent on this meeting
see American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 10-11. A few days later Trotsky
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issued essentially the same challenge to a meeting in ChicaqoSee Trotsky, "A Telegram to Chicago" (February 14, 1937) in
Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, ed . by George Breitman and
Evelyn Reed (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), pp. 39-40,
reprinted from Labor Action (February 27, 1937), under the
title, "Trotsky Telegram Repeats Challenge."
185„See American Committee for the Defense of Leon
Trotsky, Report (March 21, 1938), pp. 5-6. Also see "Wire
Break Balks Trotsky As 6,500 Await Speech Here," New York
Times
,
February 10, 1937, p. 1.
186See "2 Inquiries Start On Trotsky Fiasco," New
York Times
,
February 11, 1937, p. 8.
187See "Trotsky Back In Home," New York Times
,
February
10, 1937, p. 4, and Trotsky Archives : T4092, "Regarding the
Causes of the non- transmission of Mr. Trotsky's Speech""
(February 10, 1937), signed by Bernard Wolfe.
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189Quoted in Editorial, "More on the Moscow Trial,"
Soviet Russia Today
,
Vol. 5 (November, 1936), 8.
190
"A Lawyer Views the Radek Trial," and Leon [ sic ]
Feuchtwanger on the Trial," in Soviet Russia Today , Vol. 6
(March, 1937), 12. For another view see "Feuchtwanger Sees
Trial as Check To War," Daily Worker
,
February 1, 1937, p. 2.
1 91
"Newton D. Baker Reviews the Treason Trial Record,"
Soviet Russia Today , Vol. 6 (April, 1937), 8.
19 2Quoted in Editorial, "Aid and Comfort for the
Fascists," Soviet Russia Today , Vol. 6 (March, 1937), 7.
193Edi torial , "The New Treason Trial," Soviet Russia
Today
,
Vol. 5 (February, 1937), 7. *
194See Editorial, "Shape of Things," Nation , January
30, 1937, p. 114, and Editorial, "Behind the Soviet Trials,"
Nation
,
February 6, 1937, pp. 143-45.
195Editorial , "Another Russian Trial," New Republic ,
February 3, 1937, pp. 399-400.
196Editorial , "Russian Politics in America," New
Republic
,
February 17, 1937, pp. 33-34.
197Suzanne La Follette, Letter, "October Is Safe"
(February 5, 1937), Nation , February 13, 1937, p. 196.
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198Franz Hoellering, Letter, "Evidence Is Essential"(February 8, 1937), Nation
,
February 20, 1937, p. 224.
199James Rorty, Letter, "Harsh Words from a Friend"(February 16, 1937), Nation
,
February 27, 1937, p. 252.
200W^ldon Burke, Letter, "The Russian Trial," New
Republic
,
February 17, 1937, pp. 50-51. in a reply to"
Burke the editors of New Republic denied that they took
their opinions "ready-made" from Walter Duranty, even though
"on the whole" they agreed with him. They also claimed that
there were two broad aspects of democracy, "political .and
economic," with Soviet Russia having only the second kind:
"It nevertheless is a part, and an important part, of the




201Letters, "Trotsky: Friends and Enemies," New
Republic
,
February 24, 1937, p. 75. Also Drinted in Socialist
Call
,
February 13, 1937, p. 4.
202Martha Gruening, Letter, "Trotsky and Civil Liber-
ties," New Republic
, March 3, 1937, p. 113.
203Letter, "Trotsky and the Russian Trials," New,
Republic
,
March 17, 1937, p. 169. The signers of this letter
were: John Chamberlain, Eleanor Clark, James T. Farrell,
Martha Gruening, Louis Hacker, Suzanne La Follette, Ludwig
Lore, James Rorty, Clara G. Stillman, and Lionel Trilling.
In a reply the editors of New Republ ic doubted that a counter-
trial could establish either Trotsky's guilt or innocence;
"it would simply intensify the confusion." With only one
side represented, the inquiry "would serve chiefly as a sound-
ing board for propaganda." Trotsky, instead, should publish
any evidence bearing on the trials, which "would serve much
the same purpose as if it were delivered verbally before a
court of inquiry." Meanwhile, there were other questions of
more importance than Trotsky's guilt, e.g., Spain and Ameri-
can labor. "And there is the question whether American
liberals and progressives are going to work toward the ends
they have in common, or whether they are going to dissipate
their influence by quarrels among themselves over questions
that concern them at second hand." See loc . ci t . , pp. 169-
70.
204James T. Farrell, "On 'The Nation'," Socialist Call ,
July 17, 1937, p. 5. In this attack on the Nation '
s
timidity,
Farrell suggested that if it waited until January 2037 to
assemble all the facts, then it could write an editorial
almost as bold as those of Oswald Garrison Villard in 1937.
Villard, of course, had been the editor and elder statesman
of the Nation for many years. In 1937 he was prepared to
condemn the Moscow trials, unlike Freda Kirchwey.
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205 TLyons, Red Decade
, p. 243. "But the years of equi-
vocation, apology and complacent suspension of judgment hadhelped the incredible revolution absorb the purges, to
emerge stronger after the invigorating draught of blood,"
commented Lyons on the posture of the^liberal journals toward
the purge. In general, he wrote, there were "no intellectual
acrobatics which the f el low- travelers would not undertake to
save their lovely faith in Russia. . . . They had developed
a set of card-indexed formulas of rationalization for washing
out such minor blemishes on the beloved dictatorship of the
proletariat." See loc. cit
. , pp. 244-45. Philip Rahv sum-
marized the attitude of the liberal journals in the following
formula: "'Some people will believe the trials are frame-ups;
some people will believe the trials are not frame-ups.
However, both sides are partisan. As for ourselves, we
prefer to view them sub specie aeterni tati
s
. Perhaps in a
hundred years we shall know the truth."" See Rahv, "Trials
of the Mind," Partisan Review
, IV (April, 1938), 5. Also
see Max Eastman, Stalin ' s Russia and the Crisis In Socialism
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1940), pp. 267-78.
2 0 SWarren, Liberal s and Communism
, pp. 177-79, 172-73.
207American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
"Introductory Note," World Voices on the Moscow Trial s
, p. 6.
208Adamic, My America
, pp. 85-86. At a general meeting,
attended by about one-eighth of the Defense Committee's total
membership, Adamic found that "most of this one-eighth was
obviously more ignorant about the facts and issues involved
than was I, who had just been kicked out of a foreign country
on account of them." There was "no clarity, no solid under-
standing," added Adamic, who believed that many had joined
at the urging of a friend. See loc . cit ., p. 85.
209,, Professor John Dewey's Speech" (March 1 , 1937),




American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
Report (March 21, 1938), p. 1. It seems likely that Dewey
presented these "principles" at the March 1937 membership^
meeting, but the final report does not expressly state this
as fact.
211 Editorial , "Roundabout Roads to Trotskyism," New
Masses
,
February 23, 1937, p. 19.
212See American Committee for the Defense of Leon





213Trotsky Archives : T4128.1, "To the President of the
658
Commission of the Socialist Lawyers' Front" (March 15? 1937)For more on the Lawyers' Front see Editorial, "Trotsky'Investigates Himself," and Marion Hammett and William Smith,Inside the Trotsky 'Trial'," in New Masse s, April 20, 1937,
p. 28, and April 27, 1937, p. 10.
-
According to the editorialthree Mexican judges had been appointed to study the evidencebut "Trotsky haughtily rejected this offer," apparently be-
cause he believed some Front members were communists.
214George Novack, interview in New York City, November
9, 1971, and Suzanne La Follette, private letter, November
26, 1971. Trotsky had written to Ms. La Follette urging the
importance of immediate action— in a letter probably dated
March 16, 1937.
215„Suzanne La Follette, private letter, November 26,
1971.
216This "confidential letter" (March 17, 1937) from
Trotsky to his New York followers was provided through the
courtesy of George Novack. The "internal crisis" to which
Trotsky referred may have been the resignations from the
Defense Committee or friction between the liberal and
Trotskyite factions within the organization.
217Ibid
. , pp. 1-2.
218Ibid
. , p. 2. In this letter Trotsky reminded the
New York "comrades" of the elementary rules of coalition:
retain group identity; view the ally as a possible adversary;
preserve full rights of criticism; supplement the bloc with
independent action ; use favorable circumstances to take the
initiative when allies are hesitating. The failure to act
on these f ormul as , he added in a harsh judgmen t , belonged
"in principle to the same category as the f ailure of the
Chinese Communists after their entrance into the Kuomintang."
See loc . cit . , p. 3.
219-.. A oIbid




Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
the Charges made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials ,
John Dewey et al. (New York: Harper & Brothers, iy38} , p. 3.
Hereafter cited as Not Guil ty .
221
In separate interviews, both George Novack and James
T. Farrell agreed that Margaret de Silver donated $5000 to
the Committee. But Suzanne La Follette put the figure closer
to $2000-3000. The Novack interview was held on November 9,
1971, the La Follette interview on March 7, 1972, and the
Farrell interview on March 2, 1972— all in New York City.
222American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky,
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RePort (March 21, 1938), p. 3. Also see "Dewey Heads Commis-




223Suzanne La Follette, private letter, November 26,
1971. A logical candidate for the sub-commission was Norman
Thomas, but considering the bitter fight then raging with
the Trotskyites in the Socialist Party, it would have been
"inappropriate" for him to join, contends James T. Farrell
(interview, New York City, March 2, 1972). Also Thomas was
planning a trip to Europe and the Soviet Union in March 1937,
but because "I had been on the John Dewey Committee for
Justice to Trotsky," he later explained, the Soviet author-
ities held up the visa. He wrote to Sir Stafford Cripps for
help, and finally obtained the necessary visa. See Norman
Thomas, "The Thirties in America as a Socialist Recalls Them,"
in Simon, ed. , As We Saw the Thirties
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1943), p. 774, and "Political Murder," Time , January 25,
1943, pp. 21-22.
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notarized statement (August 8, 1940), Dewey Commission








See not^ized statement (August 8
"
0), Dewey Commission Exhibit D438 (second folder), TrotskyArchives. Ruehle was identified by foes of the Commis sion asthe father-in-law of Fritz Bach, "a notorious Trotskyite,"
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on Finerty thought Trotsky a "great man," another Eamon de
Valera. The only references to the Irish in the hearings
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reasons of discretion, but Suzanne La Follette and Albert
672
Glotzer have indicated that Trotsky dined at least once withthe Commission members. See Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, p.
m. t 5
e
i? ^ comments come from a private interview withMs. La Follette (New York City, March 7, 1972), and a letterfrom Mr. Glotzer, dated December 19, 1972.
92Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," SaturdayEvening Post, June 12, 1937, p. 76. For Finerty's comment s
on examining Trotsky as a "hostile witness" see "Trotsky ToTestify As 'Hostile Witness'," New York Times
, April 6,1937, p. 7.
93Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 342-44.
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. , p. 345. See "The Fewer Outsiders The Better,"
Saturday Evening Post
,
June 12, 1937, pp. 76, 77, for Beals'
comments on Finerty's emphasis on "alleged" and his gentle
questioning of Trotsky.
96Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 347. Also see loc . cit' .
,
pp. 344-357. According to Beals, Trotsky's "official trans-
lator" [Solow?] requested him to ask questions of "real import"
and passed him several likely possibilities. See Beals, "The




97Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post
,
June 12, 1937, p. 77.
98Trotsky, "The Preliminary Inquiry at Coyoacan,"









p. 65. Of the almost 600 pages in the official
record of the hearings, Finerty's direct examination of Trotsky
took less than a hundred pages.
101 Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post , June 12, 1937, p. 77.
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, pp. 458-59. See loc. cit . , p. 301, and Not
Guilty
, pp. 6-7, 14-15, for material on the "best evidence"
rule and the certification of documents.
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105C^ase of Leon Trotsky_, pp. 51-52. Norwegian Nazismade an unsuccessful attempt to steal Trotsky's documents inAugust 1936; the GPU in Paris was more successful on November
7, 1936. However, Beals later wrote that Trotsky "hems andhaws' on the question of the archives 's location and the onlvdocuments in Mexico were "merely uncertified copies." Trotskyfound this allegation "absolutely false." See "The FewerOutsiders The Better," Saturday Evening Pos^, June 12, 1937,
p. 76, and Trotsky, "Mr. Beals as a Witness" (May 18, 1937),in Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, pp. 66-67, supplied byGeorge Novack.
Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 63, 249-50.
Ibid., p. xxv. At the May 1937 Mecca meeting Dewey
announced that Otto Ruehle would examine the archives in
Mexico, and the European sub-commission would examine the
European documents—with Trotsky's assent. In Not Guilty
,
p. 13, it was claimed that the Commission had had "unhampered
access" to the archives.
108Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday
Evening Post
,
June 12, 1937, p. 76. According to Beals,
Stolberg believed the Times man would snap up the comment about
"'only copies'" in Trotsky's testimony. Actually Frank
Kluckhohn had already stressed this aspect of the trial in
"Trial of Trotsky To Be All Trotsky," and "Trotsky Ready For
'Trial'," New York Times
,
April 5, 1937, p. 11, and April 11,
1937, IV, p. 5.





"^Trotsky , "Mr. Beals as a Witness," in Writings of
Leon Trotsky , 1937-38 , p. 66. Trotsky commented, "I have
never heard of anyone certifying the copies of his own letters."
"*"Farrell, "Dewey in Mexico," in John Dewey , a Sympo-
sium ed. by Sidney Hook, pp. 361, 363-64. v
11?
Beals, "The Fewer Outsiders The Better," Saturday




, p. 381. "Stripped of the
splendours of his mighty eloquence, denying himself the advan-
tages which even the humdrum speaker finds in the use of his
native language, he answered impromptu the most varied, complex,
and unexpected questions." This was Deutscher's rather flat-
tering view of Trotsky's performance.
114Case of Leon Trotsky , pp. 348-49. Trotsky also
stated, "Yes, a revolutionary must know English and with the
help of patience I will learn English." See loc . cit . , p. 278.
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At one Point Goldman asked Trotskyif he had been accused of crucifying Jesus Christ. "T havenot at this moment," was the reply. See loc. cit
. , p. 340.
120 T .. ,Ibid
. , p. 5 79.
121
Ibid
. , pp. 466, 481.
122Ibid
. , pp. 481-82.
123 Ibid
. , p. 482.
124
Ibid
. , pp. 466, 487.
125Trotsky, "The Preliminary Inquiry at Coyoacan,"
Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38
, p. 64. After the hearings
were completed Dewey stated, "The only three matters of fact
upon which there was a show of independent objective evidence
have been subject to grave doubt as Mr. Finerty has just
clearly proved." See "Truth is on the March ," p. 10.
126Max Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial (New York:
Pioneer Publishers, 1936), pp. 81-82.
127
People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.,
Report of Court Proceedings in The Case of the Trotsky i te-
Zinovievite Terrorist Centre (Moscow: People's Commissariat
of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1936), pp. 100-01. Hereafter
cited as Tro t skyi te-Zinovievi te Centre .
W 128Ibid.
, p. 87. *
129Ibid
. , pp. 94-95.
130Ibid
. , pp. 112-13.
131 Ibid.
, pp. 96, 114.
132Alexander Orlov [pseud.], The Secret History of
Stalin's Crimes (New York: Random House, 1953), p. 55. Also
see Shachtman, Behind the Moscow Trial , p. 82, and Case of
Leon Trotsky
, pp. 146, 167, 520.
TOO
Orlov, Secret History
, pp. 57-58. There was a rumor
that the NKVD deliberately introduced the slip on the Bristol
675
hotel in order to sabotage the trial. See Nathan Leites andElsa Bernaut, Ritual of Liquidation : The Case of the MoscowTrials (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 19547,
~~pT 424~T
134Quoted in Abraham Unger, "More Light on the Moscow
Trial," Soviet Russia Today
,
Vol. 5 (February, 1937), 31.
135
"The 'Hotel Bristol' in Copenhagen," Soviet Russ ia
Today_, Vol. 6 (March, 1937), 7, and "The Farce in Mexico,"
Soviet Russia Today
, Vol. 6 (May, 1937), 8.
136
"Readers' Forum," New Masses
, March 9, 1937, p. 21.
Also see Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 168. The Daily Worker also
used Martin Nielsen as an authority on the Bristol Hotel in
an article entitled, "'Bristol' Is Shown as Notorious Trotzky-
ist Copenhagen Hangout," February 11, 1937, p. 2. In an
editorial the same paper contended that it was natural to
mistake the cafe and hotel: "The cry 'Hotel Bristol' will
not save the Trotzkyist scum from the condemnation of honest
workers." See "A Shyster 'Defense' Col 1 apses ," February 12,
1937, p. 6.
137Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 135, 152-53. Also see
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, pp. 182-83, and Dewey Commission
Exhibit D68 (deposition of B. F. and Esther Field, dated
April 9, 1937), Trotsk y Archives .
138Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 154, 172. Also see
Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 184, and Dewey Commission
Exhibit D48, "In re Copenhagen Visit" (a precis of all the
material dealing with Copenhagen, n.d.), Trotsky Archives .
Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 30, 156-57, 163-64, 167,
170-71. Apparently Trotsky feared detection and spent at
least one night in a small pension, but there is some disa-
greement about the length of the stay. See loc . ci
t
. , p.
164, Deutscher, Prophet Outcast , pp. 184-85, and Dewey Com-
mission Exhibit D68, Trotsky Archives .
140 Deutscher, Prophet Outcast , pp. 186-87. The names
of the many visitors to the villa may be found on pp. 137-40
of Case of Leon Trotsky . The resolutions emanating from the
meetings are included in Dewey Commission Exhibits D48, D150-
54, Trotsky Archives .
141 Deutscher , Prophet Outcast , p. 184. Also see Dewey
Commission Exhibit D68, Trotsky Archives .
142Dewey Commission Exhibit D48, Trotsky Archives , drawn
from exhibits D146-48. The Soviet embassy in Copenhagen made
threatening noises about economic sanctions if Trotsky were
allowed to stay in Denmark.
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143,,Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, pp. 188, 190. Trotsky
wanted to visit Sweden or the United States.
144Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 520-21. Many of these
comments were drawn from Trotsky Archive s: T4128, "OtelBristol" (March 13, 1937). '
145Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 521. Also see loc . cit.,
pp. 146-47, 168-70, 171-72, for a discussion of the "splotch"
in the radiophoto of the Bristol Cafe reproduced in Soviet
Russia Today (March, 1937, p. 7). in their deposition the
Fields contended that there was something "queer" about the
brightness of several signs in the photo, and that the "big
black splotch" was really the location of the cafe, not the
candy store. "The Konditori Bristol is not next door but
actually several doors away at quite a_ distance from the hotel
and was not a_ part of i t in any way
,
and there was no door
connecting the Konditori ( candy store i t would be called here )
and the Grand Hotel i" For some unknown reason this deposition
was "rejected" by the Commission. See Dewey Commission
Exhibit D68, Trotsky Archive s. The question of the Bristol
was a nagging one for Soviet defenders. Margaret I. Lamont,
the wife of Corliss, wrote an article on the physical location
of the hotel, after a 1938 visit to Copenhagen. She felt that
it was "humanly understandable" that the cafe had been con-
fused with the hotel. See "A Visit. To The Bristol," Soviet
Russia Today
,
Vol. 7 (August-September, 1938), 16.








, pp. 140-41, 149, 161-62. Trotsky later
corrected himself, and wrote Miss La Follette that he met
his son on the 6th of December. See loc . cit . , pp. 592-93.
150Ibid
.
, pp. 158-59. Trotsky was unable t© produce
the records of his phone calls to Berlin; it was a "delicate
matter," involving the Danish government. See loc . cit . , p.
141, and 142-45 for a summary of the many depositions entered
on Trotsky's behalf. They are summarized in Dewey Commission
Exhibit D48, Trotsky Archives .
151Case of Leon Trotsky, pp. 145, 590. Dewey Commission
Exhibits D103 and D104 contain reproductions of Sedov's stamped
school books ( Trotsky Archives ).
152Case of Leon Trotsky , Appendix I, pp. 589-90, dated
May 29, 1937.
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153,,See Dewey Commission Exhibit D106, Trotsky Archives
or
PM e"er da^d Augus;t 17, 1937, which TroTsl^enTT:cn^rssLa toilette on the earlier correspondence.
154
Ibid. A search of the Paris archives had belatedlydiscovered the letters between Sedov and his mother. They are
contained in Dewey Commission Exhibits D107-118, Trotsky
Archives. Some of the letters are quoted in Not Guil ty, pp.84-85, and Orlov, Secret History
,
56-57.




. , p. 94.
157Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 91, 516, 592. Trotsky
thought it noteworthy that Holtzman gave no details in his
testimony, and was not asked about lodgings or his passport.
His story "crumbles into dust."
158
Ibid
. , pp. 94-97, 172-73. The Pfemfert-Tro tsky and
Olberg-Trotsky correspondence may be found in Dewey Commission
Exhibits D9-16, D24-27, D31, Trotsky Archives
,
along with
other material on Olberg. Also see Not Guilty
, pp. 107-08.
159Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 517. For more of Trotsky's
views of Olberg see Trotsky Archives : T3995, "Who is V.
Olberg— the most important witness in the Moscow Trial?"
(August 20, 1936).
"^^Ibid
. , pp. 138-39, 165. Also see Deutscher, Prophet
Outcast
, pp. 25-26, 59n, 187, 194, for more on the Sobolevi tzius
brothers.
161
Trotsky Archives : T4112.1, "Declaration regarding
the case of Senin and Well" (February 27, 1937). In this
statement Trotsky reviewed their visit to Turkey, the trip to
Copenhagen, and the "crafty little coup d'etat" in the German
organization "in connection with the G.P.U."
1 For more on Soble-Senin-Sobolevi tzius see Hearings
before the Sub-committee to Investigate the Administration of.
the Internal Security Act November 21, 1957, Part 87 (Wash-
ington: U.S. Senate, 1958), pp. 4875-76. His brother, Dr.
Robert Soblen (Roman Well), received a life sentence on August
7, 1961, but escaped to Israel the next year, and later com-
mitted suicide in London. See David Dallin, From Purge to
Coexistence : Essays on Stalin '
s
& Khrushchev ' s Russia
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1961), p. 72. For material
on Zborowski see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast , pp. 347-49, 366,
390-96, 405-10, 422, and Henry Kasson [nom de plume of David
Dallin], "The Zborowski Case," New Leader , November 21, 1955,
and Dallin, "Mark Zborowski, Soviet Agent," New Leader , March
19 & 26, 1956.
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163 c . ,Senin's role is open to question. Deutscher h*=;
trial But Robert Conquest, Isaac Don Levine, and VictorSerge have tended to find him responsible for at least someof Trotsky's troubles. See Prophet Outcast, pp 25^26 ?87-Conquest, The Great Terror
: ~sT^TT^_s~^Tir^e of the T_hfr^tie^'(New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), pTlTl—L~neT^rhe^Mind of an Assassin (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cud^hV,1959), pp. 24-27, 225-26; and Victor Serge, Vie et Mort deTrotsky (Paris: Amiot *Dumon t
, 1951), pp. 20T=02~
164., . „ . „ ,Not Guilty
, p. 91. One Alfred Kruse stated in adeposition that the hotel had been turned into offices, notpulled down. See Dewey Commission Exhibit D125, Trotsky
Archives
.
Kruse volunteered another deposition (Dewey Com-
mission Exhibit D76) in which he testified to the greatdifficulty in contacting Trotsky during the latter' s 1932
visit to Denmark. In this deposition Kruse claimed that in
1915-16 he had been a courier for the Bolsheviks: "By the
knowledge of the bolshewic representatives I also had com-
missions to fullfill in handing over some material for the
socialdemocratic Douma-f rac tion Tscheidze and Trotskyite-
circles," tasks that "lighting the activity" of the Bolsheviks.
The spelling is accurately rendered from the original state-
ment. Trotsky apparently had no time to discuss with Kruse
old conspiratorial activities, much to Kruse' s astonishment.
The Dewey Commission also gave him short rift.
165Not Guilty
, pp. 91-92. In two statements A. Vikelsoe
Jensen, of the Danish Students' Social Democratic organization,
gave contradictory information on the 1932 location of the
hotel and cafe/confectionary. The question was whether the
cafe was contiguous to the hotel or separated by several small
shops. Also see Dewey Commission Exhibits D124, 127, 128,





. , pp. 95-96. The evidence on this question was
"very voluminous," some 67 documents. See loc . ci
t





. , pp. 109-15. Leon Sedov also testified on his
relations with Olberg. See loc . cit . , p. 100.
170Ibid.
, pp. 120-26.
171 Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge : The Origins and
Consequences of Stalinism , trans, by Colleen Taylor, ed . by
David Joravsky and Georges Haupt (New York: Random House,
1971), p. 250.
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. , pp. 202-03.
1 74Walter Duranty, "Radek Wins Tilt of Wits at Trial-Confession Amazes Spectators," New York Times, January 25,"
1937, p. 3. William Allen White wrote that Romm was "a qood,
convinced Communist," an "amiable, kindly, rather exceptionallyintelligent, soft-voiced and even-tempered man." When Whiteknew him he was "neither the fool which his testimony would
suggest, nor a ruthless perjurer who would send men to exile
and death." In addition, Paul Ward also wrote kindly of the
ex-Washington correspondent and vouched for his pro-Moscow
sentiments. See White, "Moscow and Emporia," New Republic,
September 21
, 1938, p. 179, and Ward, "Vladimir^onmV7
Nation
,
February 6, 1937, p. 147.
1 75People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R.,
Report of Court Proceedings in the case of the Anti-Soviet
Trotskyite Centre (Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice
of the U.S.S.R., 1937), pp. 93, 136. Hereafter cited as





. , pp. 136-43.
1 no
Ibid , , pp. 141-42.
179 Ibid .
, pp. 143-44. Radek disagreed on a few points
with Romm's testimony. See loc . ci
t
. , p. 145.
180Joseph E. Davies, Mi ssion to Moscow, Pocketbook
revised edition (New York: Blakiston Company, 1941/1943, p. 41
181
'"American Writers Attempt to Save Romm; Soviet Assured
Journalist Held Was Loyal," New York Times
,
January 24, 1937,
p. 28. A group of Washington journalists also called on
Ambassador Troyanovsky to express their "*shock and dismay 1 "
at Romm 1 s arrest, and assured the Soviet official that Romm
had defended Soviet policies "'without qualification and with
every indication that he believed in them wholeheartedly. 1,1
The Ambassador replied that he had known Romm for many years
and felt keenly his arrest, but had also known he was a Trot-
skyite. See "Friends Again Act In Romm's Behalf," New York
Times
,
January 27, 1937, p. 10.
182 Davies, Mission to Moscow , pp. 43-44. The letter
was dated January 26 , 1937.
183 Ibid.
, pp. 44-45n, 78. The Soviet official was
Ambassador Oumansky. Romm may have been sent to the interior,
i
680
but he was never heard from again. See Dallin, From Purge toCoexistence
, P. 98. ——
"
—
Case of Leon Trotsky_, pp. 549, 177. The depositions
on the case were listed in loc. cit., pp. 185-86. The materialon the visa is contained in Dewey Commission Exhibits D166-
176, Trotsky Archives
. Also see Not Guilty
, pp. 214-15.
185C^ase of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 549, 30, 174. in the party
on the boat were Sarah Weber, Max Shachtman, Jean Van Hei-jenoort, and "Adolphe," a German emigre. The party sailed as
"'Max Shachtman and suite,"' See Not Guilty
, pp. 211-13, for
the testimony of Shachtman and Weber before the New York sub-
commission.
186C^ase of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 262, 182, 201, 551.
187Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, pp. 260-61. Max Shacht-
man testified that Sarah Weber had " 1 a mechanical device on
the principle of an electric pad, with chemicals and a rubber
bag,"' which she applied to Trotsky's back. See Not Guilty,
pp. 211-12.
188Case of Leon Trotsky ? pp. 174, 550.
189 Ibid
.
, p. 175. The test of the decree is in loc . cit .
,
p. 186. Trotsky arrived on the 24th of July and later commen-
ted : fff It is a long time . . . since I acknowledged the





190Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 175-76, 550-51. Trotsky's
case was somewhat weakened by the fact that the party had not
signed the hotel register. See loc . cit
. , pp. 186, 196-07.
This discrepancy was picked up by Soviet Russia Today , in an
article entitled, "The Farce In Mexico," Vol. 6 (May, 1937),
9. On another point, Trotsky commended the "accuracy" of a
Times correspondent, who reported that Trotsky had been
variously described as on his way to Corsica, Roy^t, or Vichy
after leaving the vessel. See Case of Leon Trotsky , pp. 175,
203, 550, and New York Times , February 16, 1937, p. 16 on
"Romm's Testimony at Trial." Apparently the Times was in
Trotsky's camp. After the Russian exile had given some of
his evidence to the paper ("Trotsky Gives His Proof Of Moscow
Trial Falsity," February 16, 1937, p. 1), an editorial appeared
which stated, "Where three vital pieces of evidence can be
manufactured by a secret police an entire body of evidence can
be manufactured." The burden of proof was on Stalin, not
Trotsky, contended the editorial: "Three confessed acts
have been shown to be impossible. The taint extends to the
whole trial." See "Trotsky's Defense," February 17, 1937,
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p. 20. Various depositions on the trip to St. Palais arealso listed as Dewey Commission Exhibits D186, D188-90, D192-95, Trotsky Archives . '
Van Heijenoort, Weber, and "Adolphe" headed in thedirection of Paris to throw off any would-be followersShachtman spent several days in Marseilles, arranging forthe safekeeping of the luggage, including Trotsky's "library »The boxes were stamped "M.S.," which led Trotsky to remark,
"The box can testify in our favor. (Laughter)" Shachtman
then went to Paris and the United States, without seeing
Trotsky again in France. Beals, however, was unconvinced
that any GPU agents would actually follow the Trotsky party.
For material on the ruse see Case of Leon Trotsky, pp. 176,
194-95, 197-99, 201
, 551 , 5 5 3T~^d~NoT~Gu'i 1 ty
, p. 212.
192Case o f Leon Trotsky
, p. 194. Also see Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast
, p. 262.
193Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 176.
194Ibid
. , pp. 176-79, 187, 552. Also see Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast
, p. 263 and Not Guilty
, pp. 217-26. The
depositions on the fire are listed as Dewey Commission
Exhibits D197-205, Trotsky Archives .
195Case of Leon Trotsky
,
178-79, 188-89, 191, 552.
Also see Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, pp. 263-65, on Trotsky's
ennui at the time. For various depositions on the period at
"Les Embruns" see Dewey Commission Exhibits D207-218, Trotsky
Archives
.
196For more on Trotsky's many visitors at the time see
Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 202-03, 552-53; Deutscher, Prophet
Outcast
, pp. 263-64; Not Guilty , pp. 212-13. Some twenty-four
depositions were collected from visitors, listed in Dewey
Commission Exhibit D161, Trotsky Archives . Also see Trotsky,
"Romm Frequented Dark Paris Alleys" (February 15, 1937), in
Writings of Leon Trotsky
,
1937-38




197Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 30, 180-81, 265-66, 553.
Unfortunately for his case, the French police were unwilling
to document his trips around France, apparently for political
reasons. See loc. cit . , 178-79, 190, 552, and Deutscher,
Prophet Outcast
, pp. 265-66. Also see Trotsky Archives ;
T4111.5 (February 26, 1937), "A Monsieur le President du
Conseil des Ministres de France." This letter calling for an
official French investigation of the alleged meeting with
Romm was apparently never sent.
198Case of Leon Trotsky
,
pp. 183-85. Trotsky's admis-
sion that he did not know Romm, or even read Izvestia , drew
682
some sharp comments. "Extraordinary, if true t-h»f ™~ kprofesses to be an authoritative critic of^ Sovet"Govern-ment should never read its official organ!" This editorialwent on to note that Trotsky's latest book was filled with
for ft
at thS Same Ume Romm was Siting
I (m , .
T
S
S FarCS ln Mexico '" Soviet Russia Today, Vol.
6 (May, 1927), 8. Trotsky's statem 5nT~Tha-t he haerHi^r heardOf Romra, a "stellar correspondent" for Tass and Izvestia, wassimply incredible," and went far toward "discrediting" himThis was the judgment of Mauritz A. Hallgren, Why I ResiqnedFrom the Trotsky Defense Committee (New York: "internationalPublishers, 1937?), pp. 8-9.




, pp. 536, 538.
I i
201 Ibid
. , p. 540,
202Ibid
. , p. 542.
203
I_bid
. , pp. 541-42. There had been no mention of the
"parallel centre" in the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, hence the
need for some timely help from Radek. Trotsky believed that
this 1932 schema had been constructed "retroactively" and
"very poorly."
204 Ibid
. , pp. 539-40. Romm had testified that Radek put
the letter in his pocket, after glancing at it. In the opinion
of Trotsky, "All the confessions abound in such 'concrete'
platitudes, of which the most incompetent writer of detective
stories would be ashamed."
205-,. .Ibid
. , pp. 543, 544.
Ibid








. , pp. 552-53.
Ibid
. , p. 553.
211The Dewey Commission
ally Dewey Commission Exhibits D160, "Memorandum on the
Deposition of the Witness Vladimir Romm," and D161, "Against
Romm," Trotsky Archives , for full particulars of the evidence
212





^°n ' Sara Weber
'
amon 3 others, onuly 26-27 1937. The Commission Rogatoire heard Sedov andothers m Pans, May 12-June 22, 1937T~MoTe details onthese two sub-commissions will be given in Chapter VI SeeNot Gui 1 ty , p. 7.
213
Ibid
. , p. 206.
214
Ibid





. , pp. 228-29.
217Leon Trotsky, I Stake My Life !, prepared address for
a meeting in the Hippodrome Theatre, New York City, February
9, 1937, with an Introduction by Max Shachtman (New York:
Pioneer Publishers, 1937), p. 16. Also see Trotsky Archives :




. , pp. 58-59, 79. These quotations are drawn
from the testimony of both Pyatakov and Bukhartsev.
220Ibid
. , pp. 60, 79. These quotations are drawn from









224Cited in Case of Leon Trotsky
, pp. 229-30. Also see
loc . ci
t
. , pp. 213, 563, and Not Guilty , pp. 184-87. It was
85 kilometers from Kjeller airdrome to Weksal.
Cited in Case of Leon Trotsky






, p. 170. Trotsky also stressed
that the Norwegians had not contended that winter flights were
impossible: "Why, then, is it the job of the Moscow court to
compile a meteorological handbook for aviators? The question
is much more concrete: Did a foreign plane land in Oslo during
the month of December, 1935, or not?" See Case of Leon Trotsky ,
p. 564. However, Theodore Bayer contended that it could
"hardly be accepted at its face value" that foreign planes did
not land; it was likely that the plane landed somewhere other
than the regular airdrome in order not to be 'recorded . " See
684
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R°binSOn ^ifT^ "eir visits to '
do ^80 m ?h
NSW Y°rk sub-co^^sion. See Not Guilty
,pp. 1 -81 T ere were no Russians among the visitor s. SeeDeutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 295.




231Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 222.
232These remarks of Mr. and Mrs. N. K. Dahl were quotedin Deutscher, Prophet Outcast
, p. 298, but Trotsky did notinclude the Dahls in the camping party. The nearby lake had60-70 centimeters of snow on it and the campers were forced
to travel to the cabin by sleigh. Not even "'the most modern
tank, 1 " testified Erwin Wolf (or Wolff), could have broken
through the thick woods and steep cliffs. See Case of Leon
Trotsky
, pp. 213, 215, 221-22, 230, and Not GuiTtyT Fp.~T83-
84. For more on this episode see Trotsky, "Why Did the GPU




, pp. 37-38, reprinted from the
Bulletin of the Opposition
, No. 54-5, March, 1937. This
article can be found in the Trotsky Archives in two parts:
T4063, "Why did the GPU choose the month of December?"
(January 31, 1937), and T4065.1, "Why did the GPU choose
Norway?" (January 31, 1937).
233Quoted in a letter from Andor Braun, "Readers' Forum,"
New Masses
, March 9, 1937, p. 21, from an article in the
Copenhagen papter, Daqens Nyheter .
234Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 223.
235 . vIbid .
, p. 567. Trotsky was replying to a hypothesis
in Tidens Tegn
,
a Norwegian "'yellow journal.'" This story
also received certain attention in American circles. See
"Piatakov, Spector Visits to Trotzky Confirmed in Norwegian
Press," Daily Worker
,
January 30, 1937, p. 5.
236Case of Leon Trotsky
, p. 562.
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